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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this Ph.D. dissertation is to analyze the United States model of transparency 
in the public sector. The dissertation moves from the assumption that this model does not 
coincide with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which is only a component – albeit 
prominent – of it. Government secrecy, which extends beyond the executive branch, 
constitutes a comprehensive limit to transparency. At the heart of the concept of government 
secrecy is the system of classification of national security information, which has 
implications for each of the three branches of the Federal Government, as the Author shows. 
Despite several connections with executive branch secrecy, which may be pinpointed at a 
theoretical level, the relation between transparency and secrecy features its own framework 
in the legislative and judicial branches. How this relation emerges in the executive branch, 
however, is the core of the issue, and its study requires distinguishing executive privilege 
from mandatory disclosure that federal agencies have to ensure under the FOIA. The former 
is mostly meant in the United States as the power of the President, implicitly recognized by 
the Constitution, to withhold information from Congress. The exercise of this power affects 
the carrying out of the congressional oversight function. As to the latter, the FOIA 
exemptions mold the level of agency disclosure, and the President and the Attorney General 
establish the extent of disclosure by issuing memoranda on implementation of the FOIA. The 
Author dwells on exemptions 1 and 5, as their scope embraces most of the issues addressed 
in the present dissertation. The federal legislation on agency open meetings, which provides 
for specific exemptions, complete the system of executive branch transparency. In the 
conclusions, the Author identifies some paradoxes in the United States model of 
transparency considered as a whole, which, however, turns out to be satisfactory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The purpose of my Ph.D. dissertation is to analyze the United States model of 
transparency in the public sector. Even though this dissertation also aspires to arouse interest 
within the American academic community, it is mainly targeted at a European audience, as 
it is based on the assumption that European scholars seldom engage in a close examination 
of the U.S. model of transparency. Recent debate over the adoption of freedom of 
information (FOI) legislation in Italy has provided me with the chance to conduct such an 
examination. The present work, in particular, intends to answer to two related questions. The 
first one is the following: Does studying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suffice to 
grasp the U.S. model of transparency existing at federal level? Since the answer is no, a 
second question ensues: What is there beyond FOIA provisions? The FOIA, indeed, is just 
a piece – albeit extremely important – of a bigger system concerning the relation between 
transparency and secrecy in the executive branch. Another important piece of this system is 
executive privilege, an institution that, despite being autonomous, is related to the scope of 
the FOIA, as I will show. To make the analysis more complete, I will also outline how such 
a relation emerges in the other two branches of the Federal Government, the legislative and 
judicial branches, as they contribute to forming the U.S. public sector in a broad sense. The 
heart of the issue of transparency, however, consists in pinpointing the level of disclosure 
federal departments and agencies have to ensure pursuant to the FOIA. The other federal 
sunshine laws, indeed, have a somewhat marginal role.  
 As Hood has observed, both at national and at international level, the term 
“transparency” has gradually gained “quasi-religious significance in debate over governance 
and institutional design,”1 as well as – I add – with respect to administrative activity, in a 
more specific sense. This term is of Latin origin. Arena has noted that it is a compound word, 
which puts together two Latin terms – “trans” and “apparent” – and literally means “that 
which is seen-through […].”2 The Author has argued that from its etymology, it can be 
                                                          
1 CHRISTOPHER HOOD, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in ID. – DAVID HEALD, 
Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, 3 (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 
2006). 
2 GREGORIO ARENA, Administrative Transparency and Law Reform in Italy, in ALESSANDRO 
PIZZORUSSO (ed.), Italian Studies in Law. A Review of Legal Problems, 111 note 12 (Martinus 
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inferred that the concept of transparency implies “the existence of a barrier, a body through 
which, however, one can look.”3 Therefore, whatever the context to which this concept 
applies and thus even if the context pertains to access to administrative documents and 
records – Arena continues – there are always “two possible positions” wherein a person may 
stand with respect to transparency, “one before and one beyond the barrier (though 
transparent).”4 When applied to the public sector, the term “transparency” implies the 
concept of public scrutiny5. Hood has pointed out that the very public sector is the context 
in which the concept of transparency is most commonly used. Transparency, indeed, is often 
meant as a concept that “denotes government according to fixed and published rules, on the 
basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the public […].”6 Heald has 
pointed out that “transparency” and “openness” are often used as synonyms7, though in 
reality the former carries an added value, which extends beyond the mere ability to gain 
access to information held by public administrations. In Italy, for instance, where the concept 
of openness is usually conceived of as the principle of publicity, scholars have long conceded 
that transparency is “a quid pluris” with respect to both access to administrative documents 
and publicity8. As early as the late 1980s, Marrama argued that a transparent public 
administration is an administration capable of meeting needs “of clearness, of 
comprehensibility, of non-equivocality” in organizing its structure and in carrying out its 
administrative action9.     
                                                          
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994). See also ROBERTO CHIEPPA, La trasparenza 
come regola della pubblica amministrazione, Dir. econ., 613, 615 (1994). Similarly to Arena, 
Chieppa has pointed out that transparency derives from “trans” and “parere,” and means “to make 
appear, i.e., to let see, to let know.”  
3 ARENA, Administrative Transparency and Law Reform in Italy, ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 HOOD, Transparency in Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting JOHN BLACK (ed.), 
Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 476 (1997) (reporting the definition of “transparent policy 
measures” provided by the 1997 edition of the Oxford Dictionary of Economics, according to which 
policy measures are transparent when their adoption, content, and execution are “open to public 
scrutiny.”)  
6 Id., at 5 (quoting CHRISTOPHER HOOD, Transparency, in PAUL B. CLARKE – JOE FOWERAKER 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, 701 (London, Routledge, 2001)).  
7 DAVID HEALD, Varieties of Transparency, in Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, supra 
note 1, at 25-26. 
8 FRANCESCO MANGANARO, Evoluzione del principio di trasparenza amministrativa, Astrid 
Rassegna, 22 (2009), p. 3. 
9 ROBERTO MARRAMA, La pubblica amministrazione tra trasparenza e riservatezza 
nell’organizzazione e nel procedimento amministrativo, Dir. proc. amm., 416, 419 (1989).  
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 As Metcalfe has noted, the term “transparency” gradually migrated to the United 
States from Europe especially in the early years of the twenty-first century10. As a result of 
this evolution – the Author contends – this term “now has a currency that most succinctly 
and comprehensively encompasses all that secrecy is not.”11 The terms traditionally used in 
the United States to pinpoint the concept of transparency applied to the public sector – and, 
namely, to the executive branch – are the following: “freedom of information;” “openness 
in government;” “government sunshine.”12 The phrase “access to records [held by public 
authorities],” instead, has always enjoyed widespread usage both in the United States and 
overseas. In the United States, sunlight and sunshine are the metaphors that have embodied 
a concept corresponding to that of transparency for more than a century. By characterizing 
publicity as a remedy against corruption, indeed, in the early twentieth century, Justice 
Brandeis stated that sunlight turns out to be “the best of disinfectants […].”13 As Aftergood 
has observed, the sunlight metaphor actually represents the need for broad access to records 
and information held by the executive branch even when there is no fact of corruption to 
prevent or to fight14. It is interesting to point out that despite not having a long-standing 
tradition of the usage of the term – and concept – of transparency, the U.S. legal system 
features a system of FOI legislation that overall constitutes an advanced model of 
transparency in the public sector. The present Ph.D. dissertation is aimed at analyzing this 
model.       
 The Ph.D. dissertation is divided into three chapters, and proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 1 is devoted to some concepts relevant to the work. Since the dissertation is focused 
on the U.S. legal system, the concepts Chapter 1 takes into consideration are addressed in 
light of their implications for such a legal system, within which they have a specific meaning. 
Firstly, I will analyze the concept of secrecy, especially in the acceptation of government 
                                                          
10 See DANIEL METCALFE, The nature of government secrecy, 26 Gov’t Inform. Quart. 305, 305 note 
1 (2009). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. (referring to Dep’t of Justice, FOIA Post, “OIP Gives Implementation Advice to Other 
Nations” (posted: December 12, 2002)). 
13 The entire statement of Justice Brandeis reads as follows: “Publicity is justly commended as a 
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, Harper’s Wkly. 
(December 20, 1913), reprinted in ID., Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, 92 
(Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York, 1914, then reprinted in 1932). 
14 See STEVEN AFTERGOOD, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, Yale L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 399, 399 (2009).   
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secrecy. The Federal Government – namely, the executive branch – often withholds certain 
information from public access to protect some interests that are essential to the country. 
During an address delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 
1975, Attorney General Edward Levi pinpointed such essential interests as government 
secrecy is aimed at protecting: national security; foreign affairs; law enforcement. American 
citizens are aware of the need for secrecy, and accept that their right to know be subject to 
restrictions. The Moynihan Commission Report underscored that the system of classification 
of national security information represents the core of such secrecy. A Senate subcommittee 
hearing, which took place in 1973, addressed government secrecy. During the hearing, Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy stressed that wrongdoing tends to thrive when secrecy prevails over 
transparency, as the Watergate scandal showed. However, as noted above, transparency may 
not be absolute. At that hearing, Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson pinpointed the 
underlying paradox that features government secrecy: On the one hand, such secrecy poses 
some risks, as it lends itself to abuses in its usage; on the other hand, it is necessary. The 
Constitution assigns the President of the United States both the role as Commander-in-Chief 
and authority in the domain of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the President – the Attorney 
General observed – is empowered to keep secrets when he deems that disclosure would 
jeopardize one of the fundamental interests of the country, and thus is empowered to 
establish a system of classified information pertaining to national security. Then, the 
distinction between deep and shallow secrets, elaborated by Scheppele in 1988, is analyzed. 
For purposes of the present work, such a distinction, based on the degree of predictability of 
a given secret, is of interest for its potential application to the public sector, which does not 
constitute its original scope. The national security domain is fertile ground for the creation 
of deep secrets. Kitrosser, however, has argued that the Constitution requires that secrets be 
shallow and thus susceptible to checks within the Federal Government. Seemingly, covert 
action falls within the concept of deep secrets, though in reality it should be considered just 
an example of shallow secrets, since Congress is entitled to be informed of any covert action 
the President of the United States decides to take on. Subsection B addresses the need to 
strike a balance between transparency and secrecy. Furthermore, other two values with 
respect to which a compromise is to be reached are democracy and efficiency. To identify 
the proper balance between transparency and secrecy, the risks of excessive secrecy must be 
taken into account, such as those related to poor sharing of information within the executive 
branch. Furthermore, transparency is a remedy against the so-called groupthink, i.e., the 
tendency of a group of people featured by a high level of cohesion to sharing the same view, 
13 
 
without leaving any room for oversight over possible mistakes or wrongdoing. Subsection 
C intends to highlight the universal appeal of the concept of secrecy by touching upon some 
aspects of secrecy at European Union level. This subsection, in other words, shows that not 
only individual countries but also supranational organizations, as the European Union is, 
need to rely on the keeping of secrets. In particular, various interinstitutional agreements 
govern a given EU institution’s access to sensitive information held by another EU 
institution. The fact that specific agreements are concluded reveals that access to sensitive 
information is restricted for EU entities other than the one that holds such information.  
 Part II of Chapter 1 is devoted to Congress’s oversight function over the executive 
branch, which is an integral part of the overall authority of the legislative branch. Even 
though this function may not be exercised incessantly, it turns out to be extremely important 
as it contributes substantially to reducing executive branch secrecy. Congress, however, is a 
political branch of the Federal Government, and it may occur that investigations into the 
executive branch are exploited by members of Congress for personal goals. Richard Nixon, 
for instance, gained great visibility as a champion of transparency in the Hiss-Chambers 
case, yet, more than twenty years later, Nixon himself, as President of the United States, 
tried to cover up Watergate-related conversations with advisors by invoking the existence of 
absolute executive privilege. Nixon’s incoherence over time reveals that transparency 
obtained by congressional inquiries should be assessed with due caution. The full access 
doctrine, elaborated by Divoll, is then examined. Such a doctrine advocates Congress’s 
entitlement to have broad access to executive branch information even in such sensitive 
fields as national security and foreign affairs. Access to information enables Congress not 
only to detect wrongdoing on behalf of the people, who usually may not rely on much 
disclosure in such fields, but also to make cognizant appropriation decisions. Accordingly – 
Divoll observes – Congress must also have broad access to information concerning the 
gathering of foreign intelligence and the carrying out of covert action, and thus in matters 
that everyone – at least prima facie – would characterize as replete with deep secrets.  
 Part III deals with some concepts related to secrecy. The first one is the concept of 
national security, which however does not have a single definition. The executive order on 
classification of national security information that is currently effective, Executive Order 
13526 of 2009, simply identifies national security as including the two sectors of national 
defense and foreign affairs. It has been noted that traditionally, national security was related 
inextricably to the military protection of the country from external threats, but it gradually 
became clear that the scope of national security was much broader than the military domain. 
14 
 
Between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new century, the Hart-
Rudman Commission provided an account of diverse threats that were emerging in the new 
international context. In particular, it is noteworthy its third, final report, wherein the Hart-
Rudman Commission recommended a reorganization of the executive branch to ensure a 
better management of homeland security. Terrorism and cybersecurity are two of the typical 
threats of the new context, and indeed are specifically addressed in the strategy documents 
issued – on a periodic basis – by the Federal Executive. The last paragraph of this subsection 
deals with leaks in the national security domain, and begins with an analysis of the regulation 
of leaks in the Espionage Act of 1917 as codified in the U.S. Code. The paragraph then 
touches upon the similar concept of whistleblowing, and refers to scholarly positions 
stressing that federal legislation does not protect whistleblowers in the domain of national 
security in a proper fashion. Furthermore, WikiLeaks’ unauthorized disclosure of a huge 
amount of classified information and its implications for the U.S. legal system are addressed. 
Scholars have argued that the WikiLeaks’ structure and its way of operating calls for a new 
approach towards leaks, distinct from the traditional approach followed in the 1970s to tackle 
the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. Scholars also agree that the real impact of WikiLeaks 
disclosures on the U.S. Government is unclear, at least in the short term. Section B deals 
with homeland security, a concept that, like the one of national security, does not have a 
single definition. Homeland security was originally aimed at coping with the terrorism 
threat, and indeed the Department of Homeland Security was established in the aftermath of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. The creation of this department brought about what has 
been characterized as the greatest reorganization of the executive branch since the end of the 
1940s, when the national security administrative apparatus was created. Furthermore, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 contemplated a new exemption to freedom of information, 
which was incorporated into the scope of Exemption 3 of the FOIA. This exemption allows 
agencies to withhold information from the public’s access pursuant to federal statutes other 
than the FOIA, provided that the conditions established in Exemption 3 itself are met. The 
scope of homeland security gradually extended beyond terrorism, and now includes a vast 
range of matters, such as natural disasters and other accidents that occur on U.S. soil, border 
and maritime security, and immigration. The tendency of the concepts of national security 
and homeland security to overlapping is evident, yet a distinction between them is possible. 
By referring to some observations set out at a 2012 House of Representatives subcommittee 
hearing and to Morag’s standpoint on the issue, I will argue that the scope of homeland 
security may be identified as capable of including all threats that are only concerned with 
15 
 
U.S. soil. The scope of national security, instead, extends to threats related to the 
international context, i.e., threats that do not exhaust their impact on a purely domestic 
environment. Then, basic considerations on the concept of executive privilege are provided. 
In particular, I will refer to the heterogeneous content of such a concept, and thus to the 
multiple acceptations by which it can be interpreted. 
 Chapter 2 deals with the relation between transparency and secrecy in the legislative 
and judicial branches of the Federal Government. I am aware that this chapter may seem 
prima facie to be off topic, since transparency and secrecy are usually addressed just with 
respect to the executive branch. However, I deem it proper to provide the reader with outlines 
of the relation between transparency and secrecy in the other two branches of government. 
Furthermore, I will show that some of the topics included in this chapter relate to 
transparency and secrecy in the executive branch. As far as Congress is concerned, while the 
Congressional Record represents a form of transparency peculiar to the legislative branch, 
the reasons the members of Congress may invoke to keep floor and committee proceedings 
secret suggest that the legislative and executive branches are not so different when it comes 
to claims of secrecy. The reasons that may justify secret sessions in the two Houses of 
Congress and closed-door meetings and hearings in congressional committees and 
subcommittees, indeed, recall the exemptions of the FOIA, and lead to conclude that there 
are some limits to transparency that are common to the whole Federal Government. I will 
also mention an interesting – albeit dated – theory of Bleisch, who advocates the need for 
accuracy of the Congressional Record. Among the arguments he deploys is the right of 
access to information held by public authorities, a right that – he notes – has the First 
Amendment as its constitutional basis. As to the judicial branch, after pointing out that 
transparency is a traditional feature of this branch, I will dwell on secrecy in judicial 
proceedings. The state secrets privilege represents the most typical instrument to invoke 
secrecy in civil litigation in the interest of national security. Traditionally used to prevent 
the usage of certain documents as evidence at trial, the application of the privilege was 
frequently claimed by the Bush administration to obtain dismissal of entire cases. The same 
section also deals with grand jury proceedings, which feature a high level of secrecy, and 
considers the military commissions that were established in the aftermath of 9/11 to try 
suspect terrorists. As to the latter, which represent a product of the war on terror, an 
interesting position has been set out by Aronson. He has observed that the U.S. 
Government’s policy to keep the military commissions apart from the remainder of the 
judicial system and to exclude them from public scrutiny ended up producing the opposite 
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effect to arouse the interest of Americans in such commissions, and thus in the way suspect 
terrorists were treated. Secrecy, however, is not the general rule governing judicial 
proceedings. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the First 
Amendment of the Constitution ensures the public’s right of access to court proceedings – 
namely, to criminal trials – since the early 1980s. A court may deny such access only if it 
complies with some procedural requirements established by the Supreme Court and by 
courts of appeals. Finally, paragraph D analyzes the main contents of the Classified 
Information Procedure Act, which is concerned with criminal court proceedings involving 
the use and thus the potential disclosure of classified information. The court has to lay down 
procedures for the admission of classified information as evidence and for its handling 
during the trial. It is evident that the Classified Information Procedure Act implies another 
aspect of the relation between transparency and secrecy.  
 Chapter 3 is the core of the whole work, because it deals with the heart of the relation 
between transparency and secrecy – how this relation emerges in the executive branch. Part 
I of this chapter is devoted to executive privilege, a legal institution that is peculiar to the 
U.S. legal system, at least in its ordinary meaning, which refers to the ability of the executive 
branch to withhold information from Congress. I will begin with an analysis of Berger’s 
criticism of executive privilege. I am fully aware that his position may be considered dated, 
especially because his doctrine against the privilege, elaborated in the 1970s, did not have 
much following. However, his endeavor to deprive executive privilege of any constitutional 
foundations represents extraordinary evidence of how hard he championed transparency in 
the relations between the legislative and executive branches. Furthermore, since Berger 
makes large use of historical precedents dating back to either the British experience or the 
time of the Framers, i.e., the time in which the U.S. Constitution was drafted, mentioning 
the arguments his doctrine is based upon provides the reader with a useful historical 
perspective. Such an historical perspective may be interesting especially in consideration of 
the fact that especially before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (in 1946) 
and – later – of the FOIA, the requests for information Congress made in the exercise of its 
power of inquiry into the executive branch were proved essential to increase the level of 
transparency within the executive branch itself. Prakash’s arguments against executive 
privilege, which differ from those used by Berger, are reported, as well. Most scholars, 
however, advocate the existence of executive privilege. Berger’s doctrine, indeed – albeit 
interesting – is not tenable. Some of these scholars have rebutted Berger’s various 
arguments, and their positions, too, are worth mentioning. Not only do these positions 
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provide further elements for a historical perspective on the U.S. experience; but they also 
show overall that the congressional power of inquiry into the executive branch does not have 
such sanctity as Berger tried to assign to it. The term “executive privilege” was coined in the 
1950s, even though – it has been noted – the practice whereby the executive branch 
withholds information from Congress dates back to George Washington, and thus to the 
dawn of the American Republic. It is also provided an overview of the usage of the term 
after its formal adoption by the U.S. presidents. Then, it is stressed that the legislative and 
executive branches of the Federal Government usually reach political settlement to their 
conflicts concerning access to information, i.e., conflicts arousing from requests for 
information the executive branch receives from Congress. Courts intervene to solve such 
conflicts only as a last resort, and thus only when the two political branches of government 
do not succeed in reaching an accommodation. Paragraph F is devoted to United States v. 
Nixon, a 1974 decision in which the Supreme Court addressed executive privilege for the 
first time. The Court held that executive privilege is an implicit presidential power 
recognized by the Constitution, yet it is not absolute. Accordingly, President Nixon’s claim 
of unlimited executive privilege, aimed at denying judicial access to some conversations 
related to the Watergate scandal the President had with advisors, was rejected. The 
President’s interest in confidentiality – the Supreme Court observed – prevails over the need 
for judicial access to information only if military, diplomatic, or national security secrets are 
involved. Finally, President Obama’s claim of executive privilege in the so-called 
“Operation Fast and Furious” is mentioned. 
 Part II deals with the FOIA. After a brief history of the enactment of the FOIA and 
of its codification in the U.S. Code, I will stress that the FOIA replaced section 3 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the application of which had not ensured an adequate level 
of openness. The wording of section 3, devoted to public information, was composed of too 
generic clauses, and agencies had deployed it to cover up mistakes in the carrying out of 
their activities. The FOIA, instead, is based on a philosophy of full disclosure. Paragraph C 
overviews the statutes that contain the main amendments to the FOIA Congress has passed 
over the years. Such statutes are the following: the 1974 FOIA Amendments Act; the 
Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 
1996; The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003; the OPEN Government Act 
of 2007; the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009. It is also outlined the structure of the Federal Register, 
which is the official gazette of the executive branch, and of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
which has more limited content, as it encompasses only agency final rules and regulations. 
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Then, FOIA provisions are examined. Reference to the Federal Register is germane, since 
the FOIA begins by pinpointing a series of information agencies have to publish in the 
Federal Register itself. Then, I will deal with proactive disclosures. The FOIA requires that 
agencies make available to the public certain categories of records and information 
established in the act, and today this obligation is fulfilled especially by the publication of 
such records and information on agencies’ official websites. Then, access to agency records 
and information upon request is analyzed. Section H, instead, underscores that the FOIA 
applies only to the executive branch, while the other two branches of the Federal 
Government are outside the scope of the FOIA. Then, the definition of “agency record,” 
which the version of the FOIA that became effective in 1967 did not provide for, is 
examined. Paragraph J touches upon the charging of fees by federal agencies for processing 
FOIA requests. I will seek to stress that still today most of the regulation of this matter 
derives from provisions added by the FOIA Amendments Act of 1986 and from the 
implementing guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 1987. 
Paragraph K deals with the FOIA exemptions. It begins by highlighting that the exemptions 
embody a compromise Congress identified between the people’s right to know and agencies’ 
interest in keeping certain information secret. Since the primary purpose of the FOIA is to 
ensure that records and information be disclosed as often as possible, agencies are supposed 
to give a narrow interpretation to the FOIA exemptions. Furthermore, agencies have to 
comply with the so-called “‘reasonably segregable’ obligation,” and thus separate the non-
exempt portion of a record from the portion that may be lawfully withheld from access, and 
disclose the former. Then, I will overview the content of the nine exemptions enumerated in 
the FOIA, with a final reference to the exclusions. As to the latter, it is important to underline 
above all the distinction existing between the situations in which an exclusion applies and 
those in which an agency resorts to the so-called “Glomarization.”  Paragraph M addresses 
FOIA guidelines, and thus the memoranda issued by the President and by the Attorney 
General on implementation of the FOIA. Firstly, I will provide an account of the memoranda 
adopted by President Obama both on transparency and on the FOIA, which require that 
agencies apply a presumption in favor of openness. Secondly, I will analyze the 2009 
Attorney General Holder’s memorandum on implementation of the FOIA, and compare it to 
the memoranda issued by former attorneys general Ashcroft and Reno – respectively – in 
2001 and 1993. The memorandum issued by Holder re-establishes the level of transparency 
already provided for by the Reno memorandum, while the Ashcroft memorandum brought 
about a setback in this regard. It has been observed, indeed, that such a memorandum 
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substantially turned the right to know ensured by the FOIA into a need to know, as was the 
case before the enactment of the FOIA. Paragraph L intends to dig deeper with respect to 
two FOIA exemptions – Exemption 5 and Exemption 1. As to the former, Congress 
conceded that such an exemption is aimed at ensuring the frank exchange of ideas within an 
agency and between agencies in the discussion of legal issue or in the formulation of policies, 
and thus protects the quality of agency decision-making. It is also stressed that the 
presidential communications privilege, which pertains to the presidential decision-making 
process – or, as practice shows, to a lower level of decision-making than the presidential 
one, provided that the President sanctions its invocation – is an integral part of Exemption 
5. The most typical content of this exemption, however, is the deliberative process privilege, 
which is  aimed at preserving the candor of agency communications. The fact that these 
privileges are both included in Exemption 5, even though their scope is not equivalent, 
proves that executive privilege and the FOIA are related topics. Then, Exemption 1, the 
exemption concerning national security, is examined. This exemption was significantly 
amended by the FOIA Amendments Act of 1974, which expressly provided for the ability 
for courts to conduct in camera inspection of classified material relevant in a given FOIA 
case, and consequently, to perform de novo review of the withholding of information from 
access. Courts, however, have always followed a deferential approach towards agency 
classifications decisions in consideration of the expertise of executive branch officials in the 
domains of national security and foreign affairs. Judicial deference applies to agency 
affidavits, provided that they describe accurately the classified material at issue, and set forth 
reasons for the propriety of keeping such material classified. Then, I will analyze the 
classification system of national security information. After a brief history of how this 
system developed, I will provide an account of the main contents of the executive order on 
classified information that is currently effective. In particular, three aspects forge the 
framework of this executive order: the classification levels and the list of the types of 
information that may be classified, two matters with respect to which the executive order of 
2009 did not bring in any substantial novelty; the distinction between original and derivative 
classification authority; declassification, which is implemented by the carrying out of 
various procedures laid down by the executive order itself. Finally, the relation of the 
Department of Homeland Security with classified information is examined. This department 
has to ensure coordination between all government levels, individuals, and businesses that 
are involved in the management of homeland security for the accomplishment of its 
missions. Participants in the homeland security enterprise, however, need to gain access to 
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classified information handled by the Department of Homeland Security. Specific rules, 
standards, and programs govern the access to such information by public entities and the 
private sector.     
 Part III deals with federal sunshine laws other than the FOIA – namely, the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (GITSA). As to 
the former, its purposes and main contents are outlined. Then, the FACA regulations adopted 
by the General Services Administration in 2001 are analyzed. Those regulations address the 
relation between transparency and secrecy with respect to meetings held by advisory 
committees operating at federal level. The 2001 FACA regulations, for instance, establish a 
specific proceeding for closure – in whole or in part – of a meeting, and require that the 
public be ensured timely access to advisory committee records. Advisory committees may 
deny access to such records by applying FOIA exemptions. Paragraph B, instead, is devoted 
to the GITSA, and begins with an account of the essential content of the act. Since the 
transparency requirements established by the GITSA apply only to meetings, it is crucial to 
identifying what constitutes a meeting under the act, and yet the language of the GITSA is 
rather unclear thereupon. Then, I will provide an overview of the ten exemptions enumerated 
in the GITSA by stressing that seven of these exemptions patently recall the FOIA 
exemptions, and indirect reference to another FOIA exemption may be pinpointed. 
Furthermore, a series of costs arouse from application of the GITSA. Such costs mainly 
consist in the usage of techniques whereby agencies subject to the GITSA, i.e., agencies with 
a multi-member governing body, circumvent the law, thereby avoiding implementation of 
the GITSA. The most important of these techniques is notation voting, whereby agency 
members exchange written communications and vote on agency business without holding a 
formal meeting. Federal courts have considered notation voting compatible with the GITSA. 
      
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
GOVERNMENT SECRECY AND OTHER CONCEPTS 
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I. Secrecy 
A. Government Secrecy in the United States 
1. The Need for Government Secrecy 
 Governing a community requires the keeping of secrets, and in the United States – 
as anywhere else – citizens understand that the existence of secrets is crucial to protecting 
some fundamental interests. That the exercise of sovereign power relies on withholding 
certain information from public access is a settled principle. As King Louis XIII’s Chief 
Minister Cardinal Richelieu stated in the seventeenth century, “[s]ecrecy is the first essential 
in affairs of state.”15 The report on government secrecy issued in 1997 by the Commission 
on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy16, also known as the Moynihan Secrecy 
Commission or just Moynihan Commission, after its chairman, U.S. Senator Daniel P. 
Moynihan, [hereinafter – Moynihan Commission Report]17 observes that since American 
citizens “have a great deal of common sense,” they are cognizant of the need for government 
secrecy, and therefore “accept the proposition that some things must be kept hidden [from 
public access].”18 They are capable of grasping the importance of relying on a stable 
classification system, an excessive shrinking or fluidity of which “[would] compromise vital 
information and capabilities, and make it harder for the United States to collect information 
in the future.”19 If the classification system were to start being perceived as precarious and 
vulnerable – the Moynihan Commission Report continues – the United States would lose 
                                                          
15 The quotation is found in RICHARD G. POWERS, Introduction, in DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, Secrecy: 
The American Experience, 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
16 The Commission was established by Title IX of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 382 (April 30, 1994). Title IX constitutes an 
autonomous portion of the entire statute, and is called “Protection and Reduction of Government 
Secrecy Act”. Section 902 noted, in the findings of the act, that during the Cold War, a vast system 
of classification of sensitive material gradually developed, resulting in “limit[ing] public access to 
information and reduc[ing] the ability of the public to participate with full knowledge in the process 
of governmental decisionmaking.” Title IX established, for a two-year period, a bipartisan 
commission aimed at studying government secrecy in the form of classified material. In particular, 
Section 903(1) provided that the purpose of the Commission was “to examine the implications of the 
extensive classification of information and to make recommendations to reduce the volume of 
information classified and thereby to strengthen the protection of legitimate classified information.” 
The Commission was also entrusted with the purpose “to examine and make recommendations 
concerning current procedures relating to the granting of security clearances.” Section 903(2).      
17 Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (S.Doc. 105-
2) (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off., 1997) [Moynihan Commission Report]. 
18 Moynihan Commission Report, at xlix. 
19 Ibid.  
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credibility domestically but above all abroad. Informants and foreign countries, indeed, 
“would be much more reluctant to confide in U.S. intelligence or government officials for 
fear of being compromised in a rush to declassify.”20 
 On April 28, 1975, Attorney General Edward Levi21 delivered an address on 
government secrecy22 before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which – 
as Chesney has argued – “captured the essence of the secrecy dilemma.”23 Levi points out 
that in recent years, a position that advocates absolute transparency and – accordingly – 
stigmatizes government secrecy has sprung up, mostly as a reaction to President Nixon’s 
claim of an unlimited scope of executive privilege to prevent a special prosecutor from 
gaining access to recordings and transcripts of conversations between the President and his 
advisors related to the Watergate scandal24. Moving from the idea that government secrecy 
is always aimed at covering up mistakes or wrongdoing, the Attorney General observes, such 
a position ends up characterizing any form of secrecy pertaining to the U.S. Government – 
namely, the executive branch – as an unjustifiable “abridgment of the people’s right to know 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 See ROBERT M. CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1263-64 (2007) (noting that President Ford appointed Levi as Attorney General 
in early 1975, and thus at a time in which “the public’s faith in government had plummeted as a result 
of, among other things, the Watergate scandal and revelations in the media and Congress concerning 
abusive surveillance practices carried out within the United States in the name of national security.” 
In this regard, the Author mentions the final report issued by the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Sen. Church, and indeed 
also known as the Church Committee, which between 1975 and 1976 conducted an investigation into 
a series of abuses conducted by intelligence agencies, ranging from warrantless surveillance of 
American citizens to covert action. Id., 1264 note 93 (referring to SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, S. Rep. No. 94-755 
(1976)).   
22 Address by the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States, Before the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 42 West 44th Street, New York, New York (April 
28, 1975) [Attorney General Levi’s Address], available at 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/levi/1975/04-28-1975.pdf. 
23 CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at 1264. 
24 Attorney General Levi’s Address, at 2. The Watergate scandal and its judicial, indeed, constitute a 
necessary premise of Levi’s address. The notorious Watergate scandal, an affair concerned with 
political espionage against the Democratic Party, eventually drove from office President Nixon, who 
resigned on August 9, 1974. For bibliographic references thereof, see FAYE JONES, Twenty-Five 
Years After Watergate: A Selective Bibliography, 51 Hastings L.J. 793 (2000). 
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[…].”25 According to Levi, such a position may not be espoused, as it fails to consider – and 
thus underestimates – the need for government secrecy, which turns out to be “common to 
all governments, [and, above all,] essential to ours since its formation.”26 Some degree of 
secrecy, however, ensures effectiveness in the carrying out of essential functions by the 
executive branch27. In particular, the functions the address pinpoints as functions requiring 
the withholding of certain information from public access are the ones that closely embody 
the state sovereignty – law enforcement28, national security29, and foreign affairs30. As to the 
latter domain, Levi mentions a 1948 decision, C & S Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship 
Corp.31, wherein the Supreme Court held that reports prepared by intelligence agencies 
should be made available just to the U.S. President in consideration of its leading role in the 
field of foreign affairs32. Furthermore, the Attorney General argues that total disclosure of 
records and information held by the executive branch in the fields of law enforcement, 
national security, and foreign policy would bring about the paradoxical effect of endangering 
or even thwarting “the government’s right to know,”33 for the executive branch could not 
gain and keep certain types of information that require secrecy. As a result – Levi continues 
– the executive branch could not ensure the carrying out of “what has been said to be the 
basic function of any government, the protection of the security of the individual and his 
property.”34 Reference to the gathering of intelligence information and – more generally – 
to the system of classification of information pertaining to the national security and foreign 
relations of the United States is clear.   
 
2. Government Secrecy as Addressed at a 1973 Senate Subcommittee Hearing 
 Before Attorney General Levi’s address, in 1973, the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of Powers of the Committee on the 
                                                          
25 Attorney General Levi’s Address, at 1-2. 
26 Id., at 2. 
27 Id., at 4. 
28 Id., at 16-17. 
29 Id., at 17-19. 
30 Id., at 19-20. 
31 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
32 Id., at 111 (“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign 
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published to the 
world.”) 
33 Attorney General Levi’s Address, at 21. 
34 Ibid. 
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Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on 
Government Operations of the U.S. Senate held a series of hearings that dealt with – inter 
alia – government secrecy35. At the June 26, 1973 hearing, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of 
Powers, made the following statement: 
 “If yesterday’s testimony at the caucus room teaches us anything, it demonstrates 
beyond debate that Government secrecy breeds Government deceit, that executive privilege 
nurtures executive arrogance, that national security is frequently the cover for political 
embarrassment, and that the best antidote to official malfeasance, misfeasance, and 
nonfeasance is the sunshine and fresh air of full public disclosure of official activities.”36   
 Sen. Kennedy was referring to the June 25 hearing, included in the then-ongoing 
Watergate hearings. Those hearings were revealing – the Senator noted – “clandestine 
activities of Federal officials,”37 which President Nixon tried to cover up by raising a claim 
of absolute executive privilege. Sen. Kennedy’s statement identifies two key aspects of 
government secrecy: executive privilege, meant as the ability of the Chief Executive and 
high officials to invoke the need to keep certain executive branch information secret; and 
national security, the protection of which is frequently appealed to as a justification for 
secrecy. But above all, Sen. Kennedy argues that secrecy within government – namely, 
within the executive branch – tends to foster the commission of wrongdoing, and that 
transparency is the best means to fight such a tendency. By noting that wrongdoing 
potentially thrives in secrecy, the Senator sets out an entrenched principle, so he does not 
contend anything new. It has been self-evident for centuries, indeed, that secrecy may be 
deployed to cover up any type of misbehavior38. However, not all secrets imply bad faith, as 
is often the case that secrecy serves to protect essential interests. By arguing that “while not 
all secrets are discreditable, all that is discreditable and all wrongdoing seek out secrecy,” 
                                                          
35 Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government – Hearings before the 
Subcommittees on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of Powers of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee 
on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off., 
1973). 
36 Id., at 209.   
37 Id., at 1 (hearing of June 7, 1973) (opening statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
38 See EZRA C. SEAMAN, The American System of Government, 73 (New York, 1870) (arguing that 
secrecy “favors intrigue and fraud, corruption and crime.”) 
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Bok has suggested that secrecy turns out to be a neutral concept39. To put it differently, the 
fact that crimes and misbehavior in general are always associated with a penchant for secrecy 
does not entail per se the formulation of a value judgment – in this case, a negative one – 
upon the concept of secrecy. 
 At the same hearing of June 26, Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson, too, 
addressed government secrecy. He defines secrecy as “a paradox,” for it turns out to be at 
the same time “a threat as well as a necessary incident to democratic government.”40 
Absolute secrecy would be against the law, but certain information must be kept confidential. 
The Attorney General recalls that according to a commonly accepted principle, “the public 
interest is, at times, better served by nondisclosure.”41 The President’s role, established by 
the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief and his authority in the domain of foreign affairs 
– the Attorney General observes – “impl[y] a power to keep secrets in situations where the 
national interest would be impaired by the disclosure [of information].”42  
 As the Supreme Court contended in Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan43, the authority of the 
President to classify information bearing on national security and determine who is allowed 
to gain access to such information derives “primarily” from the President’s role as 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”44 and does not require 
“any explicit congressional grant” to exist45. A 1996 memorandum prepared by the Office 
of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice argued that since the President is not 
only Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and head of the executive branch, but also 
the nation’s sole organ competent to represent the United States in external relations, the 
President himself has “ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention and 
dissemination of intelligence and other national security information in the Executive 
Branch.”46 Accordingly, even when Congress makes requests for intelligence information, 
the determination whether to disclose the sought information to members of Congress is 
                                                          
39 SISSELA BOK, Secrecy: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, 26 (New York, 1982). 
40 Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government – Hearings, supra note 35, 
at 215 (statement of Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson). 
41 Id., at 232. 
42 Id., at 245. 
43 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
44 Art. II, § 2, U.S. Const. 
45 Egan, 484 U.S., at 527 (referring to Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961)). 
46 Memorandum from Christopher H. Schroeder, Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael J. O’Neil, 
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (November  26, 1996), p. 4. 
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entrusted to “someone who is acting in an official capacity on behalf of the President and 
who is ultimately responsible, perhaps through intermediaries, to the President.”47 In this 
memorandum, therefore, the OLC underlines that the President has always to authorize – 
whether directly or indirectly – the flow of intelligence and other classified information to 
Congress48. Agency employees not immediately related to the President – the memorandum 
notes – may disclose to members of Congress information pertaining to national security 
only if they are properly authorized to do so by executive branch personnel “who [in turn] 
derive their authority from the President.”49 Even though this memorandum adopts too a 
restrictive interpretation of Congress’s role in matters involving classified information, it 
rests on an assertion that enjoys consensus among scholars and judges: The system of 
classification has constitutional underpinnings in the U.S. President’s role as Commander-
in-Chief and in his authority in the field of foreign affairs.    
 
3. The Deep and Shallow Secrets Doctrine and Its Application to the Public Sector  
 In a 1988 book50, Scheppele sifted the concept of secrecy by proposing a distinction 
between deep and shallow secrets, which is clearly rooted in the Author’s background in the 
field of sociology51. According to such a theory – devised for a common law system, as the 
title of the book clarifies – a given secret falls within the category of deep secrets or rather 
in that of shallow secrets depending on whether and to what extent its existence is 
predictable. A secret is shallow whenever the target, i.e., the concerned party, knows or at 
least suspects that certain information is being concealed from her52. As Scheppele explains, 
a shallow secret implies that the target “has at least some shadowy sense” of the existence 
of the secret53. On the contrary, a secret is deep whenever under no circumstances can the 
                                                          
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 KIM L. SCHEPPELE, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988).  
51 There is no better evidence of such an assertion than mentioning the title of Chapter I of 
Scheppele’s book itself: “The Sociology of secrecy.” 
52 See SCHEPPELE, Legal Secrets, supra note 50, at 21 (“When the target suspects that there might be 
a secret, we find shallow secrets.”) (italics in original). By looking through Scheppele’s distinction, 
Strudler has contended that “there must be some tangible basis for suspecting the existence of the 
information comprising [a] shallow secret.” ALAN STRUDLER, Moral Complexity in the Law of 
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337, 367 note 102 (1997).    
53 SCHEPPELE, Legal Secrets, id., at 76. 
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target gain awareness that there is a secret, and thus that certain information or documents 
are excluded from disclosure. Scheppele characterizes the target with respect to deep secrets 
as someone who is “completely in the dark, never imagining that relevant information might 
be had.”54 It is not a matter of skillfulness in either detecting hidden information or in sensing 
that something is not revealed, as no clue is directed at the existence of a secret55. For the 
very reason that in deep secrets, the target is objectively unable even to raise a doubt that 
someone might have failed to divulge some material or at least to suggest that such material 
exists, the target is not stimulated to take on a search for information56.   
 Sheppele’s doctrine is better suited for the private sector than for the public one57, as 
Scheppele herself concedes58, and yet some scholars have tried to apply the doctrine to the 
latter. It is possible to assume the existence of a correspondence between the amount of 
secrecy the government and the administration of a certain country deploys and the number 
of deep secrets that are likely to be found in that country. To put it differently, what 
Moynihan, with reference to the system of classified information the United States gradually 
developed during the Cold War, called a “culture of secrecy”59 is fertile soil for deep secrets. 
Furthermore, Pozen has underlined another highly probable correspondence by observing 
that “[i]llegal programs will tend to be deeper secrets than legal ones […].”60 A policy or 
                                                          
54 Id., at 21. 
55 Id., at 75-76 (“One can be clever and still not learn about deep secrets because one does not even 
know that there might be information out there that matters.”) 
56 Id., at 76 (observing that it is rationally impossible to decide “to search for information that, from 
the searcher’s perspective, does not exist.”) 
57 See GARY MARX, The Law’s Secrets, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1614, 1621 (1990) (suggesting applying 
Scheppele’s doctrine – with due adjustments – to the public sector, namely to “sealed records,” by 
which he means classified information, and electronic surveillance). 
58 After noting that common law – the humus wherein her doctrine has thrived – is “overwhelmingly 
private law,” Scheppele expressly excludes the state – hence, public and administrative law – from 
the subject matter of her analysis. Id., at 323. Then, she adds a consideration that seems quite 
mysterious to me. She concedes, as is obvious, that states – very likely meant as governments – 
frequently resort to secrecy, but argues that for example, “the justification of national security is 
simply not a credible claim for other actors.” Ibid. It is undeniable that the information asymmetry 
characterizing the public sector does not exist in the private sphere. In the relation between a public 
authority and a citizen, there is an inherent gap of knowledge, especially in fields involving sensitive 
information. In private contracts and private law in general, instead, the parties to a relation should 
be ensured “equal access” to information that is kept secret. The parties – Scheppele contends – 
“[must] have equal probabilities of finding the information if they put in the same level of effort.” 
Id., at 109. 
59 MOYNIHAN, Secrecy, supra note 15, at 154. 
60 DAVID E. POZEN, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 274 (2010). 
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activity a certain government decides to conceal in an attempt to escape public scrutiny as 
much as possible, indeed, suggests that the government is aware that such a policy or activity 
is – or may be – incompatible with the legal system. Such a pathological usage of deep 
secrets somehow recalls what Scheppele has envisioned thinking of a relation between equal 
parties: One party will probably exploit the existence of a deep secret the other party knows 
nothing about61.  
 Kitrosser has advanced a distinction aimed at adapting the categories of deep and 
shallow secrets to the public sector – the distinction between macro and micro secrecy62. The 
latter essentially refers to the execution of the laws by the President and the whole executive 
branch63. In her view, such a category recalls that of shallow secrets. Indeed, since the 
execution of statutes is a function the Constitution expressly vests in the executive branch, 
Congress is aware that in performing this function, the executive branch may deploy secrecy, 
and thus Congress itself has the ability to pinpoint such secrecy and expose it. Macro secrecy, 
instead, may not be prevented, since neither the other two branches of government nor 
private citizens know anything about the usage of such secrecy by the Executive64. The same 
Author has also argued that Scheppele’s distinction between shallow and deep secrets 
implies something more than this single alternative. Each of the two categories may actually 
be divided into two subcategories: “very shallow [and] minimally shallow,” on the one hand; 
“minimally deep [and] very deep,” on the other hand65. Furthermore, Kitrosser has excluded 
the compatibility of deep secrecy with the Constitution. The executive branch – she 
maintains – is allowed by the Constitution to deploy only “shallow and politically checkable” 
                                                          
61 SCHEPPELE, Legal Secrets, supra note 50, at 77 (arguing that “[f]orbidding deep secrets prevents 
one party from taking advantage of another who cannot defend herself.”) 
62 See HEIDI KITROSSER, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential 
Supremacy, 5 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 62, 64 note 9 (2010) (maintaining that the concepts 
of “macro” and “micro” secrets “parallel in important respects” those of “deep” and “shallow” 
secrets). 
63 Id., at 64 (stressing that the statutes enacted by Congress are a typical example of “macro-
transparency,” yet they may authorize the President and federal agencies to execute them in secret, 
in which case the execution of the laws falls within the concept of “micro-secrecy”).   
64 Ibid. (arguing that macro secrets “are those about which outsiders – in this case Congress, the 
courts, and the public – are unaware and thus cannot even try to check.”) 
65 HEIDI KITROSSER, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 
489, 514 (2007). 
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secrets66, and thus secrets the other branches of the Federal Government are capable of 
detecting. 
 Whether or not the underlying objective of a deep secret is to cover up misconduct, 
a government tends to appeal to this type of secrets mainly in domains wherein a certain 
amount of secrecy is inevitable, such as national security67. As Pozen has argued, not only 
may it happen that disclosure of a given program undermines the achievement of the 
purposes of this program68, but – more generally – policies in the national security domain 
tend to “involve matters of life and death, as well as some of the most morally and legally 
controversial activities taken by government, and therefore raise the stakes of secrecy 
[…].”69 The Federal Executive may take advantage of the need for secrecy in the national 
security domain to keep certain policies secret, and thus to shield them not only from access 
by the general public but also from congressional oversight70. Deep secrets are better suited 
for the achievement of such objectives than shallow secrets. As Pozen himself has observed, 
“national security policymaking is a natural field in which to expect officials to gravitate 
toward depth [of secrecy].”71  
 Seemingly, covert action, whose scope involves both the field of national security 
and that of foreign affairs, represents a typical example of deep secrecy, but its regulation in 
the U.S. Code does not support such a prima facie assertion. Cover action is not illegitimate 
per se, even though U.S. presidents are supposed to resort to it only if they deem covert 
action to be the only way to achieve certain objectives. Section 3093(a) of title 50, U.S. 
Code, indeed, is formulated in the negative form to stress that the general rule forbids covert 
action, the usage of which therefore is meant by statutory law as an exception to the rule. As 
noted, a covert action is legitimate only if the President considers such an action “necessary 
                                                          
66 Ibid.  
67 POZEN, Deep Secrecy, supra note 60, at 275 (pointing out that “deep secrecy may be most likely 
to occur, and to raise the most vexing problems, in the area of national security.”) 
68 Ibid. (“Publicizing information about [national security] policies […] poses a special risk of 
vitiating the underlying objective.”) 
69 Ibid.  
70 See KITROSSER, Supremely Opaque?, supra note 62, at 64 (observing that if agencies operating in 
the national security domain were not obliged to share sensitive information with congressional 
intelligence committees – and thus, from the opposite perspective, if these committees could not 
make requests for intelligence information -- there would be little to stop the executive branch from 
secretly circumventing statutory requirements, and thus from transforming micro-secret programs 
into macro-secrets.”) 
71 POZEN, Deep Secrecy, supra note 60, at 275.  
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to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to […] 
national security […].” Therefore, the President of the United States is granted discretion as 
to the an and the quando (the “if” and the “when”) of covert action, while the quid – i.e., the 
content, and thus the details of operations – will be probably for the head of the agency or 
of another entity involved to determine. As Radsan has maintained, “the question is not 
whether [the United States] should engage in covert action, but how often and under what 
circumstances.”72 For each covert action he authorizes, the President issues a finding, which 
has to meet the conditions laid down in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a). In brief, 
each finding has to be in writing and precede the carrying out of operations, unless there is 
an impellent need to act immediately. In such a case, a written record must be formed 
simultaneously with the adoption of the decision by the President, who has also to prepare a 
written finding thereof as soon as possible, “but in no event more than 48 hours after the 
decision is made.”73 Furthermore, the President is required to specify in each finding “each 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or 
otherwise participate in any significant way in [a given covert] action.”74  
 Congress has the right to be informed of any covert action set by the Chief Executive. 
Under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, 
agencies, and other entities of the Federal Executive involved in a given covert action have 
to ensure that by providing Congress with information on such an action, they not cause the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information concerning “exceptionally sensitive 
matters […].” They have to keep the congressional committees on intelligence “fully and 
currently informed of all covert actions [the United States takes on], including significant 
failures.”75 Paragraph 2 clarifies that the right of access these committees enjoy is absolute, 
so departments and agencies are required to comply entirely with requests for information 
instrumental in the exercise of Congress’ oversight function. Subsection (c)(1) provides that 
the President has to present written reports containing the finding issued for any covert action 
to the congressional intelligence committees before covert action gets started. Paragraph (2), 
however, addresses the case in which the President determines that access to information on 
a certain covert action at that very moment by all members of intelligence committees would 
be detrimental to “vital interests of the United States […].” In such a case, access to the 
                                                          
72 JOHN RADSAN, An Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 St. Louis U. L. J. 485, 487 (2009). 
73 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(1). 
74 Section 3093(a)(3). 
75 Section 3093(b)(1). 
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President’s report is restricted – substantially – to the chairpersons of congressional 
intelligence committees, and to majority and minority leaders of the two Houses of Congress. 
Paragraph (5)(A) requires that the President set forth the reasons for his decision to limit 
access to the finding concerning a certain covert action by issuing a written statement. The 
President has also to ensure that by 180 days from issuance of such a statement, each member 
of the congressional intelligence committees have access to it76. All these provisions granting 
Congress broad access to information on covert action lead to conclude that covert actions 
do not constitute deep secrets, at least according to statutory law.          
 A deep secret, however, is not bound to remain as such in perpetuity. The regulation 
of classification systems, indeed, usually subjects the classification of information to 
expiration by providing for mechanisms for automatic declassification, which are found, for 
instance, in the U.S. legal system77. Furthermore, deep secrets may be brought to light by 
investigations conducted by the legislative branch, which often determine the added, positive 
effect of exposing wrongdoing perpetrated by the Executive and its apparatus. As Kitrosser 
has noted, by exercising its power to inquire into the executive branch, for example, 
Congress succeeded in taking off the veil of secrecy that surrounded the Watergate tapes78. 
The investigation carried out by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities – she argues – resulted in turning the deep secret concerning the existence of such 
tapes into a shallow secret, and the next step to take was to examine their content79. The 
exposure of misconduct may also ensue from whistleblowing and leaks. Leaks and 
revelations coming from whistleblowers have been somewhat frequent in the American 
experience in the past few decades, even though it is impossible to envision their usage 
because such instruments of transparency require that an agency employee or someone 
related anyway to the executive branch take the initiative. By moving from the fact that leaks 
and whistleblowing occur on a regular basis, Samaha has argued that “the United States has 
                                                          
76 Section 3093(c)(5)(B)(i). 
77 Section 1.5, E.O. 13526. See infra. 
78 See KITROSSER, Secrecy and Separated Powers, supra note 65, at 529 (arguing that “[i]t was only 
through its capacity to question former presidential aide Alexander Butterfield that the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities discovered the [Watergate] tapes’ existence in the 
first place.”) 
79 Ibid. (“Once the tapes became a shallow rather than a deep secret, further legal and political 
maneuvering could take place in an effort to discover their content.”) 
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an active though informal system of information access that makes unauthorized disclosure 
possible and even routine.”80       
 
 
B. Reaching a Compromise Between Transparency and Secrecy 
1. The Need to Strike a Balance Between Transparency and Secrecy and Between 
Democracy and Efficiency  
 Government secrecy is inevitable not only in the United States but anywhere in the 
world, as transparency is not the only interest at stake when governments and the related 
administrative apparatus perform their functions. National security represents the archetype 
of those domains wherein a compromise between transparency and secrecy is necessary81. 
Reaching such a compromise in the domain of national security has been a primary concern 
since the early days of the American Republic82. If a balance between secrecy and 
transparency is often hard to strike with respect to national security and other matters that 
may require to seal information by applying secrets, the conundrum is actually more 
complicated. This balance, indeed, underlies another one, which concerns two essential 
values – democracy and efficiency of the executive branch as a whole in conducting its own 
business. As Samaha argues, granting the public access to information formed or held by 
agencies of the executive branch or by other entities acting on behalf of or under the 
supervision of the Executive is necessary for a democratic regime. Yet, the statutes 
regulating access to such information must ensure that the level of transparency not 
jeopardize executive efficiency83. Furthermore, reaching a sound compromise between the 
                                                          
80 ADAM M. SAMAHA, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 919 (2006). 
81 See Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1556, 1558 (2008) (maintaining that “[e]ven 
strongly committed transparency advocates recognize that sometimes the government must be able 
to operate in secret,” and pinpointing the national security field as a typical example in this regard). 
By doing so – the Note continues – they “implicitly conced[e] that other interests can outweigh the 
need for transparency.” Ibid. 
82 See Examining Department of Justice’s Investigation of Journalists Who Publish Classified 
Information: Lessons from the Jack Anderson Case – Hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 6, 2006) (prepared statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(arguing that “strik[ing] the proper balance between secrecy and openness in matters that touch on 
national security […] is an issue of paramount concern that has vexed our nation since its founding 
and continues to challenge us since the world changed on September 11, 2001.”) 
83 See SAMAHA, Government Secrets, supra note 80, at 913. 
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people’s right to know and the need to foster the functioning of the executive is even harder 
when a government must cope with an emergency, thus in a critical situation, such as the 
one the United States found itself in after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Pallitto and 
Weaver argue that the legislation the U.S. Congress passed as a response to such attacks – 
namely, the USA PATRIOT Act of 200184 and the Homeland Security Act of 200285 – shows 
a close “nexus between secrecy and efficiency […].”86 The Authors pinpoint such a nexus 
not only as “a recurring theme in the Bush administration’s anti-terror policy since 9/11,” 
but  -- in more general terms – as a key to understanding the whole war on terror the 
Administration engaged in87. In emergencies, the compromise between secrecy and 
transparency tends to lean towards the former, as that between democracy and efficiency 
does towards the latter. As a result, relying on approval by most citizens, the Bush 
administration – the Authors continue – deploys a good deal of government secrecy “in 
exchange for the efficient operation of anti-terror programs.”88 Pallitto and Weaver, indeed, 
have provided various examples demonstrating that in the balance to strike between 
democracy, as a value that implies to opt for transparency, and efficiency, as a value that – 
on the contrary – is in a symbiotic relation with secrecy – the two statutes mentioned above 
chose the latter89.    
                                                          
84 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001), Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(October 26, 2001). 
85 Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (November 25, 2002). 
86 ROBERT M. PALLITTO – WILLIAM G. WEAVER, Presidential Secrecy and the Law, 124 (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Id., at 125.  
89 Id., at 126-128 (underscoring that as to electronic surveillance, title II of the USA PATRIOT Act 
amended the FISA and federal criminal law to “blu[r] the line between intelligence and law 
enforcement,” and facilitate the sharing of information between agencies working in these two fields, 
while at the same time it was made very hard for targets to get aware that they were put under 
surveillance). Similarly, the USA PATRIOT Act also reduced the guarantee traditionally granted to 
those who may be subject to criminal prosecution by grand jury secrecy. The Authors observe that 
“[a]s a result of the lifting of grand jury confidentiality, the balance between government efficacy 
and individual privacy shifts decisively in favor of the government.” Id., at 128. On the one hand, 
government attorneys were allowed to share information obtained in the course of grand jury 
proceedings with federal agencies “for any reason that is even tangentially connected to national 
security.” Id., at 129. On the other hand, people involved in such proceedings were not notified of 
the disclosure of material to agencies. Ibid. As far as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is 
concerned, instead, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security was devised to have a 
pivotal role in dealing with homeland security and to handle “access to an unprecedented amount of 
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2. Risks of Excessive Secrecy 
 Roberts observes that national security and government secrecy appear to be 
“inseparable” concepts90, as it is impossible to apply absolute transparency in the field of 
national security. The military, for instance, relies upon secrecy to safeguard the strategic 
information it possesses91, and so do the agencies belonging to the intelligence community92. 
At times, unauthorized disclosure of extremely sensitive information is deemed to constitute 
such a serious threat that this information is subject to special access programs93, the purpose 
of which is to ensure more strongly than the ordinary classification system does that the 
concerned information be not disclosed. The regulation of special access programs is 
currently found in Executive Order 13526, which governs the classification of national 
security information94. Section 4.3(a) pinpoints the persons within the Federal Executive that 
have the power to establish a special access program, unless the President of the United 
States determines otherwise. Such persons are the following: the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Director of National 
Intelligence; or the principal deputy of each of the authorities and entities just mentioned. 
However, only the Director of National Intelligence may create special access programs 
whose scope concerns exclusively intelligence activities, and thus does not extends to the 
                                                          
information [within the Federal Executive].” Id., at 139. Not only can the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland security – the Authors note – gain “almost unlimited access to information;” the 
Secretary “can also unilaterally dent access to others without possibility of review.” Id., at 140.          
90 ALASDAIR ROBERTS, National Security and Open Government, 9 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 69, 69 
(2004). 
91 Ibid. (“To protect the country, we must keep secrets about the capabilities of weapons and the 
location of troops.”) 
92 On December 4, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, which 
– inter alia – pinpointed the Director of National Intelligence as the head of the Intelligence 
Community, a role previously exercised by the CIA. The Intelligence Community is an association 
of agencies – currently, sixteen – whose mission includes carrying out intelligence activities 
“necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the 
United States […].” Section 1.4., E.O. 12333.  
93 See Moynihan Commission Report, at 26 (mentioning the Congressional Emergency Relocation 
Site, the information on the existence of which was declassified in 1994, as an example of a long-
lasting special access program). The structure, located in West Virginia, was built during the Cold 
War to house the entire Congress and a part of its staff employees in case serious national security 
emergencies occurred. Ibid.   
94 Executive Order 13526 (“Classified National Security Information”), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (December 
29, 2009). 
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military domain. From this provision, it may be inferred that the Director of National 
Intelligence is the person – except for, obviously, the supreme role of the President of the 
United States – who is empowered to determine when intelligence information needs such a 
protection that it must fall within a special access program. This authority is consistent with 
the role of the Director of National Intelligence as the head of the Intelligence Community95. 
It is also prescribed that the number of special access programs be kept “at an absolute 
minimum […].” Subsection (a) specifies that a statute may require a special access program 
or such a program may be established by the persons mentioned above, provided that two 
conditions are jointly met. The executive branch official or member of the Cabinet 
establishing a special access program, indeed, has to determine in a finding that there exists 
an exceptional threat to certain information96, and the ordinary rules and procedures 
governing access to information having the same classification level as that to subject to the 
special access program “are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from 
unauthorized disclosure.”97 Furthermore, consistent with the exceptional nature of such 
programs is the prescription that access to them be restricted to a “reasonably small and 
commensurate” number of persons98, which is for each individual program to identify. 
Section 4.3(b)(3), however, specifies that other than an oversight program over each special 
access program, established pursuant to section 5.4(d) of the Executive Order, the Director 
of the Information Security Oversight Office enjoys unlimited access to all special access 
programs. In the event of the extremely sensitive nature of a given program, an agency head 
may direct that the right of access to the program be granted only to the Director of the 
Information Security Oversight Office, and thus not extend to any other employee or official. 
Therefore, except for the supreme role the Constitution assigns to the President of the United 
States, if on the one hand the Director of National Intelligence is the highest (or second-
highest) authority as to the establishment of special access programs, the Director of the 
Information Security Oversight Office is the highest (or second-highest) authority as to 
access to these programs.              
 However, history shows that excessive secrecy within the executive branch may 
prove detrimental to effectiveness in the conduct of administrative business. As far as the 
military domain is concerned, Bok has provided an example concerning the failure of the 
                                                          
95 See supra note 92. 
96 Section 4.3(a)(1) E.O. 13256. 
97 Section 4.3(a)(2). 
98 Section 4.3(b)(1). 
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United States’ helicopter incursion into Iran in April 1980, a military operation aimed at 
rescuing some American citizens, who had been illegally imprisoned in Teheran99. The 
Author emphasizes that the operation turned out to be a fiasco in part due to a large amount 
of secrecy, which characterized both the planning of the mission and its performance. To put 
it differently, the excessive zeal of the officers in charge of the operation in restricting 
disclosure information on the operation even to those directly involved in it contributed 
significantly to the failure of the mission. The members of the squad, indeed, were 
individually acquainted with just pieces of information strictly necessary for them to fulfill 
the respective tasks100. The Author continues by noting that in the course of the operation, 
“crew members were under such heavy secrecy restrictions that they could not coordinate 
their activities.”101 An official report prepared by a group charged with analyzing the 
dynamics of the operation found that the decision to force the helicopters to keep complete 
radio silence proved crucial to the failure of the operation102. 
 Furthermore, secrecy in the national security domain should not go so far as to 
hamper cooperation and flow of information between agencies of the executive branch. The 
poor sharing of information and data between federal agencies engaged in intelligence or 
law enforcement activities, indeed, potentially jeopardizes the country’s protection. In this 
regard, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil represent a fitting example of 
what implications a scarce flow of information within the executive branch may entail. On 
                                                          
99 See BOK, Secrecy: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, supra note 39, at 195.   
100 Ibid. (arguing that “information was only parceled out to each member according to what he was 
thought to need to play his particular role.”) 
101 Ibid. 
102 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE – JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Rescue Mission Report, 48 (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1980) (pointing out that as the helicopters lost sight of one another and thus 
could not rely upon light signals anymore, “each separate element lacked vital information.”) 
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the one hand, the 9/11 Commission103 concedes in its final report104 that in such a case, 
putting together bits of information collected by different agencies to build a comprehensive 
picture was very complicated105, especially because of the transnational nature of the 
affair106. On the other hand, firstly, the agency action over the months preceding the attacks 
was featured by many omissions107 and by an overall tendency to underestimating the 
terrorism threat on U.S. soil108. Secondly – and this is the most important aspect here – the 
exchange of information within the Federal Executive was totally insufficient109.  
 As the Commission points out, the sharing of information pertaining to potential 
threats to national security between the agencies of the intelligence community and those 
                                                          
103 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 
Commission, was an independent, bipartisan commission established by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2383 (November 27, 2002). The 
Commission was established – within the legislative branch – and regulated by title VI of the act, 
codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101 note. Section 602 of the act entrusted the Commission with multiple 
purposes: namely, to conduct an accurate analysis of the facts and circumstances concerning the 9/11 
al Qaeda attacks and their causes; to provide an accounting of the response by the United States in 
the aftermath of the assault; and to make some recommendations aimed at improving the capacity of 
the executive branch to prevent future acts of terrorism. Therefore, as section 604(a)(1)(A) clarified, 
the primary function of the Commission was to carry out a detailed investigation over the terrorist 
attacks and all related circumstances. The Commission performed this function especially by 
deploying a great deal of testimony.  
104 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known 
as “The 9/11 Commission Report”) (Norton ed., 2004). 
105 Id., at 355 (“From the details of this case, or from the other opportunities we catalogue in the text 
box, one can see how hard it is for the intelligence community to assemble enough of the puzzle 
pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense of them and then develop a fully informed 
joint plan.”) 
106 Ibid.  
107 Id., at 353-357 (underlining the lack of an effective management system of transnational 
operations). 
108 Id., at 263 (emphasizing a clear gap in the activities aimed at tackling the terrorism threat out of 
the U.S. borders and in the country’s territory). While agencies operating overseas were monitoring 
adequately such a threat and had already taken numerous preventive actions thereupon, “[f]ar less 
was done domestically […].” Ibid. Agencies dealing with foreign intelligence were focused on the 
situation overseas, and domestic agencies – by contrast – tended to overlooking what was not directly 
related to the U.S. soil. The 9/11 attacks – the Commission observed – “fell into the void” left by 
foreign and home operations, as “[n]o one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets.” Ibid.   
109 Id., at 353 (arguing that information concerning the terrorism threat in possession of various 
agencies “was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal misunderstandings.”) The 
report also provides a list of cases in which the CIA and the FBI failed to share with each other 
significant information on movements of possible Muslim terrorists. Id., at 355-356.  
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charged with law enforcement missions “was not a priority before 9/11.”110 Had the flow of 
information within the executive branch been more widespread, especially with a higher 
degree of information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, there 
would have been much more chances for the United States to thwart the al Qaeda’s plot. As 
the Commission concedes, “[t]he biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater 
likelihood of connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing 
information.”111 Most of the times, certain information is shared only if an agency 
demonstrates the existence of a specific need to know. In other words, the agency possessing 
the information tends not to share it with other agencies proactively, but only if it is asked 
to do so. According to the Commission, this is a typical Cold-War approach to intelligence 
information that proves outdated. The approach to follow – the Commission argues – calls 
for the overcoming of the assumption that “the risk of inadverted disclosure outweighs the 
benefits of wider sharing,” and therefore the passage from “a ‘need to know’ culture of 
information protection [to] a ‘need to share’ culture of integration.”112  
 
3. Transparency as a Remedy Against Groupthink 
 Transparency is an essential tool to preventing the commitment of any wrongdoing, 
for the prescription that executive branch business be made available to anyone is supposed 
to act as a deterrent against most of such misbehavior as secrecy might succeed in 
concealing. Transparency, however, is also capable of breaking a sort of code of silence, 
which may exist amid employees of a given office or of another administrative body. 
Employees sharing workplace, indeed, are often inclined to perceive themselves as part of a 
homogeneous group, and may end up justifying mistakes made by their colleagues, or even 
covering-up their wrongdoing. They also tend to adopt a unique view with respect to legal 
or policy issues that present to themselves, with consequent frustration of any possibility for 
critical analysis and oversight of opinions and decisions. Such a multifaceted phenomenon 
has been studied from a psychological perspective and defined “groupthink.” Janis, in 
particular, has described groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they 
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity 
                                                          
110 Id., at 328. 
111 Id., at 416. 
112 Id., at 417. For the action taken by Congress to give substance to the recommendations made by 
the 9/11 Commission, see the Implementation Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007, Pub. L. 110-53, 110 Stat. 2731 (August 3, 2007). 
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override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”113 
Department and agency personnel is not the only environment wherein groupthink may 
thrive. A tendency to groupthink, for instance, has been pinpointed in corporate boards and 
especially in their decision-making processes114. In such a sector, actually, study on the 
phenomenon seems to be somewhat advanced. Polarization and cascades have been 
conceptualized as negative effects produced by groupthink115, and thus the three notions are 
related to one another116. 
 Janis has studied how groupthink affected the dynamics of presidential decision-
making process by creating a solid bond between the president and his advisors on occasion 
of some crucial events in twentieth century’s U.S. history, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the Vietnam War, and the Watergate cover-up117. Overall, since a group tends to reason – 
and perhaps even to act – as a monolith, it is usually extremely difficult for its members not 
only to gain awareness of possible mistakes118, but also to make objective assessment of the 
action taken119. As a result, there is almost no room left for oversight and critical review of 
business transacted by the group. It has been noted that if these are the main features and 
implications of groupthink, such a phenomenon has long manifested itself in the national 
                                                          
113 IRVING L. JANIS, Victims of Groupthink, 78 (Boston, 1978). See also ID., Groupthink: 
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 9 (2nd ed., MA, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1982).  
114 See MARLEEN O’CONNOR, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1233 
(2003).  
115 O’Connor has argued that polarization “refers to how group deliberation pushes a group, and its 
individual members, toward increased risk-taking.” Id., at 1255. The Author instead has 
characterized a cascade as “a process whereby an entire group quickly comes to share a view, which 
may be false, because some people in the group appear to accept the belief.” Id., at 1240. A cascade 
imply the production of a “snowballing effect,” since it all starts with some members of a group 
supporting a position. Subsequently, other members of the same group join them in advocating such 
a position, which in the end turns out to be shared by the whole group. Id., at 1257.  
116 Ibid. (arguing that “groupthink encompasses the same ideas as polarizations and cascades […].”) 
117 JANIS, Victims of Groupthink, supra note 113, at 25. 
118 Id., at 37 (“When groupthink tendencies become dominant, the members try to avoid saying 
anything that might disturb the smooth surface unanimity that enables the members to feel confident 
that their policies are correct and bound to succeed.”)    
119 O’CONNOR, The Enron Board, supra note 114, at 1258 (maintaining that Janis’ case studies on 
presidential decision-making process are aimed at “show[ing] how cohesive groups can make serious 
miscalculations about both the practical and moral consequences of their decisions.”)  
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security domain120. A widespread culture of transparency is the only remedy against the 
tendency of groupthink to thriving. 
 
 
C. The Universal Appeal of Secrecy: Secrecy at European Union Level 
1. Negotiation of Treaties 
 Not only sovereign states, but also supranational organizations such as the European 
Union121 need to rely upon a certain amount of secrets. About the very experience of the EU, 
it has been observed that “[s]ecrecy is universally appealing.”122 The European Union has 
authority to enter into international treaties and agreements123, and the exercise of such an 
authority has grown in recent years124. Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                                          
120 See DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN, National Intelligence and the Rule of Law, 2 The Journal of the 
ACS Issue Group, 2, 11, 13 (2008) (contending that “U.S. national security history is replete with 
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goal.”)    
121 See FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, Rethinking the Legal Foundations of the European Constitutional 
Order: The Lessons of the New Historical Research, 28 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 1311, 1334 (2013) 
(characterizing the European Union as “the most highly developed supranational legal system in 
existence today.”) See also GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA, The European Union’s Mixed 
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Perspective (September 20, 2013), available at https://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2013/09/20/acelg-
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123 See, e.g., RAMSES A. WESSEL, The EU as a party to international agreements: shared 
competences, mixed responsibilities, in ALAN DASHWOOD – MARK MARESCAU (eds.), Law and 
Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, 152 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) (arguing that EU international legal personality is to be inferred from Article 
47 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, which recognizes 
legal personality to the European Union.) See also JULIJA BRSAKOSKA, The Legal Personality of the 
EU, 2 Iustinianus Primus Law Review, 1, 9 (2011) (contending that Article 47 TEU should be 
interpreted so as to encompass EU international legal capacity, although the Lisbon Treaty does not 
directly address EU international legal status). Had the Lisbon Treaty dealt with such a matter 
expressly – the Author continues – “the international identity of the Union would be clearer, more 
transparent and more visible to third countries, as well as its citizens.” Ibid. 
124 See ELISA BARONCINI, L’Unione Europea e la procedura di conclusione degli accordi 
internazionali dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, 5 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 5, 6 (2013) 
(maintaining that the “widespread activity of the EU as treaty-maker” is evident today). See also 
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European Union (TFEU) sets out the general procedure for the conclusion of international 
agreements with third countries – i.e., countries outside the EU – and international 
organizations125. Under Article 218(2) TFEU, the Council of the European Union 
[hereinafter – Council] is empowered to authorize the commencement of negotiations on 
recommendations of the European Commission [hereinafter – “EC” or “Commission”], and 
to adopt negotiating directives. Furthermore, the Council is vested with the authority to 
conclude treaties and agreements, for the signing of which its assent is requisite. Pursuant to 
Article 218(3), the Council nominates “the Union negotiator,” which is the Commission in 
most cases. However, when the agreement concerns “exclusively or principally” the 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP), it is the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that is in charge of negotiation. Therefore, consistently 
with the fact that the Commission turns out to be the “core executive”126 in the European 
institutional architecture, it is also the EU main negotiator. As such, the Commission needs 
to resort to secrecy, which is traditionally the rule governing negotiation at international 
level127. The European Parliament [hereinafter – “EP” or “Parliament”]128, too, has a role in 
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activity of the EU on the international plane.”) 
125 Different procedures apply to specific subject matters – namely, the common commercial policy 
(Article 207 TFEU), and the monetary or foreign exchange regime (Article 219 TFEU). 
126 SIMON HIX, The Political System of the European Union, 32 (2nd ed., Basingsotke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). See also DEIRDRE CURTIN, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, 
Practices, and the Living Constitution, 91 (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2009) 
(arguing that the Commission is commonly considered as the EU core executive for its functions 
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system.”) 
127 See AURÉLIAN COLSON, The Ambassador Between Light and Shade: The Emergence of Secrecy 
as the Norm for International Negotiation, 13 J. Int. Neg. 179 (2008) (arguing that the secrecy of 
negotiation gradually established itself as the general rule in international relations, especially after 
the Renaissance). See also DEIRDRE CURTIN, Judging EU Secrecy, Cahiers de Droit Européen 2012, 
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relationship among the negotiating parties” is based on secrecy, which traditionally features 
international relations).  
128 Even though the Lisbon Treaty assigned to the EP a more important role within the overall EU 
architecture than the one it played in the past, it may still not be deemed to equate to the national 
parliaments of the member states and – more generally – to a typical legislative assembly of a 
sovereign state. See ALINA KACZOROWSKA, European Union Law, 82 (3rd ed., London and New 
York: Routledge, 2013) (maintaining that “the EP, unlike national parliaments, is not a real, 
sovereign parliament as it has no power on its own to initiate and enact legislation or to impose 
taxes.”)  
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EU international relations. Its consent, indeed, is required for the Council to conclude treaties 
and agreements in the subject matters enumerated in Article 218(6)(a)(i)-(v), which include 
such subject matters as apply the ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of EU 
acts129. The EP is to be consulted in all other cases130. Furthermore, Article 218(10) TFEU 
entitles the EP to be “immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure [for the 
conclusion of treaties and agreements].” As a result, the secrecy that features negotiations 
conducted by the Commission on behalf of the EU at international level is limited by the 
wide right to know that EU primary law grants to the Parliament. It is quite clear that EU 
primary law allows for a good deal of flexibility in this regard, so that any disputes 
concerning access to information in the formation of treaties may be solved by the dynamics 
that the relations between the EC and the EP will assume in practice131.   
 
2. Interinstitutional Agreements  
 The EP and the EC entered into a framework agreement regulating their relations on 
October 20, 2010 [hereinafter – EP-EC Framework Agreement]132. It is an interinstitutional 
agreement, as its purpose is to establish basic rules on the interactions between two EU 
institutions133. Point 24 of the EP-EC Framework Agreement requires that the Commission 
submit to the Parliament information concerning all the stages of the negotiation of 
international agreements “in sufficient time for [the Parliament] to be able to express its 
point of view if appropriate, and for the Commission to be able to take Parliament’s views 
as far as possible into account.” Furthermore, point 24 allows the Parliament to gain access 
to confidential information held by the Commission pursuant to Annex II to the EP-EC 
Framework Agreement. The stated purpose of Annex II, indeed, is to “govern the forwarding 
to Parliament and the handling of confidential information […] from the Commission in 
connection with the exercise of Parliament’s prerogatives and competences.”134 Confidential 
                                                          
129 Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU. 
130 Article 218(6)(b). 
131 It is not easy to detect in practice the degree of sensitive information that the EC agrees to share 
with the EP, as Curtain appears to suggest. See DEIRDRE CURTIN, Secrecy regulation by the 
European Union inside out, in DAVID COLE et al. (eds.), Secrecy, National Security, and the 
Vindication of Constitutional Law, 321 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).     
132 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, October 20, 2010, OJ L 304 20.11.2010, p. 47. 
133 See BART DRIESSEN, Interinstitutional conventions and institutional balance, 33 E.L. Rev., 4, 
550 (2008).  
134 Point 1.1, Annex II. 
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information as meant by the annex mainly includes the markings whereby European Union 
classified information (EUCI) is identified135. Under point 1.2.2 of Annex II, the different 
markings that may be assigned to EUCI depend on “varying degrees of prejudice,” which 
the unauthorized disclosure of such material could cause to interests of the EU or of member 
states. Point 1.2.3 obliges the Commission to release the confidential information requested 
by “one of the parliamentary bodies or office-holders mentioned in point 1.4 [of the same 
annex].”     
 An interinstitutional agreement signed on November 20, 2002, instead, governs the 
Parliament’s access to sensitive information held by the Council in the field of security and 
defense policy [hereinafter – EP-Council Agreement]136. Point 1.1 of EP-Council Agreement 
clarifies that in such a context, sensitive information is meant as information that is 
classified, whether it originates from a member state, a third state, or an international 
organization, and regardless of the medium containing it and of “[its] state of completion.” 
Overall, members of the Parliament (MEPs) are granted restricted access to such 
information, and the President of the Parliament plays a pivotal role in requesting the 
information to the Council and handling it after the material of interest has been disclosed. 
Point 3.1 provides that the President of the EP or the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy [hereinafter – Committee] 
may request that the Committee be informed “on developments in European security and 
defence policy,” and gain access to sensitive information. Furthermore, point 3.3, which 
appears to represent the core of the whole interinstitutional agreement, grants the President 
of the EP and a four-member special committee chaired by the Chairman of the Committee 
the right to be acquainted with sensitive information whenever access to such information is 
necessary for the EP to exercise its own powers in the field of security and defense policy. 
It is also provided that the President of the EP and the special committee are allowed to 
consult the released documents “on the premises of the Council.” Point 3.3 of the EP-Council 
Agreement grants the President of the EP broad discretion in handling such sensitive 
information as has been disclosed by the Council. The President of the EP, in particular, is 
empowered to choose from some pre-established options for the sharing of such information 
                                                          
135 Point 1.2.1, Annex II. 
136 Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the 
field of security and defence policy, OJ C 298 30.11.2002, p. 1. 
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with the Parliament137. These options do not apply when the information at issue is classified 
as TOP SECRET. In June 2011, the EP adopted a decision that established principles, 
standards, and procedures for the handling of classified and other sensitive information at 
disposal of the Parliament itself138. 
 
3. Council Decision 2013/488/EU on Protection of EU Classified Information 
 In 2013, the Council adopted a decision on classified information [hereinafter – EUCI 
Council Decision]139 “lay[ing] down the basic principles and minimum standards of security 
for protecting EUCI.”140 Article 2(2) of EUCI Council Decision establishes four different 
categories of classified information, of which EU TOP SECRET and EU RESTRICTED lie 
at the two opposite poles of the scale of harm the dissemination of protected information and 
documents may bring about. EU TOP SECRET is a classification level that applies when 
the classifier determines that the unauthorized disclosure of certain information and 
documents “could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the 
European Union or of one or more of the Member States.”141 Since the provision enumerates 
– and defines – the classification levels in descending order with respect to the seriousness 
of the threat they pose, EU RESTRICTED is the marking that comes last. In such a case, the 
threat proves so modest – if compared to the other categories – that it is considered capable 
of determining not sheer harm to interests of the EU or of member states, but mere 
disadvantages142. Furthermore, Article 2(3) of EUCI Council Decision allows that additional 
markings be applied to classified information in order to provide a more accurate description 
of the main features of the information, such as its origin and the specific field to which it 
pertains. Article 3(1) suggests that the classification of information has to comply with the 
principle of proportionality. This principle, actually, is typical of any classification system, 
insofar as it implies the legitimate demand that the sacrifice to the right to knowledge that 
stems from the classification of certain information not be excessive in consideration of the 
objective to achieve. The provision, indeed, prescribes that whatever the marking applied, 
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the information retain its classification level “for only as long as necessary.” Under Article 
3(2), a prior written consent of the state or authority that has created the information subject 
to classification is requisite for either the downgrading or declassification of such 
information, as well as for the modification or removal of additional markings. Finally, 
Article 9(1) of EUCI Council Decision clarifies that the management of classified 
information consists in “the application of administrative measures for controlling EUCI 
throughout its life-cycle […].” Such measures, indeed, cover the whole existence of 
classified information, from beginning – the creation and thus the application of a given 
marking – to end – declassification and even “destruction of EUCI.” 
 
 
 
II. Congress’s Oversight Function over the Executive Branch  
A. The Congressional Oversight Function: General Considerations 
 In addition to the people’s right to know, the executive branch has to ensure wide 
access to information to Congress, which plays an important role in reducing the level of 
secrecy in the legal system by performing an oversight function over the executive branch. 
The oversight function, which is exercised especially by congressional committees through 
the conduction of inquiries and holding ad hoc hearings, is an integral part of the authority 
the Constitution bestows upon the legislative branch143, as George Mason pointed out at the 
Convention of Philadelphia144, where the Constitution was drafted in 1787. Congress’s 
oversight power also extends to fields wherein the release of information calls for due 
caution, such as national security and foreign affairs. As to the former, actually, since the 
classification system shields a large amount of information from public access, the carrying 
out of inquiries and hearings is often the only way – unless leaks or whistleblowing occur – 
to shed some light into the activities of the executive branch, and to compel it to account for 
                                                          
143 See MORTON ROSENBERG, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, 
and Recent Developments, CRS Report for Congress (August 21, 2008), p. 5 (observing that 
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Mason) (arguing that “the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers […].”) 
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its conduct. Pallitto and Weaver have contended that if Congress were to fail to inquire into 
the business transacted by the agencies belonging to the Intelligence Community and thus 
deliberately depend upon the information such agencies submit, Congress itself would end 
up being “completely at the mercy of the president and the executive bureaucracy.”145 By 
the same token, if Congress keeps a deferential approach in the domain of foreign affairs, 
the executive branch turns out to enjoy large discretion in deciding the amount of 
information to share. Especially if the event of congressional deference, leaks concerning 
such secret business or misbehaviors as a given whistleblower decides to divulge may be the 
only solution to overcome secrecy in this field. Schlesinger Jr. has mentioned the famous 
Jay Treaty and the annexation of Texas to the United States, which ensued to a negotiation 
with the Texas Republic, as examples of situations in which only “defiance [to the rules],” 
hence the leaking of information, made the executive business more transparent146. The 
Author points out that in such cases, as well as when the executive provides Congress with 
false information, “the rebellious collaboration between anonymous and disgusted officials 
and the press seemed the only means of getting the American democracy back into working 
equilibrium.”147 
 The exercise of the power to inquire into the executive branch is inevitably 
intermittent, and thus features breaks of continuity. Congress, therefore, may not be expected 
to carry out investigations over the executive branch on a regular basis, as if it were a daily 
activity like the lawmaking one. Fuchs has observed that Congress “is not a useful institution 
for overseeing day-to-day matters” due to the restrictions on the “breadth, speed, and 
frequency with which it can perform oversight functions.”148 The exercise of the 
congressional power of inquiry – the Author continues – turns out to be “sporadic at best.”149 
In like manner, Weaver and Pallitto have argued that because of the very discontinuity that 
characterizes such a power, courts are more efficient than Congress in bringing about 
exposure of agency misconduct. The latter, indeed, “cannot subject administrators to the 
                                                          
145 PALLITTO – WEAVER, Presidential Secrecy and the Law, supra note 86, at 113. 
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level and frequency of scrutiny necessary to systematically discourage abuse.”150 Congress, 
however, have some means by which it may force executive branch officials to disclose the 
information it needs – namely, the power of issuing subpoenas aimed at obtaining the release 
of information and that of holding such officials in contempt. The simple threat of using 
either power often suffices to urge the executive branch to disclose the requested material, 
whether or not it is “convinced of the appropriateness of the information access request.”151 
Furthermore, Devins has noted that congressional committees often succeed in acquiring the 
information they need by putting pressure on executive officials during their testimony in 
oversight hearings152. 
 
 
B. When Transparency Is Used For Personal Goals: Nixon’s Posture in the Hiss-
Chambers case  
 As strange as it may appear prima facie, a congressional inquiry conducted shortly 
after the end of World War II is of interest in a work on transparency for the implications 
that  some intellectual effort and originality lead to infer from it. The inquiry was concerned 
with the Hiss-Chambers case, an espionage case, the meaning of which can be grasped only 
by taking into adequate consideration the fear of Communism that wrapped up the American 
politics and society especially in the early years of the Cold War. The case can be summed 
up as follows. During the summer of 1948, the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC), a specific congressional committee of the House of Representatives aimed at 
protecting the country from the Communism threat, embarked on an investigation involving 
– among others – Alger Hiss, a U.S. State Department high-ranking official. Especially in 
light of the testimony of Whittaker Chambers, a confessed former Communist agent, Hiss 
was accused of being a member of the U.S. Communist Party and of spying for the Soviet 
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Union at least until the late 1930s, when Chambers abjured Marxism153. Due to the lack of 
substantial evidence against Hiss, who categorically denied all accusations, the HUAC was 
about to let him off, but then-little known California Representative Richard Nixon strived 
to persuade the Committee to carry on with the inquiry. Hiss was tried twice, and found 
guilty of perjury in 1950154, whereas the espionage indictment was foreclosed by statute 
limitations. Today, it is still controversial whether Hiss actually engaged in espionage for 
the Soviets155.  
 However, two aspects of this whole affair really matter: the surprisingly high number 
of FBI records Representative Nixon had access to, and the Representative’s posture, if 
compared with the one he kept with respect to the Watergate tape recordings more than 
twenty years later. As will be explained later, indeed, in the 1970s, President Nixon strived 
to cover up a series of White House conversations related to the Watergate scandal by 
claiming the existence of absolute executive privilege. On the contrary, Nixon’s approach 
turned out to be clearly transparency-oriented in the Hiss-Chambers case. As far as this case 
                                                          
153 Chambers alleged that Hiss was a top-level member of the so-called Ware Group, “an 
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is concerned, the FBI files document an intense exchange of information between FBI agents 
and Representative Nixon as the HUAC investigation was ongoing156. Indirect confirmation 
that Nixon depended mainly upon FBI records to build its leading role during the Hiss-
related investigation may be found in the words used by Nixon himself. Indeed, during a 
speech he made at the House of Representatives on January 26, 1950,157 just a few days after 
Hiss was convicted for perjury, Nixon complained about a presidential directive158 that 
ordered all administrative agencies to refuse to release any information concerning the 
loyalty of executive branch employees to congressional committees159. Therefore – Nixon 
noted – the HUAC “had to conduct its investigation with no assistance whatever from the 
administrative branch of the Government, [and thereby the FBI] was unable to lend 
assistance to the committee.”160 
 Yet, above all, the Hiss-Chambers Case displays Nixon’s incoherence on 
transparency over the years161. In such a case, as a Congressman, he appeared to champion 
transparency as an absolute value. In the aforementioned speech of January 26, 1950, Nixon 
emphatically underlined his “solemn responsibility, both as a member of the Committee on 
Un-American Activities and as a member of [the House of Representatives to publicize] 
certain facts concerning the case which led to the trial and conviction of Alger Hiss for 
perjury […].”162 He continued by noting that the Hiss-Chambers Case and its implications 
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“involve[d] considerations which affect[ed] the very security of this Republic.”163 
Furthermore, a White House tape contains the explicit admission of Nixon, while he was 
serving as President of the United States, that by leaking details on the case to the press he 
had provoked Hiss’s conviction even before the evidence against Hiss was examined by the 
grand jury164. Beyond any doubt, neither the press nor congressional investigations are 
supposed to turn into weapons politicians may deploy to tear someone apart or to achieve 
other merely personal goals. Since Richard Nixon came out as the true winner in the Hiss-
Chambers Case, which afforded him a degree of public visibility he certainly did not have 
before, it is possible to argue that in such a case, he exploited the value of transparency just 
to boost significantly his own political career. The discrepancy in his behavior is showed by 
the fact that with respect to the Watergate scandal, Nixon appeared to champion an opposite 
value – the value of executive branch secrecy.  
 Such discrepancy was brought up at the President’s News Conference of March 15, 
1973,165 where the President was asked to explain why he based his conduct in the Hiss-
Chambers Case on transparency, while he hampered the congressional investigation over the 
Watergate scandal by invoking the need for secrecy. The response of President Nixon turns 
out to be very interesting. He contended that the two cases were actually very dissimilar, 
because the Hiss-Chambers Case was concerned with espionage, while the Watergate affair 
was not. In the former, for the very reason that the HUAC “was investigating espionage 
against the Government of [the United States], that committee should have had complete 
cooperation from at least the executive branch of the Government in the form that [the 
HUAC] asked.”166 The Watergate scandal, instead, was not an espionage case, or if one 
deems it as such, it was concerned with a different type of espionage, one that not only was 
merely domestic and thus did not involve any relations with foreign countries or 
organizations, but also had a clear political nature: It was, as the President put it, “espionage 
by one political organization against another.”167 Therefore, Congress – Nixon concluded – 
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164 WALDRON, Watergate, supra note 155, at 44 (quoting a statement of President Nixon recorded by 
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“would have a far greater right and would be on much stronger ground to ask the Government 
to cooperate in a matter involving espionage against the Government than in a matter like 
[Watergate] involving politics.”168 President Nixon’s argument was weak, since the essential 
purpose of the oversight power of Congress is to pinpoint any wrongdoing perpetrated within 
the executive branch or – in any event – imputable to it. Claiming that congressional 
committees should deliberately refrain from inquiring into sectors wherein executive branch 
officials somehow operate means raising the odds that such sectors be affected by 
misconduct.  
 If some sense may be found in the President’s reasoning, it is probably related to the 
fact that espionage represents a traditional activity, the primary purpose of which is to tackle 
national security threats and prevent any harm to the country. This consideration, however, 
leads to argue that intelligence and other activities aimed at protecting the country may 
require some amount of secrecy. However, such a conclusion contrasts with the President’s 
position: In the event of a true threat to the U.S. national security, the two political branches 
of government must ensure to each other the highest level of cooperation, and thus there 
should not be any room for executive secrecy. Furthermore, the fact that today, the concept 
of homeland security adds to the more old-fashioned concept of national security suggests 
that the whole picture of threats is more complicated and broader than it used to be in the 
past. However, one lesson may certainly be drawn from Nixon’s incoherence: despite being 
essential to spotting misbehavior in the executive branch, congressional investigations way 
well be biased, especially if they underlie interests that are blatantly different from that in 
increasing transparency in the Federal Government. 
 
 
C. Congress’s Power of Inquiry Into the Executive Branch When There Is No Written 
Record Concerning a Given Decision 
 Congress may also exercise its power of inquiry to react to particular cases of 
presidential secrecy, namely when the president makes a decision that is not made public 
and not even put into writing. From a purely formal perspective, congressional oversight 
appears to be hindered by the fact that the legislative branch cannot gain access to documents 
tracking the whole presidential decision-making process, since some of those documents are 
missing. It is evident that in such cases, the role of hearings tends to become predominant, 
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insofar as hearings are the most suitable means for fact-finding. In this regard, the Moynihan 
Commission Report provides an example pertaining to the domain of foreign affairs under 
the Clinton administration169. In 1994, President Clinton acquiesced to Iranian large-scale 
shipments of arms into Bosnia-Herzegovina via Croatia, but such a decision was not put into 
writing. Indeed, the Department of State – which is responsible for the United States’ 
international relations, and therefore is equivalent to the ministry for foreign affairs in most 
countries worldwide – did not provide the involved ambassadors with written instructions as 
to how to handle the situation. In 1996, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
inquired into the matter. Of particular interest is what then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott uttered during his testimony before the Committee. He advocated the Department of 
State’s conduct by stressing that when it comes to diplomatic relations and relevant internal 
deliberations, secrecy is often necessary for the protection of extremely sensitive matters. In 
addition, he stated that “[w]hat goes down on paper is more likely to come out in public, in 
inappropriate and harmful ways, harmful to the national interest.”170 Talbott was referring 
to the risk of leaks, which is favored by the existence of records171.  
 The Senate Committee concluded its report by formulating some recommendations. 
Firstly, it is recommended that the Executive Branch – especially the White House and the 
Department of State – produce a written record of any significant decision in the field of 
foreign affairs, yet at the same time apply mechanisms aimed at ensuring that a proper level 
of secrecy be kept. Secondly, the Committee highlights that to be able to perform its 
institutional functions, it needs to receive constant information from the executive branch. 
In this regard, the Committee refers to section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947172, 
currently codified at section 3091 of title 50, U.S. Code. According to Section 3091(a)(1), 
the President has to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees “are kept fully and 
currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States […].” Subsection (d) 
requires that the two Houses of Congress adopt rules or resolutions setting forth “procedures 
to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified information, and all information 
relating to intelligence sources and methods, that is furnished to the congressional 
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171 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Anthony Lake, too, mentioned in his 
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intelligence committees or to Members of Congress […].” Furthermore, subsection (e) 
excludes that any portion of the act may be used to restrict Congress’s access to information 
concerning intelligence. Thirdly, the Senate Committee’s report contends that the executive 
branch should adequately acquaint Congress with any significant change in the foreign 
policy of the United States that has been made in secret. 
 
 
D. The Full Access Doctrine 
 The full access doctrine is a theory, elaborated by Divoll, that argues that Congress 
is entitled to gain access to any information it needs to perform its oversight function, unless 
the requested information is reasonably deemed by the executive to be privileged, and thus 
may be withheld173. When policies are molded and actions are taken for the safety of the 
country – or at least it is stated that they are – Congress’s need to be apprised of the executive 
branch conduct proves even more compelling. Divoll refers in particular to “the aggressive 
intelligence programs” conducted under the Bush administration174. In more general terms, 
Divoll argues that in the national security domain, Congress’s right to know must be broad, 
albeit not so broad to entail “a complete cascade of information” flowing from the executive 
to the legislative branch175. Absolute transparency, without even recognizing to the 
Executive the prerogative to put off the release of information when it is proper to do so176, 
would be – the Author argues – “disruptive and unwieldy,” for it could undermine the 
outcomes of intelligence activities and thus jeopardize human lives177. In this field, however, 
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the withholding of information from Congress as it carries out investigations over the 
executive branch must be an exception to the rule. 
 In the domains of national security and foreign affairs, at least two main reasons – 
the Author observes – lead to advocate broad access to information by Congress. Firstly, the 
activities carried out by the agencies of the Intelligence Community are governed by a rule 
of secrecy, which finds its practical application in the system of classified information. By 
exercising its oversight function, Congress stands as a bulwark against misconduct and 
abuses the agencies operating in this field may be tempted to commit by turning the neutral 
concept of secrecy into that of concealment, usually meant with a negative acceptation. 
According to the Author, therefore, Congress and – namely – the committees on intelligence 
end up being the only overseers of the executive branch that American citizens may depend 
on to know how intelligence agencies operate on U.S. soil and abroad178. Secondly, broad 
access to national security information is necessary for Congress to make cognizant 
decisions on appropriations, and thus to pick programs and activities in this field that are 
worth funding. Such an argument is based on Article I, Section 9(7) Const., which vests 
Congress with the power of the purse, i.e., the power to establish in budget legislation the 
appropriations that provide all executive branch activities with funds179. Divoll, in particular, 
puts stress on Congress’s need to gain access not only to records and documents on the 
content of activities and programs, but also to “detailed budget numbers” pertaining to 
federal agencies conducting business in the national security field, even though such 
numbers are usually “highly classified […].”180 Congress, indeed, is unable to approve the 
funding of ongoing or new intelligence operations by formally inserting specific 
appropriation provisions in the annual budget legislation if it is not properly acquainted with 
“detailed information about the nature of the programs [performed or proposed by 
intelligence agencies] and their estimated cost.”181  
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 Accordingly, the full access doctrine – Divoll maintains – leads to recognize the 
ability of Congress to obtain a great majority of the information held by agencies operating 
in the national security domain, even when such information are concerned with the 
gathering of foreign intelligence or the carrying out of covert action182. It is the committees 
on intelligence of the two Houses of Congress, not the executive branch, that must determine 
what information they need to perform their oversight function properly183. In general terms, 
federal agencies may not refuse to disclose information to Congress, since Congress’s broad 
right to know is consistent with such flow of information from the executive to the legislative 
branch as the Constitution requires. The committees of Congress have a potentially unlimited 
right of access, because no information held by the whole apparatus of the executive branch 
– Divoll contends – “is beyond their legitimate grasp, and the Framers did not give the 
President any authority to resist [requests for information advanced by Congress].”184 
However, as already noted, Divoll observes that it would be inappropriate for Congress to 
gain access to any piece of information concerning intelligence activities. The full access 
doctrine advocates the existence of a right of access that turns out to be tendentially absolute. 
Yet, it does not require that Congress exercise this right to obtain the release of information 
that do not prove necessary for it to perform its constitutional functions, such as the details 
of a certain intelligence operation185. 
 It has been observed that making the agencies of the Intelligence Community more 
transparent increases the risks of a distorted usage of disclosure in this field. The Executive, 
indeed, may prompt such agencies to alter reality and manipulate data when drafting reports 
or forming records. The publication of those reports and records are capable of steering the 
public opinion towards a given orientation. Rovner maintains that “greater transparency 
increases the likelihood of politicization and that published [intelligence] estimates will be 
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biased.”186 He reaches the conclusion that such estimates should be governed by a rule of 
secrecy and thus kept as classified material, because “[t]he expectation that intelligence will 
be declassified creates incentives for policymakers to manipulate future assessments.”187 The 
full access doctrine mentioned above lacks an innovative value, as it does not add anything 
new to the debate over the extent of Congress’s right of access to executive branch 
information. The limits such a doctrine pinpoints to congressional access to information stem 
from the application of a mere principle of common sense. It is rather evident, indeed, that 
such access must be weighted up with the supreme interests of the country, such as the 
protection of human lives and the safeguard of the integrity of the country itself, and may 
succumb to them on some occasions. The full access doctrine, however, deserves credit for 
the emphasis it puts on Congress’s need to gain broad access to information in any field of 
executive branch activity, including intelligence and related business in the national security 
domain. Constant access to information pertaining to such domain by Congress is most likely 
to manage to prevent misuse of intelligence information, as with the case mentioned above 
of alteration of intelligence estimates for political purposes. 
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III. Concepts That Imply a Claim of Secrecy 
A. National Security 
1. The Compelling Interest in Protection of National Security 
 The Supreme Court has conceded for a long time that the Federal Government – 
namely, the executive branch – is entitled to be engaged in the protection of national security, 
which thus constitutes one of the legitimate objectives the Government constantly endeavors 
to achieve188. The Court has actually gone further, and regarded preserving the security of 
the nation as the most “compelling” of governmental interests189. In like manner, Rep. Larry 
Combest, as Vice Chairman of the Moynihan Commission, maintained that national security 
“is not simply one among many government concerns [but] the primary reason why [the 
U.S.] government is created.”190 Accordingly, the 2014 edition of one of the official 
documents the Executive issues on a periodic basis to set out strategies in the comprehensive 
field of national security and to assess implementation of policies thereupon – the 
quadrennial homeland security review191 – stated that “[t]here is no more important function 
that a government can provide for its people than safety and security.”192 If national security 
is so important that it usually prevails in weighing up the conflicting interests a FOIA request 
(or a congressional request for information)  may involve, it is likely that by invoking the 
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need to protect national security the executive branch will obtain the effect of lawfully 
shielding requested information from access by the public (or Congress). By moving – 
implicitly – from such a consideration, Roberts has observed that national security tends to 
be regarded “as a trump card,” and thus – metaphorically speaking – as a sort of spell to cast 
to impede disclosure of Government-held information whenever the supreme interest in 
safeguarding the country appears to be at stake193.    
 
2. The Concept of National Security 
 What is national security? Unfortunately, there is no unanimously accepted definition 
of the term, for two main reasons. Firstly, most scholars in different fields have failed to dig 
deep into the concept194. Secondly, it is impossible to establish a single, final definition, 
because the content of national security tends to vary over time, depending on the threats 
and concerns that are deemed to be primary in a given period. Accordingly, it has been 
observed that for the very reason that national security lacks stable, pre-fixed content, its 
scope ends up being too vague if not specified195. Positive law provides just a few leads in 
this regard. The executive order on classification of national security information currently 
effective, E.O. 13526 of 2009, as former executive orders on the same matters did, defines 
national security just by putting together the two sectors of national defense and foreign 
affairs. Under section 6.1(l) E.O., indeed, there exists damage to national security when 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information causes “harm to the national defense or 
foreign relations of the United States […].” 
 In the United States – like in most countries – national security was traditionally 
conceived of as inextricably related to the defense of the country against any attack, and thus 
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its scope tended to equate to that of the military domain196. National security has been 
defined as “the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats.”197 Such 
a definition, however, is not satisfactory, since what has potential to jeopardize human lives 
and the stability of the country may be concerned just with the merely domestic environment. 
Therefore, the scope of national security must include not only external but also internal 
threats198. It has been observed that security – and thus national security – is usually “an 
instrumental value,” as it is invoked “in order to enjoy the products or outcomes of some 
other value(s).”199 Even when individuals or groups seem to be pursuing security as “an 
ultimate value” – it has been noted – they are in reality protecting “something else – the 
physical survival of themselves or of some collectivity […].”200 The traditional coincidence 
between national security and defense of the country from external powers ensured by the 
military probably facilitated the widespread usage of such concepts as government secrecy 
and state secrets privilege201. The armed forces, indeed, have always relied upon a high level 
of secrecy, justified with the sensitive nature of most information and data they hold. In 
weighing up various interests related to requests for information, the interest of the military 
in keeping confidential the information they handle in performing their primary function – 
“the protection of citizens’ physical security”202 – tends to prevail over the interest in 
disclosure. In other words, the executive branch frequently denies access to military 
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information by claiming that disclosure to such information could jeopardize the safety of 
citizens or of the country. Bok has argued that the interest in “self-preservation [and in the] 
protection of everything of value in human lives” underpins military secrecy203. Such secrecy 
– the Author continues – may be invoked for the protection either of individuals as such or 
of individuals as part of a community. In the latter case, “collective secrecy” – as Bok has 
called it – justifies the withholding of information from access by the public, and is more 
frequently deployed than the other type of secrecy204. 
 Today, it is unanimously conceded that national security concerns go well beyond 
the military domain. In the 1970s, Brown directed severe criticism at the “overwhelmingly 
military character” the concept of national security had assumed since World War II205. As 
a result – the Author noted – threats to national security other than the ones directly 
concerned with the military sphere tended to be overlooked206. Brown, however, was not the 
first to point out that purely military threats did not exhaust the range of concerns the Federal 
Government – namely, the executive branch – found itself dealing with207. Economic and 
environmental issues, for instance, have long been regarded as capable of endangering the 
security of the country as much as a direct aggression to the country itself208. Since various 
threats pinpointed as such require public money to be addressed, the Government is usually 
compelled to establish priorities among such threats, if not as to their importance, at least as 
to the amount of funding dedicated to them209. The Moynihan Commission Report also 
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pointed out that nowadays, the scope of national security unfolds much beyond the military 
sphere210. Those who are vested with the institutional duty to pinpoint and assess the threats 
that may endanger the United States – namely, the members of Congress, the President, and 
the heads of departments and agencies – “[have] to regard a broad range of matters as directly 
relevant to the country’s security.”211  
  
3. The Hart-Rudman Commission and the New Threats to National Security After the 
End of the Cold War  
 In the United States, the end of the Cold War marked a watershed, as enabled a clearer 
perception of the threats posed to national security by issues not directly related to a military 
attack on the country. In 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen established a study 
commission, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, also known 
as the Hart-Rudman Commission or Hart-Rudman Task Force on Homeland Security 
[hereinafter – Hart-Rudman Commission], and assigned it the task to analyze the global 
environment that was developing after the end of the Cold War and to set forth 
recommendations for a national security strategy capable of coping with such new 
environment212. The Hart-Rudman Commission accomplished its tasks by following a three-
phase process, and the reports it issued prove noteworthy – above all – for two reasons: 
firstly, they underlined that the set of threats to national security extended far beyond the 
military domain; secondly, the third and final report suggested strengthening the role and 
implementing structure of homeland security, a concept that gained momentum after 
September 11, 2001.  
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 In its phase I report, released in 1999, the Hart-Rudman Commission outlined the 
main trends the first quarter of the twenty-first century would feature in the fields of science 
and technology, economy, politics and civilian society, as well as in the traditional military 
sector. It also pinpointed the main challenges the United States would have to face in that 
period, and observed that some of them, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism, and advances in information technology and biotechnologies pose 
potential threats to national security213. Furthermore, globalization of economy is deemed 
capable of affecting stability both at national and global levels214. Overall, the Hart-Rudman 
Commission found that without a doubt, in the twenty-first century, “major threats to 
national security [would] broaden beyond the purely military [domain].”215  
 The phase II report, instead, released on April 15, 2000, put forward proposals and 
suggestions for a new national strategy capable of tackling the international security 
environment that was taking shape. Such a strategy – the report states – “must find its anchor 
in U.S. national interests,” which are grouped into three types: survival, critical, and 
significant interests216. Survival interests are defined as those interests that must be 
guaranteed at any cost, for otherwise “America would cease to exist as we know it.”217 These 
interests, therefore, embody the core of national security, as they imply the need to preserve 
the safety of the country. Furthermore, they require protection not only of the legal 
foundations of the country – the constitutional order of the United States – but also “of those 
core strengths – educational, industrial, and scientific-technological – that underlie 
America’s political, economic, and military position in the world.”218 In a theoretical order 
of importance among the interests that it is a mission of the Federal Government – namely, 
of the executive branch – to pursue, critical interests rank second. They are aimed at ensuring 
public utilities and services – such as energy, communications, transportation, and healthcare 
– the provision of which proves essential to citizens’ everyday life219. Finally, significant 
interests are mainly concerned with promotion of democracy, well-being, and economic 
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growth outside the U.S. borders. This category of interests encompasses the interest that 
“neither mass murder nor gross violations of human rights” occur anywhere in the world220. 
It is quite evident that the content and underlying rationale of significant interests entail the 
risk that they come with a load of ideological considerations221. 
 The final report prepared by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which came out in 
February 2001, turns out to be extremely interesting, as noted above, especially for putting 
emphasis on the concept of homeland security and for suggesting some major changes in the 
national security administrative apparatus. First of all, it is surprising that the report 
somehow envisioned what would occur on September 11, 2001, as it maintained that “[a] 
direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter 
century.”222 The executive branch of the Federal Government, however – the report points 
out – is not equipped to address homeland security, since “[n]o adequate coordination 
mechanism exists” either among the numerous federal agencies competent in the homeland 
security domain or with levels of government other than the federal, which should be 
involved in the management of homeland security223. Overall, the executive branch is 
deemed “very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to 
protect the homeland.”224 In light of the threats stemming from the new international security 
environment, preservation of the American homeland – the report argues – “should be the 
primary national security mission of the U.S. government.”225 The Hart-Rudman 
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Commission, therefore, places homeland security at the heart of the national security strategy 
it proposes. Moreover, since the Federal Executive is considered to lack the necessary 
organizational structure to ensure efficiency in the management of homeland security and in 
the coordination of all involved entities, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommends the 
creation of a specific federal agency aimed at dealing with homeland security issues226. The 
report devises such an agency, a key component of which should be the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, to bear responsibility “for planning, coordinating, and integrating 
various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.”227 In addition to the 
functions vested in such an agency, the National Security Council is destined to play a 
strategic role in the framework of homeland security as conceived by the report. Congress, 
too, is included in the Hart-Rudman Commission’s proposal, and its intervention is actually 
considered as a prerequisite for the reorganization of the whole administrative apparatus 
pertaining to homeland security. The report, indeed, recommends that Congress “refurbish 
the legal foundation for homeland security in response to the new threat environment.”228  
 
4. Terrorism and Cybersecurity 
 National security concerns tend to vary in subject and evolve in degree of intensity 
over time, as showed by the fact that terrorism is not perceived anymore as the most 
prominent threat to the security of the country, as it was – instead – in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks on U.S. soil. It has been noted that the 9/11 attacks brought national security 
back at the forefront among the matters the President had to address, as was the case during 
the Cold War229. The two George W. Bush administrations engaged in an incessant war on 
terror, which raised a heated debate among constitutional and administrative law scholars 
over the proper compromise to reach between security and freedom without violating the 
Constitution230. Such a debate was stirred up above all by such Government policies as 
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warrantless wiretapping and extraordinary renditions whose legitimacy has been strongly 
challenged. As the terrorism threat seemed to be fading away due to the weakening of Al 
Qaeda and of its satellite organizations, however, the self-proclaimed Islamic State sprang 
up in 2014, thereby posing new dangers to U.S. national security. It has been noted that the 
U.S. Government has an interest in hampering the emergence of a dominant power in the 
Middle East231. A scenario characterized by multiple states and authorities, indeed, will 
enable the United States to maintain an influence in that region, and as a result, the stakes of 
a direct attack on U.S. soil will wane232.  
 Cybersecurity, the purpose of which – as the term suggests – is to protect a country 
from cyberattacks, i.e., attacks brought through information technologies, is a challenge the 
United States has faced in recent years. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
pointed out that cybersecurity and the relative infrastructure “are vulnerable to a wide range 
of risk stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards.”233 This strategy 
document underscores that copying with cybersecurity proves highly burdensome for some 
reasons. First of all, cyberattacks may come from anywhere in the world, since only expertise 
in computer science is what it takes to perpetrate them, regardless of the exact location of 
the author. However, cyberspace is related to physical assets, which constitute the 
infrastructure of the cybersecurity system, and as a result, a major challenge consists “[in] 
reducing vulnerabilities and consequences in complex cyber networks.”234 The critical 
infrastructure implying the usage of information technologies is crucial to the efficient 
provision of basic services – such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, and 
financial services – and, accordingly, the Federal Executive is strongly committed to 
securing such infrastructure. This objective, which – the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review notes – is more complicated to achieve today than it was in the past because 
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the critical infrastructure “is increasingly subject to sophisticated cyber intrusions that pose 
new risks,” constitutes a major homeland security mission235. The accomplishment of such 
a mission calls for cooperation between various levels of government, as well as between 
public entities and the private sector. Even though the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) lies at the heart of the overall cybersecurity framework within the federal executive 
branch, the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review specifies that such a department 
is not entrusted with the whole responsibility, but other two departments are involved in the 
managing of cybersecurity: the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense236. 
Furthermore, it is stressed that the DHS performs its functions by following “a risk-informed 
approach,” which takes into account all threats and hazards capable of jeopardizing the 
critical infrastructure of cybersecurity237. An executive order and some directives regulate 
such an approach238. The accomplishment of the mission to secure cybersecurity 
infrastructure in light of the threat posed by the Islamic State may prompt the executive 
branch to invoke secrecy in the interest of national security, thereby refusing to disclose 
certain information concerning the management of cybersecurity or the conduct of cyber 
operations against the Islamic State239.   
 
5. Leaks in the National Security Domain 
a. The Regulation of Leaks in the Espionage Act of 1917 as Codified 
 A leak consists in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information outside the 
executive branch and namely to the press, so that such information can be published, and 
                                                          
235 Id., at 40. 
236 Id., at 40-41. 
237 Id., at 41. 
238 Id., at 42. The regulation of the approach the DHS is supposed to follow in tackling cybersecurity 
is found in the following sources: Executive Order 13,636 (“Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity”), February 12, 2013, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (February 19, 2013); Presidential Policy 
Directive/PPD – 21 (“Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”), February 12, 2013; 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST), Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (February 12, 2014); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, The 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) -- NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience (December 2013).     
239 See W.J. HENNIGAN, Pentagon Wages Cyberwar Against Islamic State, Los Angeles Times 
(February 29, 2016) (statement of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
(“We don’t want the enemy to know when, where and how we’re conducting cyberoperations […]. 
We don’t want them to have information that allows them to adapt over time.”)  
67 
 
thus become of public domain. The Espionage Act of 1917240, codified at sections 792 et 
seqq. of Chapter 18 (“Espionage and Censorship”), U.S. Code, establishes punishment for 
all persons involved in the unauthorized disclosure of national security information subject 
to classification. On the one hand, the First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees both 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. On the other hand, the unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information could reasonably endanger national security. Stone has 
argued that in such a conflict between supreme values, courts are called upon to determine 
whether “the value of the disclosure to informed public deliberation outweigh[s] its danger 
to the national security.”241 In particular, section 793 (“Gathering, transmitting or losing 
defense information”) identifies the information the legal system protects by providing for a 
specific crime in a twofold manner. First of all, section 793(a), which targets the person 
unlawfully obtaining protected information, enumerates the objects in which information 
pertaining to national defense consists, and thus establishes the content of such 
information242. Subsections (d) and (e), instead, refer to the medium containing such 
information243, and – respectively – target persons who have lawful or unlawful access to 
such information, and in either case deliver, transmit, or cause the transmission of the 
information to someone who is not entitled to obtaining it. All persons involved in leaking 
operations shall be punished if they are aware that such information “could be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation […].”244  Furthermore, 
section 798 punishes the unlawful disclosure of classified information, and in such a case, 
                                                          
240 Pub. L. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (June 15, 1917). 
241 GEOFFREY R. STONE, Top Secret: When Our Government Keeps Us in the Dark, 2 (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2007). 
242 Among the specific objects of national defense information section 793(a) pinpoints is 
“information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, […] building, office, research 
laboratory or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in 
progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States […].”   
243 Subsections (d) and (e) applies to persons who – respectively – have lawful or unlawful access to 
and transmit or cause the transmission of “any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, 
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note 
relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense […].” 
244 18 U.S.C. § 793(d),(e). See MARY-ROSE PAPANDREA, Balancing and the Unauthorized 
Disclosure of National Security Information: A Response to Mark Fenster’s Disclosure Effects: 
WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 94, 104 (2012) (noting that even though “this 
requirement might offer protection to well-meaning defendants who believed the disclosed 
information was important for the public to know, it does not require a court to balance the harm of 
disclosure against its benefits.”) 
68 
 
too, it has to be ascertained that the author of the disclosure, i.e., “[w]hoever knowingly and 
willfully” communicates or otherwise makes available classified information to someone 
who is not entitled to receiving the release of such information, by transmitting or using such 
information brings harm “to the safety or interest of the United States or […] benefit of any 
foreign government to the detriment of the United States […].” For purposes thereof, section 
798(b) defines classified information as “information which, at the time of a violation of this 
section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States 
Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” Not any 
classified information, however, triggers application of section 798, the scope of which, 
identified quite accurately in subsection (a)245, is limited to cryptographic and 
communication intelligence information. Other sections in the U.S. Code, only some of 
which concern national defense information,246 are devoted to leaks247.  
 
b. Whistleblowing 
 The concept of leak is closely related to that of whistleblowing. The latter, however, 
refers to situations in which agency employees disclose what they consider “unlawful 
secrets,”248 and consequently, those employees need protection from any retaliation on their 
work position because of their decision to expose unlawful activities or practices. The 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989249, as amended, provides for the general legal 
framework on whistleblowing, which is also addressed by sector federal statutes250. The 
effectiveness of all these statutes, however, has been questioned especially in the very 
domain of national security251. Pozen notes that while in general terms, such statutes ensure 
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actual protection to departments’ and agencies’ employees who disclose alleged wrongdoing 
in the conduct of agency business to officials within the executive branch or to congressional 
committees252, the same statutes “offer less succor when it comes to classified information,” 
as in this field they turn out to be “confusing and user-unfriendly […].”253 These statutes, 
indeed, do not provide whistleblowers in the national security domain with specific 
protection from such retaliation as may consist in revoking the security clearance, whose 
possession is requisite for access to classified information. In the fields of national security 
and foreign affairs, loss of one’s security clearance – the Author points out – “generally 
means loss of one’s job [, as well].”254 If, on the one hand, federal legislation on 
whistleblowing is usually interpreted as defective towards those who – whatever their 
motivation – reveal classified information without being authorized to do so255, it has been 
noted, on the other hand, that those who decide to leak national security information outside 
the executive branch tend to not deploy whistleblowing procedures256.  
 
c. WikiLeaks Disclosures and Their Implications  
 The unauthorized disclosure of classified information – especially when it is massive 
in amount, as with the case of WikiLeaks – tends to stir up public debate, which may also 
last a long time, but it is usually hard to pinpoint the actual impact of disseminating secret 
information on the legal system in general and on the national security domain in particular. 
WikiLeaks is a journalistic organization that has disclosed through online publication a huge 
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number of secret documents and information about various national governments since 
2006, but got into the spotlight – at least in the United States – especially in 2010 and 2011. 
In that period, indeed, WikiLeaks released thousands of documents concerning the conduct 
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq257, and of diplomatic cables pertaining to U.S. embassies. 
Some major newspapers in the United States and Europe also published a good deal of such 
documents and information. However, what has been the impact of such ponderous 
dissemination of secret information? It has long been underlined the difficulty to identify 
how much the revelation of secret information to the public really affects policymaking in 
the United States258. Various scholars have detected the same difficulty with respect to 
WikiLeaks disclosures259, which in any event stirred up public debate on the matters 
involved by such disclosures260. It is probably correct Papandrea’s assertion that WikiLeaks 
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“is notable not because the disclosures were all that harmful [to U.S. national security and 
foreign affairs,] but because government officials fear they are losing the ability to control 
classified information […].”261 Edward Snowden’s dissemination, occurred in 2013, of 
secret surveillance activities carried out by the National Security Agency262 appears to have 
had a stronger impact on the executive branch of the Federal Government263 and generated 
a broader public debate264, even though this is a case where the concept of leak overlaps that 
of whisteblowing265.  
 Furthermore, what appears to be somewhat interesting about the WikiLeaks affair is 
how disclosures occurred, and thus how WikiLeaks actually operates. In this regard, 
WikiLeaks has been compared to the Pentagon Papers, a set of documents setting forth U.S. 
foreign policy towards Vietnam266, both by the press267 and scholarship. The publication of 
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such a leaked study, which President Nixon tried to impede268, caused litigation that 
eventually got before the Supreme Court269. In their concurring opinions, Justices Black and 
Douglas set forth some interesting observations – respectively – on the concept of security270 
and on that of secrecy271. Scholars agree that between the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks 
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differences overcome analogies, and thus criteria used to analyze the former may not be 
applied to the latter272. In particular, a clear difference is concerned with the possibility to 
identify intermediaries, who winnow leaked material and determine what is worth 
publishing. This possibility existed without a doubt at the time of the Pentagon Papers, while 
– it has been observed – appears to be not so essential with respect to such an organization 
as WikiLeaks273. However, regardless of the more or less marked success in implementing 
the concept of transparency274, all leaks have in common the effect of bringing information 
to light – and this effect may well bring about the dissolution of deep secrets – without resort 
to the Freedom of Information Act275. Since classified information is shielded from access 
by a specific exemption to freedom of information, leaks may be considered a means to 
bypass the FOIA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
(Douglas, J., concurring). He then suggests that government secrecy should be restricted as much as 
possible, since it “is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors.” Id., at 724. A 
principle of publicity must govern matters of general interest, on which indeed “there should be 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate.” Ibid. (referring to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U. S. 254, 269-270)).   
272 See BELLIA, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, supra 
note 257, at 1454 (pinpointing, in brief, the main issues that WikiLeaks’ way of releasing secret 
documents raises as follows: “the challenge of controlling the secondary transmission of leaked 
information and the corresponding likelihood of ‘unintermediated’ disclosure by an insider; the risks 
of non-media intermediaries attempting to curtail such disclosures, as a response to government 
pressure or otherwise; and the pressing need to prevent and respond to leaks at the source.”)   
273 See PAPANDREA, Balancing and the Unauthorized Disclosure of National Security Information, 
supra note 244, at 110 (arguing that prior to WikiLeaks, publication of classified or otherwise 
sensitive information required an identifiable intermediary, while “WikiLeaks and everything it 
represents – easy technology, disclosure outside the U.S. borders – raise the specter that these gate-
keeping intermediaries making generally responsible publication decisions are no longer 
necessary.”) 
274 See PELED, WikiLeaks as a Transparency Hard-Case, supra note 268, at 75 (arguing that 
“WikiLeaks and Data.gov have made it clear that simply dumping information in the public 
commons does not achieve transparency.”) 
275 Id., at 73-74 (observing that WikiLeaks does not follow “the more traditional approach to 
transparency that developed through the implementation of FOIA.”)   
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B. Homeland Security 
1. The Concept of Homeland Security 
 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a new policy 
concept276 was inserted into the federal legal system – homeland security. As Morag has 
observed, homeland security “is a uniquely American concept.”277 Section 101(1) of title 6, 
U.S. Code, makes it clear that the terms “American homeland” and “homeland,” whenever 
used in chapter 1 (“Homeland Security Organization”) of this title – and, actually, in the U.S. 
Code in general – mean the United States of America. Since “homeland security” is peculiar 
to the United States, other countries usually do not adopt such a concept, and even if they 
do, the concept does not have abroad analogous implications to those, which feature the U.S. 
legal system278. As Friedman has maintained, while most states – especially the Western 
ones, i.e., those the United States is usually compared with, simply refer to national security 
and/or national defense, in the U.S., especially after September 11, 2001, “homeland” has 
been added to either traditional concepts, thereby forming the combined terms “homeland 
security” and “homeland defense.” Such terms, besides, may not be used as synonyms, for 
– as I will try to explain later just by touching upon this matter – the former appears to have 
a broader scope. Notwithstanding such a distinction, the addition of “homeland” to concepts 
that may well stand and make sense even without it shows that there is a peculiar American 
way of meaning such concepts, a way that is almost impossible to replicate elsewhere, 
because – as noted above – it is deeply rooted in the American experience. If it is so, one 
may wonder what such an American way consists in. However, it is not easy to provide a 
clear answer, since the various entities within the executive branch operating in the domain 
of homeland security are entrusted with numerous, diverse missions and objectives. The 
enlargement of the administrative state after the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil to address 
specifically homeland security shows how seriously the U.S. Government has since taken 
                                                          
276 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, Homeland Security: The Concept and the Presidential Coordination 
Office – First Assessment, 32 Presidential Stud. Quart. 397 (2002). 
277 See NADAV MORAG, Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?, 7 Homeland 
Security Affairs 1, 1 (2011); ID., Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 1 (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons ed., 2011). 
278 MORAG, Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?, ibid. (“With the creation, in 
the United States, of homeland security as a policy framework and practitioner and academic 
discipline during the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century, other democracies took 
notice and some began to use the terminology of homeland security without, necessarily, 
understanding its scope or raison d’être.”) 
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on its commitment to protecting the homeland. It is a serious commitment that the adoption 
of the concept of “homeland security” already implies. Friedman has gone so far as to argue 
– and I advocate his interpretation – that the addition of “homeland” to the word “security” 
indicates an excessive way of defining security279. What is excessive, however, is not only 
the definition of security, but also – and above all – the content of such a definition, which 
in turn indicates a sort of obsession for security.   
 There is not a unique definition of homeland security280. Actually, any attempt to 
pinpoint a single definition capable of applying to the whole activity carried out by the 
Federal Executive is doomed to failure, because since the 9/11 attacks, different strategic 
documents issued by the White House or the Department of Homeland Security have given 
homeland security different content281. By establishing a plurality of missions and 
objectives, indeed, those documents have molded the scope of homeland security in a 
different fashion. Originally, terrorism, i.e., the challenge to cope with the terrorism threat, 
constituted the core of homeland security. Even though the concept of homeland security 
already existed before September 11, 2001, the attacks on American soil prompted the U.S. 
Government to address homeland security at statutory level specifically, and to reorganize 
the structure of the Federal Executive to make it more rational and to improve the degree of 
coordination among different entities. The United States had undergone terrorism attacks 
before, but only those occurring on September 11, 2001 – as White has pointed out – turned 
homeland security “[into] a national priority.”282 The features of these attacks made them 
unique, as the 9/11 Commission report underscored283, and thus led to a series of legislative 
and administrative measures aimed at addressing homeland security, and – mainly – at 
                                                          
279 BENJAMIN H. FRIEDMAN, Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security, 126 Pol. Sc. Quart., 
77, 78 (2011) (“Only a nation that defines its security excessively needs to modify the word ‘security’ 
to describe defense of its territory.”)    
280 See SHAWN REESE, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, 
CRS Report for Congress (January 8, 2013), p. 1 (observing that “[t]en years after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, policymakers continue to grapple with the definition of homeland security.”) 
281 Id., at 8 (providing a scheme of different definitions of homeland security established by different 
official documents issued either by the White House or by the Department of Homeland Security in 
the period 2007-2012). 
282 RICHARD WHITE, Towards a Unified Homeland Security Strategy: An Asset Vulnerability Model, 
10 Homeland Security Affairs 1, 10 (2014).   
283 See The 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 104, at 339 (characterizing the Al Qaeda attacks as 
“an event of surpassing disproportion.”) Unlike the case with previous attacks – the report explained 
– the 9/11 attacks caused extraordinary damage to the United States in consideration of the extremely 
small group of people directly involved in them. Id., at 339-340.  
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countering the terrorism threat. The objective to tackle terrorism is still an essential 
component of homeland security. The current National Security Strategy, issued by the 
White House in February 2015, indeed, states that “[t]he threat of catastrophic attacks against 
our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists.”284 The scope of homeland 
security, however, gradually extended a lot beyond terrorism. By a few years after the 9/11 
attacks, in part due to such events as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, homeland security had 
included in its scope domestic catastrophic accidents and natural disasters285. In 
consideration of this expansion of the scope, White has argued that the primary purpose of 
homeland security should be identified as the purpose “to safeguard the United States from 
[any] domestic catastrophic attack.”286 According to the Author, indeed, such a formulation 
of the primary purpose of homeland security is neutral, since it does not discriminate 
between terrorism attacks and other catastrophic events, whatever the cause or motivation. 
Yet, there is more. Today, not only does homeland security aim to organize and managing 
the United States’ reaction to natural disasters and other domestic accidents; it also addresses 
border and maritime security, as well as immigration287. Given the vastness the scope of 
homeland security has acquired over time, Reese has properly highlighted the importance of 
pinpointing priorities among diverse missions of homeland security288, and such priorities 
are mainly established by the national security strategy289. 
                                                          
284 THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Strategy (February 2015), p. 9. The document concedes 
that this threat and the way of coping with it have changed a lot since 2001, but it is still crucial to 
putting considerable efforts at fighting terrorism. Id., at 9-10. 
285 See HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007), 
p. 10 (stating that homeland security is aimed at coping with – inter alia – both natural disasters, 
which “encompass a variety of meteorological and geological hazards,” and “catastrophic domestic 
accidents involving industrial hazards and infrastructure failures.”) As to the latter, they consist, for 
instance, in chemical spills, which may have a severe impact on public health and environment. Ibid. 
Furthermore, disasters caused by human activities include incidents capable of affecting the critical 
infrastructure of the United States, as was the case with the electrical power blackout known as the 
“Northeast Blackout of 2003.” Id., at 11. 
286 WHITE, Towards a Unified Homeland Security Strategy, supra note 282, ibid. 
287 See REESE, Defining Homeland Security, supra note 280, at 2. 
288 Ibid. (“A clear prioritization of strategic missions would help focus and direct federal entities’ 
homeland security activities.”) 
289 See WHITE, Towards a Unified Homeland Security Strategy, supra note 282, ibid. (noting that the 
national security strategy issued by the White House “serves as a coordinating framework for federal 
agencies to prioritize resources and schedule activities to work towards common national goals.”) 
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 Homeland security is much broader than homeland defense, which is only one of its 
components. Relyea has observed that the concept of homeland security “appears to be 
rooted in past efforts at civil defense,”290 and finds confirmation of this assumption in a 2001 
address of President Bush291. Civil defense, which began to assume a stable framework only 
after the end of World War II292, was traditionally deemed to embrace all the entities and 
activities aimed at preventing any damage to the United States and its citizens or at 
dampening the consequences of such damage293. At the dawn of the Cold War, indeed, the 
executive branch intended to establish “a permanent peacetime system of civil defense” 
characterized by flexibility, so that it could be “quickly and easily expanded to meet the 
exigencies of a given situation.”294 Therefore, what used to be included in the old concept of 
civil defense now constitutes an integral part of the scope of homeland security. The 
Department of Defense is responsible for ensuring the main objectives homeland defense 
requires to achieve – namely, “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or 
other threats as directed by the President.”295 The scope of homeland security, as already 
noted, is broader than that of homeland defense, as the former puts together – above all – 
“law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues.”296 All levels of government, 
as well as the private sector, must participate in addressing such issues.  
 
                                                          
290 RELYEA, Homeland Security: The Concept and the Presidential Coordination Office, supra note 
276, at 398. 
291 See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 37 (November 12, 2001), 1617 (statement 
of President George W. Bush) (“We will ask state and local officials to create a new modern civil 
defense service, similar to local volunteer fire departments, to respond to local emergencies when 
the manpower of governments is stretched thin.”)    
292 RELYEA, Homeland Security: The Concept and the Presidential Coordination Office, supra note 
276, at 398.  
293 See U.S. OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING, Civil Defense for National Security, 1 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1948) (arguing that civil defense “is the mobilization, 
organization and direction of the civilian populace and necessary supporting agencies to minimize 
the effects of enemy action directed against people, communities, industrial plants, facilities and 
other installations – and to maintain or restore those facilities essential to civil life and to preserve 
the maximum civilian support of the war effort.”) 
294 RUSSEL J. HOPLEY, Letter of Transmittal, in Civil Defense for National Security, id., at v. 
295 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Homeland Defense, Joint Publications 3-27 (Washington, D.C., 2007), p. 
vii. 
296 REESE, Defining Homeland Security, supra note 280, at 2.  
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2. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland 
Security within the executive branch of the Federal Government. Section 111(b) of title 6, 
U.S. Code, identifies the mission of the department by conferring upon it a set of functions, 
ranging from sheer terrorism prevention to preservation of “the overall economic security of 
the United States,” which the Department of Homeland Security has to ensure that “[be] not 
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.”297 Under 
section 112, the President of the United States shall appoint, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, a Secretary of Homeland Security298, who is the head of the Department of 
Homeland Security, and as such exercises direction, management, and control powers over 
it299. The Secretary is entrusted with the authority to ensure coordination between all entities 
and persons involved in homeland security300, and performs such authority by availing 
himself or herself of a specific office301. 
 The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has been described as “the 
largest government reorganization in a half century,” since this “colossal” department has 
combined functions formerly distributed among twenty-two federal agencies302. The 
magnitude of the reorganization, which has also been questioned as a way of facilitating the 
control over administrative structures303, received criticism in Congress prior to the passage 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002304. It has also been noted that initially, President Bush 
himself opposed the idea of establishing a new bureaucratic unit within the federal 
                                                          
297 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(F). 
298 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1). 
299 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2). 
300 6 U.S.C. § 112(c). 
301 The office subsection (c) refers to is the Office for State and Local Government Coordination, 
whose specific responsibilities are enumerated by section 361(b) of the same title – title 6, U.S. Code.   
302 DARA K. COHEN et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal 
Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev., 673, 676 (2006). 
303 Id., at 675 (arguing that “[t]he creation or reorganization of bureaucratic units – such as the new 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – remains among the least understood techniques for 
controlling bureaucracies.”) 
304 See Cong. Rec., supra note 71, at S11034 (statement of Sen. Mark Dayton) (“I do not hear the 
American people clamoring for us to build a new, cumbersome, bureaucratic leviathan […]. While 
Americans cast their ballots, they may have had hopes for safer communities than protection from 
terrorism, but I sincerely doubt that they were voting to create a huge, new bureaucracy.”) 
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administration305. The Department of Homeland Security was created to ensure 
centralization and coordination306 in the gathering of sensitive information by the Federal 
Executive. Therefore, the establishment of the DHS responded to the need to provide some 
rationalization, on an organizational level, to the handling of information that is classified or 
sensitive in any event. Congressional debate shows that the members of Congress were 
aware that the Department of Homeland Security would handle a massive amount of 
classified information307. It has also been noted that all the pre-existing agencies brought 
into the DHS apparatus were assigned new statutory objectives and responsibilities. As a 
result, the new missions of such agencies added up to more traditional ones308, and both of 
them had to be funded. However, the new homeland security missions were preferred from 
the outset in the allocation of resources309. Furthermore, Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast argue 
that since the President exercises immediate control over the DHS, its creation resulted in 
strengthening the Chief Executive’s powers310. Such a consequence of the establishment of 
the Department of Homeland Security emerged in congressional debate311.  
 
 
                                                          
305 COHEN et al., Crisis Bureaucracy, supra note 302, at 692 (setting out some underlying reasons 
that may have prompted the President to change his mind and champion the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security). 
306 Id., at 718 (pointing out that “[t]he frequently stated rationale for creating the massive Department 
was coordination.”) 
307 See 148 Cong. Rec. S11035 (November 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Robert Byre) (“I understand 
this new Homeland Security Department will be wrestling with many issues of national security that 
should not be subjected to public disclosures rules.”) 
308 COHEN et al., Crisis Bureaucracy, supra note 302, at 727 (underlining that some clashes may 
occur between the “legacy mandates [of those agencies and their] new homeland security mandates 
[…].”) 
309 Ibid. (contending that “the creation of DHS, coupled with an insistence on revenue neutrality, 
appears to have allowed Bush to transfer resources out of agency legacy mandates into new homeland 
security concerns.”) 
310 Id., at 729 (maintaining that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 “allowed the President to select 
a cadre of political appointees to oversee twenty-two agencies lodged in a new bureaucracy with the 
daunting mission of protecting the homeland while continuing to carry out non-homeland security 
missions.”)  
311 See 148 Cong. Rec. S8046 (September 3, 2002) (statement of Sen. Robert Byre) (“The President 
is clearly attempting to remove the limits on his power [in the homeland security domain,] and 
Congress is doing very little, up to this point, to restrain the administration’s ambitions.”) Sen. Byre 
also observed that conceding that the President should have the necessary leeway to cope with 
various homeland security concerns did not mean granting him “a blank check.” Ibid. 
80 
 
3. The Withholding of Critical Infrastructure Information from Public Access 
 In addition to establishing the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 pinpointed a new category of information – critical infrastructure 
information – that is excluded from public access pursuant to the FOIA. Subtitle B, devoted 
to the regulation of the access to such information, has its own autonomy within the statute, 
and is called the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, codified at 6 U.S.C. 131 et 
seqq. Section 133(a)(1) establishes the subject to which the exemption from disclosure 
applies by referring to critical infrastructure information that is “voluntarily submitted” to 
the Department of Homeland Security, and expressly stated as such pursuant to paragraph 
(2). The denial of access is legitimate only if the information is used by the Department of 
Homeland Security not only to ensure the security of critical infrastructure, but also for 
“analysis, warning, interdependency study, recovery, reconstitution, or other informational 
purpose [regarding critical infrastructure].” By identifying the FOIA as a legal basis, Section 
133(a)(1)(A) vests the Department of Homeland Security with the authority to keep such 
information secret. This authority enters the scope of the FOIA through Exemption 3, which 
– as will be noted later – allows federal agencies to withhold information from public access 
by applying nondisclosure provisions contained in federal statutes other than the FOIA.  
 
 
C. The Relation Between National Security and Homeland Security 
1. A 2012 House of Representatives Subcommittee Hearing 
 What is the relation between the concepts of national security and homeland security? 
Do they coincide or not? Since neither national security nor homeland security has a single, 
pre-fixed definition, it is not easy to answer those questions. On February 3, 2012, the 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management – Committee on Homeland 
Security of the House of Representatives held a hearing312 during which interesting 
observations were advanced in this regard. The main purpose of the hearing was to analyze 
the strategy documents issued by the White House and – especially – by the Department of 
Homeland Security, and to assess the implementation of such documents. In his opening 
statement, the Chairman of the subcommittee, Rep. Michael T. McCaul, notes that the DHS 
                                                          
312 Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats? – Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management – Committee on Homeland Security, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess. (February 3, 2012) (Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Gov’t Print. Off.). 
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is the third-largest department within the executive branch of the Federal Government as for 
number of employees and amount of funding313. He also points out that the DHS has met 
with severe criticism “for excessive bureaucracy, waste, ineffectiveness, and lack of 
transparency that have hindered its operations and wasted taxpayer dollars.”314 As already 
noted above, both the White House and the Department of Homeland Security issue 
periodically strategy documents on national security and homeland security315 that establish 
multiple objectives and priorities, and set forth different definitions of the two concepts. 
McCaul argues that not only does such a plethora of strategy documents may bring about 
overlaps of their content; it also ends up hampering Congress in the exercise of its oversight 
function, and – above all – giving rise to confusion in DHS components, i.e., in the entities 
charged with accomplishing DHS missions316. He concludes that the DHS would need a 
single strategy document capable of embracing all diverse objectives and missions of the 
Department, such as to control the U.S. borders, to secure transportation, and to protect the 
President317.  
 The added value of the hearing – hence, the reason as to why I am mentioning it – 
lies in various references that participants in the hearing made to the relation between the 
concepts of national security and homeland security. In particular, after Rep. Keating notes 
that the 2010 National Security Strategy is the first strategy document to include homeland 
security within the scope of national security318, Caudle stresses the point that homeland 
security is by now an integral part of national security319. She refers to the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review Report320 issued in February 2010, then superseded by a new 
                                                          
313 Id., at 1 (Oral Statement of Hon. Michael T. McCaul) (noting that the DHS has more than 200,000 
employees, and its annual budget amounts to more than 40 million dollars).  
314 Ibid. 
315 The main strategy documents are the following: the National Security Strategy; the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security; the National Strategy for Counterterrorism; The Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review; the Bottom-Up Review. Ibid.  
316 Ibid.  
317 Id., at 2. 
318 Id., at 4 (Oral Statement of Rep. William R. Keating). 
319 Id., at 12 (Oral Statement of Sharon L. Caudle). 
320 Section 707 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by the Implementation 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, supra note (Pub. L. 110-53, 110 Stat. 2731 
(August 3, 2007)) provides for the mandatory adoption of a quadrennial homeland security review 
report. Section 707 is now codified as section 347 of title 6, U.S. Code. Section 347(a)(2) defines 
such a document as “a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the Nation, 
including recommendations regarding the longterm strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland 
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quadrennial report, issued in June 2014. The 2010 report – Caudle notes – underscores the 
importance of ensuring that all members of the homeland security community, also known 
as the homeland security enterprise, whatever the level of government – federal or local – or 
the legal nature – public or private – of the entity or person, be involved in accomplishing 
the missions and achieving the objectives of the DHS321. She also indirectly pinpoints 
government transparency as one of the means capable of preventing global shocks and thus 
contributing to tackling threats to national security322.      
 Above all, during the hearing, Caudle is asked whether she detects any marked 
differences between the 2010 National Security Strategy and the two issued by former 
President George W. Bush323. She recalls once again that the 2010 National Security Strategy 
is the first to put “emphasis on placing homeland security within National Security.”324 She 
deems such a choice to be wise, since homeland security “does not stop at the [U.S.] 
borders.” The scope of homeland security, as gradually broadened since 2001, ends up 
overlapping in part with the traditional domains of national security and foreign affairs. 
However, such overlapping – Caudle contends – is not an alarming issue, for “what we do 
overseas internationally, [as well as] what we do with our defense establishments […,] has 
                                                          
security and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the 
[DHS].”  
321 Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?, supra note 312, at 14 
(“As was the case with earlier policies, the [2010] Report called for a National framework of 
collective efforts and shared responsibilities to build and sustain critical homeland security 
capabilities.”) 
322 Caudle points out that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grasped the essential 
role of drivers of future change to preventing global shocks and thus to addressing national security 
properly. Id., at 20 (referring to FEMA, Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2020: Forging 
Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty. Office of Policy and Program Analysis (January 2010)). 
According to the FEMA report, among such drivers is “Universal Access and Use of Information,” 
notably favored by the Internet and related technological innovations. Id., at 7 (italics in original). 
Tools developed in the Information Age result in increasing public participation in decision-making, 
as they “empower the public to play a greater role [than the one they could play in the past] in 
identifying ‘what matters’ and producing content themselves.” Public information official 
repositories, i.e., administered by the Federal Government, realize the beneficial function to steer 
individuals, i.e., public information users, through an ocean of material freely available online. The 
report argues that “[p]ublic access to ‘raw’ data sources, such as Data.gov expands the possibilities 
of how existing information can be used, and increases expectations of government transparency.” 
Ibid (emphasis added).   
323 Under the George W. Bush Presidency, the White House issued two national security strategies – 
respectively – on September 17, 2002, and on March 16, 2006.  
324 Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?, supra note 312, at 28. 
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implications for homeland security.”325 The multiple homeland security missions identified 
by the 2010 National Security Strategy go well beyond the prevention of terrorism. They are 
also aimed, indeed, at coping with natural disasters, accidents caused by human activities, 
and any other event or situation capable of jeopardizing the ordinary functioning of the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the scope of homeland security now embraces – Caudle 
notes – “all of the threats and hazards or drivers of those threats and hazards that are 
important [to the United States].”326  
 
2. A Possible Distinction Between National Security and Homeland Security 
 The conclusion I draw from this dissertation over the concepts of national security 
and homeland security is that the only possible distinction between them rests on the purely 
domestic or international scope of the threats considered. In this sense, homeland security 
includes all threats and hazards that turn out to be only domestic, i.e., that exhaust their 
effects within the U.S. soil. Accordingly, the threats that instead exceed the borders of the 
United States – thus, threats that operate on a global scale or, in any event, have international 
implications – fall within national security. To put it differently, whenever foreign 
intelligence gathering or other operations conducted abroad by agencies of the Intelligence 
Community are involved, the more traditional concept of national security applies. 
 Such a reconstruction is consistent with what Morag, for instance, has maintained 
about the concept of homeland security. The Author, indeed, defines homeland security as a 
product not only “of American geographic isolation [, but also of] the strong tendency 
throughout American history to believe that there was a clear divide between events, issues, 
and problems outside US borders and those inside US borders.”327 Before the concept of 
homeland security was recognized at statutory level and specific structures within the 
executive branch of the Federal Government were created to address homeland security – 
Morag observes – the U.S. legal system and its institutional framework were suited to cope 
with international threats, but not also with purely domestic threats. Instruments tailored to 
threats concerning only the American territory, i.e., threats that did not involve U.S. foreign 
affairs, were missing. Therefore, the Federal Government created a structure and began 
adopting policies concerning homeland security “to fill this void between what the US could 
                                                          
325 Ibid.  
326 Id., at 31. 
327 MORAG, Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?, supra note 277, ibid. 
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do overseas and what it was unable to do domestically.”328 Such a distinction between 
national security and homeland security probably lays itself open to critics because of the 
theoretical approach it is based upon. However, it is the only distinction that two concepts 
featured by such fluctuating content – as I tried to explain – appear to indicate. 
 
 
D. Executive Privilege and Its Heterogeneous Content 
 The term “executive privilege” has a plurality of contents, whose essence is the 
ability of the executive branch to refuse the release of certain information it holds. Kinkopf 
has emphasized the vagueness of the concept, because of the multiple forms into which it 
can turn329. The various acceptations of the concept have in common the purpose of invoking 
executive privilege to withhold executive branch information from a branch of the Federal 
Government other than the Executive or from the public in general. The main meaning of 
executive privilege is based on a narrow interpretation, according to which the privilege may 
be used to prevent Congress from gaining access to executive branch information. This 
meaning implies a demand for information that Congress advances usually when exercising 
its power to inquire into the executive branch. An extensive interpretation, instead, refers to 
the ability of the Executive to withhold information not only from the other two branches of 
the Federal Government – the legislative and judicial ones – but also from the general public, 
i.e., from any person, whether an individual, an association, or an enterprise. Pursuant to this 
much broader interpretation, executive privilege features a twofold scope. The first one 
pertains to national security and foreign affairs, two fields that invocation of the privilege is 
aimed at protecting, whereas the other scope is concerned with the free exchange of opinions 
within the executive branch. The latter is deemed to encompass the so-called presidential 
communications privilege. Rozell has defined such a privilege as “the right of the President 
and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from those who have 
compulsory power – Congress and the courts (and therefore, ultimately, the public).”330  
                                                          
328 Ibid.  
329 See NEIL KINKOPF, Executive Privilege: The Clinton Administration in the Courts, 8 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 631, 631-632 (2000) (arguing that executive privilege “is remarkably protean [, as] 
it can assume a seemingly limitless array of forms and, consequently, is difficult to grasp.”)  
330 MARK J. ROZELL, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush 
Presidency, 52 Duke L. J. 403, 404 (2002). 
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 If executive privilege is meant in a broad sense, it can be divided into different 
categories depending on the person or entity appealing to the privilege. If it is a federal 
department or agency that invokes the privilege, two exemptions to the Freedom of 
Information Act may be applied, either separately or jointly. The FOIA exemptions will be 
analyzed later331. Here, I limit myself to pointing out that Exemption 1 protects information 
concerning national security and foreign affairs, while Exemption 5 allows the withholding 
of material, whose disclosure would impede the frank exchange of ideas within an agency 
or between two or more agencies. Even though Exemptions 1 and 5 may be simultaneously 
called upon to deny access to certain information, they follow their own standards and have 
a different impact on freedom of information. It has been observed that “[t]he right to 
disclosure differs markedly with the two classifications.”332 However, according to the most 
widespread acceptation of the privilege, it is the Chief Executive that raises a claim of 
executive privilege to refuse the release of information to Congress, when it is conducting 
an inquiry into the executive branch, or to a federal court or another authority having judicial 
functions, as was the case with the denial of access to a special prosecutor who had requested 
access to some White House conversation in United States v. Nixon333. As Kitrosser has 
noted, indeed, U.S. presidents tend to claim “[the existence] of a constitutional right to 
withhold information from Congress, the courts, or persons or agencies empowered by 
Congress to seek information.”334 The two souls of executive privilege are both legitimate: 
the President may resort to the privilege “to protect, first, certain national security needs, and 
second, the confidentiality of White House deliberations when it is in the public interest to 
do so.”335  
 It is also important to stress that executive departments and agencies may not call 
upon the FOIA exemptions to prevent the legislative branch from gaining access to 
information held by those departments and agencies. Section 552(d) of title 5 of the U.S. 
Code, indeed, provides that the FOIA “is not authority to withhold information from 
Congress.” Therefore, the FOIA expressly excludes legislative-executive disputes 
concerning access to information from its own scope. Furthermore, in a 1990 decision, Dow 
                                                          
331 See infra, Chapter 3, Part II. 
332 PETER L. STRAUSS et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law. Cases and Comments, 501 
(11th ed., University Casebook, 2011). 
333 See infra, Chapter 3, Part I. 
334 KITROSSER, Secrecy and Separated Powers, supra note 65, at 492. 
335 ROZELL, Executive Privilege Revived?, supra note 330, ibid. 
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Jones & Co. v. Dep’t of Justice336, the D.C. Circuit held that Exemption 5 may not be 
deployed to shield from public access information the executive branch has submitted to 
Congress. The exemption – the Court argues – is intended to cover the exchange of ideas 
either within an agency or between agencies of the executive branch, but does not extend to 
the flow of communications between the legislative and executive branches. Under no 
circumstances may Congress be considered an agency under the FOIA. Therefore, 
communications between the former and a federal agency are not tantamount to such inter-
agency memoranda or letters as Exemption 5 refers to, and thus do not fall within the scope 
of this FOIA exemption 5337. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                          
336 917 F. 2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
337 Id., at 575. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  
 
 
 
I. Transparency and Secrecy in Congress 
A. The Reference to Secrecy in the U.S. Constitution  
 As regards recognition of the authority to withhold information from public access 
and to conduct secret business, the U.S. Constitution shows a paradox. In the United States, 
government secrecy is usually meant as a set of prerogatives and privileges that are vested – 
either expressly or implicitly – in the executive branch, not in Congress. Other than the 
Freedom of Information Act, whose nine exemptions result in restricting access to federal 
agencies’ records, it has always been acknowledged – almost unanimously – the existence 
of executive privilege, a long-standing institution the Executive may appeal to in order to 
shield its business from public scrutiny, above all from congressional investigations. While 
executive privilege is not provided for in the Constitution, secrecy in Congress finds formal 
recognition in the written text, namely in Article I, Section 5, Clause 3338. Firstly, this 
provision bestows regulatory autonomy on the two houses of Congress by empowering them 
to set their own rules of procedure. The scope of each House’s power to regulate its 
proceedings is extremely broad, and subject only to basic limitations. As the Supreme Court 
stated as early as 1892, provided that the Constitution is observed and there is no violation 
of fundamental rights, “all matters of method are open to the determination of the [two] 
House[s].”339 The power is also inexhaustible, and thus it can be exercised innumerable times 
without ceasing to exist340. Secondly – and above all – Article I, Section 5, Clause 3, Const. 
prescribes that each House “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish 
                                                          
338 See DAKOTA S. RUDESILL, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 Harv. Nat. Sec. J.  Secret Law 
241, 254 (2016) (underscoring that such a Clause is “the Constitution’s sole textual reference to 
secrecy […].”) 
339 United states v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).  
340 Id. (arguing that the two Houses power to establish rules of proceedings “[is] always subject to be 
exercised by the House[s], and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge 
of any other body or tribunal”). Id.    
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the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy […].”341 Even 
though the House and Senate journals were envisioned by the Founding Fathers as the 
official means to report on business carried out within Congress342, the Congressional 
Record has been “more widely known, referred to, and used”343 since its establishment in 
the late nineteenth century. The former have a more restricted content, as they do not 
encompass any transcription of floor debates344. Both the House of Representatives and 
                                                          
341 For a discussion about this clause, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 410–22 (2004). 
342 MILDRED L. AMER, The Congressional Record; Content, History and Issues, CRS Report for 
Congress (January 14, 1993) p. 2 (noting that the Framers bore in mind the experience of the 
Constitutional Convention, where secrecy was the rule, with only journals reporting its proceedings). 
Relyea mentions an episode occurred during the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in which James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania, dealing with a proposal to grant each chamber of the federal Congress 
discretion in determining what parts of its journal should be published, stated: “The people have the 
right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the 
legislature to conceal their proceedings.” HAROLD C. RELYEA, Congress as Publisher: Politics, 
Institutions, and Policy, 29 Gov’t Inform. Quart. 291, 291 (2012) (drawing upon M. Farrand (ed.), 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 260 (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1937)). 
343 AMER, The Congressional Record, id., at 1. 
344 The journals include presidential communications, Congress’s voting, the legislative history of 
statutes, and procedural matters. They mainly consist in “minute books or summaries of the floor 
proceedings published after each session of the Congress is completed.” ROBERT C. BYRD, Reporters 
of Debate and the Congressional Record, in ID., 2 The Senate, 1789-1989, 311-312 (Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1991). The House and Senate journals, therefore, may be defined as 
“the minutes […] of the business transacted by each house [of Congress].” AUGUST IMHOLTZ, JR., 
Congress as Publisher: The Magic of the U.S. Congressional Serial Set, 29 Gov’t Inform. Quart. 
285, 285 (2012). The journals used to be published in the United States Congressional Serial Set, 
also known simply as the Serial Set, which consists in “[a] massive compilation of printed 
publications of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.” It published congressional 
materials as of the First Session of Fifteenth Congress (1817). Congressional business carried out 
before the Fifteenth Congress, instead, is documented in the American State Papers. The name U.S. 
Congressional Serial Set, which actually was officially adopted only in 1981 after several names had 
followed one another over time, derives from the structure of the collection. It is divided into 
volumes, within which materials are arranged by class of publication, and such an arrangement is 
repeated for each (annual) session of each Congress. All volumes are applied “the serial, or 
sequential, numbering [which begins] with Serial Set Volume number 1 in the 15th Congress […].” 
Id. The U.S. Congressional Serial Set published the House and Senate journals from the 15th 
Congress (1817) through the Eighty-second  Congress (1952), and has ever since contained reports 
and documents prepared by or submitted to the two Houses. Reports consist in studies or 
communications – the latter’s aim is to express the official standpoint of a given congressional body 
– that committees (or subcommittees) submit to the House or the Senate. The main category of 
committee reports is given by legislative reports, which “far outnumber the other types of Reports in 
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Senate rules of proceedings allow of closed-door meetings and regulate the access to the 
relevant records. 
 
 
B. The Congressional Record: History, Regulation, and Structure 
 The Congressional Record came up as the final stage of a tortuous history concerning 
the publication of legislative branch business. No sooner had the First Congress begun to 
work, than the House of Representatives opened its doors to the public, and reporters were 
allowed to report unofficially floor debates, which were thus divulged on newspapers. It has 
been pointed out that those early accounts were not impartial, but rather biased by the 
opinions of the newspapers’ editors345. Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate held 
secret meetings until 1794346, and, nevertheless, excerpts from Senate journals were at times 
published in newspapers. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the National 
Intelligencer – a Washington, D.C. newspaper - had been publishing reports – albeit, rather 
inaccurate347 - on congressional proceedings348. The newspaper owner was Samuel Smith, 
who later sold it to Joseph Gales. Gales and William Seaton, both stenographic reporters, 
were officially assigned the position of Congress printers in 1819. The Register of Debates, 
which they published 1824 through 1837, consisted in a set of abstracts of such floor debates 
as the editors deemed worthy of reporting. The accounts of congressional proceedings 
                                                          
the Serial Set […].” Id., at 286. Somewhat marginal room in the Serial Set is devoted to the class 
known as “documents”, whose items “[are] less directly tied to legislative functions than the 
Reports.” Id. This class, indeed, mainly includes executive branch material.          
345 AMER, The Congressional Record, supra note 342, ibid. 
346 The House of Representatives and the Senate granted reporters access to congressional debates 
and proceedings – respectively – as of April 8, 1789, and December 9, 1795. See DAVID BLEISCH, 
The Congressional Record and the First Amendment: Accuracy is the Best Policy, 12 Boston. C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 341, 344 note 14 (1985) (drawing upon ELISABETH G. MCPHERSON, Reporting 
the Debates of Congress, 28 Q.J. of Speech, 141, 144 (1942)). The Senate Historian’s Office states 
that “[t]he framers of the Constitution assumed that the Senate would follow their own practice, as 
well as that of the Congressional Congress, of meeting in secret.” See http://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/minute/The_Senate_Opens_Its_Doors.htm (quoted in CHRISTOPHER M. 
DAVIS, Secret Sessions of the House and Senate: Authority, Confidentiality, and Frequency, CRS 
Report for Congress (December 30, 2014), p. 3 note 11).  
347 AMER, The Congressional Record, supra note 342, at 3. 
348 The National Intelligencer “published its notes on the [congressional] debates, which other 
newspapers around the country then clipped and reprinted.” BYRD, Reporters of Debate and 
Congressional Records, supra note 344, at 312-313 (quoted in AMER, The Congressional Record, 
ibid.).  
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published in the Register of Debates were more complete than those contained in the 
National Intelligencer. After ceasing to be Congress printers, Gales and Seaton embarked on 
a brand new project in the period 1833-34. They began publishing the Annals of Congress, 
which were aimed at reconstructing abstracts of past congressional proceedings by drawing 
on many diverse sources349. However, in the same period, the Congressional Globe began 
publishing reports on congressional business, as well, and its accuracy in the transcription 
of debates improved considerably over time.  
 As of 1850, reporting on congressional activities was gradually institutionalized, with 
Congress directly providing the Congressional Globe’s editors with copies of debates350. As 
Amer has noted, “[t]his semiofficial plan marks the beginning of so-called ‘verbatim’ 
reporting in Congress.”351 However, the time was not ripe yet for a verbatim account of 
congressional proceedings, which indeed was quickly overcome by a new policy of the 
Congressional Globe, based on a selection of debates worthy of publication352. Then, a three-
phase process led Congress to sanction the daily publication of the Congressional Record. 
On June 23, 1860, Congressional Joint Resolution 25353 established the Government Printing 
Office (GPO), whose current name is Government Publishing Office354, as a federal printing 
                                                          
349 The Annals of Congress’s scope stretched from the First to the Eighteenth Congress, First Session, 
thus it did not extend beyond 1824.  
350 In the period 1848-1850, Congress entered into contracts by which independent reporters and 
newspapers’ editors were financed to record congressional debates and deliver a copy of them to the 
Congressional Globe’s editors. See BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, 
supra note 346, at 345. This operation was supposed to ensure a good level of accuracy of the debates 
printed in the Congressional Globe.   
351 AMER, The Congressional Record, supra note 342, at 5. 
352 In 1851, the Congressional Globe’s editors stated that from then onward, verbatim reporting of 
debates would be restricted to speeches and remarks deemed to be of primary importance by 
congressmen. As far as the remainder of congressional debates, the Congressional Globe would 
provide just a summary. See BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra 
note 346, at 345.  
353 12 Stat. 117. 
354 See Pub. L. 113-235, div. H, title I, §1301 (a),(b), Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2537 (December 16, 
2014). In particular, division H of the statute, which contains the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Act of 2015, addressed the issue of the name of the Government Printing Office. Subsection (a) of 
Section 1301 of the act established the change of name from Government Printing Office to 
Government Publishing Office, and subsection (b) prescribed that from then on, the new name should 
be considered as replacing the old one anywhere it was found in the law and official papers. Both 
these subsections are codified at as a note preceding section 301 of title 44, U.S. Code. Furthermore, 
subsection (c) substituted the term ‘‘Director of the Government Publishing Office’’ for “Public 
Printer” anywhere the latter term appeared in title 44, U.S. Code. Section 301 provides that the 
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agency within Congress’s administrative structure. In 1865, Congress prescribed that the 
Congressional Globe be published daily355. On March 3, 1873, Congress entrusted the 
Government Printing Office with the function of officially publishing debates and activities 
of the two Houses356. The Congressional Record, which replaced the Congressional Globe, 
constituted “the official congressional gazette”357 all along. It was first published on March 
5, 1873358, and has been relied upon ever since as the official source for disseminating 
Congress proceedings and debates.  
 Chapter 9 of Title 44, U.S. Code, deals with the Congressional Record. Most of its 
content is tantamount to the codification of the Printing Act of 1895359, which still sets forth 
“much of the basic policy” on the matter360. Section 901 obliges the Joint Committee on 
Printing361, which is entrusted with an oversight function over “the arrangement and style of 
the Congressional Record,” to ensure that the Congressional Record be “substantially a 
verbatim report of [congressional] proceedings.” It is also required that “all needed action 
for the reduction of unnecessary bulk” be taken. The Congressional Record has to be 
endowed with semimonthly and session indexes362. They are prepared by the Government 
Publishing Office, which is also charged with the printing and distribution of the 
Congressional Record, “as directed by the Joint Committee on Printing.”363 The 
responsibility for the different activities regarding the Congressional record is split between 
Congress – namely, the Joint Committee on Printing – and the GPO: A control function over 
                                                          
Director of the Government Publishing Office be appointed by the President “by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”   
355 13 Stat. 460 (1865).  
356 17 Stat. 510 (1873). 
357 HAROLD C. RELYEA, The Exercise of Congressional Legislative Power in Service to the Informing 
Function, CRS Report for Congress (May 22, 1996), p. 4, in Public Access to Government 
Information in the 21st Century – Hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration, U.S. 
Senate, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996), p. 311. 
358 The first issue was devoted to a special session that the Senate held on the previous day – March 
4, 1873.  
359 28 Stat. 601 (January 12, 1895). 
360 RELYEA, The Exercise of Congressional Legislative Power, supra note 357, ibid.  
361 The Joint Committee on Printing has an equal composition of representatives and senators. Under 
section 101 of Title 44, U.S. Code, indeed, the Joint Committee on Printing consists of the 
chairperson and four members of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the 
chairperson and four members of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of 
Representatives.   
362 44 U.S.C. § 902. 
363 Section 903. 
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the content, revision, and reporting is vested in the former, while the latter is responsible for 
the printing, binding, and distribution of the Congressional Record364. Section 903 specifies 
that the Congressional Record, which is issued daily, is to bear the date “of the actual day’s 
proceedings reported.” The Joint Committee on Printing has also to ensure that the daily 
edition of the Congressional Record include information concerning congressional 
committee meetings and hearings, as well as “a brief resume of congressional activities for 
the previous day […].”365 The information on congressional committees that is found in the 
daily Congressional Record boils down to details about place and subject matter of 
committee meetings and hearings, and to the mentioning of reports submitted to the Houses. 
Therefore, the Congressional Record encompasses no verbatim account of congressional 
business carried out within committees.  
 The daily edition of the Congressional Record consists of four sections: the 
proceedings of the House of Representatives and those of the Senate; the Extensions of 
Remarks; the Daily Digest. The Congressional Record provides an account of what 
happened in Congress the previous day, i.e., the day before the issuing of the gazette. Other 
than the daily edition of the Congressional Record, there is a permanent edition, whose 
content and structure are somewhat different. The sections devoted to the proceedings of the 
two Houses, actually, include communications from the executive branch and a good deal 
of heterogeneous material bearing on legislation passed or just introduced. Furthermore – 
and above all – the report of floor debates turns out to be not as accurate as the term 
“verbatim” used in Section 901 would suggest. Not only are members of both Houses 
allowed to edit the transcript of their remarks before they are published in the Congressional 
Record; Representatives are also authorized to extend their oral remarks, and Senators – in 
like manner – are granted permission to conclude speeches when they were cut off on the 
floor. Further remarks and material not related to ongoing legislative proceedings, too, may 
be inserted in the Congressional Record, provided that certain size restrictions are observed. 
The section concerning the Extensions of Remarks, previously known as the Appendix, 
includes all material that does not directly bears on floor activities. This section, therefore, 
may be composed of the following contents: remarks meant as prosecution of speeches that 
members of Congress could not conclude on the floor due to time limits; the transcript – 
either verbatim or edited – of speeches delivered or remarks made entirely out of Congress; 
                                                          
364 AMER, The Congressional Record, supra note 342, at 6. 
365 44 U.S.C. § 905. 
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the text of letters Representatives or Senators send or receive from constituents; the printing 
– rectius, the posting, when the operation is performed electronically – of newspaper articles. 
A list of scheduled committee and subcommittee meetings, too, is usually placed in this 
section. The last portion of the daily edition of the Congressional Record is the Daily Digest, 
established by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (also known as the Congressional 
Reorganization Act)366. Its content is tantamount to “a concise and convenient account” of 
business conducted by congressional committees and subcommittees367. The final section of 
the Congressional Record, therefore, sheds some light on committee and subcommittee 
meetings and hearings, as well as on further activities they carry out. 
 
 
C. Television Coverage of Congressional Proceedings 
 Television coverage of congressional proceedings began on a regular basis only in 
the 1970s, at the end of a long-standing resistance by the members of Congress. Television 
had already entered Congress previously, but only on sporadic occasions368. Not 
surprisingly, significant improvements in this regard occurred in the Seventies, “a time of 
heightened public interest in ‘sunshine in government’ and legislative-executive clashes over 
the Vietnam War.”369 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970370 addressed both the 
openness of committee meetings and hearings371 and the broadcasting of committee 
hearings. Section 116(a) provides for the possibility of radio or television broadcast of such 
committee hearings as the public is allowed to attend. Paragraph (b) amends rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives especially by setting out the two main objectives the 
broadcasting of committee hearings is directed at achieving.  
 These objectives reveal the need to render the business carried out in Congress – 
namely, in the House of Representatives – more intelligible. The first of such objectives 
somehow evokes the metaphor of sunshine mentioned above, as it expressly considers TV 
                                                          
366 Pub. L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (August 2, 1946), especially section 221. 
367 AMER, The Congressional Record, supra note 342, at 9. 
368 The opening day of the 80th Congress (1947-1949) at the House of Representatives was subject 
to TV coverage. Just a few other committee hearings of the House and Senate were televised in the 
following two decades. See WALTER J. OLESZECK, Congress and the Internet: Highlights, CRS 
Report for Congress (August 29, 2007), p. 5.  
369 Id. 
370 Pub. L. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (October 26, 1970). 
371 Respectively, sections 103 and 112, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. 
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coverage of committee hearings as instrumental to “the education, enlightment, and 
information of the general public […].” The second objective, too, is targeted at the public. 
The broadcasting of committee hearings, indeed, may significantly contribute to the 
comprehension by citizens of the role of the House of Representatives within the Federal 
Government. Such objectives are still found in the Rules of the House372. Furthermore, 
reference is made to “such written rules” as each congressional committee may adopt to 
regulate radio or television coverage, as well as photography, of hearings that are accessible 
to the public. In the Seventies, an increasing demand for TV coverage of floor debates also 
arose in Congress373. Eventually, the House decided to broadcast its floor debates in 1979, 
while the Senate adopted an equivalent TV coverage system only in 1986.   
 
 
D. Secret Sessions of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
 The two houses of Congress have at times met in secret, albeit not simultaneously, 
as secret sessions have been more frequent in the Senate than in the House of 
Representatives. It has been noted that Congress’s secret sessions enjoy “the blessing of the 
Constitution’s Journal Clause” mentioned above374. As far as the House is concerned, the 
rate of secret meetings was higher in the early decades of the American Republic. Other than 
the secret sessions that were held during the War of 1812 against Britain “mainly to receive 
confidential communications from the President,”375 the House convened secret meetings in 
1825 and in 1830. Since then, closed-door sessions have taken place only four times: in 
1979, 1980, 1983, and 2008376. On all these occasions, the issues to discuss in secret either 
fell within the domains of foreign affairs and national security or regarded purely military 
                                                          
372 Rule XI(4)(a) of the Rules of the House of Representatives. See infra. 
373 Top staff aide to the House subcommittee on broadcasting Donald Wolfensberger noted that the 
demand for TV coverage of floor proceedings came out mainly to offset President Nixon’s unique 
position at the forefront of the political scene. He stated: “What gave impetus to televising House 
floor debates was the recognition by the Democratic leadership in early 1970 that President Richard 
Nixon was dominating the airwaves with defenses of his Vietnam War policies, while congressional 
opponents were not being given equal access by the networks.” DON WOLFENSBERGER, 20 Years of 
House TV: A Bipartisan Reform for a Partisan Era?, Roll Call, March 18, 1999, 6 (quoted in 
OLESZECK, Congress and the Internet, supra note 368, ibid.). 
374 RUDESILL, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, supra note 338, ibid.  
375 DAVIS, Secret Sessions of the House and Senate, supra note 346, at 3. 
376 Ibid. 
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operations377. As noted above, senators always gathered in secret until 1794, but the practice 
of holding closed-door meetings remained quite an appealing option even subsequently. 
Executive sessions of the Senate – i.e., the sessions devoted to nominations of Federal 
Government’s officials and treaties – featured confidentiality until 1929378. Data show that 
the Senate has held 57 secret sessions since 1929, most of the times to deal with matters of 
                                                          
377 In 1979, a secret session of the House took place to discuss the Panama Canal Act. In 1980, 
instead, the House of Representatives deemed it proper to call a secret session to consider Communist 
countries’ involvement in Nicaragua. The situation in Nicaragua also formed the subject matter of a 
1983 secret session, focused on the U.S. engagement in paramilitary operations. Finally, the House 
held a closed-door session on March 13, 2008, to discuss the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
and electronic surveillance in general – a very hot topic at the time. Id., at 5. 
378 The distinction between legislative and executive sessions as for openness to reporters and the 
public emerged as a compromise that the U.S. Senate reached with state legislatures with respect to 
the degree of openness of congressional proceedings. Only executive sessions could enjoy the 
privilege of secrecy for  more than a century. Id., at 3 note 12 (referring to the Senate Historian’s 
Office, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Executive_Sessions.htm). 
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national security379 or foreign affairs380, or to discuss the impeachment of federal judges381. 
Impeachment proceedings against President Clinton led to six secret sessions of the Senate. 
Furthermore, the Senate practice of holding closed meetings to address international treaties, 
especially when they involve delicate matters, has not disappeared382.  
 The two Houses of Congress have separate regulation for secret sessions. Rule XVII, 
clause 9, of the House of Representatives sets down the conditions on which a secret session 
may be held: when the House has received confidential communications from the President 
of the United States or when a Representative acquaints the House with possession of 
                                                          
379 On July 14, 1966, for example, a secret session was aimed at considering Senate Resolution 283, 
proposed by Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The 
resolution “advocated the creation of a separate Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations to 
oversee the major intelligence agencies.” FREDERICK M. KAISER, Legislative History of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, CRS Report for Congress (August 16, 1978), p. 4. In 1972, the 
Senate tackled a controversy on disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, a study on the U.S. policy towards 
Vietnam and on the subsequent conduct of the Vietnam War, by holding some closed-door sessions. 
On the Pentagon Papers affair, see infra. Senator Mike Gravel requested the publication of the 
memorandum in the Congressional Record. The memorandum, in fact, was no mystery to the 
American people, as some portions of it had come out in newspapers and magazines. On May 2 and 
4, 1972, the Senate held secret sessions to debate the propriety of disclosing the memorandum, which 
was then still classified. Therefore, as has been observed, the key question the Senate found itself 
discussing behind closed doors “[was] whether the Senate, without executive branch permission, 
could declassify documents.” House, Senate Probe Government Classification Policy, in CQ 
Almanac 1972 (28th ed., Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), available at 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal72-1249450. During the May 2 and 4 
secret sessions, Gravel’s request was not put to the vote, so the Senate failed to take a final stand. 
Nevertheless, the Senate, accepting a proposal put forward by Senator Robert C. Byrd, published an 
edited transcript of the secret sessions in the May 5 Congressional Record. According to Byrd, 
indeed, “nothing was said during the secret session that revealed sensitive information […].” Ibid. 
The affair was not over. On his own initiative, Gravel had a broad portion of the Pentagon Papers 
printed in the May 9 Congressional Record, after reading it on the floor. He received a good deal of 
criticism for doing so without awaiting the Senate approval.   
380 On May 15, 1978, for example, there was a Senate closed session aimed at analyzing upsides and 
downsides of selling military aircrafts to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.  
381 For instance, on December 7, 2010, the Senate held a closed-door session to debate the 
impeachment of a federal judge of Louisiana, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. See DAVIS, Secret Sessions 
of the House and Senate, supra note 346, at 3.  
382 On December 20, 2010, for instance, the Senate opted for a secret session to discuss the ratification 
of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; official name – Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), a treaty between the United States and 
Russia on the reduction of nuclear arms. In 1997, instead, a Senate secret session was devoted to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. Ibid. 
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communications to be kept confidential. In such cases, once the House has been cleared of 
all outsiders, the communications may be read, and proceedings may be carried out. As to 
how to request the closure of proceedings, either a special rule or a specific motion made in 
the House may entail a secret session. The motion for a secret session may not be debated, 
“but is subject to the motion to lay on the table”383. The Representative who offers the motion 
for a secret session is granted one hour of debate after the House resolves into secret session. 
If the motion is approved by a simple majority, the House is cleared of everyone other than 
Members of the House, “and those officers and employees specified by the Speaker whose 
attendance was essential to the functioning of the secret session.”384 These employees are 
directed to sign an oath of secrecy. The discussion of a motion to disclose the content of the 
closed session may be allowed, as well, “within narrow limits of relevancy.”385 Even if the 
motion is rejected, the House may by unanimous consent have the transcripts of the secret 
session published in the Congressional Record, as edited according to suggestions made by 
committees. The confidential communications to be read and discussed in secret session may 
well be in possession of a congressional committee386.  
 As regards the upper chamber, Rule XXI of the Standing Rules of the Senate lays 
down the basic regulation of secret sessions387. Under Paragraph 1, if another Member of the 
Senate seconds a motion for a closed session offered by any Senator, the Presiding Officer 
is obliged to have the chamber cleared, and direct that the doors remain closed throughout 
the session. Therefore, it has correctly been observed that the Presiding Officer is granted 
“no discretion about going into secret session if the motion is made and seconded.”388 The 
motion to shield a session from public access, therefore, is debated. Paragraph 2, instead, 
cross-refers to rules XXIX and XXXI. The former is devoted to executive sessions – i.e., 
                                                          
383 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of 
Representatives of the United States One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, H.Doc. 113-181, 113th 
Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Gov’t Publ. Off., 2015), p. 778. 
384 Id, at 779. 
385 Id., at 778. 
386 For instance, a secret session that took place in the 96th Congress (1980) was concerned with 
classified information held by two House committees – the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. They both had specifically authorized usage of the 
classified material in a secret session of the House of Representatives. Given the existence of that 
very specific authorization, the Speaker overruled a point of order objecting to the motion of a secret 
session. Id., at 779.   
387 Available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome. 
388 DAVIS, Secret Sessions of the House and Senate, supra note 346, at 2. 
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sessions aimed at considering executive business, whose scope includes nominations and 
treaties. Paragraph 2 of Rule XXIX contains the list of persons allowed to remain inside the 
chamber when the Senate doors are closed for examination of either simply executive or 
confidential matters. The list is an open one, for the Presiding Officer is empowered to 
pinpoint discretionally further officers who are permitted to attend a secret session. All 
officers present at such a session are sworn to secrecy. By approving a specific resolution, 
however, the Senate may remove the injunction of secrecy389. The order prescribing the 
removal has to be published in the Congressional Record390. Rule XXIX(5) provides for 
serious sanctions to impose on those who violate the injunction of secrecy, and specifies that 
the sanctions also apply to the illegal disclosure of confidential information dealt with in 
committees and subcommittees. Those sanctions consist in expulsion from the assembly, if 
the transgressor is a Senator, or in dismissal from service and punishment for contempt, if 
the violation is committed by either an officer or an employee. Rule XXXI(2) establishes a 
general rule of openness for the carrying out of Senate business, and requires a majority vote 
for an executive session – devoted to either a particular nomination or an international treaty 
– to take place in secret. In such cases, the secrecy of proceedings may be overcome by a 
majority vote, and each Senator is allowed “[to] make public his vote in closed executive 
session.” The matter of secret sessions is also addressed in the Rules on Impeachment Trials 
of the Senate391. Rule XX provides that when considering an impeachment trial, the Senate 
be supposed to hold open meetings, unless it decides otherwise. A motion for a closed-door 
session may not be debated. If any Senator objects to it, the motion is immediately put to the 
vote, and “yeas and nays […] shall be entered on the record.”392  
 
 
E. Secrecy in Congressional Committees 
 The poor level of transparency that features business transacted in congressional 
committees has frequently been denounced throughout the American experience, even in 
                                                          
389 Rule XXIX(3). 
390 Rule XXIX(4). 
391 See Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials, in U.S. 
SENATE, Senate Manual containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, And Resolutions Affecting the 
Business of the United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off., 
2014)  p. 223.  
392 Id., at 227. 
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recent years393. In his autobiography, Robert La Follette, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin 
1906 through 1925, in addition to censuring parties’ practice of delegating the adoption of 
crucial decisions to an inner circle of chosen politicians, clearly described the state of 
frustration he found himself in detecting shortage of openness in committee activities394. The 
fact that a good deal of committee business is conducted in secret might be seen as an 
alarming issue, in consideration of the pivotal role committees have within the legislative 
branch of government. The scope of committee activities, indeed, covers all main functions 
vested in Congress, as it ranges from legislative drafting to executive branch oversight and 
even to policy formulation395. In general terms, at the heart of the congressional committee 
system are standing committees, i.e., the committees established by statute or resolution to 
operate permanently396. Welsh has characterized standing committees as “the workhorses of 
                                                          
393 See, e.g., PERLA NI, Open House Project group, September 4, 2007, available at 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/openhouseproject/H7QYJhuzpuU ("We just did a survey 
of what transcripts/audio/video is available from Congressional Committees […]. You’ll notice how 
many committees for which there is no audio, no video nor transcript available […]. Also, for the 
ones that do post video, either it’s not posted until months after or it’s posted, but not archived so if 
you miss it, you’ve missed it.”) (quoted in Free Government Information (FGI), Congressional 
Committees - Secrecy and Delayed Transparency, available at http://freegovinfo.info/node/1405). 
394 See ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, La Follette’s Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political 
Experiences, 298-99 (Madison: The Robert M. La Follette Co., 1913) (“Since I came to the United 
States Senate [, again] and again I have protested against secret hearings before Congressional 
committees upon the public business. I have protested against the business of Congress being taken 
into a secret party caucus and there disposed of by party rule; I have asserted and maintained at all 
times my right as a public servant to discuss in open Senate, and everywhere publicly, all legislative 
proceedings, whether originating in the executive sessions of committees, or behind closed doors of 
caucus conferences.”)  
395 MICHAEL WELSH, An Overview of the Development of U.S. Congressional Committees, Law 
Librarians’ Society of Washington, D.C. publication (July 2008), p. 1 (arguing that “[b]esides their 
role in crafting legislation, [congressional committees] have become the instruments through which 
Congress oversees executive agencies and participates in formulating and overseeing national 
policy.”) As for the instruments to perform those functions, all types of committees are allowed to 
hold hearings and carry out investigations. Practice shows that only standing committees usually 
report out legislation, instead, as they are the category of committees more directly involved in 
legislative procedures. Id. Standing committees, indeed, are empowered to intervene significantly on 
ongoing legislation by sifting and amending bills before their final passage.      
396 Welsh points out that when referred to standing committees, the adjective “permanent” should not 
be meant in an absolute sense, especially with respect to the House of Representatives. Firstly, the 
House – unlike the Senate – lacks continuity, and thus it needs reconstituting when each new 
Congress commences its functions. Secondly, both the House and Senate enjoy discretion to abolish 
standing committees, provided that their own rules are amended accordingly. Id., at 1 note 1.  
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Congress.”397 The other types of committees, indeed, have a more restricted role within the 
overarching framework of Congress398.  
 Woodrow Wilson detected a “despotic principle” of secrecy in the carrying out of 
congressional activities399, and committee proceedings represent the paradigm of such 
secrecy400. Congressional committees, indeed, tend to deploy secrecy much more than it is 
invoked for floor debates and proceedings. Rudesill has noted that as of the nineteenth 
century, floor activities were kept secret only in exceptional circumstances, while 
committees continued to meet behind closed doors quite frequently, thereby following a 
tradition of secrecy that was typical of the Continental and Confederation Congresses401. 
This gap in the usage of secrecy between floor and committee activities – the Author points 
out – still exists today: on the one hand, the two Houses hold “open full chamber sessions to 
debate and pass the law,” with closed sessions taking place only sporadically; on the other 
hand, committees tend to carry out closed-door proceedings on a regular basis “to consider 
non-public information.”402 The secrecy of committee debates might stir up alarm, for, as 
Wilson observed, they are essential to molding legislation403. However, despite pointing out 
that public scrutiny is thwarted by the tendency “to shift the theatre of debate upon legislation 
from the floor of Congress to the privacy of the committee-rooms,”404 Wilson recommends 
                                                          
397 Id., at 1.  
398 Select and special committees imply the existence of a contingency, and – therefore – are devised 
to work temporarily, and established just to achieve a given purpose. Ibid. Once the purpose is 
reached, their mission is accomplished, so they should cease to exist. In fact, select committees tend 
to last much longer than special committees, as the very term “special” suggests. Joint committees, 
instead, differ manifestly from the other committee categories, especially for their composition, 
which is given by an equal number of Representatives and Senators. Id., at 2. 
399 WOODROW WILSON, Cabinet Government in the United States, in MARIO R. DI NUNZIO (ed.), 
Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches, 219 (New York: New York University Press, 
2006) (quoted in JAMES J. MARQUARDT, Transparency and American Primacy in World Politics, 71 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011)). 
400 WOODROW WILSON, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, 84 (Boston and 
New York, 1885) (maintaining that congressional committees are “accustomed to hold their sessions 
in absolute secrecy.”)  Since committee business is governed by a rule of secrecy, transparency of 
proceedings and debates through open-door sessions – the Author argues – ends up being a sort of 
“concession” granted by committees. Ibid. 
401 See RUDESILL, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, supra note 338, at 254-255. 
402 Id., at 255. 
403 WILSON, Congressional Government, supra note 400, at 82 (contending that “it is the discussions 
which take place in the Committees that give form to legislation.”)  
404 Id., at 81. 
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not overestimating the impact of committee secrecy. When drafting legislation, Congress 
benefits from frank discussion and competent advice, which are more likely to arise behind 
the closed doors of committee hearings and meetings405. The veil of secrecy that covers up 
committee proceedings and debates allows everyone involved – not only members of 
Congress, but also the officers, scholars, and stakeholders participating in hearings – to 
express their position freely, and even though full discussion may generate conflicts, it favors 
a better balancing of the interests at stake406. Therefore, secrecy is justified by the nature of 
committee activities, which end up resembling those carried out in workshops. In Wilson’s 
opinion, indeed, committees – namely, standing committees – “are legislative workshops 
that conduct their affairs ‘separately and in secret.’”407 Committee business comes down to 
“a joust between antagonistic interests,”408 while the battle on principles is up to the floor. 
Even if committee activities were published in detail – the Author continues – their verbatim 
accounts would be of little use to the public, and thus would represent no significant 
contribution to the democratic principle409. Wilson concludes that reduced transparency is 
totally consistent with the nature of committee business, which is instrumental to the powers 
vested in the two Houses of Congress410.  
 Specific regulation governs secrecy in congressional committees. As for the House 
of Representatives411, first of all, Rule XI(e)(1)(A) requires that each committee keep a 
                                                          
405 Id., at 82 (maintaining that the “siftings of legislative questions by the Committees are of great 
value in enabling the House [and the Senate] to obtain ‘undarkened counsel’ and intelligent 
suggestions from authoritative sources.”)   
406 Id., at 82-83 (observing that “the controversies which spring up in the committee-rooms, both 
amongst the committee-men themselves and between those who appear before the Committees as 
advocates of special measures, cannot but contribute to add clearness and definite consistency to the 
reports submitted to the House [and to the Senate].”) 
407 MARQUARDT, Transparency and American Primacy, supra note 399, ibid. (quoting WOODROW 
WILSON, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, 133 (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1964)).  
408 WILSON, Congressional Government, supra note 400, at 85. 
409 Ibid. (arguing that debates taking place in committees (and subcommittees) of Congress “could 
scarcely either inform or elevate public opinion, even if they were to obtain its heed.”)  
410 Id., at 83 (contending that a reason for excluding the publication of committee proceedings is that 
committees are “commissioned, not to instruct the public, but to instruct and guide the House [and 
the Senate].”) 
411 Rule X(1)(a)-(t) of the House of Representatives lists the standing committees the House itself is 
composed of and the subject matters entrusted to each of them. Under the general principle given in 
Rule XI(1)(a)(1)(A), the Rules of the House of Representatives also apply to its committees and 
subcommittees, within the limits of applicability. 
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complete record of all its proceedings and activities. By using wording that recalls the 
regulation of the Congressional Record contained in the U.S. Code, Rule XI prescribes that 
committees ensure “a substantially verbatim account of remarks actually made” in the course 
of hearings or meetings, and allows for only slight editing of delivered speeches “[due to] 
technical, grammatical, [or] typographical [reasons].” Mandatory transcript extends to any 
vote taken, whose record has also to be made available in electronic form, and a summary 
description of the subject matter of any vote is requisite, as well412. All records of a given 
committee are to be physically separated from the congressional records pertaining to the 
Representative serving as chair of that committee. The former are property of the House, 
and any Member, officer, or employee of the House is entitled to gain access to them413. 
Furthermore, Rule XI(e)(5) directs committees to have each hearing and meeting taped in 
both audio and video formats414, and to ensure that the recording be of easy access to the 
public415. Rule XI(g)(1) requires that each meeting of any standing committee or 
subcommittee be “open to the public, including to radio, television, and still photography 
coverage.” In the course of an open meeting, however, if the majority of the members is 
present, a committee or subcommittee is allowed “by record vote” to switch the remainder 
of the meeting into executive session and therefore into a secret session. The doors of the 
meeting may be closed when the disclosure of the matters the committee or subcommittee 
is to deal with “would endanger national security, would compromise sensitive law 
enforcement information, would tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, or 
otherwise would violate a law or rule of the House.” The same provision is established by 
subparagraph (2)(A) with respect to committee or subcommittee hearings. Either rule on the 
shielding of business from public access do not apply to meetings or hearings held by the 
Committee on Ethics or its subcommittees. Under subdivision (C), members, officers, or 
other staff may be denied by majority vote of a committee or subcommittee 
“nonparticipatory attendance” of a given hearing or of a series of hearings for the same 
reasons meetings and hearings may be closed to the general public. As for the Committee on 
Ethics, by contrast, secrecy is the general rule, while openness is the exception. Rule 
XI(3)(h)(1), indeed, requires that all meetings and hearings be held in executive session and 
therefore in secret. This secrecy rule is subject to two exceptions: one established by the 
                                                          
412 Rule XI(e)(1)(B)(i). 
413 Rule XI(e)(2)(A). 
414 Rule XI(e)(5)(A). 
415 Rule XI(e)(5)(B). 
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provision itself; it is for the members of the Committee, instead, to invoke the other. As far 
as the former is concerned, whenever the Committee holds a hearing devoted to sanctions, 
or a hearing takes place before an adjudicatory subcommittee, the hearing is open to the 
public. This exception, however, can be overcome by a majority vote of the committee that 
opts for a closed-door hearing416. Furthermore, the committee members are empowered to 
avoid that meetings and hearings be held in executive session, and thus be governed by a 
secrecy rule by adopting a majority vote that allows the public into the meeting or hearing. 
Finally, Rule XI(4) addresses audio and video coverage of committee proceedings. The 
scope of this coverage embraces all committee meetings and hearings that are accessible to 
the public417. Rule XI(4)(a) suggests that committees’ transparency enables the people to 
better grasp the importance of the House as a body of the federal Government, thereby 
implying that when such transparency is missing and audio and video coverage of committee 
business is not permitted, the functions of the House appear more obscure to the general 
public.  
 Similarly, the Senate committees have their own regulation of activities carried out 
in secret418. Rule XXVI(5)(b) of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires the openness to 
the public of any committee or subcommittee meeting, including those devoted to the 
conduction of hearings. Any Senator, however, is entitled to present a motion for the closing 
up of a meeting or a series of meetings, and if other members second the motion, the closing 
up is permitted, but it may not last more than fourteen calendar days. The matters, the 
discussion of which justifies the exclusion of the public from a meeting or a series of 
meetings are set out in clauses (1) through (6). More markedly than what the Rules of the 
House of Representatives do when pinpointing the reasons for closed-door meetings and 
hearings, those clauses recall some of the nine exemptions to the Freedom of Information 
Act, which allow executive branch agencies to withhold information from the public. Clause 
(1) refers to the two domains that are located at the core of executive branch secrecy – 
national security and foreign affairs. Clause (2), instead, authorizes a meeting or a series of 
meeting to be held in secret when the matters to discuss are concerned with committee staff 
                                                          
416 Rule XI(3)(h)(2). 
417 Rule XI(4)(e). 
418 After providing that the Senate standing committees are to be appointed “at the commencement 
of each Congress,” and are subject to the principle of continuity in the carrying out of business, 
paragraph 1 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate enumerates the existing standing 
committees (subparagraphs (a) to (p)). The number of Senators each committee has to consist of is 
set forth by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same rule. 
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personnel or purely internal procedures. Under clause (3), secrecy is possible when the 
matters to consider or the testimony to be taken at a meeting or more meetings may result in 
charging an individual with crime or misconduct, “or will represent a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of the privacy of an individual.” Clause (4) identifies the confidentiality that 
surrounds law enforcement investigations as a cause for secret meetings of Senate 
committees. Clause (5) pertains to financial or commercial information and to trade secrets 
that may be included in it, and allows a committee to hold closed-door meetings if either an 
act of Congress calls for confidentiality in the handling of that information or the unduly 
disclosure of the information would compromise competition by harming the position on the 
market of the concerned individual. Finally, clause (6) refers to other matters that statutes or 
executive branch regulations prescribe to be kept confidential. In addition, the closing of a 
committee meeting may represent a measure the Chair of the committee adopts to maintain 
order whenever disorder or protests spring up during an open meeting419. Each committee is 
required to keep a complete transcript or electronic recording of all its proceedings, even if 
some business is transacted in secret, unless a committee determines by a majority vote the 
exclusion of part of its proceedings from recording420.  
 
 
F. The Theory of Bleisch on Accuracy of the Congressional Record 
a. The Revision Privilege for Members of Congress  
 The so-called revision privilege, which – as Bleisch has noted – is acknowledged 
“[as] a matter of congressional tradition,”421 allows the members of Congress to revise and 
extend speeches delivered on the floor before they are published in the Congressional 
Record, and even to insert in it new remarks, never pronounced in Congress. The privilege 
is believed to date back to the first half of the nineteenth century, when editors of the Register 
of Debates began boosting the editing of remarks actually made on the floor by 
Congressmen422. It has been pointed out that originally, the scope of the privilege “was 
virtually unlimited.”423 Not only could members of Congress make any adjustments to 
                                                          
419 Rule XXVI(5)(d). 
420 Rule XXVI(5)(e)(1). 
421 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 349. 
422 Id., at 342 note 7 (referring to MCPHERSON, Reporting the Debates of Congress, supra note 346, 
at 144 note 22). 
423 Id., at 349. 
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remarks prior to their publication, but they were also permitted to add brand new speeches, 
never delivered on the floor. Furthermore, alterations to the verbatim transcript of speeches 
and remarks were not supposed to be marked as such, and as a result, it proved hard to 
distinguish edited speeches from those constituting the mere transcript of what was uttered 
in the course of congressional debate424. After some unsuccessful attempts, in 1978, 
Congress eventually passed a resolution to limit the use of revision privilege. Under the 
resolution, ex-novo speeches – i.e., speeches inserted in the Congressional Record as 
completely new material, since they were not delivered on the floor at all – were supposed 
to be delimited and thus marked by circular symbols called bullets425. The working of this 
mechanism, however, did not prove flawless426. Two main reasons for the existence and 
propriety of use of revision privilege have been raised. The first one refers to the purpose to 
correct and remove either typographical errors committed by official reporters in the 
transcript of debates or grammatical mistakes made by members of Congress when 
delivering a speech. Bleisch has stressed that in addition to coping with mechanical mistakes, 
this reason may extend to provide members of Congress with a remedy for “indecorous 
remarks made in the heat of debate.”427 The justification for invoking the privilege appears 
to be straightforward in all these cases, which have in common the fact that the privilege acts 
as a means to edit what has actually been uttered on the floor. The other primary reason 
underlies the usage of the privilege as a tool for members of Congress to enjoy more room 
– and time – than they are granted on the floor.  
 Bleisch opposes both justifications. Even though it is admirable the concern for 
transparency that may be deduced from his objections, I consider his stand too rigid. First, 
the Author points at the practice of allowing members of Congress to correct grammatical 
errors made in delivering speeches, and argues that such a practice results in “obscur[ing] 
the Record’s significance as an historical record.”428 If a member of Congress taking the 
floor gives a speech replete with mistakes, the speech – Bleisch observes – should be kept 
                                                          
424 Id. It has been emphatically contended that the Congressional Records contains “not only what 
was said in Congress, but also what members want people to believe they would have said had they 
been there [, and it is] hard to tell one from the other.” Id., at 349 note 47 (quoting 121 Cong. Rec. 
26, 33745 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Hubbard Jr.)). 
425 See 124 Cong. Rec. 4, 5207-09 (1978). 
426 See BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 351-352 
(mentioning practical situations in which the bullet mechanism unveils some shortcomings). 
427 Id., at 355. 
428 Id., at 356. 
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as such, to form evidence of a poor performance429. By the same token, Bleisch argues that 
even injurious remarks or expressions should be transcribed in the Congressional Record, as 
otherwise the historical value of the Congressional Record would be diminished. In other 
words, publishing insults actually pronounced may help grasp the dynamics of a certain 
debate in Congress430. Finally, Bleisch seems to challenge the propriety of inserting in the 
Congressional Record remarks not even partly uttered on the floor, for they affect – 
potentially at least – the process of detecting Congress’s legislative intent. The Author, 
indeed, assumes that since such remarks “[have gone] unchallenged on the floor,” thereby 
escaping any chance of rebuttal, they may orientate significantly the reconstruction of 
legislative intent431.  
 Bleisch’s position stirs up some observations on each count. It is undeniable that 
members of Congress are to be held accountable – especially to their constituents – for the 
speeches they deliver and for the way they express themselves on the floor. However, such 
speeches should be evaluated mainly by their contents. What is important of a speech is the 
message(s) it conveys, and the message is hardly affected by grammar mistakes. When it 
comes to insulting remarks, instead, Bleisch apparently has a point. The function of historical 
evidence would suggest that the Congressional Record contain transcripts of insults as they 
were uttered on the floor. However, Bleisch formulated its objection in 1985, when paper-
based dissemination of material was the rule. Today, the Internet and social networks make 
almost impossible for insults and gaffes to go unnoticed, insofar as potentially libelous 
remarks are exploited to slam political opponents, regardless of how embarrassing it may be 
for those to whom such remarks are ascribed432. Criticism to added remarks, too, should be 
                                                          
429 A Representative or a Senator making a large number of mistakes when speaking on the floor 
should not benefit the privilege of removing them, for she is the only one responsible for a speech 
“[which] was poorly organized or poorly delivered.” Id, at 356. 
430 Ibid. (maintaining that “[h]istorical knowledge of a single insult may go far in explaining the 
cooperation of certain participants in the debate.”) To corroborate his point, the Author also quotes 
the following statement made by a Senator in the late Fifties: “[T]he inevitable added zest and 
controversy and slips and lapses could make the Record a far more lively and readable document.” 
SEN. NEUBERGER, The Congressional Record Is Not A Record, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1958 
(Magazine), reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. 26, 33519 (1977) (quoted in BLEISCH, The Congressional 
Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 356 note 94). 
431 Id., at 357. 
432 Id., at 356 (noting that “mudslinging and name calling [arising from congressional debates] might 
prove embarrassing in print.”)  
107 
 
lessened, especially after the adoption of the bullet mechanism433. Members of Congress 
deserve a chance to explain their viewpoints in a more comprehensive fashion than they are 
allowed to do on the floor. Even though social networks allow them nowadays to interact 
simultaneously with anyone and thus to clarify their remarks before their constituents on a 
regular basis, members of Congress may perceive the need to endow their views with an 
official format. On the one hand, the insertion of speeches and remarks that were not actually 
made on the floor reduces the Congressional Record’s value as purely historical evidence. 
On the other hand, transparency is safeguarded by the very publication of such remarks in 
the Congressional Record, and even strengthened by the usage of bullets to split original 
from added material.  
 Added speeches are not subject to the criticism that could have arisen had they been 
delivered on the floor, but do not benefit from substantial contributions that oral discussion 
could have brought to those speeches. Therefore, having speeches and remarks printed in the 
Congressional Record without exposing them to criticism in Congress may not be the most 
appropriate choice for a Representative or a Senator. Furthermore, to corroborate his 
opinion, Bleisch makes a case that, however, refers to a rather unusual situation. He 
maintains that added speeches and remarks turn out to be deceiving for those who depend 
on the Congressional Record to detect Congress’s legislative intent whenever a member of 
Congress advocates a given position in the course of debate, but then her added remarks 
express a different standpoint. The Author finds that such discrepancy may entail serious 
effects, since the member of Congress “may influence the deliberations or vote [on the floor] 
and subsequently uses her revision privilege to alter her statement [thereby reflecting] a 
different intent before her remarks are printed in the Record.”434 The situation the Author 
describes, however, is unlikely to occur frequently, especially if the discrepancy mentioned 
above is deliberately meant to affect the reconstruction of legislative intent. Moreover, it is 
hard to believe that an individual member of Congress’s change of position – for instance – 
is capable of affecting considerably the interpretation of legislative history of a given statute. 
Only a reversal of standpoint coming from a very authoritative member of Congress might 
                                                          
433 See MILDRED AMER, A User’s Guide to the Congressional Record, CRS report for Congress (May 
6, 2008), p. 1 (pointing out that in the section of the Congressional Record devoted to the Senate 
floor proceedings, a bullet is used to distinguish added remarks from speeches actually delivered on 
the floor, while in the section pertaining to the proceedings of the House of Representatives, “any 
portion of a statement not spoken [on the floor] is printed in different type style.”)  
434 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 357. 
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produce such an effect, but then such a member would need to appeal to extremely sound 
arguments to explain her behavior without losing her reliability. However, transparency is 
ensured in any event: Whether or not the reasons for the reversal of standpoint are persuasive, 
they are put on record, so constituents are able to hold the Representative or Senator 
accountable. 
 Bleisch argues that the scarce accuracy of the Congressional Record due to lack of 
correspondence between what has been uttered on the floor and what is published in the 
Congressional Record entails serious implications for the business conducted by the 
executive and judicial branches of the Federal Government. The premise to Bleisch’s 
reasoning is that not only does the Congressional Record prove useful to scholars and 
journalists interested in congressional proceedings, but federal agencies and courts, too, 
depend much on it “for discerning congressional intent […].”435 Agencies usually look to 
the Congressional Record in the drafting process of regulations. Since their regulations are 
aimed at the implementation and enforcement of federal statutes, agencies – the Author 
observes – need to look through the Congressional Record to infer the true meaning of statute 
provisions from their legislative history. By doing so, agencies ensure that the regulations 
they draft be consistent with legislative intent of the statutes that such regulations are 
supposed to implement. Consequently, Bleisch contends that “an inaccurate Record could 
result in the promulgation of federal regulations which do not adequately reflect 
congressional intent.”436 In like manner, federal courts usually draw upon the Congressional 
Record to understand what Congress actually intended when it passed a given statute. Courts, 
therefore, may well be biased by remarks not made on the floor, which are capable of 
shrouding the authentic legislative intent of federal statutes437. Bleisch seeks to sustain his 
assertion by referring to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969438, the legislative 
intent of which courts deduced by consulting the Congressional Record in a multitude of 
                                                          
435 Id., at 341. The Author indeed notes that administrative agencies and courts are “the two major 
forums for the implementation of governmental policy.” Ibid. (referring to Cong. Rec. 18, 23860 
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Packwood)).   
436 Id., at 358. 
437 “When an unstated argument has been printed without rebuttal, legislative intent can be clouded 
forever.” (remarks of Rep. Steiger). 124 Cong. Rec. 4, 5110 (1978) (quoted in BLEISCH, id., at 358 
note 102).  
438 Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (January 1, 1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seqq. 
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cases439. The Author casts doubts on the actual capability of courts to identify the 
congressional intent in all such cases, since it was impossible to separate for certain within 
the content of the Congressional Record what constituted the mere transcript of speeches 
delivered on the floor from what was added later instead440. Such an example, however, is 
weak evidence, as it suffices to observe that the bullet mechanism was adopted to cope with 
the very inconvenience regarding the distinction between floor and extraneous material in 
the Congressional Record. Therefore, Bleaisch’s concern for the poor level of accuracy that 
features the Congressional Record may not be advocated. Both federal agencies and courts, 
indeed, are able to avoid misunderstanding in detecting the true intent of statutes passed by 
Congress.  
 
b. Bleisch’s Reference to the Right of Access to Information Held By Public Authorities 
 Furthermore, Bleisch puts forward a theory that finds in some of the rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment of the Constitution441 grounds for requiring more accuracy in the 
contents of the Congressional Record. The theory moves from including in the First 
Amendment two rights that courts have gradually recognized as falling within the scope of 
this amendment: the right to receive information from Congress and agencies, and the right 
of access to information held by public authorities. As to the former, however, Bleisch 
himself notes that the restrictions courts have formulated over time to its application442 lead 
                                                          
439 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 359 (reporting 
that federal courts cited the Congressional Record in at least 247 cases concerning the application of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969). 
440 Ibid.  
441 The amendments of the U.S. Constitution up to the Tenth make up the so-called Bill of Rights. 
As Corwin has noted, they were proposed in 1789, and it took just 810 days for them to be approved. 
Corwin, 186 note 1. These ten amendments “were designed to quiet the fears of mild opponents of 
the Constitution in its original form […].” Id., at 186. The First Amendment requires that the Federal 
Government as a whole protect a series of freedoms and rights, at the core of which are the following: 
freedom of speech; freedom of religion; freedom of the press; the right of peaceable assembly. By 
the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court had extended the prescription of safeguarding such 
freedoms and rights to the individual states of the Federation. See – respectively – Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (including both freedom of speech and freedom of the press “among 
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Near v. 
Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931); DeJonge v. Ore., 299 U.S. 353 (1937).      
442 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 364-366 
(referring to the following supreme Court decisions: Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
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to rule out that the right to receive information could be invoked by individuals to demand a 
more accurate Congressional Record. As the Author points out, the revision privilege trumps 
the right to receive information, insofar as Congress may “simply asser[t] its power to control 
the contents of a document for whose publication it is solely responsible,”443 i.e., the same 
Congressional Record. Moreover, Bleisch himself concedes that, regardless of the 
Congressional Record, there is nothing prohibiting members of Congress from 
disseminating transcripts of portions of debates without editing them. In fact, the Internet 
provides Representatives and Senators today with potential for such voluntary disclosure, 
which – in that sense – may well wind up remedying to the impurity of the Congressional 
Record.  
 As noted above, Bleisch also comes up with a proposal for curbing the use of revision 
privilege based on the right of access to information held by the Government – namely, by 
entities within the executive branch. Such a proposal lacks any soundness, at least in the way 
it is formulated. Bleisch, indeed, picks cases that generate confusion instead of contributing 
to corroborating his theory. In particular, he refers to two similar 1974 cases444, wherein the 
plaintiffs challenged prison regulations for not allowing journalists to interview inmates and 
thus for restricting the right of the press to gain information on prison conditions. The 
plaintiffs – inmates and journalists in the first case, the Washington Post and one of its 
reporters in the second one – claim that the denial of interviews infringe a right of theirs 
grounded in the First Amendment: the right to gather news (on a public facility), and hence 
the right of access to information concerning the public sector. In both cases, the Supreme 
Court holds that neither of the prison regulations challenged by plaintiffs limits the freedom 
of members of the press to request conversations and interviews with inmates, provided that 
the peculiar dynamics of a prison are respected. Furthermore, the Court refuses to recognize 
to the press members a wider right of access to public authorities’ information than that any 
person enjoys. Bleisch also refers specifically to the dissenting opinions of Justice Powell, 
who – especially in Saxbe, that is, the second case – “created the framework for a judicial 
theory of a constitutionally based right of access to governmentally held information.”445 
Justice Powell argues that since the press is protected by the First Amendment in its search 
                                                          
(1965); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Virginia state Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
County Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). 
443 Id., at 366. 
444 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington, 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
445 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 370.   
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for news, in a case concerning the management of a federal facility, the restriction of such a 
right recognized to the press calls for “stronger grounds than simple governmental deference 
[…].”446 Apart from the credit that Justice Powell deserves for showing sensitivity towards 
the press’s rights, the cases at issue do not appear to be the most suited for championing a 
right of the members of the press to gather official information. In Saxbe, indeed, the Court 
notes that the federal regulation challenged by the plaintiffs prohibits media members neither 
from touring the prison and visiting friends or relatives who are inmates447, nor from 
questioning ex-prisoners on the treatment they received when they were serving their time 
in the facility448. Furthermore – and above all – it was only with a 1980 decision, Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia449, that the Supreme Court began taking steps towards the 
recognition of a First Amendment right to openness. As Bleisch himself observes, however, 
it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will go so far as to prescribe nearly total accuracy 
of the transcripts of congressional debates to be published in the Congressional Record450. 
The Author also argues that nevertheless, limiting the scope of revision privilege would have 
the beneficial effect to “prohibi[t] the government from distorting information that it 
voluntarily disseminates to the extent that such information reflects upon the government’s 
official actions and proceedings.”451 The editing of speeches delivered on the floor and the 
insertion of further remarks in the Congressional Record – Bleisch explains – ends up 
affecting the democratic principle, as constituents are not capable of evaluating outright the 
actual performance of Representatives and Senators452.  
 
 
 
                                                          
446 Id. In particular, Justice Powell stated that “official restraints on access to news sources, even 
though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First Amendment that 
it is both appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in terms 
more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience.” Saxbe, at 860. Powell 
also cited a precedent where the Supreme Court had contended that “without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Ibid. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).  
447 Saxbe, at 846-847. 
448 Id., at 848. 
449 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
450 BLEISCH, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment, supra note 346, at 374-375. 
451 Id., at 376. 
452 Id., at 376-377. 
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c. Overall assessment of Bleisch’s Theory  
 Overall, Bleisch’s opinion is not tenable, especially now in the so-called Information 
Age. As I pointed out above, the Internet offers plenty of tools and occasions for members 
of Congress to stay in touch steadily with their constituents453, and social networks have 
definitely increased the chances for the latter to hold politicians accountable. Furthermore, 
this potential enabled by technology, which includes the online streaming of debates and 
committee or subcommittee meetings and hearings, favors transparency of the legislative 
branch. Today, it is somewhat hard to maintain that the partial inaccuracy of the 
Congressional Record may hamper the functions vested in the judiciary and federal agencies. 
Firstly, the bullet mechanism has solved a good deal of the issue by marking what has not 
been uttered in Congress, so that it can be told apart quite easily from speeches delivered on 
the floor. Secondly, the addition of new remarks and further material in the Congressional 
Record – provided that they are relevant to the subject matter at issue – results in improving 
the legislative branch’s transparency. As Italian scholars have explained in a more clear 
fashion – from a purely theoretical perspective – than American ones, the concept of 
transparency does not boil down to gaining access to records, but implies the demand that 
transacted business be made intelligible to anyone. In that sense, the material inserted in the 
Congressional Record, albeit not directly related to floor debates, proves useful. If the added 
material is deliberately aimed at obscuring the legislative intent of a given statute as arising 
from the Congressional Record, the objective of ensuring transparency is not achieved. In 
such cases, however, the members of Congress are subject to the political sanction of being 
held accountable by their constituents. Therefore, the democratic principle appears to be 
safeguarded.  
 Bleisch, instead, could have been more concerned with the practice of secret sessions, 
which involves both the two Houses of Congress and their committees and subcommittees. 
The regulation of the conditions and proceedings for holding secret sessions and exempting 
the relevant transcripts from being published in the Congressional Record, however, is an 
adequate bulwark against abuses. Furthermore, the reasons for holding secret sessions that 
the members of Congress may invoke have in common a very telling element. The wording 
that the Rules of the House of the Representatives and the Standing Rules of the Senate 
                                                          
453 OLESZECK, Congress and the Internet, supra note 368, at 10 (stressing that “the Internet has the 
potential to foster an interactive, or two-way, process of communication between Members and their 
constituents, as well as with other individuals and organizations.”)  
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employ to identify such reasons, indeed, recalls that of the exemptions that federal agencies 
may apply to deny the disclosure of their records under the Freedom of Information Act. To 
be more precise, a close examination of the wording of the rules of the two Houses of 
Congress leads to argues that the analogy with the FOIA exemptions – and, especially, with 
two of the exemptions, i.e., the exemption on national security and foreign affairs, and that 
concerning law enforcement records – is manifest above all when secrecy applies to 
meetings and hearings of committees or subcommittees. As to floor proceedings, it is the 
need to deal with certain matters in executive sessions that appears to be a common 
justification for closing the doors of the two Houses to the public and the press. In such 
cases, therefore, the legislator establishes beforehand a general category of sessions that tend 
to be held in secret. Congress, indeed, is fully aware that some deal of secrecy is necessary 
not only in the executive, but also in the legislative branch.         
 
 
 
II. Transparency and Secrecy in the Judicial Branch 
A. Transparency as a Typical Feature of the Judicial Branch 
 Transparency features the functions carried out by the judicial branch. Weinstein has 
argued that court secrecy is a matter that should be addressed with extreme caution, because 
erring on the side of sealed judicial proceedings by restricting excessively public access to 
courtrooms and records would result in undermining the high level of trust Americans have 
in courts454. A penchant for openness, therefore, ensures the trustworthiness of the judiciary. 
There exists much agreement, indeed, upon pinpointing transparency – in such a case, meant 
as a mere synonym to openness – as an element that underpins the robust confidence the 
judicial branch inspires in people455. In the United States, judicial branch transparency does 
                                                          
454 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 53, 53 
(2000) (“The assumption that all aspects of court-centered litigation are out in the open, on the record, 
and fully explained by the court is an important foundation for the confidence our public has in its 
courts.”) 
455 See Panel IV: Secrecy and the Courts: The Judges’ Perspective, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 169, 174 (2000) 
(“One of the reasons the federal judiciary enjoys the high regard and confidence of the people that it 
does, is that by and large our system is very transparent, very open.”) (remarks of Judge Sidney H. 
Stein). The judiciary as a whole has also been warned that allowing “unnecessary secrecy” in the 
courts may jeopardize such confidence. Id., at 175 (remarks of Judge David G. Trager).   
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not boil down to making decisions available to the public, today electronically, but is also 
visible in the rendering of opinions by judges.  
 As Ginsburg has pointed out, the disclosure of dissenting opinions marks a clear 
difference between common law and civil law legal systems. In the latter, typical of 
continental European countries, courts are required to render “a collective judgment, cast in 
stylized, impersonal language.”456 The judgment is collective in the sense that it gives voice 
to the opinion of the court as a whole, while individual judges’ standpoint is substantially 
irrelevant. As a result, the court decision seeks to synthetize different positions, and judges 
who do not agree upon the opinion rendered by the court they belong to are not allowed to 
draw up dissenting opinions. As Ginsborg himself has argued, “[d]isagreement, if it exists, 
[…] is not disclosed.”457 By contrast, the United States and other countries sharing the 
British tradition recognize to each member of a court “the prerogative to write separately.”458 
By relying upon his own experience as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
the Author maintains that “an impressive dissent” usually results in improving the quality of 
the majority opinion, since it prompts the author of that opinion “to refine and clarify her 
initial circulation.”459 Furthermore, well-structured dissent opinions, especially when 
rendered by members of a supreme court, may lay the foundations for an evolution in the 
solution given to important legal issues460. Overall, the two approaches – the Anglo-Saxon’s 
and the continental Europe’s – reveal different policies, and are aimed at achieving specific 
objectives. The features of civil law systems previously mentioned, indeed, are deemed “to 
foster the public’s perception of the law as dependably stable and secure.”461 Common-law 
systems, instead, value “the independence of the individual judge” by granting her the ability 
to speak her own mind, and thereby ensure “the transparency of the judicial process.”462  
 
 
                                                          
456 RUTH B. GINSBURG, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2011). 
457 Ibid. 
458 Id., at 3.  
459 Ibid. 
460 As Chief Justice Hughes contended, “[a] dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal […] to the 
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the 
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” CHARLES HUGES, The Supreme Court of 
the United States, 68 (1936) (quoted in RUTH B. GINSBURG, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 
Wash. L. Rev. 133, 144 (1990)).   
461 GINSBURG, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, supra note 456, at 3.  
462 Ibid. 
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B. Secrecy in Judicial Proceedings 
a. Family Law Cases  
 Secrecy of the courts, however, is necessary in many diverse situations. Firstly, quite 
similarly to what happens in the course of federal agencies’ decision-making process, not 
only does confidentiality enables the frank exchange of ideas between judges and with 
clerks; it also favors the thoughtful formulation of opinions463. Judges, therefore, rely on 
keeping confidential what occurs in camera before a holding is rendered. Secondly, courts 
are often required to strike a balance between openness and secrecy, especially when the 
privacy of the parties to a judicial proceeding is at stake or sensitive matters are involved464.  
 Family law cases constitute an example of judicial proceedings that often require the 
application of restrictions to transparency. Even though the family court system is 
administered by individual state courts, and thus does not involve directly the federal 
judiciary, cases considered by the family courts are noteworthy. They represent, indeed, a 
paradigm of how the need to reach a compromise between public access to records and 
proceedings – on one side – and confidentiality – on the other side – may arise outside the 
field of administrative law. Most of the times, those cases deal with subject matters that are 
sensitive per se, such as child abuse or neglect, custody and visitation conditions, juvenile 
delinquency465. Closing the doors of the family court used to be the general rule466, a rule 
aimed at protecting the concerned children, whose well-being might be compromised by 
disclosure of information, especially in abuse and neglect cases467. Over the last two decades, 
however, a growing tendency towards making family court proceedings more accessible has 
sprung up at state level, and New York State law represents a telling example in this regard. 
                                                          
463 See WEINSTEIN, Secrecy in Civil Trials, supra note 454, ibid. (contending that “everything in 
court should be public and nothing secret except the internal chambers discussions by judges with 
their clerks and various drafts of opinions.”)   
464 See NICHOLAS SCOPPETTA, Symposium – Comment, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 135, 136 (2000) (arguing that 
the reasons for closing the doors of a court usually imply the existence of “extremely personal, highly 
confidential matters.”)  
465 Id. (referring to a case in which a minor tried before a family court “had a history of prostitution” 
that was relevant to the judicial proceeding, and the judge discretionary decided not to make “open 
and available to the public” the records documenting such a history).   
466 See JENNIFER L. ROSATO, The Future of Access to the Family Court: Beyond Naming and 
Blaming, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 149, 151 (2000) (noting that “[h]istorically, [cases addressed by the family 
court] have proceeded under a veil of secrecy.”)  
467 Id. (contending that in the family court system, “[t]he culture of secrecy grew out of a desire to 
protect children from disclosure of sensitive information in abuse and neglect cases.”) 
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In particular, section 205.4 of the Uniform Rules for New York State Trial Courts468 is 
concerned with access to family court proceedings. Section 205.4(b) establishes a general 
principle of openness469. The judge presiding in the courtroom, however, is entrusted with 
“statutory discretion” to exclude either the public or specific individuals from accessing the 
courtroom “on a case by case basis,” provided that supporting evidence is given470. 
Furthermore, the same provision identifies some of the factors the decision of closing the 
judicial proceeding made by the presiding judge may be based upon471. The factors the 
presiding judge may take into consideration include “the privacy interests of individuals 
before the court, and the need for protection of the litigants, in particular, children, from 
harm […].”472 Accordingly, moving from the need to preserve the privacy of parties, 
especially of minors, section 205.5 grants the right of access to family court records to such 
persons and authorities as the same section enumerates.  
 
b. Secrecy in Civil Litigation: The State Secrets Privilege   
 The state secrets privilege is used to invoke secrecy in civil litigation, and has been 
defined as “a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to withhold 
information, the disclosure of which would harm national security.”473 The primary purpose 
of the state secrets privilege, therefore, is to protect national security by preventing the 
disclosure of sensitive information in the course of civil litigation474. One may wonder 
whether in addition to being rooted in common law, the privilege also has a constitutional 
basis. Yet, there is no consensus in scholarship with respect to this issue475. Furthermore, 
                                                          
468 Available at http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/trialcourts/205.shtml#04. 
469 Section 205.4(a) provides that the family court “is open to the public.”  
470 Section 205.4(b). 
471 Section 205.4(b)(1)-(4). 
472 Section 205.4(b)(3). 
473 NEIL KINKOPF, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 489, 489 
(2007). 
474 Id., at 491. 
475 See CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at 1294 
(referring to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)) (taking into consideration the 
Supreme Court’s dictum in Nixon, according to which executive privilege is not absolute, unless 
military or diplomatic secrets, or other sensitive information pertaining to national security are 
involved). This dictum – Chesney argues – suggests that state secrets should be treated differently 
from the exchange of communications within the executive branch that is protected from disclosure 
by executive privilege. In both cases, however, the withholding of information by executive branch 
officials on behalf of the U.S. Government is deemed compatible with the Constitution. Therefore, 
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Kinkopf has argued that “the basic defect of the state secrets privilege,” as interpreted by 
courts, consists in the fact that it does not imply any compromise between the opposing 
interests in openness, on the one hand, and in protection of the information and documents 
from release, on the other hand476. If the court determines that the privilege applies – the 
Author continues – “the privilege [itself] is considered to be absolute.”477 As Frost has 
stressed, the privilege may affect civil litigation in different ways478.     
 The Supreme Court expressly recognized the state secrets privilege in a 1953 
decision that still constitutes the leading case on the issue, United States v. Reynolds479. The 
case involved the application of the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA)480, a statute Congress 
passed in the aftermath of World War II that allowed individuals to sue the U.S. Government 
for most torts caused by its conduct481. Reynolds was concerned with lawsuits brought under 
                                                          
from the Supreme Court’s dictum it can be inferred – Chesney concludes – that not only executive 
privilege, but “the state secrets privilege also has constitutional underpinnings.” Id., at 1295. Pallitto 
and Weaver, instead, advocate the opposite position: Unlike executive privilege, the state secrets 
privilege does not have any constitutional foundation, and only originates from common law. 
PALLITTO – WEAVER, Presidential Secrecy and the Law, supra note 86, at 98-99; 105; 117-19; 206.     
476 KINKOPF, The State Secrets Problem, supra note 473, at 492. 
477 Ibid. According to the Author, the fact that the state secrets privilege does not contemplate a 
balance to strike between competing interests distinguishes it from “other governmental privileges, 
such as the presidential communications privilege […].” Ibid. In like manner, Weaver and Pallitto 
have stressed that the unlike executive privilege, the state secrets privilege is absolute. PALLITTO – 
WEAVER, id., at 93 (“Once it is determined that the privilege is asserted over properly classified 
information, no amount of demonstrated need on the part of a litigant will overcome the operation of 
the privilege; no balancing can occur, as with executive privilege.”)    
478 See AMANDA FROST, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 
1931, 1937 (2007). Firstly, the privilege may be invoked to bar evidence from admission in civil 
proceedings. The case may proceed further, but without such evidence. Secondly, the application of 
the privilege may deprive the defendant of information he or she depended upon to organize a sound 
defense. In such a case, the defendant may be granted summary judgment on usage of that 
information. Thirdly, if the pivotal subject matter of litigation is a state secret, the invocation of the 
state secrets privilege brings about dismissal of the case, if the court deems the privilege legitimate. 
The case, indeed, may not proceed further.  
479 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
480 Ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 28, U.S. 
Code). 
481 See CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at 1282 
(noting that after its enactment, the FTCA was frequently used to claim damages related to accidents 
that involved military ships and vehicles, and in the course of litigation, plaintiffs usually sought to 
gain access to internal investigations reports on such accidents, with the Government opposing the 
release of those reports).  
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the FTCA by the widows of three men who died in the crash of an Air Force B-29, which 
was flying to test classified equipment. In the litigation, plaintiffs sought to obtain the U.S. 
Air Force’s official accident investigation reports, as well as other material, but the 
Government objected, claiming that the release of the requested documents would jeopardize 
national security482. After identifying some formal requirements for the invocation of the 
state secrets privilege483, the majority opinion in Reynolds, delivered by Chief Justice 
Vinson, addressed the substance of the privilege, which is considered “well established in 
the law of evidence.”484 According to the opinion, documents and information a plaintiff 
requires access to may not be disclosed and not even be examined in camera whenever the 
court detects “a reasonable danger” that ordering the production of the sought material “will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”485 
In particular, should information concerning the classified equipment the B-29 aircraft was 
bearing be disclosed, national security could reasonably be expected to be damaged. The 
internal accident investigation report, therefore, may not be released in litigation, since there 
was “a reasonable danger” that such report would contain references to the classified 
equipment that was being tested when the crash occurred486. The Supreme Court, however, 
just assumes that the report contain such information487. As Chesney has observed, the 
Vinson opinion applied the “reasonably danger” standard to determine not only “how 
security-sensitive” documents and information must be to be protected from disclosure – 
and thus to be privileged – but also whether the judge should conduct in camera examination 
of such documents and information488. Chesney underlines “the folly” of using such a 
standard especially as to the former aspect. Today that the accident investigation report is of 
public domain, it is known that it did not actually contain information pertaining to the 
classified equipment of the aircraft that crashed. Had the Supreme Court permitted the 
                                                          
482 Reynolds, 345 U.S., at 5. 
483 See, in particular, id., at 7-8 (contending that it is requisite a formal claim of the privilege, filed 
by the head of the department “which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration 
by that officer.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
484 Id., at 6-7. 
485 Id., at 10. 
486 Ibid. 
487 See CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at 1287. 
See also LOUIS FISHER, In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the 
Reynolds Case, xi (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2006) (noting that the report, when was 
eventually declassified, revealed that “[it] contained nothing that could be called state secrets.”) 
488 CHESNEY, ibid. 
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district judge to engage in an in camera inspection of the report – the Author continues – the 
lack of any classified information in the report on the accident would probably have been 
discovered489. The key message Reynolds conveys is that judges should adopt a deferential 
approach when the state secrets privilege is invoked by the executive branch in the national 
security domain490. However, it has been noted that the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia usually engages in thorough examination before recognizing the legitimacy of the 
state secrets privilege491.   
 Scholars have debated as to whether there was some change in the usage of the state 
secrets privilege under the George W. Bush administration. Firstly, it has been pointed out 
that overall, the application of the privilege was increasingly claimed beginning from the 
late 1970s492. Secondly – and this is the heart of the debate – some scholars have argued that 
not only did the Bush administration raise the claim of the privilege with greater frequency 
than previous administrations, but it also changed the purpose of the claim. In the past, he 
state secrets privilege – those scholars contend – served above all the purpose to restrict the 
documents that could be used as evidence in litigation, while under the Bush administration, 
it was “invoked as grounds for dismissal of entire lawsuits.”493 Chesney objects to such a 
reconstruction494, but his position appears to be isolated495. As the Fourth Circuit observed 
                                                          
489 Id., at 1288. 
490 See PALLITTO – WEAVER, Presidential Secrecy and the Law, supra note 86, at 98 (arguing that 
the “clear message of the Reynolds ruling is that courts are to show utmost deference to executive 
assertions of privilege.”) See also FISHER, In the Name of National Security, supra note 487, at 257 
(“What Reynolds did was to send an ominous signal that in matters of national security, the judiciary 
is willing to fold its tent and join the executive branch.”).   
491 See CARRIE N. LYONS, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Government 
Misuse, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 99, 107 and note 57 (2007). 
492 See FROST, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, supra note 478, at 1938; 
CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at Appendix, 
1315-1332; PALLITTO – WEAVER, Presidential Secrecy and the Law, supra note 86, at 101-102. 
493 FROST, id., at 1939. See also FISHER, In the Name of National Security, supra note 487, at 212, 
245; PALLITTO – WEAVER, id., at 109;  SHAYANA KADIDAL, The State Secrets Privilege and 
Executive Misconduct, JURIST Forum (May 30, 2006), available at 
https://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/NSA_06.08.22_Jurist.pdf. Judicial practice 
of dismissing cases based on the state secrets privilege, however, already existed before the Bush 
administration. See KINKOPF, The State Secrets Problem, supra note 473, at 490-491 note 14. 
494 See CHESNEY, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 21, at 50-
52 (arguing that an analysis of case law leads to concluding that the Bush Administration’s assertion 
of the state secrets privilege turns out to be consistent with past practice).  
495 See FROST, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, supra note 478, at 1939-1940 
(explaining why Chesney’s interpretation of the usage of the privilege after 9/11 is not tenable). For 
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in EI-Masri v. United States496, a court will dismiss a case by applying the state secrets 
privilege if “the circumstances make clear that privileged information will be so central to 
the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”497     
 
c. The Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings 
 Grand juries, expressly mentioned in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution498, 
represent a typical U.S. instrument, which is supposed to act as an independent check on 
sufficiency of government allegations for a criminal trial. It lays on federal prosecutors, 
indeed, the burden to convince a body of persons – composed of a varying number of 
members (sixteen to twenty-three)499 – that the evidence prosecutors themselves have 
collected on behalf of the Government is sufficient to initiate a criminal trial against a 
suspect. Jurors are citizens, whose service on a grand jury, as Fisher has argued, allows them 
“to participate in government decisions, understand [such decisions], and check abusive, 
politically driven prosecutors.”500 Therefore, by participating in a grand jury – the Author 
continues – citizens are granted a chance to contribute “to prevent[ing] the government’s use 
of arbitrary power” to try alleged suspects501. Only if a majority of jurors considers the 
presented evidence to be sufficient, the grand jury may indict502 someone of a federal crime, 
thereby formulating a charge that is tantamount to a recommendation that such a person be 
brought to trial.  
                                                          
a list of scholarly positions commenting on the assertion of the state secrets privilege under the Bush 
administration, see LAURA K. DONOHUE, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, 79-80 
note 6 (2010). 
496 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
497 Id., at 308. 
498 The Fifth Amendment provides, “No person shall be held for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger […].”  
499 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter – Fed.R.Crim.P.], Title III, Rule 6(a)(1).  
500 LOUIS FISHER, The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America’s Freedom, 11 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008). 
501 Ibid. 
502 The Fifth Amendment distinguishes “presentment” from “indictment.” No elements can be 
deduced from the text of the provision, however, to identify what the difference between those terms 
consists in. Corwin has noted that whereas “[a] presentment is returned upon the initiative of the 
grand jury [,] an indictment is returned upon evidence laid before that body by the public prosecutor.” 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, The Constitution and What It Means Today, 208-209 (11th ed., Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1954).  
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 Grand jury proceedings feature a high level of secrecy, which is even higher with 
respect to deliberations and voting. Rule 6(e)(1) Fed.R.Crim.P., indeed, prescribes that all 
proceedings carried out by a grand jury be recorded by a court reporter or by a recording 
device, except for deliberations and voting. In a 1983 decision – United States v. Sells 
Engineering503 – the Supreme Court provided a series of justifications for “[the] long-
established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal 
courts.”504 Firstly, the secrecy of grand jury proceedings may prompt “many prospective 
witnesses” to consent to testify, since those witnesses may rely on the fact that their 
testimony will not be disclosed505. Secondly, secrecy promotes complete, frank testimony, 
an argument that is closely related to the first one. Thirdly, if grand jury proceedings were 
totally accessible, the suspects could try to alter the voting operations. Finally, secrecy 
safeguards the privacy of persons who are accused but then exonerated by the grand jury, as 
they “will not be held up to public ridicule.”506 Rule 6(e)(3), however, establishes some 
exceptions to grand jury secrecy for purposes of cooperation within the Federal Government. 
Under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), for instance, a government attorney is allowed to disclose grand jury 
material concerning foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence 
information507 to any federal law enforcement official or to personnel from the Intelligence 
Community “to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of that 
official’s duties.” A government attorney may also disclose to appropriate U.S. federal or 
state officials grand jury material that is concerned with a threat of attack posed by a foreign 
power, or a threat of domestic or international sabotage or terrorism, or abusive intelligence 
gathering activities by a foreign power “for the purpose of preventing or responding to such 
threat or activities.” The federal or state officials receiving such information have to use it 
in conformity with the guidelines issued by the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence thereof508. Furthermore, Rule 6(e)(6) prescribes that records, orders, 
and subpoenas related to grand jury proceedings be kept sealed “to the extent and as long as 
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.” 
                                                          
503 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
504 Id., at 424 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958)). 
505 Ibid. (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)). 
506 Ibid. (quoting Douglas, 441 U.S., at 219). 
507 Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii) defines in detail what the term “foreign intelligence information” embraces. 
508 Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i). 
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Finally, Rule 6(e)(7) provides that any violation of Rule 6 or of relevant guidelines may 
entail the sanction consisting in the contempt of court.  
 As Fisher has pointed out by mentioning an affair that occurred under the George W. 
Bush administration509, a grand jury investigation may also result in bringing to light the 
improper classification of one or more documents. The affair may be summed up as follows. 
On November 20, 2006, a U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York issues a 
grand jury subpoena to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit 
organization, whose stated mission is to protect individual rights and liberties guaranteed on 
U.S. soil by the Constitution and by the laws of the United States. By issuing the subpoena, 
the Government requests “any and all copies”510 of a 2005 document in possession of the 
ACLU, which is classified as “Secret.” The ACLU challenges the subpoena by claiming not 
only that a grand jury do not have authority to request all copies of a given document, but 
also that the subpoena violates the ACLU’s First Amendment rights511. The government, in 
turn, claims that its authority to formulate the request derives from sections 793 and 798 of 
Title 18, U.S. Code, concerning espionage512. On December 11, 2006, a district judge holds 
a closed-door hearing, aimed at examining the Government’s request for all copies of the 
classified document mentioned above. At the close of the hearing, the judge orders that all 
documents pertaining to the case remain sealed, even though the ACLU is free to make 
publicly any comments. The proceeding goes on, and the Government explains that the aim 
of the grand jury is to investigate the leaking to the ACLU of the classified document at 
issue, which the ACLU deem “to be of interest to it and to the public.”513 According to the 
ACLU, the application of the “Secret” marking to the document represents a “striking, yet 
typical, example of over-classification.”514 On December 18, U.S. Attorney Michael J. 
Garcia informs the district judge of the Government’s intention to withdraw the subpoena, 
                                                          
509 FISHER, The Constitution and 9/11, supra note 500, at 44-49. 
510 Grand Jury Subpoena 0108, subpoena to the ACLU, signed by U.S. Attorney Micheal J. Garcia 
and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jennifer G. Rodgers, Southern District of New York, November 20, 
2006.  
511 The ACLU considers the issuing of the subpoena as merely “an improper confiscatory, 
information-suppressive” operation. Memorandum of Law in Support of the ACLU’s Motion to 
Quash. In re Grand Gury Subpoena Served on the American Cicil Liberties Union (December 11, 
2006) p. 13. 
512 Id., at 5. 
513 Ibid. 
514 FISHER, The Constitution and 9/11, supra note 500, at 46, note 103 (quoting an e-mail from Paul 
McMasters, Freedom Forum (December 13, 2006)). 
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and reports that the document at issue has been declassified. Accordingly, the judge directs 
that all records related to the document be made available to the public515. Fischer has 
contended that this affair “offers a glowing example of a document that should never have 
been classified at any level, much less ‘Secret.’”516 Since the document sets forth guidelines 
for taking pictures of enemy prisoners of war and detainees, the Author continues, “[t]he 
evident purpose in drafting and disseminating the document was to avoid the type of 
embarrassing publicity associated with photos of Abu Ghraib prisoners in Iraq.”517 Fischer 
has concluded that there existed no legal grounds for classifying the document518. The affair 
demonstrates that secrecy is a general matter that goes through the whole legal system. In 
this case, the classification level of a given document, thus a typical administrative measure, 
was affected by a grand jury proceeding. This proceeding, aimed at analyzing the evidence 
for a criminal trial pursuant to the Espionage Act of 1917, eventually led to the 
declassification of the document.   
 
d. Military Commissions 
 Military commissions are shrouded in a veil of secrecy. The United States has a long-
standing tradition of military commissions or courts as an extraordinary means to cope with 
wartime conditions519. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil prompted 
President Bush to order the creation of military commissions, designed to try terrorist 
                                                          
515 Order, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on the American Civil Liberties Union, M11-188 (JSR), 
Judge Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (December 18, 2006). 
516 FISHER, The Constitution and 9/11, supra note 500, at 47. 
517 Id., at 47-48. 
518 Id., at 48. Fischer has underlined that none of the categories of classified material defined by the 
then-effective Executive Order No. 13,292, enacted by President Bush, could be interpreted so 
broadly as to encompass the taking of photos of enemy prisoners of war or detainees. Id. See Exec. 
Order No. 13,292 – “Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified 
National Security Information”, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (March 25, 2003).    
519 See ORI ARONSON, In/visible courts: military tribunals as other spaces, in COLE et al. (eds.), 
Secrecy, National Security, and the Vindication of Constitutional Law, supra note 131, at 232 (noting 
that the practice by the U.S. Government of establishing military commissions to tackle emergency 
situations, usually related to wartime or to the aftermath of a war, “dates back to the eighteenth 
century.”) See also DAVID B. RIVKIN, JR. – LEE A. CASEY, The Use of Military Commissions in the 
War on Terror, 24 Boston U. Int. L. J. 123, 123 (2006) (pointing out that military commissions have 
been “an integral part of the American legal tradition since the War for Independence.”) 
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suspects that American authorities would apprehend in the course of the war on terror520. A 
few years later, Congress passed specific legislation on military commissions521, which was 
in part declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court over time for undue deprivation of 
detainee rights522. Military commissions have been located ever since within the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, in Cuba, and thus “essentially away from the public 
eye.”523 Aronson has observed that such commissions “are not secret courts in the formal 
sense,”524 as civilian attorneys in possession of special security clearances may provide the 
accused with legal defense525, and the press is generally recognized the right of access to 
court proceedings. Section 949d(c) of Title 10, U.S. Code, governs the closure of 
proceedings. The military judge is empowered to prescribe that all or part of military 
commission proceedings be closed to the public, provided that he or she offers a specific 
finding that such a closure is necessary to protect information, “the disclosure of which could 
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, including intelligence or 
law enforcement sources, methods, or activities.”526 The sealing of proceedings is also 
allowed when it is ordered in the interest of the physical safety of individuals527. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that military court opinions should always be available online, 
though in reality they are published in official websites “only sporadically.”528  
 Aronson has defined military commissions as “semi-secret courts,” for they were 
designed to reduce “their transparency and publicity, as well as the assurance of full 
accessibility to evidence relevant to a defendant’s defense.”529 Therefore, the right to be tried 
in open court, a typical right of a democratic legal system, turns out to be seriously restricted 
for those who are tried by military commissions. Not only are terrorist suspects deprived of 
                                                          
520 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002). 
521 Military Commission Act of 2006 (“An Act to authorize trial by military commission for 
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.”), Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (October 17, 
2006), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a et seqq. 
522 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and – above all – Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008).  
523 ARONSON, In/visible courts, supra note 519, ibid. 
524 Ibid. 
525 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(3). See DAVID LUBAN, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1981, 1989-92 (2008). 
526 10 U.S.C. § 949c(2)(A). 
527 Section 949c(2)(B). 
528 ARONSON, In/visible courts, supra note 519, at 235. 
529 Ibid. 
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some basic human rights, but they are also tried in distinct fora, tailor-made for alleged 
enemy combatants. Resnik has maintained that “[w]hen cases proceed in public, courts 
institutionalize democracy’s claim to impose constraints on state power.”530 Open court 
proceedings – the Author explains – are requisite for “participatory parity,” since the parties 
to a trial tend to interact with each other, and in doing so, they perceive themselves as 
equals531. Such equality among the parties is ensured by openness of proceedings, insofar as 
any restriction to the equality of the parties may be decried. In that sense, courts end up being 
“potentially egalitarian political venues […].”532 After 9/11, the executive branch promoted 
the enactment of legislation that sought to keep military commission proceedings as far as 
possible from public scrutiny. The Executive – Resnik notes – intended to establish “a 
separate ‘tribunal system’ for alleged enemy combatants [that was] aimed at controlling 
access and information as well as limiting the rights of detainees by augmenting the powers 
of the state.”533 Resnik has even gone so far as to question the propriety of the phrase “closed 
military courts.”534 Indeed, she has defined such a phrase as an “oxymoron,” since a court is 
always a public institution535, and referring the concept of secrecy to a court means to thwart 
the close connection “between openness and adjudicatory processes.”536 Open court 
proceedings537 also entail the need to ensure the publication of court opinions: As Resnik 
                                                          
530 JUDITH RESNIK, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 771, 807 (2008). To 
further prove her point, the Author quotes Bentham’s maxim according to which “[p]ublicity is the 
very soul of justice […] It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.” Ibid. (quoting JEREMY 
BENTHAM, Chapter X, Of Publicity and Privacy, as Applied to Judicature in General, and to the 
Collection of the Evidence in Particular, in 6 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 351, 355 (William Tait, 
1843)).   
531 RESNIK, Courts: In and Out of Sight, id., at 807. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Id., at 808. 
534 JUDITH RESNIK, Bring Back Bentham: ‘Open Courts,’ ‘Terror Trials,’ and Public Sphere(s), 5 L. 
& Ethics Hum. Rts. 2, 4 (2011).  
535 Resnik, indeed, has contended that courts “are one avenue through which private persons come 
together to form a public, assuming an identity as participants acting within a political and social 
order.” Id., at 30. 
536 Id., at 4. As she already did previously (see, supra note 515), the Author recalls the political 
philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, who was an advocate of publicity, a concept that implied the chance 
for the public to conduct in many venues “scrutiny of various actors and institutions – judges and 
courts, included.” Ibid. She also points out that according to Bentham, the guarantee of openness in 
judicial proceedings was one of the “methods for transferring authority to the public, [thereby] 
forming a ‘tribunal’ whose opinions were to influence ruling powers.” Ibid.  
537 Id., at 30 (observing that open court proceedings “enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest, 
and materialize the exercise of both public and private power.”) 
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herself has argued, “[o]pen courts and published opinions permit individuals who are neither 
employees of the courts nor disputants to learn, firsthand, about processes and outcomes.”538 
Accordingly, Aronson has correctly pointed out that the principles of openness, visibility, 
publicity, and accessibility of court proceedings are not only “essentials of dignified 
treatment” of people in a rule-of-law system, but also “instruments for ensuring fair, 
legitimate and accountable use of judicial power […].”539 
 Aronson has also argued that while from the outset, the U.S. Government intended 
to set the military commissions aimed at trying terrorist suspects apart from the remainder 
of the judicial system in order to prevent public scrutiny over those commissions, such a 
policy ended up producing the opposite effect of arousing the interest of Americans. The 
Author starts off by referring to the concept of “heterotopia,” elaborated by Foucault in 1967 
to embrace what a given society considers its “other” in any respect540. The spaces a society 
designs to be isolated, on the contrary, show proclivity to catching the attention of the public 
for the very reason that they are devised to differ from what is ordinary541. Aronson has 
pointed out that the military commissions the Government established in the post-9/11 era – 
especially, the court at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp – fully embody heterotopias 
as meant by Foucault. Such tribunals, indeed, consist in “secluded facilities with complex 
systems regulating entry and exit [and] reside in distant locations […].”542 Whereas they are 
shrouded in mystery, the military courts tend to be perceived as a sort of acid test to figure 
out the ability of the U.S. society to deal with dangerous threats without failing in the basic 
values of that society543. Aronson has argued that on the one hand, military commissions 
lack the high degree of visibility that features ordinary courts; on the other hand, the “very 
                                                          
538 Ibid. 
539 ARONSON, In/visible courts, supra note 519, at 236. 
540 Id., at 237 (italics in original) (referring to MICHAEL FOUCAULT, Of Other Spaces, 16 Diacritics 
22 (1986) (Jay Miskowiec trans.). According to Foucault, heterotopias “are locations that […] reside 
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Ibid. (quoting FOUCAULT, id., at 26).  
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they are, and in what ways they are distinct from that which is ‘normal.’”) 
542 Id., at 238. 
543 Ibid. (arguing that in consideration of their restrictions to the traditional principle of open judicial 
proceedings, the military commissions “are singled out as the other kind of forum by which to 
measure and test a political community’s constitutional convictions and political inhibitions.” (italics 
in original). 
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otherness [of the former] provides a different kind of visibility […].”544 Even though military 
tribunals were designed to benefit the secrecy they are wrapped in, the very existence of 
separate fora targeting suspect terrorists makes them “more noticeable [than ordinary courts] 
and thus more readily subject to review and critique.”545 To put it differently, the U.S. 
Government’s decision to have suspect terrorists tried not before civilian courts but before 
special courts that do not apply the ordinary rule of openness resulted in directing the 
attention of the press, of scholars, and of the public in general at military tribunals. As 
Aronson has observed, the “separate institutional setting for trying terrorism suspects 
necessarily invokes special awareness and [public] scrutiny.”546 The Author concludes that 
in such a case, secrecy turns out to be “a political device, grounded in social practices of 
exclusion, distinction, and taboo.”547 Despite a low level of transparency, therefore, military 
commissions tend to attract the public’s eyes because of their exceptional function and 
separate location. 
 
 
C. Access to Criminal Trials and Relative Records 
 As I briefly mentioned above, the Supreme Court has gradually recognized that the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution underpins – inter alia – a right of access to court 
proceedings since the holding rendered in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia548. In that 
case, the right of access to a criminal trial was denied both to the press and to the public. 
According to the Supreme Court majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Burger, the 
trial court did not provide proper justification for depriving the press and the public of their 
First Amendment right to gain access to criminal trial proceedings549, a right that – Burger 
underlines – was historically guaranteed in the United States550. Richmond turns out to be a 
watershed case, as Justice Stevens pointed out in a concurring opinion551. He puts emphasis 
on the fact that for the first time, the Supreme Court substantially acknowledges the 
constitutional foundation of a right of the press to gather news, and of a right of the public 
                                                          
544 Ibid. (italics in original). 
545 Id., at 239. 
546 Id. 
547 Id., at 246 (italics in original).  
548 Richmond, 448 U.S., supra note 449. 
549 Id., at 580. 
550 Id., at 564-574. 
551 Id., at 582.  
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to gain access to government-held information552. In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan, instead, stresses the need for a balance that the court is always supposed to strike 
between the people’s right to gather information from the government and other involved 
interests553. Therefore, the right to know and to gain access to the court proceedings may 
outweigh other interests only if the judge holds so on a case-by-case analysis. Justice 
Brennan concludes that, whether the right at issue is meant as the right to gain access to the 
courtroom and to relevant records or the right to gather government information in general, 
“what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is 
important in terms of that very process.”554 The Supreme Court addressed again accessibility 
to criminal court proceedings in a 1982 case, which would become another milestone in the 
field – Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court555. The case was concerned with alleged 
sexual offenses committed against three minors, and the presiding judge issued an order 
prescribing the exclusion of the public from the courtroom in conformity with Massachusetts 
statute law. The core of the holding goes in the same direction as Richmond: the closure of 
the courtroom to anyone not directly involved in the process results in violating the press’ 
and the public’s First Amendment right to access to criminal trials556. The majority opinion 
emphasizes the cardinal role that the principle of openness plays in criminal trials as a 
guarantee that the fact-finding be carried out correctly and the rights of the accused be 
respected, because the court proceedings are subject to the supervision of the public557. 
Despite meeting limits in its application558, the principle of openness in criminal trials is 
deemed to “foste[r] an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the 
judicial process.”559 The majority opinion also argues that “public access to criminal trials 
permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process – an 
                                                          
552 Id., at 582-584. 
553 Id., at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must 
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554 Id., at 589. 
555 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
556 Id., at 602. 
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558 Id., at 606-607. The press and the public may be denied access to the courtroom and to relevant 
records if “a compelling governmental interest” requires keeping the court proceedings confidential, 
provided that the closure of the court “is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id., at 607. 
559 Id., at 606. 
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essential component in our structure of self-government.”560 Since access to the courtroom 
and to court proceedings records ends up being the means by which public scrutiny is 
exercised over the conduct of trials, courts are allowed to deny the right of access to the press 
and the public only if there exists no reasonable alternative to closure to safeguard a 
compelling interest that also enjoys constitutional coverage561.  
 Considering that access to trials and relative records enables public scrutiny, courts 
may exclude such access if a few procedural requirements, identified especially by the 
Supreme Court and by the Second and Forth court of appeals circuits with respect to criminal 
trials, are met. A court that intends to close – totally or partially – a trial or to seal the relevant 
records has to comply with a series of procedures, which are “prerequisites” for legitimate 
denial of the press’ and the public’s right of access to courtroom and to trial records562. The 
first procedural requirement prescribes that the court decision to opt for a closed-door trial 
be subject to “[s]ome form of public notice,” to potentially afford anyone an opportunity to 
challenge such a decision563. The second requirement consists in devoting a public hearing 
to discussion over the propriety and lawfulness of closing the trial. Those who claim that 
their right of access to court proceedings has been unduly violated are supposed to be given 
a chance to argue the closure issue “in open court.”564 Finally, under the third requirement, 
a court deciding to close a trial and keep the relevant records confidential has to set forth the 
reasons for the closure of its proceedings on the record in a rather detailed fashion565.  
 The courts are to follow those procedural requirements “even, and perhaps 
especially,” in cases involving espionage, where the closure of trial proceedings is justified 
with the need to preserve either the security of the country or the identity of foreign 
                                                          
560 Ibid. 
561 ADAM LIPTAK, Symposium – Comment, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 21, 21-22 (2000) (referring to Press-
Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court [hereinafter 
– Press-Enterprise I], 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); Richmond, supra note, at 581). 
562 In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984). 
563 In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2th Cir. 1984).  
564 United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1408 (2nd Cir. 1993). The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, indeed, prescribed that the district court order to exclude the public from accessing the Cojab 
hearing records be vacated, for such an order was issued not in open court but separately. 
565 See In re Knight Publishing, 743 F.2d, at 234 (ruling that “[i]f the district court believes it 
necessary to close the courtroom after hearing the objections, it must state its reasons on the record, 
supported by specific findings.”) Those findings must be “specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S., at 510.  
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informants566. In 1986, the Fourth Circuit found itself judging one of such cases – In re 
Washington Post Company567. The case involves a Ghanaian national that is accused of 
espionage for having received from a low-level CIA employee classified information 
concerning essentially the identity of covert personnel working for the U.S. Government in 
Ghana. The Washington Post Company asks the Court of Appeals to vacate orders by which 
a district court has prescribed the closure of portions of a criminal trial, and the sealing of 
related documents. The district court, in particular, has denied to the public the right of access 
to plea and sentencing hearings. Those interested in attending the trial have not been 
provided any chance to challenge the court secrecy. The idea underlying the closure is that 
granting the general public access to the trial and to relevant documents could thwart the 
confidentiality of the content of certain intelligence information. The Fourth Circuit, 
however, observes that under no circumstances would a public hearing on closure have 
resulted in disseminating the sensitive information involved in the trial568. To put it 
differently, an open discussion on the propriety and legitimacy of sealing court proceedings 
and relevant documents has nothing to do with the contents of the trial, as the substance of 
the proceedings is kept out of the discussion. Therefore, even if national security concerns 
are involved in the trial, as is indeed the case with In re Washington Post Company, granting 
the public an actual chance to challenge the decision of closing the court proceedings does 
not affect the assessment of such concerns, nor the way of coping with them. Since 
considering the issue of forbidding public access to the courtroom does not ensue 
dissemination of the classified information the trial may be concerned with, the Fourth 
Circuit observes, the procedural requirements previously mentioned “are fully applicable in 
the context of closure motions based on threats to national security.”569 The Fourth Circuit 
also argues that if courts were to fail to enforce the procedural requirements for the closure 
of proceedings whenever classified or otherwise sensitive information are involved in a case, 
                                                          
566 LIPTAK, Comment, supra note 561, at 26. 
567 In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
568 Id., at 391 (contending that “[t]here is no reason to fear that these procedures [instrumental to the 
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the independent position of the judicial branch would be undermined by complete deference 
to the Executive570.  
 
 
D. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 
 The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), enacted on October 15, 1980,571 
and codified as Appendix to Title 18 of the U.S. Code572, lays down rules and procedures 
aimed at solving the conflict between secrecy and due process requirements in criminal 
litigation involving the use and thus the potential disclosure of classified information. As the 
Fourth Circuit noted in 1985, Congress enacted CIPA to tackle the growing usage of the 
practice known as greymail, whereby a criminal defendant relies on the deterrent effect that 
the threat of divulging classified information during the trial may generate573. The aim a 
defendant seeks to achieve by deploying such a practice is to prompt the government to drop 
the charges out of fear of the inappropriate dissemination of such classified information. 
CIPA has been characterized as “a procedural statute,”574 as its cardinal purpose is to 
establish procedures for the deliberation on admissibility of evidence that consists of 
classified information575. Such procedures, however, do not replace ordinary standards for 
assessing relevance and admissibility of evidence into a trial576. They are aimed, instead, at 
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introduction of the evidence in open court.”) By following those procedures – the Senate report 
continues -- the U.S. Government will be able “to ascertain the potential damage to national security 
of proceeding with a given prosecution before trial.” Ibid. 
576 See, e.g. United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099 (1984). See, also, Smith, 780 F.2d, at 1106 (pointing out that 
“[t]he legislative history is clear that Congress did not intend to alter the existing law governing the 
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ensuring a balance between the defense attorney’s freedom to choose how to manage defense 
and the government’s right to evaluate in advance the impact that the disclosure of classified 
information in the course of the trial would have577. Section 1(a) CIPA defines “[c]lassified 
information” as any information or material that “require[s] protection against unauthorized 
disclosure for reasons of national security […].” It is incumbent on the Federal Government, 
“pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation,” to determine what information or 
material needs such a protection. Paragraph (b) clarifies that “national security” includes the 
fields of national defense and foreign relations of the United States. The means that prevents 
inappropriate disclosure of classified information is a protective order, which the district 
court is supposed to issue578. Such an order have two purposes: to restrict access to the 
classified material involved in the trial to cleared persons – i.e., persons who have been 
granted a security clearance – other than to the judge and the defendant; and to protect the 
classified information – as the name of the order suggests – by establishing procedures for 
the handling of such information.    
 Sections 5 and 6 lay down the core of CIPA procedures. Under Section 5(a), a 
defendant, who intends to disclose classified information either directly or indirectly579, has 
to afford the court and the Government timely pretrial written notice of her intention thereof. 
The notice must provide a description of the classified information the defendant intends to 
divulge. The Eleventh Circuit clarified the prescription just mentioned by holding, in 1983, 
that the notice “must be particularized, setting forth specifically the classified information 
which the defendant reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense.”580 If the notice is 
not sufficiently detailed, Section 5(b) imposes a specific sanction on the defendant: he or she 
                                                          
admissibility of evidence.”) Such a decision also cited an excerpt from the Conference Report on the 
CIPA that reads as follows: “[T]he conferees agree that […] nothing in the conference substitute is 
intended to change the existing standards for determining relevance and admissibility [of evidence].” 
H. Conf. Rept. No. 96-1436, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), p. 12, reprinted in U.S.Code, Cong. & 
Adm.News, p. 4307, 4310 (quoted in Smith, id.).   
577 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 
(1989); United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lopez-Lima, 
738 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D.Fla. 1990). Accordingly, it has been noted that CIPA provisions are 
aimed not only at “preventing unnecessary or inadvertent disclosures of classified information [, but 
also at] advising the government of the national security ‘cost’ of going forward.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
– OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 574, ibid.   
578 Section 3 CIPA. 
579 The disclosure of classified information is considered indirect when it is caused by the conduct of 
the defendant in any trial or pretrial proceeding, but not accomplished by the defendant herself. 
580 United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983). 
133 
 
may not disclose the classified information. Furthermore, Section 6(a) provides that at 
request by the U.S. Government, the court is supposed to conduct a hearing “to make all 
determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that 
would otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding.” Such a hearing is held in 
camera, i.e., in private chambers or – in any event – with exclusion of the public, if the 
Attorney General of the United States certifies that a public hearing “may result in the 
disclosure of classified information.” Comparing the degree of deference that courts tend to 
accord to the executive branch when dealing with the withholding of classified information 
within three different systems – the CIPA, for criminal cases; the FOIA, for cases concerning 
access to agency records; the state secret privilege, which applies in civil suits –  Schulhofer 
has argued that in the CIPA, “adversary procedures for the review of executive-brach secrecy 
are at their height […].”581 According to the Author, indeed, experience shows that by the 
power vested in them by the CIPA, U.S. courts exercise “active oversight of classification 
decisions” on a regular basis582.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
                                                          
581 STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, Oversight of national security secrecy in the United States, in COLE et 
al. (eds.), Secrecy, National Security, and the Vindication of Constitutional Law, supra note 131, at 
22.  
582 Id., at 23. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HEART OF THE ISSUE: TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
 
 
 
I. Executive Privilege 
A. Executive Privilege According to Berger: “A Constitutional Myth” 
 Berger is the most fervent critic of executive privilege, which he has defined as “a 
constitutional myth.”583 Fisher observes that since Berger does not specify the acceptation 
of the term he calls upon, it is possible to argue that he refers to the traditional meaning of 
“myth,” the meaning provided by dictionaries584. If such an assertion is correct – and, indeed, 
there is no reason to think otherwise – it is rather evident that Berger’s intent is to emphasize 
his aversion to the advocates of executive privilege. The privilege has been analyzed by each 
of the three branches of the Federal Government, other than by numerous scholars, and it is 
hard to believe that so much effort has been directed at something that is just based on 
“fiction and imagination,” to such an extent that those who claim the existence of this 
institution may be considered “guilty of a falsehood.”585 Berger, therefore, deploys 
provocative language, of which there is confirmation in his book. Indeed, he clarifies that 
the myth of executive privilege has been molded by invoking “newly-minded, self-serving 
precedents [and by] crystal-glazing […].”586 In other words, the advocates of the privilege – 
Berger observes -- have deliberately provided a misrepresentation of American history to 
lay the foundations of an institution they claim the Federal Executive has always depended 
on, and always will. In his opinion, no evidence of the existence of the privilege can be found 
in American history, for such a privilege has been artificially created, mostly in academic 
and bureaucratic milieus. By adopting an extremely narrow interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution, Berger deems presidential powers to consist only in such powers as are 
expressly vested in the President by Article II Const., since this was the intention of the 
                                                          
583 RAOUL BERGER, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth [hereinafter – Executive Privilege], 
1 (MA, Harvard University Press, 1974).  
584 See LOUIS FISHER, Raoul Berger on Public Law, 8 Pol. Science Reviewer, 173, 199 (1978). 
585 Ibid. 
586 Executive Privilege, at 13. 
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Founding Fathers587. Executive privilege is not mentioned in the Constitution, and thus 
represents an implied power, a concept Berger repudiates588.   
 To prove that executive privilege is not a legitimate power under the U.S. 
Constitution, Berger focuses his analysis on Congress’s power of inquiry into the executive 
branch and into its conduct. Even Prakash, one of the few scholars in addition to Berger that 
question the existence of executive privilege, however, has observed that Berger gives too 
much prominence to Congress’s power of inquiry, which he ends up identifying as “the 
central feature of [U.S.] government.”589 He finds that historically, the congressional 
oversight function turned out to be virtually absolute, as it covered “the whole spectrum of 
government […].”590 As a result of the unlimited scope of this function, Berger argues, the 
executive branch does not enjoy any discretion to withholding information from Congress 
when the latter is carrying out an investigation. Berger, indeed, considers Congress as the 
ultimate source – and repository – of all powers of the Federal Government provided for by 
the Constitution. The legislative branch, therefore, is vested with supreme authority within 
the Government, and the power of inquire into the Executive and its administrative apparatus 
has a pivotal role.  
 Berger mostly relies upon British history to support his assertion that Congress’s 
interest in disclosure always prevails over the interest of the executive branch in keeping 
certain information confidential, and deems such an approach to be fully consistent with the 
common law tradition the U.S. and the U.K. share591. He emphasizes, indeed, that the power 
of inquiry was long at the heart of parliamentary prerogatives in Britain, especially in the 
seventeenth century. In response to a scholar raising objections about his theory, Berger 
notes that in Britain, the Executive never refused to disclose information to the Parliament 
                                                          
587 Id., at 55 (maintaining that the Framers meant the presidential powers not to exceed the ones 
expressly “conferred and enumerated” in Article II Const.). 
588 See FISHER, Raoul Berger on Public Law, supra note 584, at 175-176 (stressing that Berger rejects 
“the notion of implied powers, inherent powers, powers derived from custom, or any other extra-
constitutional power that is not expressly vested in one of the branches [of the Federal 
Government].”) 
589 SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH, A critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 
Minn. L. Rev. 1143, 1146 note 12 (1999). 
590 Executive Privilege, at 36-37. 
591 Id., at 42 (observing that “the Framers thought in terms of English institutions and employed 
common law terms.”) 
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in the period from the first half of the seventeenth to the first half of the eighteenth century592. 
In his endeavor to prove that the Framers modeled the U.S. Congress upon the British 
Parliament, Berger also recalls a 1927 decision, McGrain v. Daugherty593, wherein the 
Supreme Court looked to the British history in addressing the boundaries of Congress’s 
power of inquiry594. Furthermore, Berger mentions an avalanche of episodes taken from 
Britain’s constitutional history beginning from 1621 to show that it was never the case that 
the Crown and ministers could invoke a privilege to withhold information from the 
Parliament and therefore to avoid being accountable to the legislative power595. Berger notes 
that most of the times, inquiries conducted by the Parliament constituted “a prelude to 
impeachment,”596 and it certainly is not a coincidence that he goes back to 1621 to pinpoint 
historical evidence supporting his theory, as at the time the British Parliament was showing 
“extraordinary zeal in searching out corruption of government and trade […].”597 He 
documents parliamentary investigations that targeted any field of executive power activity, 
ranging from the war conduct598 to the use of public money599, and to the execution of 
laws600. Berger argues that from his research it can be inferred that even the sector of foreign 
affairs, “about which American presidents have drawn a curtain of secrecy,”601 was fully 
subject to the parliamentary oversight power602. Overall, he deploys a series of precedents 
to conclude that in the British system of sovereign powers – and thus in the dynamics of that 
country’s material constitution – the Parliament is the cardinal body of the State and nothing 
can escape its oversight power. Very fitting is the characterization of the British Parliament 
as “the Great Inquest of the Nation,” made by a eighteen century’s political leader – later to 
                                                          
592 More precisely, the British Parliament was never denied access to information concerning the 
Crown and executive power – and thus to administrative records – between 1621 and 1742, except 
for an isolated episode occurred in 1742. See RAOUL BERGER, Executive Privilege, Professor 
Rosenblum, and the Higher Criticism [hereinafter – Rosenblum and the Higher Criticism], Duke L. 
J. 921, 923 (1975).  
593 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
594 BERGER, Rosenblum and the Higher Criticism, supra note 592, ibid. 
595 Executive Privilege, at 15-31. 
596 Id., at 15. 
597 Id., at 16 (quoting CATHERINE D. BOWEN, The Lion and the Throne, 435 (Boston, 1957)). 
598 Id., at 17-19. 
599 Id., at 19. 
600 Id., at 19-20. 
601 Id., at 21. 
602 Id., at 21-23. 
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become Prime Minister of Britain – whose statement Berger quotes indeed603. The power of 
impeachment affords Berger the main argument to build a theory that rules out any chance 
of finding limitations to the power of inquiry: Since the former has an absolute scope and 
thus embraces all executive functions with no exceptions, so must be the latter604. However, 
it would be reductive – the Author continues – to pinpoint the power of impeachment as the 
only element capable of justifying the vastness of the scope of parliamentary investigations. 
The British Parliament did not meet restrictions in inquiring into the Crown and the 
government, including the relevant administrative apparatus, because parliamentary 
investigations were aimed at achieving a plurality of purposes, as precedents show. The 
inexistence of a privilege – and of a margin of discretion – for the Executive to refuse to 
disclose information to the Parliament when the latter is carrying out an investigation – 
Berger maintains – “rests upon the fullest legislative supervision of administration, exhibited 
by inquiries into executive miscarriages, expenditures of public moneys, and execution of 
the laws, as a basis for legislation and the like.”605    
 According to Berger, since the Framers took the British Parliament as model of 
inspiration when they devised the legislative branch of Federal Government, Congress 
enjoys an unfettered power to inquire into the executive branch, as its British counterpart 
does. There is no official evidence – he contends – that the Framers intended to establish any 
restrictions to the congressional power to conduct investigations over the executive 
branch606. The purview of constitutional provisions does not make any express reference to 
                                                          
603 Id., at 29 (drawing upon RICHARD CHANDLER, 13 History and Proceedings of Parliament from 
1621 to the Present, 172-173 (London, 1743) (statement of William Pitt the Elder – 1742) (“We are 
called the Great Inquest of the Nation, and as such it is our Duty to inquire into every Step of public 
Management, either Abroad or at Home, in order to see that nothing has been done amiss […].”) See 
also BERGER, Rosenblum and the Higher Criticism, supra note 592, ibid. (quoting CHARLES 
DAVENANT, Essays upon I. The Balance of Power. II. The Right of Making War, Peace, and 
Alliances. III. Universal Monarchy, 208 (London, 1701) (“When they are [assembled in Parliament, 
the British representatives] are a part of the Legislative Authority, whose Business has always been 
to enquire into, and correct the Errors and Abuses committed by those upon whom the Prince has 
devolv’d any part of the Executive Power.”) 
604 Executive Privilege, at 24 (arguing that “[j]ust as there exists no executive limit on the 
parliamentary power to impeach, so there can be no executive limit on the power of Parliament to 
inquire whether executive conduct amounts to impeachable misconduct.”)  
605 Id., at 24. 
606 Id., at 35. 
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such restrictions607. The act passed by Congress on September 2, 1789 that established the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury608 is given as further evidence that the Framers envisioned 
a legal system wherein the executive branch is supposed to ensure that any demand for 
information necessary for Congress to perform its oversight function be completely satisfied. 
Section 2 of the act imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury – inter alia – the duty “to 
make report, and give information to either branch of the legislature, in person or in writing 
(as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of 
Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office.” According to Berger, therefore, 
championing the existence of executive privilege, of which there exists no trace in American 
history prior to the entry into force of the Constitution, means contradicting the Framers’ 
intent609. 
 In addition to referring to Congress’s power of inquire into the executive branch, 
Berger deploys a series of other arguments to prove that executive privilege lacks any legal 
basis, especially by analyzing the powers expressly vested in the President of the United 
States by the Constitution. Firstly, Article II, Section 3, Clause 1, requires that the President 
“from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union.” According 
to Berger, such a clause establishes a presidential duty to inform that is “the reciprocal of 
the familiar legislative power to inquire.”610 To put it differently, the duty of the President 
to provide Congress with periodic updates about the comprehensive situation of the Federal 
Government and the congressional oversight power over the executive branch end up being 
two sides of the same coin. Berger also notes that such a correspondence was less evident in 
the early version of the provision at issue, the one originally presented at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787. It imposed on the President “[the] duty to inform the Legislature of the 
Constitution of the U.S. so far as may respect his Department.”611 Had such a version entered 
into force, the President would have been “placed under an unqualified duty to inform 
                                                          
607 See Executive Privilege – Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Separation of Powers of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1st sess., 245 (1971) (statement of Raoul Berger) 
(pointing out that “there is no word in the Constitution that expresses any intention whatsoever to 
curtail […] the legislative power of investigations.”)  
608 An Act to establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12 Statute I, 65, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. The act is 
currently codified at 31 U.S.C. § 331. 
609 BERGER, Rosenblum and the Higher Criticism, supra note 592, at 922 (contending that “pre-1789 
history knows no such doctrine as executive privilege, and there is reason to believe that the Framers 
did not mean to create it.”) 
610 Executive Privilege, at 38. 
611 Id., at 37 (quoting FARRAND, 2 The Records of the Convention, supra note 144, at 158). 
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Congress as to matters within the Executive Department.”612 The final version of the 
provision, instead – Berger observes – “represents a broadened and stylistically improved 
articulation of that duty [to inform the legislative branch of government].”613  
 Secondly, another case against executive privilege rests on the Take Care Clause. 
Under Article II, Section 3, Clause 5, Const., is is incumbent on the President “[to] take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The power to draft the statutes and thus to forge the 
system of legislative law is vested in Congress. Therefore, no branch or other body within 
the Federal Government – Berger maintains – has a more compelling interest in controlling 
that the Executive accurately implement the laws than the lawmaker itself, i.e., Congress614.   
 Thirdly, Berger calls upon the provision for the impeachment of the President, 
contained in Article II, Section 4, to deny that the Executive have discretion in responding 
to Congress’s requests for information. To sustain his point, the Author mentions nineteenth 
century reports of the House of Representatives. A first report, issued in 1843, points out 
that the House, which is the chamber empowered to carry out impeachment proceedings, is 
put into condition to conduct those proceedings only if it has boundless access to information 
held by the executive branch. The exercise of the impeachment power, therefore, would be 
practically hampered by the ability of the President and his staff to hold back information 
necessary for Congress to get a comprehensive picture of the situation that seems to 
undermine the loyalty of the President. If the President were to actually enjoy the ability to 
withhold information, the House could not conduct exhaustive investigations in cases 
wherein the congressional power to inquire into the executive branch – on the contrary – 
should be at its maximum extent615. By establishing an impeachment clause in the 
                                                          
612 Executive Privilege, ibid. 
613 Ibid.  
614 Id., at 3 (“Who has a more legitimate interest in inquiring whether a law has been faithfully 
executed than the lawmaker?”) 
615 See H. R. Rept. No. 27-271, 27th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1843) pp. 4-6 (quoted in JOHN R. LABOVITZ, 
Presidential Impeachment, 211 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1978)) (“The House of 
Representatives has the sole power of impeachment. The President himself, in the discharge of his 
most independent functions, is subject to the exercise of this power-a power which implie[s] the right 
of inquiry on the part of the House to the fullest and most unlimited extent․If the House possesses 
the power to impeach, it must likewise possess all the incidents of that power-the power to compel 
the attendance of all witnesses and the production of all such papers as may be considered necessary 
to prove the charges on which the impeachment is founded. If it did not, the power of impeachment 
conferred upon it by the Constitution would be nugatory. It could not exercise it with effect.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.). See also ASHER C. HINDS, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of 
Representatives of the United States, 183 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off., 1907). 
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Constitution, the Framers intended to force the President to account for allegedly illegal 
conduct of a certain gravity to Congress. In the same 1843 report, the House of 
Representatives stresses that it has “an original right” to demand information and obtain it 
from the executive branch, a right that derives from “[the House’s] character of grand inquest 
of the nation.”616 It has also been noted that the executive branch does not have a power 
equivalent to that of impeachment to winnow the conduct of Congress. In other words, 
whereas Congress is empowered to assess presidential action and its compatibility with the 
Constitution and with the legal system on a whole, the President does not enjoy 
correspondent authority towards the legislative branch. Urged by a letter of a Representative 
expressing President John Tyler’s frustration over a congressional inquiry for purposes of 
impeachment, an inquiry that in particular involved a conflict over the production of certain 
documents by the President, the House of Representatives issued a report in 1860. This 
report underlines the very fact that while the President is always accountable to Congress, 
the opposite is not true, since the latter is not constitutionally required to be accountable to 
the Chief Executive617. As a result, according to the report, Congress’s authority is broader 
than the one conferred upon the President. Even though he has some duties peculiar to his 
office, the President is not substantially different from any citizen: The power of 
impeachment serves the very purpose to avoid that the President be exempted from being 
subject to scrutiny and possible sanction618. The report, however, leans too much towards 
the legislative branch, whose position in the constitutional architecture is unduly 
emphasized. It argues, indeed, that the executive branch is always bound to be “inferior” to 
the legislative one, as only the latter “is omnipotent within the limits of the Constitution.”619 
The fact that the President is assigned a veto power over Congress legislation does not make 
the former “coequal with that branch of government which helps to impose and define [the 
duties of the President, i.e., the legislative branch].”620 It is interesting to note that in 1974 – 
the same year in which Berger monograph against executive privilege was released – the 
                                                          
616 H. R. Rept. No. 271, id., at 13 (quoted in Executive Privilege, at 36-37). 
617 See H. R. Rept. No. 36-394, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., 2 (1860) (“The conduct of the President is 
always subject to the constitutional supervision and judgment of Congress; whilst he, on the contrary, 
has no such power over either branch of that body.”) 
618 Id., at 2-3 (“The President and the citizen stand upon equality of rights. The distinction between 
them arises from an inequality of duties. Wherever the conduct of the latter is open to inquiry and 
charge, that of the former is not less so.”) 
619 Id., at 3. 
620 Ibid.  
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Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives issued a report621 that, in 
recommending the impeachment of President Nixon, addressed the scope of investigations 
over the executive branch when Congress is exercising its power of impeachment. According 
to the report, even though the President may withhold information from Congress in other 
contexts, and, in particular, he has a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of his 
conversations with advisors, the Constitution devises the congressional power of inquiry 
related to impeachment proceedings to prevail over any need for secrecy the President may 
invoke622.    
 Fourthly, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, contained in Article II, section 2, Clause 
1, Const.623, is deemed to constitute another argument against the existence of executive 
privilege. Berger suggests relating this clause with Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, which 
confers the power to declare war upon the legislative branch. Congress – he contends – turns 
out to be the supreme branch of the Federal Government even in wartime, for congressional 
authorization is necessary to begin a war. Berger notes that in the Federalist Papers, one of 
America’s “sacred text[s],”624 the President’s war authority was meant as being restricted to 
that of a first general625. Berger also cites a scholarly opinion consistent with his – the one 
                                                          
621 See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974). 
622 Id., at 209 (“Whatever the limits of the legislative power in other contexts – and whatever need 
may otherwise exist for preserving the confidentiality of Presidential conversation – in the context 
of an impeachment proceeding the balance was struck in favor of the power of inquiry when the 
impeachment provision was written into the Constitution.”) 
623 This provision qualifies the President as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States […].” 
624 CLINTON ROSSITER, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution, 52 (New York, 1964) (quoted in 
JAMES G. WILSON, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of The Federalist Papers, 
Brigham Young Uni. L. Rev. 65, 127 (1985)). See also Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist, vii 
(New American Library, New York, 1961) (“The Federalist is the most important work in political 
science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to be written, in the United States.”) But see also 
McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 433 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (quoted in RAOUL 
BERGER, Executive Privilege. A Reply to Professor Sofaer, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 603, 607 note 33 
(1975)) (“No tribute can be paid to [The Federalist Papers’ authors] which exceeds their merit; but 
in applying their opinions to the cases […] a right to judge of their correctness must be retained 
[…].”)  
625 Executive Privilege, at 63 (quoting The Federalist No. 69, 448 (New York, 1937) (A. Hamilton)) 
(arguing that the U.S. President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief may not be equated to that of 
the king in the British experience, as the former has a more restricted scope). The authority vested in 
the Chief Executive, indeed – Hamilton explains – “would amount to nothing more than the supreme 
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expressed by Henkin, who underscores the merely executive nature of the functions 
performed by generals626. According to Berger, the supremacy of Congress over the 
executive branch emerged as early as during the Revolutionary War627. The Continental 
Congress appointed George Washington as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army 
in 1775, and Rostow has highlighted Washington’s “humble posture” in performing the 
functions he was assigned628. Such a posture was consistent with the intent of the Continental 
Congress, which demanded that Washington be “its creature, or the creature of its 
committees, in every respect.”629 Rostow, whose contribution to the matter Berger exploits 
in part to corroborate his theory630, quotes a passage from an address delivered by Sen. Javits. 
The Senator has argued that the Framers were so influenced by the dynamics of the 
relationship between the Continental Congress and George Washington that such a 
relationship may be considered the “legislative history” of the concept of Commander-in-
Chief as meant in Article II of the Constitution631.   
                                                          
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral […] while that 
of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the rising and regulating of fleets and 
armies – all which, by the Constitution […] would appertain to the Legislature.” Ibid.     
626 See LOUIS HENKIN, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 50-51 (The Foundation Press, New 
York, 1972) (quoted in Executive Privilege, ibid.) (contending that “generals and admirals, even 
when they are ‘first,’ do not determine the political purposes for which troops are to be used [, but 
rather] they command [such troops] in the execution of policy made by others.”)    
627 See Executive Privilege, at 62. 
628 EUGENE V. ROSTOW, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 Texas L. Rev. 833, 
840 (1972) (referring to SEN. JACOB K. JAVITS, The Case for War Powers Legislation – Address to 
the American Bar Association Standing Comm. on World Order under Law, Hearing on War Powers 
of the President and Congress (February 5, 1972), 4-5). 
629 ROSTOW, ibid. (quoted in Executive Privilege, at 62).  
630 See Executive Privilege, at 62; RAOUL BERGER, War-Making by the President, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
29, 33 (1972). 
631 JAVITS, The Case for War Powers Legislation, (quoted in ROSTOW, Great Cases Make Bad Law, 
supra note 628, at 840 note 14) (“Clearly, the drafters of the Constitution had in mind the experience 
of the Continental Congress with George Washington when they designated the President as 
‘Commander-in-Chief’ in Article II Section 2. Thus, the ‘legislative history’ of the Constitutional 
concept of a Commander-in-Chief was the relationship of George Washington as colonial 
Commander-in-Chief to the Continental Congress.”) To enrich his assertion with historical evidence, 
Sen. Javits quotes the final clause of the commission designating Washington as Commander-in-
Chief. George Washington was required not only to stick to what the commission stipulated, but also 
to punctually “observe and follow such orders and directions from time to time as [he would] receive” 
from the Continental Congress itself or a future (different) Congress. Ibid.      
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 Fifthly, Berger makes a case against executive privilege by referring to the 
distribution of powers between the legislative and executive branches in the field of foreign 
affairs. Under Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2, Const., the authority to make treaties is vested 
in the President, but the Senate has to give its “Advice and Consent […].” From Berger’s 
viewpoint, the Founding Fathers intended to make the Senate an active and full partner of 
the Chief Executive – and of diplomats acting on his behalf – in the formation of treaties632. 
In this regard, James Madison argued that treaties belong under sheer legislation, and, as 
such, they call for execution by the executive branch633. The Senate – Berger observes – is 
empowered to participate in all stages of negotiation, as the constitutional provision does not 
distinguish between negotiation and ratification of treaties. The original version of the 
constitutional provision conferred the whole treaty-making power upon the Senate, yet the 
Framers eventually opted for the splitting of the power between the President and the 
Senate634. From such evolution the provision went through in the drafting process of the 
Constitution – the Author continues – it may not be inferred that the Framers intended to 
exclude the Senate from any involvement in the formation of treaties, for “[n]ot the slightest 
hint is to be found in the Convention records” that this was the underlying intent.”635 He 
mentions Federalist No. 75, wherein Hamilton contended that the participation of at least a 
component of the legislative branch in the making of treaties should be ensured not only for 
“the vast importance of the trust [in negotiations with foreign countries],” but also in 
consideration of the purely legislative nature of treaties636. Therefore, “the joint possession” 
– Hamilton continued – of the treaty-making power by the President and the Senate “would 
afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them.”637  
                                                          
632 See Executive Privilege, at 129 note 63 (quoting MYRES S. MCDOUGAL – ASHER LANS, Treaties 
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National 
Policy, 54 Yale L. J. 534, 539 note 25 (1945)) (“The testimony of delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention clearly indicates the intention of the draftsmen that the Senate participate equally with 
the President in the step-by-step negotiation of treaties.”)  
633 See “Helvidius” Number 1, reprinted in THOMAS MASON et al. (eds.), 15 The Papers of James 
Madison 66, 69 (1985) (“A treaty is not an execution of laws: it does not presuppose the existence 
of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution, like 
all other laws, by the executive magistrate.”)  
634 See Executive Privilege, at 127 (noting that the President “was [only] finally made a participant 
in the treaty-making process, which had been initially lodged – after the pattern of the Continental 
Congress – in the Senate alone.”). 
635 Ibid. 
636 Id., at 128 (quoting Federalist No. 75 (Hamilton), in The Federalist, supra note 625, at 486). 
637 Ibid (quoting Federalist No. 75, id., at 488).  
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 Berger deems the predominant role traditionally played by the U.S. President in the 
formation of treaties to be unlawful, as it results in depriving the Senate of its authority in 
the field. Such “monopolistic”638 practices, whereby the President has marginalized the 
legislative branch both in the making of treaties and in the declaration and conduction of a 
war, have been justified by scholars by invoking a doctrine based on “adaptation by 
usage.”639 Under such a doctrine, expressed by McDougal and Lans, a practice that various 
U.S. administrations have resorted to over time gradually entrenches itself within the legal 
system, and this very fact “makes its contemporary constitutionality unquestionable.”640 
According to Berger, which opposes the doctrine vehemently, “adaptation by usage” is just 
a label aimed at providing an appearance of legitimacy to “successive usurpations whereby 
the President has taken over treaty functions confided to Senate and President jointly, and 
war functions exclusively granted to Congress and withheld from him.”641 Such practices – 
Berger continues – bring about a significant alteration of the constitutional distribution of 
competence between the branches of the Federal Government, which instead would be 
“inviolable under the separation of powers.”642          
 
 
B. Prakash’s Arguments Against Executive Privilege 
 Despite deploying different arguments from those set forth by Berger more than 
twenty years earlier, Prakash, too, opposes to the existence of executive privilege by 
highlighting the predominant role Congress has in the Federal Government. Prakash’s theory 
may be summed up as follows: Everything in the Federal Government emanates from 
Congress, which thus ends up recalling what some ancient philosophical theories used to 
consider the Prime Mover of the universe – in this case, of the U.S. Government. Prakash 
argues that the effective ability for the President of the United States to wield the powers 
vested in him by the Constitution requires the cooperation of Congress, which by passing 
budget legislation, made of a long series of appropriations, provides the President and the 
executive branch as a whole with the necessary funding for them to carry out their 
                                                          
638 Executive Privilege, at 117. 
639 Id., at 89. 
640 MCDOUGAL – LANS, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements, supra 
note 632, at 291. 
641 Executive Privilege, at 89.  
642 Ibid. 
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institutional functions643. To put it differently, since the power of the purse is vested in 
Congress, the President depends on appropriation provisions established by Congress to be 
able to operate. As the Author notes, “without a steady and sufficient supply of funds, the 
President cannot possibly satisfy his constitutional duties or fulfill the promise of his 
executive powers.”644 The Chief Executive, indeed, is not permitted to use financial 
resources without legislative authorization645. The President’s role as Commander-in-Chief, 
assigned to him by Article II Const., also depends on appropriation provisions established 
by Congress, which other than creating the armed forces and the militia initially, enable the 
President to provide them every year with a salary and proper equipment646. If Congress 
were to decide to stop appropriating funds for the keeping of an army, the constitutional 
function of Commander-in-Chief would boil down to “a nullity.”647 Furthermore, Prakash 
observes that since the Constitution entrusts Congress with the power – not the duty – to 
establish an army and call out the militia, it may occur that the President turns out to be “a 
Commander of absolutely no one from time to time.”648  
 Similarly, Prakash reads the Necessary and Proper Clause provided for in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 18649, as proof of the assertion that only Congress’s intervention allows 
the executive branch to execute its functions. Such a clause, indeed, is deemed to include the 
authority to establish and equip executive departments and agencies. Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon Congress to create all structures and bodies constituting overall the 
executive branch of the Federal Government – what may be called the administrative state. 
The President, instead, is prohibited from creating entities and offices on his own account650. 
Such an interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause – Prakash argues – finds 
                                                          
643 See PRAKASH, A critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, supra note 589, 
at 1154 (noting that the formal text of the Constitution only requires that the President be ensured a 
salary for his office).  
644 Ibid.  
645 Id., at 1156. 
646 Id., at 1157. 
647 Ibid.  
648 Id., at 1159. 
649 Such a constitutional clause empowers Congress to adopt “all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  
650 See PRAKASH, A critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, supra note 589, 
at 1160-1162. 
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confirmation in history. It is Congress, indeed, that by adopting statutory provisions has 
gradually formed the structure of the executive branch651.  
 By characterizing Congress as a sort of driving force of the whole Federal 
Government and thus as the ultimate source of all powers vested by the Constitution in the 
three sovereign branches, Prakash takes up the position expressed by Van Alstyne652. They 
both agree, indeed, that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to provide the 
President with financial and organizational means to perform his functions. According to 
Prakash, since “powerful textual, structural, or historical arguments [showing] the contrary” 
do not appear to exist, it must be held that “Congress not only controls the more central 
means, but the peripheral means of execution [of presidential powers] as well.”653 Van 
Alstyne and Prakash outline a constitutional architecture wherein the other two branches of 
government – namely, the executive branch – depend entirely on Congress to be able to 
wield their powers and fulfill their duties. Congress is empowered not only to enact all 
statutes that are deemed to be necessary and proper to allow the whole Federal Government 
to work, but also to confer upon the other branches “incidental authorities” in order for them 
to begin “carrying into execution their respective powers.”654 Such an interpretation of the 
allocation of powers within the Federal Government leaves no room for claims of executive 
privilege. Prakash, indeed, concludes that since Congress turns out to be the supreme branch 
of government, it may not be refused access to the information it needs655. Not so dissimilar 
– in the end – is the conclusion reached by Van Alstyne, who does not exclude radically the 
invocation of executive privilege, but subjects the usage of the privilege to legislative 
authorization656.   
                                                          
651 Id., at 1161 (noting that “for over two centuries, Congress created the offices and departments, 
deciding whether, when, and how it would furnish the means of assisting the President in the use of 
his constitutional powers and in the fulfillment of his constitutional duties.”) 
652 See, in particular, WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental 
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effects of the 
Sweeping Clause, Law & Contemp. Probs. 102 (1976). 
653 PRAKASH, A critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, supra note 589, at 
1163. 
654 Id., at 1164-1165 (referring to VAN ALSTYNE, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental 
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts, supra note 652, at 128). 
655 Id., at 1163 (“Given these admittedly uncomfortable constitutional realities [, from which it 
emerges the need for the Executive to depend on Congress to perform its functions], how can we 
believe that the President has either an inherent or a penumbral right to secret communications?”) 
656 Id., at 1165 (quoting VAN ALSTYNE, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of 
the President and of the Federal Courts, supra note 652, at 128) (recalling that according to Van 
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C. Advocating the Existence of Executive Privilege 
1. Rebutting Berger’s Arguments Against Executive Privilege 
 First of all, Berger relies on a myriad of precedents concerning investigations 
conducted by the British Parliament over the government to claim that the U.S. Congress, 
modeled upon its British counterpart, enjoys an unlimited power to inquire into the executive 
branch. The accuracy and breadth of the analysis is doubtless commendable, and it certainly 
took Berger a considerable effort to trace the congressional power of inquiry back to the 
British experience657. Furthermore, making reference to historical precedents to sustain a 
given interpretation of one or more provisions in the U.S. Constitution is a somewhat 
widespread technique, which not only scholars but anyone working in the law tend to 
deploy658. Reid has maintained that “forensic history,” which consists in the merging of law 
and history, “for centuries has made legitimate contributions […,] especially to Anglo-
American constitutional law.”659 Criticism has been directed at Berger, however, on the 
merits of his research, that is, on its content. Sofaer, in particular, has argued that Berger 
engaged in a deep but biased winnowing of historical evidence, because he then employed 
just the material useful to support his theory660. The Author has stamped Berger’s 
                                                          
Alstyne, when the invocation of executive privilege is simply based on the assumption that the 
privilege itself appears to be “reasonably appropriate” in consideration of the overall authority vested 
in the U.S. President by the Constitution, such an invocation is legitimate only if it is expressly 
authorized by an act of Congress).   
657 See R.H. CLARK, Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger, 8 Akron L. Rev. 324, 324 (1975) 
(giving high credit to Berger for the meticulousness of his study). Clark, in particular, characterizes 
Berger’s work as a “momentum to scholarly research and analysis […].” Ibid. 
658 See MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 523, 524 (1995) (observing that “[l]awyers, judges, and […] legal academics regularly turn to 
history when talking about the Constitution, and not merely as a rhetorical trope.”) It does not mean, 
however, that historical references to explain a constitutional provision are always proper and correct. 
The Author argues, indeed, that “constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that are 
at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.” Id., at 525. 
659 JOHN PHILLIP REID, Law and History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 193, 205 (1993).  
660 See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, (Book Review) Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 281, 284 (1974) (esteeming the pre-1789 history reported by Berger as “incomplete and 
biased.”) Berger – the Author explains – “selects isolated events and statements out of contexts that 
are complicated and ambiguous, and bludgeons his way to the conclusions he so earnestly wants to 
reach.” His assertion that in the British experience, the Parliament enjoyed an absolute power to 
inquire into the government and the administration, for instance, is corroborated only with 
seventeenth-century precedents, whereas parliamentary investigations carried out during the 
eighteenth century are almost entirely overlooked. Ibid. Furthermore, Sofaer notes that when Bailyn 
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reconstruction of the historical roots of the power of congressional inquiry into the Executive 
as “wholly one-sided, and therefore misleading […].”661  Secondly, Berger has also 
inferred the incompatibility of executive privilege with the Constitution from the State of the 
Union Clause, pursuant to Article II, Section 3, Clause 1, Const. He reads the clause as 
though it imposed on the President a duty to supply information and bestowed upon 
Congress a corresponding right to claim the fulfillment of such a duty. Therefore, according 
to Berger, the Chief Executive does not have any discretion to select the material to disclose, 
which instead should consist of what serves to consider the Congress’s demand for periodic 
information on the state of the American Republic satisfied. Berger’s slant on the clause 
essentially rests on the provision originally proposed at the Convention of Philadelphia, 
which saddled the President with a duty to inform the legislative branch on the condition of 
the American Republic. Berger endeavors to prove that such a duty remains in the final 
version of the clause and is even specified, though in reality in the provision approved by 
the Convention and inserted in the text of the Constitution, not only is any express reference 
to an actual duty to inform disappeared, but the verb “shall” and – above all – the phrase 
“from time to time” suggest that the President is assigned some margins of discretion in 
informing Congress on the progress of the Federal Government. It has been argued that the 
idea of presidential submission to Congress in providing periodic updates on the state of the 
United States had been scratched by the time the final version of the constitutional provision 
was approved662. To sustain the theory that recognizes to the President some discretion in 
                                                          
– Berger’s main source – pinpointed seventeenth-century Britain as the context the Framers drew 
upon the most, his intent was not to extol the British Parliament’s power of oversight over the 
government. Ibid. (referring to BERNARD BAILYN, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, 26-54 (Harvard University Press, MA, 1967)). See also RALPH K. WINTER, JR., The 
Seedlings For the Forest, 83 Yale L. J. 1730, 1733 (1974) (censuring Berger’s partial collection of 
historical material and contending that “only a laboriously tortured reading of the past supports the 
conclusion that executive privilege is a ‘constitutional myth.’”); ALBERT A. LEE, (Book Review) 
Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth, 74 Columb. L. Rev. 1360, 1360-1361 (1974) (stressing 
that “Berger’s historical interpretations are […] wedded to his policy preferences, and the offspring 
of this union is an advocate’s version of history.”)     
661 SOFAER, ibid. 
662 See GARY J. SCHMITT, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power to Withhold Information from 
Congress, in JOSEPH BESSETTE – JEFFREY K. TULIS, The Presidency in the Constitutional Order: An 
Historical Examination, 159 (New Brunswick: New Jersey, 2010) (considering at least dubious the 
claim that “the first proposal [of the State of the Union Clause] manifests the true spirit of this 
segment of the Constitution […].”) Common sense – the Authors continue – suggests that the 
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providing Congress with information on the state of the country, Schmitt mentions a House 
of Representatives resolution prepared by Rep. Van Dyke663. Since Berger referred to 
congressional documents dating back to the nineteenth century to sustain his position, the 
reference to such documents must be acknowledged also a technique to rebut Berger’s 
doctrine. This House resolution, related to a request for information on the military sphere 
made to the executive branch, underlines that the President has a discretionary power to 
pinpoint the substantial content – and thus the extent – of the information sharing with 
Congress664.  
 Thirdly, Berger looks to the Take Care Clause to foreclose any room for executive 
privilege. In his opinion, Congress is the lawmaker and, as such, is always entitled to demand 
information in order to oversee the execution of the laws, i.e., of the product of the 
lawmaking activity, by the executive branch. This consideration tends to lead to a distinction 
between a formal and a substantial meaning of executive power. A distinguished scholar of 
such a subject matter – Mansfield – has observed that “the real, practical, informal executive 
[…] is far more powerful than the supposed, theoretical formal executive.”665 Merry, 
however, has pointed out that the interpretation of the President’s authority as merely 
executive was quite widespread at the Convention of Philadelphia666, and such a position 
holds true in part, since the execution of the laws is an integral part of the executive power, 
more precisely the core of such a power667. However, arguing that the President is only 
                                                          
President has such amount of discretion as he needs to establish on his own account the content and 
timing of the information to furnish to Congress. Ibid. 
663 Id., at 160. 
664 2 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Annals of Cong.), 10th 
Cong., 1st Sess., House of Representatives (February 1808) 1644 (maintaining that the President 
enjoys discretion in judging “what is proper for communication,” even though the House of 
Representatives is allowed – obviously – to request information anytime). 
665 HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power, 4 
(New York, 1989). 
666 See MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I Do Solemnly Swear: The President’s Constitutional Oath, 177 
(Lanham: Maryland, 1999) (referring to HENRY J. MERRY, The Constitutional System: The Group 
Character of the Elected Institutions, 37 (New York, 1986)). At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut, for example, defined “the Executive magistracy as nothing more 
than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect.” FARRAND, 1 The Records of 
the Convention, at 65.  
667 James Wilson warned at the Convention about a concentration of both executive and legislative 
prerogatives in the hands of the Head of the executive branch, whom he thought would be better 
embodied by “a single magistrate […].” Ibid. The only powers Wilson deemed to be “strictly 
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers,” except for officers that 
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responsible for the execution of the laws requires, firstly, giving the concept of “execution 
of the laws” a broad interpretation. To justify the assertion that the President should always 
have a power to remove his appointees, whatever the nature of the duties and tasks they are 
charged with carrying out, for instance, in a 1926 decision – Myers v. United States668 – the 
Supreme Court observed that not only is the President required to execute the laws of 
Congress, but he has also to ensure that the execution occur in a “unitary and uniform” 
fashion669. Article II of the Constitution – the Supreme Court continued – “evidently 
contemplated [such a further prescription] in vesting general executive power in the 
President alone.”670 Furthermore, and above all, it has been noted that the acceptation that 
considered the President as “a pure servant of the legislators” had lost all its appeal by the 
early decades of the twentieth century671. Mansfield has argued that the role of the President 
in the U.S. constitutional framework cannot be drawn from the “dictionary definition” of 
executive power, and therefore it does not boil down to merely “carry[ing] out the intention 
of the law.”672 A strong executive branch, on the contrary, is necessary – the Author observes 
– because it is the only remedy against “legislative usurpation [of the President’s remit].”673 
The Constitution, indeed, assigns the President a set of powers and duties that constitute his 
comprehensive, independent competence, as the separation of powers calls for674. Ensuring 
the faithful execution of the statutes passed by Congress, therefore, is only one of the 
presidential duties, “for the performance of which he is given several powers.”675 The 
President’s remit encompasses a series of powers, and some of them are not expressly 
                                                          
belonged to the legislative branch and – accordingly – were appointed by Congress. Id., at 66. See, 
also, 1 Annals of Cong., 519 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789) (statement of James Madison) (“[I]f 
anything is in its nature executive, it must be that power which is employed in superintending and 
seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.”)     
668 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
669 Id., at 135. 
670 Ibid.  
671 PAULEY, I Do Solemnly Swear, supra note 666, at 177-178 (referring to MERRY, The 
Constitutional System, at 78).   
672 MANSFIELD, Taming the Prince, supra note 665, at 2. 
673 Id., at 16. Mansfield spurs U.S. presidents and scholars to champion a strong executive power. He 
maintains, indeed, that the President “needs a doctrine, a ‘literary theory,’ to protect himself against 
the partisan application by the legislature of the dictionary definition of executive, which would 
reduce him to [a Congress’s] instrument.” Ibid.   
674 See RUTH W. GRANT – STEPHEN GRANT, The Madisonian Presidency, in BESSETTE – TULIS, The 
Presidency in the Constitutional Order, supra note 662, at 43. 
675 MANSFIELD, Taming the Prince, supra note 665, at 4. 
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mentioned in Article II of the Constitution. Among the implied powers is executive privilege, 
meant – as noted above – as the prerogative of the President to withhold information from 
Congress. 
 Fourthly, Berger maintains that executive privilege contrasts with the Impeachment 
Clause. On the one hand, impeachment represents a formidable tool Congress may deploy 
to gain information from the executive branch. Fisher has argued – and shown by providing 
precedents as examples thereof – that the congressional leverage that is usually capable of 
forcing the President to release documents encompasses three different weapons: the threat 
of conducting investigations for purposes of impeachment; the threat of exercising the 
contempt power, i.e., the power to hold executive branch officials – and members of the 
Cabinet – in contempt; and the block of presidential nominations provoked by the refuse of 
the Senate to give its consent in the appointing process676. On the other hand, Article II, 
Section 4 Const. relates impeachment to the commission of “treason, bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” It means that the impeachment power is supposed to be 
exercised not on a regular basis but, as Hamilton argued, as a response to “those offences 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust [, and thus end up having a political nature] as they relate 
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”677 Therefore, an argument aimed 
at challenging the existence of executive privilege based on the Impeachment Clause proves 
somewhat weak due to the limited application of the Clause. Furthermore, the meaning of 
the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” whose specific content the Constitution fails 
to provide, calls for reference to “the English practice of parliamentary impeachments.”678 
As Schmitt has noted, however, Berger himself concedes that the impeachment power vested 
in the British Parliament is broader than the one the U.S. Congress enjoys679. Consequently, 
inferring an absolute congressional power of inquiry into the executive branch from the 
                                                          
676 See LOUIS FISHER, Invoking Executive Privilege. Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 583, 595-602 (2000).   
677 The Federalist No. 65, supra note 625, at 423-424 (A. Hamilton).  
678 JARED P. COLE – TODD GARVEY, Impeachment and Removal, CRS Report for Congress (October 
29, 2015). In the British experience, impeachment procedures “appea[r] to have been directed against 
individuals accused of crimes against the state and encompassed offenses beyond traditional criminal 
law.” Ibid.   
679 SCHMITT, Executive Privilege, supra note 662, at 158 (quoting RAOUL BERGER, Impeachment: 
The Constitutional Problems, 311 (Harvard University Press, 1973)) (“[The British] Parliament, it is 
true, asserted virtually unlimited power; but the Framers had no intention of conferring such power 
upon Congress.”) 
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scope of impeachment investigations conducted by the British Parliament appears to be 
dubious at least680.   
 Fifthly, Berger also appeals to the Commander-in-Chief Clause to object to the 
legitimacy of executive privilege. As the case with the impeachment power, war and 
regulation of the military are other aspects wherein the British and the U.S. experience differ. 
A 1850 Supreme Court decision identified war powers as an example of the difference 
between the Executive in the two countries681. Unlike the British tradition, in the United 
States the powers to declare war and to lay down rules on the Army are vested not in the 
Chief Executive but in Congress682. Congress, however, showed all along a tendency to fail 
to exercise those powers, and the President has frequently taken over the whole authority in 
the war sector683. Sofaer has maintained that “Berger cannot seriously expect [the 
distribution of was powers arisen in practice between the legislative and executive branch] 
to be refashioned on the basis of his reading of pre-1789 history.”684 The President is in 
charge of military operations685 and thus when the United States wages war, the President 
enjoys a power of direction686 that actually makes him more than just a general in a position 
of primus inter pares. Not only does the President play an overwhelming role in the 
                                                          
680 SCHMITT, Executive Privilege, at 157. 
681 See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850) (“[I]n the distribution of political power 
between the great departments of government, there is such a wide difference between the power 
conferred on the President of the United States, and the authority and sovereignty which belongs to 
the English crown, that it would be altogether unsafe to reason from any supposed resemblance 
between them, either as regards conquests in war, or any other subject where the rights and powers 
of the executive arm of the government are brought into question.”)  
682 Article 1, Section 8, Const. See LOUIS FISHER, Congressional Access to National Security 
Information, 45 Harv. J. on Legisl. 219, 223 (2008) (pointing out that the Framers conferred the 
power to initiate war upon Congress “because they believed that Executives, in their search for fame 
and personal glory, had a natural bias to favor war at the cost of the interests of their country.”) 
683 See SOFAER, (Book Review) Executive Privilege, supra note 660, at 286 (observing that “the 
overwhelming effect of the actions and inactions of our early Congresses was to allow the President 
to assume control of foreign affairs and the military.”) The allocation of power which ensued – the 
Author continues – “has persisted to the present […].” Ibid.   
684 Ibid.  
685 See SCHMITT, Executive Privilege, supra note 662, at 170 (according to whom, “[t]he fact that a 
President may not have the power to begin a war does not clarify the amount of discretion that a 
President has in conducting a war.”) 
686 See The Federalist No. 74, 385 (The Goldman ed., 2001) (Hamilton) (contending that the 
“direction of war,” which in his opinion requires a single head of the executive branch, “implies the 
direction of the common strength [, and] the power of directing and employing the common strength, 
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”)   
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conduction of war, but he also has a good deal of discretion in governing military 
operations687. Therefore, “Berger’s thesis of a restricted and congressionally subordinate” 
Commander-in-chief688 must be considered not tenable, and it also means recognizing the 
President – as Commander-in-Chief – some leeway in answering to requests for information 
advanced by Congress689. As noted above, Berger advocates Congress’s right to have 
complete access to war-related information by recalling the relationship between the 
Congressional Congress and George Washington as Commander-in-Chief690. Not only has 
such an example been questioned691. It also appears to be too weak evidence to support a 
theory on information access disputes between the two political branches of the Federal 
Government in a war context. 
 
2. The Treaty-Making Power and Secrecy 
 Berger’s argument against executive privilege based on the distribution of power 
established by the Constitution in the field of foreign affairs deserves specific analysis, 
because this argument refers to a domain, of which secrecy is a typical feature, especially 
when the formation of treaties is involved. As noted above, indeed, this field has traditionally 
been considered as falling within the scope of government secrecy. Even though the treaty-
making power is vested in the President, Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2, Const. requires that 
the Senate give its “Advice and Consent,” and therefore the legislative branch should be 
                                                          
687 See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief 
Power, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 807 (2006) (arguing that under the Commander-in-Chief Clause, in the event 
of a war, it is up to the President to make all decisions concerning military objectives, strategy, and 
tactics, rules of engagement, treatment of prisoners of war). 
688 SCHMITT, Executive Privilege, supra note 662, at 172. 
689 See WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 
UCLA L. Rev. 116, 118 (1974) (arguing that the President is to be guaranteed “a privilege of 
confidentiality respecting specific troop locations during a time of military emergency as an 
indispensable incident of his express power as Commander in Chief […].”) 
690 See BERGER, Rosenblum and the Higher Criticism, supra note 592, at 925 note 31 (advocating 
complete access to executive branch information by Congress, which is “the senior partner in war-
making […].”) The Constitution, indeed, does not empower the President acting as Commander-in-
Chief – the Author continues – “to withhold from Congress information as to troop deployments, 
particularly since George Washington was kept on a tight rein by the Continental Congress.”) Ibid.     
691 See FISHER, Raoul Berger on Public Law, supra note 584, at 178 (questioning the example 
concerning George Washington as Commander-in-Chief, since it belongs to a time “when a separate 
executive did not exist,” so it is not correct to “relate it to the separate and independent office [of the 
executive power] created in 1787.”) 
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involved in foreign affairs. In its famous decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.692, the Supreme Court emphasized the pivotal role played by the Chief Executive in 
foreign affairs and the keeping of secrets he needs to rely upon to operate in this field. By 
quoting a statement of John Marshall made in 1800 in the House of Representatives693, 
Justice Sutherland, which delivers the opinion of the Court, characterizes the U.S. President 
as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.”694 In addition, Sutherland quotes a passage taken from a 1816 report 
prepared by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This Senate report underscores that 
the Constitution pinpoints the President as the “representative of the United States with 
regard to foreign nations,” and entrusts him with responsibility for managing international 
relations695. Such authority – the report continues – implies that the President has discretion 
in conducting negotiations with foreign countries, in which the involvement of the Senate 
results in diminishing the President’s responsibility and thereby “impair[ing] the best 
security for the national safety.” The success of these negotiations – the report adds – 
“frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.” 696  
 The Curtiss-Wright opinion observes that since the President is the sole organ of the 
Federal Government in the domain of foreign affairs, he does not need to receive specific 
standing from Congress to operate. On the contrary, Congress is supposed to ensure that the 
President itself enjoy “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction […].”697 
In this field, the President relies upon his agents abroad – namely, diplomatic and consular 
officials – which represent an essential source of information for him. Secrecy concerning 
the information they gather on behalf of the President – the Curtiss-Wright opinion contends 
– “may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it [would bring about] harmful 
results.”698 To sustain such an assertion, the Curtiss-Wright opinion mentions the famous 
episode in which President George Washington refused to provide the House of 
Representatives with instructions, correspondence, and documents on the negotiation of the 
Jay Treaty. The wisdom of the refusal to releasing the requested information – the opinion 
                                                          
692 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
693 See Annals of Cong., 6th Cong., 613 (1800). 
694 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S., at 319 (italics added). 
695 See 8 U.S. Senate Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, (February 15, 1816) p. 24. 
696 Ibid. 
697 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S., at 320. 
698 Ibid. 
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notes – “was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted.”699 Curtiss-
Wright also cites the words Washington used to justify the withholding of information700. 
Consistently with his theory, Berger gives a different interpretation of the “sole organ” 
concept, and engages in a blast against the Curtiss-Wright opinion701. Schmitt observes that 
actually, Marshall stood somewhere in the middle between the two positions, even though 
he conceded a prevailing role of the Chief Executive in foreign affairs702.    
 The Executive turns out to be the most important branch of the Federal Government 
in the field of foreign affairs. Since diplomatic agents and related officials possess the 
expertise necessary for the conduct of negotiations and the management of international 
relations in general, the competence in foreign affairs is traditionally considered to belong 
to the executive branch. A vast majority of scholars agree that the President is the only organ 
of the Republic competent to keep official connections with foreign countries, as he masters, 
by his officials, the main channels of communication at international level703. Accordingly, 
                                                          
699 Ibid. 
700 Id., at 320-321. Washington argued that “a full disclosure” of all documents concerning a 
negotiation with foreign authorities, even when the negotiation process had a positive outcome and 
thus led to the conclusion of a treaty, “might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or 
produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers.” U.S. 
Joint Committee on Printing, 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents – George 
Washington: Message to the House regarding Documents Relative to the Jay Treaty (March 30, 
1796) (New York, 1897) p. 194. Admitting that the House have a right to request and receive all the 
documents relating to a given international negotiation – Washington concluded – would result in 
“establish[ing] a dangerous precedent.” Ibid.   
701 Executive Privilege, at 133-135. 
702 See SCHMITT, Executive Privilege, supra note 662, at 164-165 (contending that “[b]etween the 
extreme positions of Berger’s president-as-clerk and Sutherland’s president-as-sovereign Marshall 
charts an executive office which, while not simply beyond congressional influence or control, is to 
an extensive degree dominant in the area of foreign affairs.”) 
703 See, e.g., PHILLIP R. TIMBLE, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 750, 755 
(1989) (highlighting the existence of undisputed consensus over the assertion that “the President has 
the exclusive power of official communication with foreign governments.”) See also EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, 214 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. 
ed., New York University Press, 1984) (characterizing as a principle rooted in constitutional practice 
“the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in its dealings with other 
nations.”) See also LOUIS HENKIN, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, 32 (2nd ed., 
1996) (pointing out that “[f]rom the beginning, the President has been the organ of communication 
with foreign governments and has had control of the principal channels of information – making the 
President the voice as well the eyes and ears of the United States.”)  
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there is no doubt that opening negotiations is up to the President704. By opposing such a 
theory, labelled as “the diplomacy power orthodoxy,”705 a scholar – Scoville – has recently 
sought to demonstrate that actually, the legislative branch has its own channels and follow 
its own practices for international relations. All these channels and practices, according to 
the Author, make up “an understudied domain of legislative diplomacy.”706 Apart from this 
somewhat novel approach, the President is still considered as the institution of the Federal 
Government enjoying predominant authority in foreign affairs, yet at the same time 
Sutherland’s opinion has gone through much criticism. On the one hand, the Curtiss-Wright 
decision is frequently quoted – or at least referred to – in federal courts’ decisions707 and 
executive branch papers708 to pinpoint the scope of presidential power in foreign affairs. On 
the other hand, many scholars have questioned Sutherland’s opinion on various counts709, 
and a D.C. Circuit decision, too, underlined the excessive range of the “sole organ” doctrine, 
if it is meant as capable of advocating a substantially absolute power of the President over 
any matter that does not exhaust its effects domestically710. Furthermore, Fisher has noted 
that actually, the Supreme Court “has never denied to Congress its constitutional authority 
to enter the field of foreign affairs and limit, reverse, or modify presidential decisions.”711  
 The treaty-making power, vested in the President, implies the keeping of secrets by 
the executive branch. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, a great advocate of the President as a 
figure enjoying supreme authority in foreign affairs, has inferred from such authority the 
corollary that the Senate – hence, the legislative branch – may not claim a right to be 
                                                          
704 See LEE B. ACKERMAN, Executive Agreements, the Treaty-Making Clause, and Strict 
Constructionism, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 587, 609 (1975) (arguing that “[i]t is certainly the President 
who starts the negotiations, and with whom other nations communicate.”) 
705 RYAN M. SCOVILLE, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 333 (2013). The Author 
challenges “the accepted understanding [according to which] the Founders viewed an exclusively 
executive diplomacy power as necessary for the United States to respond quickly to international 
events, preserve secrecy, speak with a single voice, and negotiate from a position of strength.” Ibid. 
706 Ibid.  
707 See LOUIS FISHER, The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 23-27 (Law Library of Congress, August 2006).  
708 Id., at 1-2; ID., The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power, 266 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford and New York, 2014).  
709 See FISHER, The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, supra note 707, at 20-23. 
710 See American Intern. Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 438 note 6 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (“To the extent that denominating the President as the ‘sole organ’ of the United States in 
international affairs constitutes a blanket endorsement of plenary Presidential power over any matter 
extending beyond the borders of this country, we reject that characterization.”) 
711 FISHER, The Law of the Executive Branch, supra note 708, at 268. 
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informed on a given negotiation until that negotiation is concluded712. By providing the 
advice and consent of the Senate, however, the Framers intended this chamber of Congress 
to have not a marginal role but rather an important one in the formation of treaties. Bradley 
and Flaherty have observed that had the Framers deemed to include in Article 2, Section 2, 
Clause 2, Const. only the power of the Senate to veto the conclusion and ratification of a 
treaty713, the term “consent” would have sufficed to reach the constitutional objective714. 
Corwin has maintained that under the Constitution, “the President and the Senate are 
associated throughout the entire process of ‘making’ treaties.”715 It has been noted that 
George Washington initially sought to involve the Senate in the conduct of negotiations, but 
soon opted for an opposite practice716. From then onwards, the Senate was excluded from 
participation in negotiations on a regular basis, and usually received just a ready-made 
product for either approval or rejection, i.e., for the exercise of its consent power717. As 
                                                          
712 See WOODROW WILSON, Constitutional Government in the United States, 77-78 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1908) (“The President cannot conclude a treaty with a foreign power 
without the consent of the Senate, but he may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy 
is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and prestige of the government are to be 
maintained. He need disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any critical 
matter it is completed the government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate 
may feel itself committed also.”)  
713 See CORWIN, The Constitution and What It Means Today, supra note 502, at 106 (noting that the 
treaty-making process is usually divided into two separate parts – negotiation and ratification – 
assigned in their entirety to different institutions of the Federal Government: the former assigned 
exclusively to the President, and the latter to the Senate). However, the text of the Constitution – the 
Author argues – “makes no such division of the subject […].” Ibid. 
714 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY – MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 627 (2004). 
715 CORWIN, The Constitution and What It Means Today, supra note 502, at 106. See, also, ID., The 
President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957. History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion, 207 (New 
York, 4th rev. ed., 1957). 
716 CORWIN, The Constitution and What It Means Today, ibid. (pointing out that originally, President 
Washington “tried to take counsel with the Senate even regarding the negotiation of treaties, but he 
early abandoned this method of procedure as unsatisfactory.”) See, also, BRADLEY – FLAHERTY, 
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, supra note 714, at 631-634.   
717 See ACKERMAN, Executive Agreements, supra note 704, at 625 (quoting MCDOUGAL – LANS, 
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements, supra note 632, at 207 note 56) 
(arguing that during the Washington administration, “the Senate’s role was reduced from vicarious 
participation in the making of treaties to that of ‘exercising a right of giving or withholding consent 
to agreements, in whose making it had played no direct part.’”) See, also, BRADLEY – FLAHERTY, 
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, id., at 626 (noting that the practice Washington 
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Bradley and Flaherty have maintained, such a distribution of roles between the President and 
the Senate, which began during the Washington administration, gradually became rooted in 
the treaty-making process, “and remains the practice today.”718  
 Hayden has read such an evolution as a simple consequence of the flexible nature of 
Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2, Const., whose content depends on how the dynamics of the 
relations between the executive and the legislative branch structure their respective role719. 
In other words, practice is the key to understanding such relations in foreign affairs, and – 
actually – the same holds true for any other field wherein the competence of the two branches 
may overlap. At the Convention of Philadelphia, the Founding Fathers conceived of the 
participation of the Senate in the treaty-making process as a way of making that process 
more democratic720. It has been observed, indeed, that “the Senate’s real power in the treaty-
making process lies in its ability to set forth an adequate forum for public debate.”721 
Pragmatic reasons, however, militate against the Senate’s involvement. It has been noted, 
for instance, that the democratic method that the participation of the Senate in negotiations 
implies may result in hampering the achievement of the primary objective of a negotiation 
– the conclusion of an international treaty722. Therefore, an argument in favor of an exclusive 
– or almost exclusive – role of the President in conducting international negotiations is based 
on the need for efficiency, which is deemed to be better satisfied by the executive than by 
the legislative branch when it comes to negotiating at international level723. If the need for 
                                                          
started off while being President consisted in “often formulating and negotiating treaties without 
Senate input and simply presenting the treaties to the Senate for an affirmative or negative vote.”)  
718 BRADLEY – FLAHERTY, ibid. 
719 RALSTON HAYDEN, The Senate and Treaties: 1787-1817. The Development of the Treaty Making 
Functions of the United States Senate During Their Formative Period, ix (London, 1920) 
(contending that “[t]he treaty clause of the Constitution is so flexible that the exact relations of the 
Senate and the executive in treaty-making could be worked out only in actual practice.”) 
720 See ACKERMAN, Executive Agreements, supra note 704, at 598 (pointing out that “[t]he 
incorporation of the Senate in the making of treaties was established because it was the firm hope of 
the Framers to bring to bear upon the decision-making process a wider range of knowledge, 
inculcating any decision with the force of public backing.”)  
721 Ibid.  
722 Id., at 599 (noting that an argument aimed at excluding the Senate from any involvement in 
negotiations “usually stems from the Senate’s ability to block the consummation of a treaty.”) 
723 See WALLACE MCCLURE, International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under the 
Constitution of the United States, 257 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941) (arguing that 
“[t]he executive, set up for action, is usually a better agency for negotiation than is a body set up 
primarily for deliberation [, and] it is through negotiation, not primarily deliberation, that 
international affairs are conducted.”) 
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efficiency leads to advocating a cardinal role of the President and his officials in conducting 
international negotiations, the same need may be invoked to justify secrecy in the course of 
a given negotiation. Practice, however, appears to be the key to grasping the relations 
between the legislative and the executive branch of the Federal Government not only in the 
negotiation of international treaties, but in the foreign affairs as a whole. An episode occurred 
under the Washington administration and reported by Fisher724 may be given as an example 
concerning secrecy in this field. No negotiation of a treaty was involved in such an episode. 
In 1794, the Senate adopted a resolution whereby President Washington was requested to 
submit certain correspondence documenting diplomatic relations between the United States 
and France. At a Cabinet meeting addressing the request for information, Secretary of War 
Knox suggested refusing the release of any information demanded by the Senate, while 
Attorney General Randolph and William Bradford argued that the President had discretion 
to pinpoint what material he deemed improper to disclose. Washington submitted the 
requested correspondence, yet informed the Senate that he had decided to withhold such 
parts as “in [his] judgment, for public considerations, ought not to be communicated.” The 
Senate did not insist – even though it could have done so – in demanding the release of the 
material it had been denied access to, thereby accepting the compromise between secrecy 
and transparency President Washington had found. As Sofaer has observed, “nothing would 
have prevented a majority [of members of Congress] from demanding the material, 
especially in confidence, or from using their power over foreign policy, funds and offices to 
pressure the President to divulge.”725 
 
 
D. Executive Privilege: Coinage of the Term and Subsequent Development 
 It has been noted that there is no trace of any presidential privilege, meant as one or 
more powers only implicitly vested in the President by the Constitution, in the debates at the 
Convention of Philadelphia of 1787726. Berger brings this approach based on legislative 
                                                          
724 See FISHER, The Politics of Executive Privilege, supra note 161, at 13-14.  
725 ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1318, 1321 
(1975). 
726 See ARCHIBALD COX, Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1391 (1974) (noting that 
“[t]he very few directly pertinent statements by members of the Constitutional Convention assert the 
absence of any presidential privilege.”) See, also, Myers, 272 U.S., supra note 668, at 205 (“In the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention ho hint can be found of any executive power except 
those definitely enumerated or inferable therefrom or from the duty to enforce the laws.”) 
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history even further by referring to the state conventions and constitutions to grasp the 
essence of executive power and thereby strengthen its theory against the existence of 
executive privilege727. However, Fisher has argued that the provisions of the state 
constitutions may be sifted to pinpoint where at least part of the wording of the Federal 
Constitution of 1787 stems from, still they are of no use to determine the scope of the 
President’s remit728. More generally, Berger’s interpretation of the Constitution has been 
criticized for being too narrow729, and thus for being fossilized on formalism, i.e., on the 
plain text of the constitutional provisions730. Some justices of the Supreme Court have 
followed a similar approach731. 
                                                          
727 See Executive Privilege, at 51-58. Berger refers to Goebel, Jr., who has argued that the word 
“executive” did not belong in the English common law system. However, this word entered the 
American law vocabulary “through its employment in various state constitutions adopted from 1776 
onward [as a] revolutionary response to the situation precipitated by the repudiation of the royal 
prerogative.” Id., at 51 (quoting JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., Ex Parte Clio, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 450, 474 
(1954)). By relying upon such a consideration, Berger deems the reference to the provisions of the 
several state constitutions to be the first stage to delimit the scope of the executive power. Executive 
Privilege, ibid.  
728 See FISHER, Raoul Berger on Public Law, supra note 584, at 177 (maintaining that the text of 
state constitutions may be useful for the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution just “for the source 
of some constitutional language, but the original state charters tell us very little about the anticipated 
breadth of executive power at the national level.”)  
729 See WINTER, JR., The Seedlings For the Forest, supra note 660, at 1731 (arguing that “the 
principal analytic mode Berger employs is so narrow as to be of very limited usefulness.”) 
730 See RAOUL BERGER, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 297 (Harvard University Press, 1977) (“Like Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas 
and Frankfurther, I assert the right to look at the Constitution itself stripped of judicial incrustations, 
as the index of constitutional law and to affirm that the Supreme Court has no authority to substitute 
an ‘unwritten Constitution’ for the written Constitution the Founders gave us and the people 
ratified.”) For a recent formal interpretation of the Constitution, see DAVID GRAY ADLER, The 
Framers and Executive Prerogative: A Constitutional and Historical Rebuke, 42 Presidential Stud. 
Q. 376, especially at 381-383 (2012) (refusing to recognize to the executive branch any prerogatives 
exceeding the powers expressly vested in it by the Constitution). 
731 See the justices mentioned by Berger in the passage quoted in the previous note. See, also, Myers, 
272 U.S., supra note 668, at 116 (Taft, C.J.) (subjecting to a narrow interpretation the separation of 
powers between the three branches of the Federal Government as devised by the Framers in the 
Constitution). According to the Chief Justice, in particular, “the branches should be kept separate in 
all in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded 
to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.”) 
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 Berger has noted that the term “executive privilege,” which is not expressly 
mentioned by the Constitution, was coined in 1958732. The roots of the doctrine of executive 
privilege, however, date back to 1954, a time in which Congress, boosted above all by Sen. 
McCarthy’s anti-Communist campaign, appeared to be obsessed with an almost constant 
exercise of its power of inquiry733. As a result, as Clark has argued, President Eisenhower 
deployed the doctrine “in order to safeguard the innermost workings of the executive branch 
from this boundless congressional probing.”734 On May 17, 1954, while the Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations was conducting an investigation, the 
President sent the Secretary of Defense a letter735 wherein the existence of executive 
privilege was advocated736. The letter points out that even though the relations between the 
three branches of the Federal Government must be based on full cooperation, practice shows 
that the President denied to Congress access to executive branch information whenever he 
found that the requested material “was confidential or its disclosure would be incompatible 
with the public interest or jeopardize the safety of the Nation.”737 Candor in the exchange of 
advice and opinions between executive branch employees – the letter observes – ensures 
“efficient and effective administration,” but such candor demands the ability to withhold 
information from Congress738. It is not in the public interest – the letter continues – to 
disclose any communications within the executive branch or any documents concerning the 
exchange of opinions739. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense has to instruct all employees 
                                                          
732 See Executive Privilege, at 1. See CLARK, Executive Privilege, supra note 667, ibid. (maintaining 
that “[o]ne of the most surprising aspects of executive privilege is how recently the doctrine has 
become significant.”) Clark, however, specifies that the term “executive privilege” was used as early 
as 1955. Id., at 324 note 3 (referring to TALFORD TAYLOR, Grand Inquest: The Story of 
Congressional Investigations, 97 (New York, 1955)).  
733 Id., at 324-325. 
734 Id., at 325. 
735 See DWIGHT EISENHOWER, Letter to the Secretary of Defense Directing Him To Withhold Certain 
Information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations (May 17, 1954), in Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower – 1954: Containing the Public 
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1, to December 31, 1954, , 483 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1960).  
736 See SCHLESINGER JR., The Imperial Presidency, supra note 146, at 156 (arguing that the 1954 
letter contained “the most absolute assertion of presidential right to withhold information from 
Congress ever uttered to that day in American History.”)  
737 EISENHOWER, Letter to the Secretary of Defense, supra note 735, ibid.  
738 Ibid.  
739 Id., at 483-484. 
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of his Department neither to testify about any such communications nor to release any 
documents concerning the exchange of opinions, and the letter makes it clear that this 
prescription applies “regardless of who would be benefited by such disclosures.”740 The 1954 
letter, therefore, adopts a broad acceptation of the concept of executive privilege, an 
acceptation that includes the core of the content of Exemption 5 of the FOIA – the 
deliberative process privilege741.  
 Actually, the germ of the doctrine of executive privilege dates back to a few years 
before the Eisenhower letter, and lies in a study conducted in by Herman Wolkinson742, who 
was then working as an attorney at the Department of Justice743. According to this study, 
federal courts have always conceded that the U.S. President and the heads of departments 
enjoy “an uncontrolled discretion” to withhold executive branch information and papers744. 
Commenting on that statement, however, Fisher has argued that Wolkinson’s position was 
already incorrect when it was written, and “is even less true today as a result of litigation 
and political precedents established over the past half century.”745 Furthermore, Wolkinson 
has excluded the existence of any means by which Congress could compel the heads of 
departments and agencies to release information they decided to withhold, provided that 
department and agency determinations are sanctioned by the President. Even if a public 
interest in disclosure is involved, he explains, “the President is the [only] judge of that 
interest.”746 Fisher, however, again opposes the assertion by contending that Wolkinson 
overlooked the coercive powers of Congress, which “may hold both executive officials and 
private citizens in contempt.”747  
                                                          
740 Id., at 484. 
741 See infra, Chapter 3, Part II. 
742 See HERMAN WOLKINSON, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers (Part 
I), 10 Fed’l Bar J. 103 (1949). 
743 In that study, Wolkinson was just expounding his own opinion on the withholding of information 
by the Chief Executive, as he had received no official assignment by the Truman administration. See 
SCHLESINGER JR., The Imperial Presidency, supra note 146, at 155. 
744 WOLKINSON, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, supra note 742, at 
103. 
745 FISHER, The Politics of Executive Privilege, supra note 161, at 3.  
746 WOLKINSON, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, supra note 742, at 
107. 
747 FISHER, The Politics of Executive Privilege, supra note 161, at 4. 
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 History shows that the presidents of the United States have deployed a privilege to 
withhold certain information from Congress since the dawn of the American Republic748. As 
already noted, however, executive privilege assumed an official shape only under the 
Eisenhower administration749, which – it has been calculated – appealed to the privilege 
more than fourthy times750. In 1958, then-Attorney General Rogers issued a memorandum 
that advocated the ability of the President to withhold information from Congress and thus 
to respond to requests for information by refusing – in whole or in part – the release of the 
sought material751. The memorandum banks on a long series of presidential precedents, most 
of which pertain to the early decades of the American Republic, to assert executive privilege. 
This memorandum is vehemently criticized – as was predictable – by Berger752, who strives 
to prove the misuse of such precedents to justify the existence of a traditional practice 
according to which the U.S. presidents refuse the disclosure of information to Congress when 
they deem it proper to keep some amount of secrecy753. The recalled precedents include the 
underlying affair of one of the leading case in the American legal system – Marbury v. 
Madison. Berger himself, despite contending that such precedents “run counter to the deep-
seated American tradition against secrecy in public affairs,”754 concedes that the 
                                                          
748 See MARK J. ROZELL, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A Response to 
Berger, 8 Wm. &. Mary Bill Rts. J. 541, 552 (2000) (stressing that since George Washington, all 
presidents have somehow exercised an implicit power to keep information secret and thus have 
denied access to the legislative branch). See also PRAKASH, A critical Comment on the 
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, supra note 589, at 1143 (maintained that “[f]rom the earliest 
days of the Republic, American Presidents have asserted a right to conceal executive 
communications.”)  
749 See SCHLESINGER JR., The Imperial Presidency, supra note 146, at 156 (arguing that “when by 
1954 the McCarthy inquisition had reached a degree of squalor that exhausted even Eisenhower’s 
forbearance, the administration turned to Wolkinson as ultimate authority.”) 
750 See ROZELL, Executive Privilege. The Dilemma, supra note 176, at 44. 
751 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Power of the President to Withhold 
Information from Congress, 85th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Gov’t Print. Off., 1958-1959), 
2 parts. 
752 See Executive Privilege, at 164 (stigmatizing the memorandum as “a farrago of internal 
contradictions, patently slipshod analysis, and untenable inferences.”) 
753 Id., at 164-203. 
754 Id., at 203. 
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memorandum could boast considerable following amid executive branch officials755, and in 
this regard, he refers to a 1971 testimony by William H. Rehnquist before Congress756.  
 Between July 27 and August 5, 1971, indeed, the Subcommittee on Separation of 
Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate held a series of hearings on 
executive privilege757, and William Rehnquist was called upon to testify. Rehnquist, then 
Assistant Attorney General and later Justice of the Supreme Court, begins his testimony by 
observing that unlike such a subject whose regime has fixed boundaries as the law of real 
property, executive privilege is concerned with “a broad area of government in which both 
the legislative and executive branches have claims which are both legitimate and often 
conflicting.”758 Actually, Rehnquist pinpoints not only Congress but also federal courts as 
possible requesters and thus as authorities that may need access to information. He defines 
executive privilege, indeed, as “the constitutional authority of the President to withhold 
documents or information in his possession or in the possession of the executive branch from 
compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of the Government.”759 The 
Constitution expressly provides for neither the power of the President to refuse the release 
of executive branch information to Congress nor the power of the latter to force the President 
to disclose the requested material760. However, both powers – Rehnquist argues – are 
implicitly recognized by the Constitution, for they “are firmly rooted in history and 
precedent.”761 McGrain v. Daugherty762 and United States v. Reynolds763 are mentioned as 
cases wherein the Supreme Court contended that – respectively – Congress has the power to 
inquire into the executive branch in addition to that to legislate, and the executive branch 
enjoys the privilege not to comply with a request for information. Rehnquist notes that such 
                                                          
755 Id., at 164 (maintaining that the Rogers memo has become – or rather had become by the time 
Berger wrote his book – “a bible for the executive branch.”) 
756 Ibid.  
757 Executive Privilege: the Withholding of Information by the Executive – Hearings before Senate 
the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 92nd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1971) (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1971).   
758 Id., at 420 (written statement of William H. Rehnquist). 
759 Id., at 421. 
760 Ibid.  
761 Ibid.  
762 McGrain, 273 U.S., supra note 593, at 175. 
763 Reynolds, 345 U.S., supra note 479, at 8. 
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cases did not address legislative-executive information access disputes764. In fact, he goes 
on, “there is no authoritative decision settling the extent to which Congress may compel the 
production of documents or testimony on the part of members of the executive branch.”765 
The main reason for that lies in practice, and thus in the concrete dynamics of the relations 
between the two branches of the Federal Government. Such dynamics are based on 
cooperation, as proved by the fact that “[t]he vast majority of requests by congressional 
committees for testimony from the executive branch are freely complied with […].”766 
Accordingly, Rehnquist concludes that executive privilege arises – as the index of an 
ongoing conflict between the legislative and executive branches – only in the “very rare 
case” in which a committee of Congress “after mature consideration feels that information 
in the possession of the executive branch is essential to the discharge of the legislative 
function, and where the executive feels that the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers would be infringed by its furnishing of such information […].”767  
 Since the Eisenhower administration, the presidents have often invoked executive 
privilege768 to withhold information from the other two branches of government, albeit not 
with the same frequency. In a letter dated March 31, 1965, Representative John E. Moss 
formally requested to President Lyndon B. Johnson to reaffirm the principle, previously 
established by President Kennedy, that only the Chief Executive may claim the application 
of the privilege or he must approve of its usage in any event769. Moss also underscores the 
different approach to the privilege by presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Under the former 
– Moss recalls – a report prepared by the House Committee on Government Operations 
                                                          
764 Ibid. (“Just as McGrain v. Daugherty involved the compulsory process of Congress to directed 
against a private citizen rather than against a representative of the executive branch, United States v. 
Reynolds involved compulsory process of the judicial branch rather than the legislative branch.”) 
765 Executive Privilege: the Withholding of Information by the Executive, supra note 757, at 421.  
766 Ibid.  
767 Id., at 421-422. 
768 Schlesinger, Jr., has noted that the old-fashioned sound of “executive privilege” – and it is quite 
clear that the Author has inferred such a feature of the sound from the term “privilege” – might have 
fostered its entrenchment as a legal institution and thus as a means in the hands of presidents to avoid 
the disclosure of certain information. See SCHLESINGER JR., The Imperial Presidency, supra note 
146, at 159 (“Executive privilege had the advantage of sounding like a very old term. It passed rapidly 
political discourse and very soon […] acquired the patina of ancient and hallowed doctrine.”)  
769 See LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Letter to Representative Moss Stating Administration Policy as to 
Claims of “Executive Privilege” (April 2, 1965), in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, Lyndon B. Johnson – 1965: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the 
President, January 1, to December 31, 1965, 376 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov’t Print. Off., 1960). 
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documented fourthy-four cases in which executive branch officials refused to provide 
Congress with information on the basis of the 1954 letter mentioned above, and only some 
of those cases “involved important matters of government,” while in most of them Congress 
was forbidden from gaining access to information and records concerning “routine” 
executive branch business770. A tendency to ensuring the maximum degree of cooperation 
between the branches of government, on the contrary, pervaded the Kennedy administration, 
which deployed the privilege with extreme caution771. In his reply, President Johnson assures 
Hon. Moss that he will follow in Kennedy’s footsteps with respect to the claim of executive 
privilege. It is interesting to point out that Moss, then Chairman of the Foreign Operations 
and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 
is mostly famous for being one of the main advocates of the Freedom of Information Act. 
 A watershed in the usage of executive privilege is the Nixon administration, which 
probably still represents the apex of the range the weapon of executive privilege has ever 
reached. Richard M. Nixon, indeed, unsuccessfully claimed that the President enjoyed 
“virtually unchecked discretion to block disclosure of any information related to the 
executive branch which the President believed contrary to the public interest.”772 In United 
States v. Nixon773, the President sought to persuade the Supreme Court to accept the theory 
that the Constitution implicitly recognizes absolute executive privilege, which applies to all 
presidential communications774. It is quite straightforward to understand that admitting an 
unfettered application of the doctrine of executive privilege would mean to pave the way for 
potential abuses, as President Nixon’s conduct shows775. Bad faith, indeed, is what induced 
the President to adopt such an extreme interpretation of executive privilege, as he was just 
                                                          
770 Ibid.  
771 Ibid. In a letter dated February 8, 1962, aimed at communicating the refusal to releasing certain 
information to a Senate subcommittee, President Kennedy clarified that the withholding of 
information may not be a response to any request of information, and therefore the denial of access 
may not become an ordinary practice. Ibid. 
772 CLARK, Executive Privilege, supra note 667, at 325. 
773 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
774 Id., at 703 (reporting that the President’s counsel sets forth an interpretation of the Constitution – 
namely, of its Article II, the article devoted to the President – “as providing an absolute privilege of 
confidentiality for all Presidential communications.”) 
775 See COX, Executive Privilege, supra note 726, at 1433 (arguing that if executive privilege were to 
have an unlimited scope, it would really be “a useful way of hiding inefficiency, maladministration, 
breach of trust or corruption, and also a variety of potentially controversial executive practices not 
authorized by Congress.”) 
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trying to prevent a special prosecutor from gaining access to the Watergate tapes and related 
documents and – more generally – to all records and documents concerning the Watergate 
scandal776. It has been observed that the misuse of the doctrine of executive privilege was so 
blatant that it resulted in affecting not only the public perception of the privilege777, but also 
the resort to the privilege itself by the presidents of the United States778, at least in the two 
decades following the Nixon administration. As McPhie has argued, “[i]n the aftermath of 
the Nixon administration and the Watergate scandal, presidents were reluctant to assert 
executive privilege.”779 He specifies that both Presidents Ford and Carter expressly claimed 
the privilege only once, and so did President Bush after the Reagan Presidency, under which 
formal invocations of the privilege amounted to three. The Author highlights the “flurry of 
activity involving executive privilege” that characterized the Clinton administration780. 
Rozell, too, provides a similar description of the reluctance of the presidents following Nixon 
– with the significant exception of Reagan, who sought to bring the institution back to its 
former glory – to resort to the doctrine of executive privilege to shield information from 
access by Congress781. The general condemnation surrounding President Nixon’s patent 
penchant for secrecy and his attempts to appeal to such a doctrine just to cover up 
wrongdoing – rectius, White House conversations about the wrongdoing related to 
                                                          
776 The access to the Watergate tape-recordings and the implications of such access for the legal 
system brought about multiple litigation, the various pieces of which are mentioned in JAMES M. 
POPSON, In re Grand Jury Proceedings: The Semantic of “Presumption” and “Need”, 32 Akron L. 
Rev. 155, 160-161 note 34 (1999).    
777 See JEFFREY P. CARLIN, Walker v. Cheney: Politics, Posturing, and Executive Privilege, 76 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 235, 246 (2002) (arguing that President Nixon’s “far-reaching claim [of executive 
privilege] is a clear example of an abuse of the privilege, and consequently has shaped the negative 
light in which many people see it.”) 
778 See DAWN JOHNSEN, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and 
Accomodation, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1127, 1127 (1999) (underlining “the shadow cast by President 
Nixon’s Watergate-era abuses on subsequent presidential assertion of executive privilege.”)  
779 IAIN R. MCPHIE, Introduction to Symposium: Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency, 8 
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 535, 536 (2000). 
780 Ibid. Rozell has advanced a parallelism – which actually appears to be excessive – between the 
usage of executive privilege by Presidents Nixon and Clinton, considered under either administration 
as abusive. See ROZELL, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege, supra note 748, 
at 578 (“What is problematic in the post-Watergate years is the delegitimization of executive 
privilege due to Nixon’s, and more recently Clinton’s abuses.”)  
781 See MARK J. ROZELL, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 
Minn. L. Rev. 1069, in particular 1072-1117 (1999). 
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Watergate – ended up acting as a deterrent even for the formal mention of the phrase 
“executive privilege” by the presidents782.      
 Like McPhie, Rozell detects an inversion of the trend in the resort to executive 
privilege under President Clinton. His policy on executive privilege set out in a 1994 
memorandum issued by Special Counsel to the President Lloyd Cutler [hereinafter – the 
Cutler memo]783 apparently is in line with that of his predecessors. The Cutler memo assures 
that the maximum extent possible of cooperation will be the criterion the Clinton 
administration will stick to in answering to the requests for information from Congress, and 
thereby executive privilege will be invoked only when it is considered to be strictly 
necessary by the President himself. It is specified, indeed, that claiming the application of 
executive privilege is a prerogative of the President, and not also of the heads of federal 
departments and agencies. Yet, Rozell pinpoints in the memorandum a specific sentence 
destined to “stan[d] out in light of later events.”784 The memorandum, indeed, contains the 
commitment of the administration not to invoke executive privilege to prevent either 
Congress or federal courts to gain access to documents “[i]n circumstances involving 
communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials 
[…].”785 According to Rozell, President Clinton has not honored such a commitment by 
frequently invoking the privilege786, even when the withholding of information was 
manifestly not justified by the need to protect an essential public interest787. The most 
                                                          
782 See ROZELL, Executive Privilege. The Dilemma, supra note 176, at 96-107 (reporting a series of 
cases in which both President Ford and President Carter, on advice of secretaries or aides, strived not 
to use the term “executive privilege” to achieve the purpose of withholding certain information from 
Congress, as it was conducting inquiries into the executive branch). 
783 See Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler for All Executive Department for All Executive Department 
and Agency General Counsel’s – Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies Protected 
By Executive Privilege (September 28, 1994). 
784 ROZELL, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents, supra note 781, at 1117. 
785 Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler for All Executive Department for All Executive Department and 
Agency General Counsel’s, supra note 310, ibid. 
786 See ROZELL, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents, supra note 781, at 1118-1125.  
787 Id., at 1118 (characterizing the claims of executive privilege made by the Clinton administration 
as “elaborate and mostly indefensible.”) See also id., at 1122-1124 (referring in particular to the 
claim of executive privilege raised by the White House in the Lewinsky investigation). The Author 
argues that once a federal judge questioned the legitimacy of the invocation of executive privilege in 
such a case, the White House properly dropped the claim. Judge Johnson – Rozell observes – “in 
ruling against the President, had nonetheless upheld the legitimacy of the principle of executive 
privilege and therefore had preserved this presidential power for Clinton’s successors.” Id., at 1123-
169 
 
interesting case under the Clinton administration is the one that sprang up in 1994, when the 
Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) embarked on an investigation into alleged 
wrongdoing committed by former Secretary of the Department of Agriculture Mike Espy. 
Such an affair, eventually brought to court, is important for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
shows that the scope of the executive privilege doctrine and that of the Freedom of 
Information Act may overlap. The White House, indeed, invoked not only the presidential 
communications privilege, but also the so-called deliberative process privilege. While the 
former sunstantially brings the rationale of executive privilege into the context of the FOIA, 
the latter is aimed at protecting the exchange of opinions within an agency or between 
agencies, and constitutes the core of Exemption 5 of the FOIA. Secondly, the D.C. Circuit 
in a 1997 decision, In re Sealed Case788, had the opportunity to establish the differences 
between the two types of privilege. As Rozell points out, the Court of Appeals “defined the 
these two forms of executive privilege more narrowly than did the administration.”789  
 
 
E. Political Settlement of Conflicts Between the Legislative and Executive Branches 
Concerning Access to Information 
 Political accommodations between the legislative and executive branches are the best 
way to solve the information access disputes, as they enable those branches to balance on 
their own account the various interests at stake by means of reciprocal tradeoffs. According 
to Rozell, this very solution is implied in the separation of powers as devised by the Framers, 
which could not envision such interbranch conflicts as would arise in the Federal 
Government. The “dilemma” of executive privilege – the Author argues – must be solved 
not “with constitutional rectitude [, but rather] on a case-by-case basis, through the normal 
ebb-and-flow of politics as envisioned by the Framers of the governing system in the United 
States.”790 Congress is not just the lawmaker, even though the legislative function is “[its] 
primary province,”791 but has also the power to inquire into the executive branch. As 
Woodrow Wilson maintained in his 1885 public law treatise Congressional Government in 
                                                          
1124 (referring to Judge Johnson’s Order on Executive Privilege, issued May 26, 1998, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/order052898.htm). 
788 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
789 ROZELL, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents, supra note 781, at 1120. 
790 ROZELL, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege, supra note 748, at 577-578. 
791 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 Cal. L. 
Rev. 3, 9 (1959). 
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the United States, “quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of 
administration.”792 At the same time, as Strauss has observed, the Constitution assigns the 
President “sufficient independent authority to serve as an enduring counterweight to the 
political muscle of Congress.”793 Therefore, the legislative and executive branches were 
conceived of by the Framers as capable of settling their disputes – especially, the ones 
concerning access to executive branch information – by reaching a compromise on their 
own. It also means – Rozell observes – that the search for “constitutional absolutes [is] 
misguided,” since executive privilege is neither a myth, as Berger has argued, nor a privilege 
with an unlimited scope794. Courts are reluctant to intervene in disputes involving the 
political branches of the Federal Government795, and when they do, it means that any 
endeavor of accommodation has turned into a failure. Judicial intervention, indeed, acts as a 
last resort, which is to deploy whenever the legislative and executive branches did not 
succeed in finding any settlement to their conflict796.  
 Entin has argued that negotiation between the two political branches of the Federal 
Government for settlement of their disputes – namely, the ones concerning access to 
executive branch information – is not only “fully consistent with the constitutional design, 
but it also has important practical advantages.”797 Firstly, political accommodations 
guarantee a degree of flexibility that is beneficial to the functioning of the Federal 
Government, while a practice of frequent resort to courts would end up hindering the 
efficiency of the government. Even if such an effect did not occur in concrete, judicial 
intervention usually brings about an exasperation of the conflict, for in a lawsuit someone 
wins and someone else does not, and nobody wants to be the losing party. When a dispute is 
brought before a court and the parties assume a sort of litigation-oriented mentality – the 
Author maintains – they tend “to assert maximum positions for short-term advantage in court 
and to characterize opposing views as illegitimate.”798 An exacerbation of a given conflict 
                                                          
792 WILSON, Congressional Government, supra note 400, at 297.  
793 PETER L. STRAUSS, The Places of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 641 (1984). 
794 ROZELL, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege, supra note 748, at 578. 
795 See SOFAER, (Book Review) Executive Privilege, supra note 660, at 292. 
796 See POPSON, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra note 776, at 159 (characterizing the judiciary 
as “the ultimate arbiter in the context of constitutional inter-branch disputes.”) 
797 JONATHAN L. ENTIN, Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 657, 664 (2000). 
798 Ibid. 
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may also ensue to the inevitable time elapsing between the resort to a judge and the decision. 
The Author, however, notes that the Executive complies with most of the requests for 
information coming from Congress and, especially, from its committees, and even when the 
Executive initially refuses to release the sought information, the two political branches 
usually reach a settlement to their information access disputes on their own, thus out of 
court799. Claveloux has argued that the achievement of a settlement to such disputes is 
fostered by the blurry line that separates the reasons set out by the executive branch to justify 
the withholding of information from those Congress bases its requests on800. Shane has 
highlighted that over time settlements of information access disputes have been reached even 
in cases in which the intelligence committees of the House of Representatives and of the 
Senate required access to sensitive information held by intelligence agencies “without resort 
to litigation or the threat of litigation.”801  
 
 
F. The Supreme Court on Executive Privilege: United States v. Nixon 
 In Nixon, the Supreme Court deliberates on the constitutionality of executive 
privilege for the first time, and orders President Nixon to produce the Watergate tape 
recordings for the District Court for the District of Columbia to conduct in camera 
inspection. The case, indeed, deals with judicial access to material the President sought to 
withhold to prevent its usage as evidence in a criminal trial. In this case, therefore, the 
Supreme Court is required to solve neither a legislative-executive information access dispute 
nor an invocation of state secrets privilege, as a footnote to the decision expressly makes it 
clear802. On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District 
                                                          
799 Id., at 664-665. The Author mentions three cases occurred under three different administrations – 
respectively, the Ford, the Carter, and the Reagan administration – in which a denial of access to 
executive branch information was eventually followed by disclosure, with consequent termination of 
the dispute. Id., at 665.  
800 RONALD L. CLAVELOUX, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional 
Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, Duke L. J. 1333, 1351 (1983) (contending that “the 
imprecision of the demarcation line between conflicting claims of executive secrecy and 
congressional inquiry encourages both parties to seek a compromise.”) 
801 Id., at 666 (referring to PETER M. SHANE, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses 
to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 197, 214-217 (1992)).  
802 Nixon, 418 U.S., at 712 note 19 (“We are not here concerned with the balance between the 
President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil 
litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for 
172 
 
of Columbia returns an indictment charging certain persons, all of them either staff members 
of the White House or members of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, with 
various federal offences related to the Watergate break-in. The grand jury pinpoints 
President Nixon, not designated as such in the indictment, as “an unindicted conspirator.”803 
On April 18, 1974, the Special Prosecutor the President appointed to investigate the matter 
files a motion pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17(c) for a subpoena duces tecum aimed at 
obtaining the production at trial of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, and transcripts 
concerning the conversations and meetings of the President enumerated in an attachment to 
the subpoena. On May 1, by claiming executive privilege, the President files a motion to 
quash the subpoena. On May 20, the District Court denies the presidential motion. Not only 
does the Court reject the President’s assertion that the conflict between him and the 
independent special prosecutor is not justiciable for being an “intra-executive” conflict, 
which thus lies merely within the executive branch; it also recognizes the full authority of 
the judiciary to decide over a presidential claim of executive privilege. Accordingly, the 
District Court orders an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, but the President 
impugns the order before the Court of Appeals, which grants the petitions filed by the two 
parties respectively on May 24 and June 6: the Special Prosecutor’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari before judgment, and the President’s cross-petition for the same writ but 
challenging the grand jury action.  
 Firstly, the Supreme Court rejects its alleged lack of competence to decide the case. 
The President’s counsel interprets the controversy at issue as a “jurisdictional,” intra-branch 
dispute between a subordinate officer – the independent Special Prosecutor – and the 
President of the United States. Since they both belong to the executive branch – the counsel 
argues – the dispute equates to the one that may arise between two committees of 
Congress804. Such an argument is based on a typical feature of the American legal system, 
wherein the executive branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide 
whether to prosecute a case,” and thus it is up to the President to decide ultimately what 
evidence is to be used in a given criminal case805. The Special Prosecutor – the President’s 
                                                          
information, nor with the President’s interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict 
between the President’s assertion of a generalized privileged of confidentiality and the constitutional 
need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.”) 
803 Id., at 693. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Ibid. Pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Const., the U.S. Attorney General has the power to conduct 
the criminal litigation of the Federal Government. Id., at 694.   
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counsel argues – has been delegated some powers, yet the President keeps the prerogative to 
refuse disclosure of material to any of his subordinates in the executive branch. The 
controversy would end up consisting in a political question806. The Supreme Court rejects 
such a reasoning by relying upon the traditional principle that formally qualifying a dispute 
as an intra-branch one does not suffice to exclude federal jurisdiction. As was maintained in 
United States v. ICC807, indeed, “courts must look behind names that symbolize the parties 
to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented.”808 The Supreme Court 
also finds that by denying the President’s motion to quash the subpoena, the District Court 
has complied with Rule 17(c), and the Special Prosecutor has provided adequate showing to 
justify a subpoena for production of material before trial809.  
 Then, the Supreme Court addresses the claim of executive privilege by the President. 
As noted above, the President’s counsel asserts the alleged existence of absolute executive 
privilege capable of covering any confidential810 conversation between a U.S. President and 
his close advisors, whose production at trial is considered to be against the public interest. 
The Court starts off by recalling that an entrenched principle, first established in the leading 
case Marbury v. Madison811, recognizes that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”812 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held 
that solving a conflict of authority between the branches of government implies “a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of [the Supreme] Court as 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”813 The sharing of constitutional powers between the 
branches of the Federal Government – the Supreme Court explains in Nixon – may not 
exceed such extent as is consistent with the separation of powers and “the checks and 
                                                          
806 The President’s Counsel refers to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), since there is a “textually 
demonstrable” grant of power under Article II Const. Ibid. 
807 337 U.S. 426 (1949). 
808 Id., at 430. 
809 Nixon, 418 U.S., at 702. 
810 See RAOUL BERGER, The incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 16, 29 (1974) 
(maintaining that President Nixon employed the concept of confidentiality as a “vehicle for the 
cover-up of criminal acts and conspiracies by his aides, an instrument he repeatedly employed for 
the obstruction of justice.”) 
811 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). 
812 Id., at 177.  
813 369 U.S., at 211. 
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balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.”814 That being said, the Court 
concedes that confidentiality is necessary not only between the President and his advisors, 
but – more generally – for any individual involved in a decision-making process, as complete 
disclosure turns out to be a deterrent for the unfettered expression of opinions within such a 
process815. As for the need for secrecy the President’s counsel invokes, it is noted that 
“[t]here is nothing novel about government confidentiality,” since the meetings of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 themselves “were conducted in complete privacy.”816 
According to the Special Prosecutor, the Constitution does not ensure to presidential 
communications a formal protection from disclosure that could be equated to the protection 
that is instead granted to the Members of Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause817. 
The Court points out that the existence of implicit powers has long been acknowledged818. 
Therefore, the protection of the confidentiality of presidential communications enjoys 
“constitutional underpinnings” as an implied power stemming from the formulation of 
Article II Const819. However, neither such constitutional underpinnings nor the doctrine of 
separation of powers – the Supreme Court argues – “can sustain an absolute, unqualified 
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”820 On the 
one hand, the interest in candor of opinions given to the President by his advisors is of high 
value and accordingly has a public nature. On the other hand, it has to be balanced with other 
interests, such as – in the specific case – the interest of the District Court to gain access to 
                                                          
814 Nixon, 418 U.S., at 704 (referring to The Federalist No. 47, 313 (James Madison) (S. Mittell ed., 
1938). Such an extent of power sharing allows, for instance, the judicial and the executive branches 
to be involved in the exercise of the veto power, as well as Congress and the Judiciary to be 
empowered to override a presidential veto. Ibid. 
815 Id., at 705 (“Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their 
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”) 
816 Id., at 705 note 15 (referring to FARRAND, 1 The Records of the Convention, supra note 144, at 
xi-xxv). The records of the Convention remained sealed until 1818. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). As it has been observed, most of the Framers were perfectly aware that “without 
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been written.” Ibid. (referring to 
CHARLES WARREN, The Making of the Constitution, 134-139 (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1937)). 
817 Nixon, at 705-706 note 16. 
818 Since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, it has been acknowledged and applied a 
principle according to which the grant of a given power to one of the branches of government 
includes what is “reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of [the] granted power […].” 
Nixon, 418 U.S., at 706 note 16 (quoting Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)).  
819 Id., at 705-706. 
820 Id., at 706. 
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the material concerning certain presidential communications for in camera inspection. The 
District Court is supposed to apply all the guarantees of protection from indiscriminate 
dissemination that in camera proceedings require. Such a judicial interest prevails unless – 
the Supreme Court holds – there is “a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or 
sensitive national security secrets […].”821 Granting an absolute privilege to the 
conversations and communications between the advisors and with the President – the 
Supreme Court continues – would result in impeding the execution of the functions Article 
III Const. vests in the judicial branch. The Framers divided the Federal Government into 
“three co-equal branches,” in each of which they allocated a portion of the sovereign power, 
and yet “the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence.”822 
Therefore, recognizing an implicit power of the President to consider confidential, on the 
basis of “no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of 
nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions,” the material the access to which enables a 
federal court to do justice in criminal proceedings would end up undermining the powers 
vested in the judicial branch by Article III Const.823  
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court digs deeper to pinpoint the core of the presidential 
communications privilege. It is noted that the President has legitimate expectation that his 
conversations and correspondence be treated as confidential, as private citizens do by virtue 
of their right to privacy. The confidentiality the President invokes, however, has an added 
value, constituted by the need to safeguard “the public interest in candid, objective, and even 
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.”824 A President and his aides and 
advisors – the Supreme court contends – “must be free to explore alternatives in the process 
of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to 
express except privately.”825 The presidential communications privilege, therefore, is 
deemed essential to the functioning of the Federal Government – namely, of the executive 
                                                          
821 Ibid.  
822 Id., at 707. It is also quoted a passage from Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), wherein it is argued that the Framers meant the 
three sovereign branches to interact and cooperate in practice so as to create “a workable 
government.” Id., at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). The branches are enjoined “separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Ibid. 
823 Nixon, 418 U.S., at 707. 
824 Id., at 708.  
825 Ibid.  
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branch – and “inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”826 
Recently, it has been observed that since the Nixon opinion on executive privilege rests upon 
the separation of powers, it means that the same position is to be applied to the deliberative 
process privilege, i.e., to the protection of intra-agency or inter-agency communications not 
directly related to the President and his aides827. Such a conclusion – it is argued – can be 
inferred from the very Nixon opinion, which, in a footnote828, quotes a passage from a 1966 
decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia – Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. 
Carl Zeiss, Jena829. The subpoenaed material in that case concerned memoranda and 
communications within the Department of Justice, and the withheld documents contained 
mainly “opinions, recommendations and deliberations pertaining to decisions the 
Department was required to make as to litigation and other matters […].”830 Therefore, the 
claim of privilege in that case involved “levels of executive communication lower than that 
of the President.”831 According to the District Court, freedom of expression and 
communication can be effective within the executive branch only if “the specter of 
compelled disclosure” is removed832. Government, indeed – it is added – as well as private 
citizens, “needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is essential to the 
quality of its functioning.”833  
 
 
G. President Obama and Executive Privilege: The “Operation Fast and Furious” 
 President Obama, too, invoked executive privilege with respect to the so-called 
“Operation Fast and Furious.” This name identifies a gun-running program, begun on 
October 31, 2009, who stated purpose was to track and monitor illegal weapons trafficking 
along the Southwestern U.S. border. The program was substantially a renewal of a former 
one, “Operation Wide Receiver,” established under the George W. Bush administration. 
                                                          
826 Ibid.  
827 See EDWARD J. BOULSTEIN, Individual & Group Privacy, 164 (Transpaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick and London, 2004). 
828 Nixon, 418 U.S., at 708 note 17. 
829 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff’d sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967). 
830 40 F.R.D., at 323. 
831 BOULSTEIN, Individual & Group Privacy, supra note 827, ibid. 
832 40 F.R.D., at 325. 
833 Ibid.  
177 
 
Both programs were performed by a law enforcement agency within the U.S. Department of 
Justice – the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform took on an investigation over the Operation, and 
directed requests for information at the Department of Justice. On June 20, 2012, the Deputy 
Attorney General sent the Chairman of the Committee a letter by which he communicated 
President Obama’s claim of executive privilege. The privilege was formally invoked at the 
very moment in which the Committee was threatening to hold Attorney General Eric Holder 
in contempt for failing to comply with a 2011 subpoena issued to obtain the release of the 
same information. The case, therefore, boils down to a typical legislative-executive 
information access dispute. From details of this affair it can be inferred that a congressional 
subpoena aimed at gaining information on activities carried out by the executive branch falls 
within the scope of administrative law, at least according to European standards. Even 
though the affair implies a relation between the two political branches of the Federal 
Government, indeed, the request for information made by the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform of the House of Representatives was concerned with business 
conducted by a federal agency in the law enforcement domain.  
 The affair may be summed up as follows834. On January 27, 2011, Sen. Grassley 
writes a letter to AFT Acting Director Kenneth E. Melson informing him that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee has received reports that the ATF approved of weapons trafficking 
along the southwestern U.S. border. In a second letter, Sen. Grassley refers to the danger of 
retaliation that some AFT agents are subject to for cooperating with the Senator himself and 
his staff in the gathering of information on the affair. On February 4, 2011, Assistant 
Attorney General Ronald Weich responds to Grassley’s letters by stating that the ATF did 
not sanction the sale of weapons and their entry into Mexico. However, it has been noted 
that the wording of the letter, not particularly clear, does not expressly deny the possibility 
that the weapons were brought to Mexico835. On February 28, Attorney General Holder 
directs the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Justice to conduct an 
investigation over the Operation Fast and Furious. In the course of 2011, the House 
Oversight Committee, too, takes on an investigation on the matter. On March 16, 2011, 
indeed, Chairman of the House Oversight Committee Issa writes to Melson announcing a 
                                                          
834 The reconstruction of the affair is based on the account provided by Fisher. See LOUIS FISHER, 
Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt: “Operation Fast and Furious”, 43 Pres. Stud. 
Quart. 167 (2013).  
835 Id., at 170.  
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congressional investigation over Operation Fast and Furious and requesting documents and 
information thereupon. The committee also issues a congressional subpoena, aimed at 
enforcing the release of such documents and information and at obtaining testimony. On 
May 4, 2011, the staff of the committee goes to the Department of Justice to examine 
documents in camera, and finds out that the documents have been redacted. On October 11, 
2011, the committee issues a subpoena for documents generated both before and after 
February 4. Attorney General Holder produces some records, but declines to produce others. 
In a letter dated June 20, 2012, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole states that the 
President invoked executive privilege over documents dated after February 4, 2011, because 
their disclosure would reveal the Department of Justice’s internal deliberative process. The 
assertion of executive privilege follows a decision of the House of Representatives to vote 
on a contempt motion against Holder on June 28. The June 20 letter stresses that the 
documents the House Oversight Committee requested are concerned with internal 
communications adopted in the course of the Department of Justice’s decision-making 
process aimed at formulating a response to the congressional investigation – and to a similar 
inquiry conducted by a magazine – into the Operation Fast and Furious. According to the 
letter, the release of such documents will result in “inhibit[ing] the candor” of deliberations 
within the Department of Justice with respect to the affair and in “significantly impair[ing] 
the Executive Branch’s ability to respond independently and effectively to congressional 
oversight.”836 Furthermore, the disclosure of such documents – the letter continues – will 
violate the separation of powers as provided for in the Constitution. President Obama, 
therefore, denies to Congress access to the requested information by invoking the 
presidential communications privilege, which however does not operate at a close level to 
the President in this case. The allegedly privileged communications, indeed, occurred within 
the Department of Justice837.      
 The House Oversight Committee filed a civil action to enforce its October 2011 
subpoena and thus to gain the requested information. In 2013, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia rejected the Attorney Genral’s motion to dismiss the case838. Firstly, 
                                                          
836 Letter from Dep. Att’y Gen. James Cole to Chairman Darrell Issa (June 20, 2012), p. 4 (quoted in 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
837 See RILEY T. KEENAN, Executive Privilege as Constitutional Common Law: Establishing Ground 
Rules In Political-Branch Information Disputes, 101 Corn. L. Rev. 223, 254 note 214 (2015) 
(observing that “[w]hether the President has the power to assert the privilege “on behalf” of a cabinet 
secretary is […] an unsettled issue.”)   
838 Holder, 979 F. Supp., at 2. 
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the Court quotes the D.C. Circuit, which, in a 1976 decision839, stated that “the mere fact 
that there is a conflict between the legislative and executive branches over a congressional 
subpoena does not preclude judicial resolution of the conflict.”840 Secondly, it is recalled 
that five years before, the same court “concluded in a persuasive opinion that it had 
jurisdiction to resolve a similar clash between the branches [of government].”841 The 
previous case decided by the Court was concerned with President George W. Bush’s 
invocation of executive privilege to protect the deliberative nature – and the consequent 
confidentiality, according to the Executive – of communications between the Department of 
Justice and the White House concerning proposals to dismiss and replace some U.S. 
Attorneys842. This assertion of the privilege was neither the first nor the last one under the 
Bush administration843. Thirdly, the District Court for the District of Columbia notes that at 
the present stage of the proceedings, it has only been called upon to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear the case, and it has concluded that it does. Therefore, the opinion – the 
Court underscores – “does not grapple with the scope of the President’s privilege: it simply 
rejects the notion that it is an unreviewable privilege when asserted in response to a 
legislative demand.”844 The Court bases its determination on the principle established in 
Nixon that executive privilege is not absolute. 
 
 
 
II. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
A. Enactment of the FOIA    
 The Freedom of Information Act was signed into law by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson on July 4, 1966845. It is commonly said that such a statute became effective one year 
later, though in reality the train of events that eventually led to the codification of FOIA in 
                                                          
839 United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
840 Id., at 390. 
841 Holder, 979 F. Supp., at 4 (referring to Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 
(D.D.C. 2008)). 
842 See ROSENBERG, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege, supra note 143, at 24-33. 
843 Id., at 33-34. 
844 Id., at 4-5. 
845 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (July 4, 1966). 
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the U.S. Code turns out to be not as linear as one might suppose. Public Law No. 89-487846, 
the statute that President Johnson signed on July 4, 1966,847 was supposed to enter into force 
on July 4, 1967, yet never became effective law directly. It was codified only by means of 
the enactment of a different statute. After the enactment of a temporary version of the FOIA, 
a different statute of 1966 inserted a title 5 into the U.S. Code as a collection of existing 
statutes concerning the organization and personnel of the executive branch848. The original 
section 552 of title 5, as provided for by this 1966 statute, addressed the publication of 
agency information and records. Subsection (b), in particular, required that agencies publish 
in the Federal Register information on their organization and on methods of performing their 
functions, therefore on the proceedings they carried out, on substantive rules, and on 
statements of general policy. The section, however, began by setting down two general 
categories of cases in which the prescriptions of the section itself did not apply. These 
categories appear to recall only vaguely the exemptions of the FOIA. Agencies were not 
subject to the obligations of publication provided for in the section whenever they performed 
either a function “requiring secrecy in the public interest,”849 or administrative business 
pertaining to exclusively “the internal management of an agency.”850 Furthermore, 
subsection (c) directed agencies to publish or make available otherwise all final opinions or 
orders in the adjudication of cases, unless there was “good cause” to keep them confidential. 
Finally, subsection (d) excluded the general availability of records, as agencies had to make 
them available only “to persons properly and directly concerned, except information held 
confidential for good cause found.” This provision shows how far the original section 552 
was from the rationale underlying the FOIA. However, section 551 of title 5, U.S. Code, 
brought in by Public Law No. 89-554, already included the definition of agency that would 
                                                          
846 The statute was based on a bill introduced in the Senate on February 17, 1965, during the First 
Session of the 89th U.S. Congress – S. 1160. The Senate and the House of Representatives passed 
the bill – respectively – on October 13, 1965, and on June 20, 1966.  
847 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, Federal Freedom of Information Policy: Highlights of Recent 
Developments, 26 Government Information Quart. 314, 314 (2009) (noting that not only all 
departments and agencies of the Federal Executive refused to support the FOIA, but President 
Johnson, too, signed it into law with no small amount of reluctance.”) 
848 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (September 6, 1966) – “An Act to enact title 5, United States 
Code, “Government Organization and Employees,” codifying the general and permanent laws 
relating to the organization of the Government of the United States and to its civilian officers and 
employees.” 
849 Section 552(a)(1). 
850 Section 552(a)(2). 
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be used – and still is – to identify the scope of the FOIA. Then, in 1967, Congress enacted a 
new statute, Public Law 90-23, expressly aimed at amending section 552 of title 5, U.S. 
Code, and at codifying the FOIA851. Section 3 of this act expressly repealed Public Law No. 
89-487, thereby replacing the original version of the FOIA, and section 4 fixed the same date 
as the original FOIA for the entry into force of the act. Therefore, despite being formally 
replaced by the enactment of a new act, the FOIA became effective – as originally 
established – on July 4, 1967.  
 
 
B. A Statute Aimed At Overcoming the Disappointing Experience with Section 3 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act  
 The main purposes of the original FOIA, as stated in the long title of the act, was to 
amend section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 [hereinafter – APA]852, and 
“to clarify and protect the right of the public to information […].” Congress, indeed, passed 
the FOIA to ensure citizens a much broader ability to gain access to records of federal 
departments and agencies than the “Public Information” section of the APA853 did. Senate 
Report No. 813 accompanying S. 1160854, i.e., the bill containing the original version of the 
FOIA, pinpointed the main flaws emerging both from the formulation of Section 3 APA and 
from its application in practice. First, the report quotes a famous statement of James Madison 
that reads as follows: “A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”855 It is of great 
importance – the report continues – “an information policy of full disclosure,”856 capable of 
implementing Madison’s warning, especially in consideration of the large number of 
departments and agencies that make up the federal executive branch. A policy of full 
disclosure serves the purpose to ensure the democracy of such a huge administrative 
                                                          
851 Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967) – “An Act to amend section 552 of title 5, United 
States Code, to codify the provisions of Public Law 89-487.” 
852 Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. (chapter) 324, 60 Stat. 237 (June 11, 1946).  
853 Section 3 APA, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). 
854 S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADM. PRAC. AND PROC. 
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative 
Materials, Cases, Articles, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. [hereinafter – 1966 Source Book], 36 (Comm. Print, 
1974). 
855 Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (August 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings of James Madison, 
103 (Gaillard Hant ed., New York, 1900).  
856 S. Rep. No. 813, supra note 854, at 38. 
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apparatus, wherein officials and employees in general do not enjoy electoral legitimation, as 
they are not directly accountable to the people. The APA, however, did not ensure “an 
informed electorate,” which instead is “vital to the proper operation of a democracy […].”857 
Despite being titled “Public Information,” therefore, section 3 APA did not embody the 
concept of “popular information” Madison was referring to. Indeed, the report notes that 
during congressional hearings aimed at examining the application of the APA with respect 
to openness, many witnesses testified that section 3 “has been used more as an excuse for 
withholding [information] than as a disclosure statute.”858 The report finds that this section 
“is full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public.”859  
 In particular, Section 3(a) APA required agencies to publish in the Federal Register 
a series of information and documents: firstly, information describing their “central and field 
organization,” including delegations of final authority860; secondly, statements setting out 
the methods by which agencies perform their functions and carry out proceedings, as well 
as instructions outlining the scope and contents of administrative papers; thirdly, substantive 
rules authorized by a statute of Congress, and statements of general policy or interpretations 
adopted by agencies “for the guidance of the public […].”861 Under subsection (b), agencies 
had to publish or make available to citizens all final opinions or orders issued in the 
adjudication of cases, unless there was “good cause” to keep them confidential and not to 
cite them as precedents, as well as all rules. In addition, subsection (c) provided that unless 
a statute established otherwise, official records were to be made available only “to persons 
properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.” 
Section 3 APA, however, did not apply when agencies perform a function “requiring secrecy 
in the public interest,” or when they conduct business in “any matter relating solely to the 
internal management” of agencies862. The formulation of Section 3 APA turns out to be 
almost identical to the original section 552 of title 5, U.S. Code. 
 The Senate report criticizes the wording of section 3 APA for being too generic. 
Firstly, the report maintains that unclear phrases such as “requiring secrecy in the public 
                                                          
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid. See, similarly, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (noting that section 3 APA “was 
generally recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals, and came to be looked upon more as 
a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.”) 
859 S. Rep. No. 813, supra note 854, at 38. 
860 Section 3(a)(1) APA. 
861 Section 3(a)(3) APA. 
862 Section 3, introductory sentence, APA. 
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interest”863 and “required for good cause to be held confidential” have justified the 
withholding of information on many occasions “only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or 
irregularities […].”864 Secondly, the wording of Section 3(c) has been deemed to imply “a 
double-barreled loophole,”865 consisting in agencies’ ability to withhold information in the 
event of good cause and when a request for information is presented by persons “not properly 
and directly concerned.” The report comes to the conclusion that section 3 APA hardly 
promoted people’s access to information held by the executive branch, and fostered secrecy, 
on the contrary. This section, indeed – the report observes – tends to be “cited as statutory 
authority for the withholding of virtually any piece of information that an official or an 
agency does not wish to disclose.”866 Agency officials are substantially authorized to keep 
almost any record confidential “under color of law” by the wording of section 3 APA, which 
contained “vague standards – or, more precisely – lack of standards […].”867  
 The report contends that unlike section 3 APA, the FOIA intends to establish “a 
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly 
delineated statutory language […].”868 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
pointed out in Rose v. Dep’t of the Air Force869, Congress devised the FOIA as a reaction to 
the disappointing practice under section 3 APA as to the level of openness, and thus the 
cardinal purpose of the FOIA was “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open 
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”870 The Supreme Court itself made it clear in 
Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy871 that Congress “enacted FOIA to overhaul the public-
disclosure section of the [APA].”872 The change in mindset the FOIA demanded of agencies 
is highlighted by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the foreword to his memorandum of 
                                                          
863 The report notes that a definition of public interest as a concept to call upon to justify the 
withholding of information could be found neither in the APA nor in its legislative history, and the 
APA did not provide for specific authority to check the usage of such a concept to keep certain 
information or documents secret. S. Rep. No. 813, supra note 854, at 40. 
864 Id., at 38. 
865 Id., at 40. 
866 Ibid.  
867 Ibid. 
868 Id., at 38. 
869 495 F.2d 261 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
870 Id., at 263. 
871 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). 
872 Id., at 1262. 
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June 1967 on public information [hereinafter – Clark memo]873. After recalling that 
“[n]othing so diminishes democracy as secrecy,” the Clark memo underlines that Public Law 
No. 89-487, the original version of the FOIA, does not boil down to a mere confirmation of 
the objectives and principles of section 3 APA, but on the contrary “imposes on the executive 
branch an affirmative obligation to adopt new standards and practices for publication and 
availability of information.”874 Under the FOIA – the Clark memo observes – “disclosure is 
a transcendent goal,” which may only yield to such “compelling” interests in secrecy as are 
embodied by the exemptions to freedom of information enumerated in the statute875. 
Reference is made, in particular, to the interest in preserving the privacy of citizens. Privacy 
is conceived of as a supreme value that tends to clash with the right to know and thus must 
be protected in the different contexts in which it may come up in the handling of public 
records, namely with respect to medical and personnel files and tax reports or in the form of 
trade secrets876. Furthermore, the Clark memo identifies – with laudable capacity of 
conciseness – the key elements of the FOIA. Such elements are the following: the disclosure 
of federal departments’ and agencies’ records is “the general rule, not the exception;” the 
right of access is granted to any person, and therefore the reasons and interests that prompt 
an individual to file a request for information are irrelevant; the burden of proof concerning 
the withholding of information lies on the agency; individuals claiming that the withholding 
of certain information is illegitimate have “a right to seek injunctive relief in the courts;” the 
executive branch must radically change “[its] policy and attitude” towards the release of 
records and documents to the public877.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
873 Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SUBCOMM. ON 
ADM. PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Freedom of Information Act 
and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502). Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other 
Documents, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter – 1975 Source Book], 12 (Comm. Print, 1975). 
874 Ibid. 
875 Ibid.  
876 Id., at 13. 
877 Ibid.  
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C. Main Amendments to the FOIA 
 Congress approved many amendments to the FOIA over time, yet only a few of them 
were significant as to the scope and content of the act. Great importance has the passage of 
the 1974 FOIA Amendments Act878, which addresses both substantial and procedural 
aspects. As to the former, the scope of the exemptions on national security and law 
enforcement was considerably restricted. As to the latter, the ability of the courts to conduct 
in camera inspection of withheld material was significantly strengthened, and amendments 
were also brought to the provisions concerning fees and time limits to respond to FOIA 
requests. In addition, the act explicitly provides for the segregability of material subject to a 
given request, with physical separation of the portions to protect from those to release. Then, 
the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986879 addresses the access to law enforcement 
information, a matter that is thus modified for the second time, only that this time the 
amendments mend in the opposite direction. Indeed, not only is the scope of the exemption 
broadened – in the advantage of agencies’ invocation of secrecy – but the statute also devises 
a brand new mechanism for protection of law enforcement information by providing for 
specific exclusions. The next significant step is the Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
of 1996880, which is mainly devoted to electronic records and proactive disclosures. 
Furthermore, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003881 brings in a single 
amendment to the FOIA, which however has major implications for the philosophy the entire 
act is based on – full disclosure. Such disclosure implies that access to department and 
agency records not be restricted on the side of the requester, because otherwise the right to 
know would not be granted to any person. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 makes an amendment affecting this very aspect of the FOIA. Section 312 of the act882, 
indeed, prohibits agencies of the Intelligence Community from releasing records in response 
to FOIA requests that come from a foreign government or an international governmental 
organization, whether a foreign government files a request directly or by means of a 
representative. In such cases, therefore, contrary to the rationale of the entire FOIA, the 
identity of the requester is what matters, as it leaves the agency with no choice but to deny 
access to the requested information.     
                                                          
878 Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (November 21, 1974). 
879 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (October 27, 1986). 
880 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (October 2, 1996). 
881 Pub. L. No. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2383 (November 27, 2002). 
882 Codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(E). 
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 The OPEN Government Act of 2007883 addresses a series of procedural provisions, 
some of which are aimed at strengthening the position of the requester. Indeed, requests that 
take longer than ten days to be processed have to be assigned a tracking number884, by using 
which the requester is enabled to follow step-by-step the procedure his or her request is going 
through. The requester, indeed, is given specific contacts within the agency to reach out to 
in order to get updates on the status of the request885. In handling the status of requests and 
to prevent an excessive amount of backlog, FOIA Public Liaisons play a pivotal role. Under 
section 10 of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, they bear responsibility “for assisting in 
reducing delays, increasing transparency and understanding of the status of requests, and 
assisting in the resolution of disputes.”886 They are also statutorily designed as supervisory 
officials an individual may turn to in order to make complains or raise issues with the way 
his or her FOIA request has been treated by the competent office887. The same section 
entrusts a similar but broader function to promote transparency to the Chief FOIA Officer, 
who is supposed to ensure “efficient and appropriate compliance” with the FOIA888, and 
“keep the head of the agency, the chief legal officer of the agency, and the Attorney General 
appropriately informed of the agency’s performance in implementing [the FOIA].”889 
Section 6 of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, instead, addresses time limits for agencies 
to comply with FOIA requests. The date on which a given request is first received by the 
appropriate office of the agency marks commencement of the 20-day period during which 
the request is to be processed and satisfied890. Only two situations allow the agency to toll 
such a period: when the agency needs further information from the requester, and makes a 
specific request accordingly891; and when a confrontation between the parties is necessary 
for fee assessment, but the tolling period is over as soon as the individual provides the 
clarification needed892. Furthermore, section 3 defines the term “a representative of the news 
media” for purposes of determination of fees to charge by piercing into each single element 
                                                          
883 Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007 [hereinafter – OPEN 
Government Act of 2007], Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (October 2, 2007). 
884 Section 7, OPEN Government Act of 2007 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(7)(A).  
885 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(7)(B)). 
886 Section 552(l). 
887 Ibid.  
888 Section 552(k)(1). 
889 Section 552(k)(2). 
890 Section 552(a)(6)(A)(ii), second part. 
891 Section 552(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). 
892 Section 552(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II). 
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of this term893. Even though the amendments brought in by the OPEN Government Act of 
2007 are concerned with procedural aspects of the FOIA, some observations on substance 
of the FOIA are set out in the findings, placed – as usual – at the beginning of the statute. 
After pointing out that the American Government – namely, the Federal Executive – has at 
times failed to follow the essential criterion that requires to apply the FOIA so as to make 
disclosure prevail over secrecy894, section (2)(6) of the OPEN Government Act of 2007 
underlines the importance of constant oversight over FOIA implementation by Congress. 
Such oversight – it is argued – enables Congress to determine whether and to what extent 
the FOIA needs amending and improving “to ensure that the Government remains open and 
accessible to the American people and is always based not upon the ‘need to know’ but upon 
the fundamental ‘right to know.’” 
 The OPEN Government Act of 2007 was the last statute bringing in a vast range of 
amendments to the FOIA, which however was amended in 2009, as well. The OPEN FOIA 
Act of 2009 addresses, in particular, Exemption 3, i.e., the exemption to freedom of 
information that allows departments and agencies to withhold information pursuant to 
nondisclosure provisions contained in statutes other than the FOIA. The act of 2009 adds a 
requirement to the two ones already provided for under the former version of the FOIA. This 
new requirement identifies the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 as a sort 
of watershed for the application of exemption 3. Indeed, statutes approved by Congress after 
such a date – not those approved on an earlier date – may be invoked by agencies to withhold 
material pursuant to Exemption 3 of the FOIA only if such statutes make express reference 
to this exemption895. Finally, I deem it proper to note that in recent years, various bills have 
been introduced in the two Houses of Congress to increase executive branch transparency 
by amending the FOIA. The proposed legislation currently under consideration in the two 
Houses takes up, as to content and language, the one examined in the previous Congress – 
the 113rd Congress896.  
                                                          
893 Section 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
894 Section (2)(5), OPEN Government Act of 2007. 
895 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B). 
896 In the Senate, on February 2, 2015, Sen. John Cornyn introduced the FOIA Improvement Act of 
2016 (S. 337; by practice, the year mentioned in the title of a bill may be updated depending on the 
time necessary for consideration and approval of the bill itself). The content of this bill is similar to 
that of S. 2520, considered in the previous Congress. The Senate passed the bill on March 15, 2016, 
with an amendment by unanimous consent. In the House, Representative Darrel E. Issa, who had 
already sponsored H.R. 1211 during the 113th Congress, introduced the FOIA Act (H.R. 653) on 
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D. The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations 
1. The Federal Register  
 Some of the proactive disclosures agencies are required to engage in by the FOIA 
consist in the publication of diverse documents in the Federal Register. What is the Federal 
Register? In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Register Act897, currently codified at sections 
1501 et seqq. of title 44, U.S. Code, which was aimed at ensuring “the custody of federal 
proclamations, orders, regulations, notices, and other documents […].” The Federal Register 
is the official journal of the executive branch of government. Section 4 of the Federal 
Register Act, indeed, excluded from publication business conducted by the other two 
branches898. The Federal Register, the first issue of which came out on March 14, 1936,899 
is published Monday through Friday, except on federal holidays, and contains documents of 
the executive branch900. Section 1502 entrusts the custody of the documents to be published 
in the Federal Register to the Archivist of the United States, who instead shares with the 
Director of the U.S. Government Publishing Office – an authority traditionally referred to as 
the “Public Printer,” the responsibility for the printing and distribution of such documents901. 
The Archivist “act[s] through” the Office of the Federal Register (OFR)902, which belongs 
to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The OFR is charged with 
                                                          
February 2, 2015. On January 11, 2016, the House passed the bill on motion to suspend the rules. 
The next day, the bill got to the Senate, and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
See WENDY GINSBERG, Freedom of Information Act Legislation in the 114th Congress: Issue 
Summary and Side-by-Side Analysis, CRS Report for Congress (April 21, 2016), p. 3. For a 
comparison on the content of the two bills and an analysis of their implications, id., at 4-14.   
897 Pub. L. No. 74-220, 49 Stat. 500 (July 26, 1935). 
898 Section 1501 provides that this section and the others containing the codification of the Federal 
Register Act applies to federal agencies, which include the U.S. President, and any department, 
agency, institution, commission belonging in the executive branch of the Federal Government. It is 
also expressly stated what could already be inferred from the doctrine of separation of powers: 
Neither the legislative nor the judicial branch falls within the definition of “federal agency” pursuant 
to the Federal Register Act. 
899 See RICHARD J. MCKINNEY, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal 
Regulations, 46 Law Library Lights 10, 10 (2002). 
900 Section 1501 defines documents, for purposes of publication in the Federal Register, as “any 
Presidential proclamation or Executive order and any order, regulation, rule, certificate, code of fair 
competition, license, notice, or similar instrument issued, prescribed, or promulgated by a Federal 
agency.” 
901 Section 1504. 
902 Section 1502. 
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compiling all rules and regulations adopted by federal agencies, as well as presidential 
proclamations and executive orders. The overall structure of the daily Federal Register 
comprises four categories of material, i.e., four categories of types of entry: Presidential 
Documents; Rules and Regulations; Proposed Rules; Notices. Section 1506 assigns the 
Administrative Committee of the Federal Register903 the function to issue regulations 
concerning both the publication of material and the printing of the Federal Register. Such 
regulations, for instance, determine how the certification of copies required pursuant to 
section 1503 is to be done904, and establish “the manner and form in which the Federal 
Register shall be printed, reprinted, and compiled, indexed, bound, and distributed.”905   
 Section 1505 enumerates the documents to be published in the Federal Register. 
Subsection (a) identifies three different categories. Firstly, presidential proclamations and 
executive orders are to be published in the Federal Register unless their effectiveness is not 
erga omnes, and thus they do not have “general applicability and legal effect,” or are directed 
at federal agencies, and thereby their binding effect concerns only agency personnel906. The 
mandatory content of the Federal Register also includes documents, the general applicability 
and legal effect of which is determined by the President, as well as documents, the 
publication of which is required by an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Federal Register 
contains documents “authorized to be published by regulations prescribed under this 
chapter,” and thus namely by regulations issued by the Administrative Committee of the 
Federal Register, provided that the President gives his formal approval to inserting such 
documents or classes of documents in the Federal Register907. Under section 1507, the 
publication in the Federal Register produces valid knowledge – and thus may be demanded 
of anyone falling within the scope of application of the document at issue – only after 
duplicate originals or certified copies of the document have been filed with the Office of the 
Federal Register (OFR) and a copy is made available for public inspection. That being 
clarified, section 1507 establishes a series of “rebuttable presumption[s],” i.e., presumptions 
that are only relative (iuris tantum, in Latin) and not absolute, and thus apply unless it is 
                                                          
903 The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register is composed of the following members: 
the Archivist of the United States or Acting Archivist, who serves as Chairman of the Committee; an 
officer of the Department of Justice designated by the Attorney General; and the Director of the U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, or an acting officer. 
904 44 U.S.C. § 1506(1). 
905 Section 1506(3). 
906 Section 1505(a)(1). 
907 Section 1505(b). 
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proved otherwise. Those presumptions constitute an automatic effect of publication in the 
Federal Register908.    
 
2. The Code of Federal Regulations 
 Agency final regulations and rules, i.e., such regulations and rules as become 
effective, are also published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Unlike the Federal 
Register, the Code of Federal Regulations does not encompass proposed rules, notices, or 
general policy statements. The Code of Federal Regulations is divided into 50 titles, and thus 
its structure is modeled upon that of the U.S. Code909. As the case with the U.S. Code, each 
title of the Code of Federal Regulation is concerned with a different subject matter910. The 
first edition of the CFR was published in 1938. In the 1960s, the OFR began issuing a new 
printed version of the CFR – as of 1963 for some titles, and 1967 for the whole CFR – 
destined for revision once a year911. It was soon realized, however, that an annual revision 
turned out to be extremely burdensome if conducted simultaneously for the entire CFR. 
Accordingly, in 1972, the OFR divided CFR titles into four groups and has since published 
separately the revision of such groups of titles in different, pre-fixed quarters of each 
calendar year912.  
                                                          
908 The presumptions, enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (4), are the following: the document 
published in the Federal Register “was duly issued, prescribed, or promulgated;” it complies with the 
conditions on which it may produce valid knowledge; the copy of the document contained in the 
Federal Register is a faithful, authentic copy of the original; all the provisions established in Chapter 
15 (“Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations”) of title 44, U.S. Code, and all regulations 
issued pursuant to this chapter have been complied with.   
909 The U.S. Code is a collection of such acts of Congress as are formally called “public laws,” and 
are numbered accordingly. The U.S. Code is actually composed of 54 titles.  
910 The correspondence in the order in which subject matters are placed in the U.S. Code and in the 
Code of Federal Regulations is only partial. In some cases, the name of the subject matter a given 
title is devoted to is identical. For instance, in either collection of material, title 21 is named “Food 
and Drugs.” In some other cases, the two collections deal with the same matter, but the formal name 
is slightly different. For instance, the name of title 5 is “Government Organization and Employees” 
in the U.S. Code, while is “Administrative Personnel” in the Code of Federal Regulations. In other 
cases, instead, the number and the matter of a given title do not match in the two collections. Title 
50 of the U.S. Code, for instance, is devoted to war and national defense, while title 50 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations deals with wildlife and fisheries.    
911 See MCKINNEY, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, 
McKinney, supra note 898, at 11. 
912 The revision of the different groups of CFR titles is conducted every year – respectively – on the 
following dates: titles 1-16 on January 1; titles 17-27 on April 1; titles 28-41 on July 1; titles 42-50 
on October 1 of each year.  
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 The CFR is provided for in section 1510 of title 44. From joint reading of subsections 
(a) and (b) it ensures that the CFR is a codification collecting those documents of each federal 
agency of the executive branch that possess the following features: have general applicability 
and legal effect; are published in the Federal Register; and are relied upon by agencies in 
carrying out their activities and functions. The Administrative Committee of the Federal 
Register is entrusted with the function to issue regulations on the binding of the printed 
edition of the CFR913, and on its supplementation, collation, and republication, so as to 
ensure that the CFR be kept “as current as practicable.”914 The OFR, instead, is competent 
to materially prepare and publish the CFR, and to take care of its supplements, collations, 
and indexes915. Finally, subsection (e) recognizes to the CFR just a limited capability to 
constitute an official source of the regulations issued by federal agencies. The subsection, 
indeed, provides that the documents published in the CFR are only “prima facie evidence of 
the text of the documents [published in the Federal Register] and of the fact that they are in 
effect on and after the date of publication.”916   
 
3. Electronic Editions of the Federal Register and of the CFR and Other Agency 
Material Available Online 
 There exist electronic editions of the Federal Register and of the CFR, which are 
consistent with the tendency of people to consult official documents in electronic format by 
searching them on the web. Today, indeed, a large number of websites enable interested 
persons to browse regulations, policy statements, and agency material in general 
electronically. Most of these websites are directly administered by entities of the Federal 
Government, and they usually contain – or provide a link to – an electronic version of the 
Federal Register and of the CFR917. The websites hosting specific repositories of federal 
                                                          
913 44 U.S.C. § 1510(b). 
914 Section 1510(c). 
915 Section 1510(d). 
916 See RICHARD J. MCKINNEY, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part of LLSDC’s Legislative Sourcebook (updated version, last revised: April 29, 2016) 
(pointing out that even though section 1510(e) cast some doubts on the trustworthiness of the CFR 
as a source to draw upon, courts “regularly” accept that agency regulations be referred to according 
to their publication in the CFR instead of that in the Federal Register). 
917 The OFR and the Government Publishing Office (GPO), for instance, jointly administer 
FederalRegister.gov. This website hosts a HTML edition of the Federal Register, called Federal 
Register 2.0 or FR2, the purposes of which – the website itself states – are “to make it easier for 
citizens and communities to understand the regulatory process and to participate in Government 
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documents and information do not replace individual agencies’ websites, but rather they 
offer people further opportunities for free online access to material pertaining to the 
executive branch or to the whole Federal Government918. In addition to the Federal 
Government, some (private) universities – namely, law schools – offer on their websites free 
access to repositories containing a consistent amount of regulations, information, and 
documents pertaining to the Government919. Furthermore, private companies grant their 
users, who have to subscribe a contract and pay a fee, the ability to browse almost boundless 
information on the Federal Government by deploying updated databases managed directly 
by such companies920. 
                                                          
decision-making.” https://www.federalregister.gov/policy/about-us. The website also provides the 
user with a series of navigation aids, as well as with links to external resources, such as 
Regulations.gov and e-CFR. The former originates from the eRulemaking Program, created in 2002, 
and is managed by the eRulemaking Program Management Office, which is based within the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but benefits from cooperation with various federal 
agencies. It is a document repository that allows interested persons to give their contribution to 
federal rulemaking in the course of its formation by posting comments directly on the website, whose 
subheading indeed reads as follows: “Your Voice in Federal Decision-Making.” 
https://www.regulations.gov/#!home. See MCKINNEY, A Research Guide to the Federal Register 
and the Code of Federal Regulations, ibid. (noting that Regulations.gov “encourage[s] electronic 
comments on proposed regulations from ordinary citizens by presenting a simple way to search, link, 
and submit and view comments to agency proposed regulations that are still open for comment.”) 
The e-CFR, instead, is an electronic version of the Code of Federal Regulations. As with the case of 
Federal Register 2.0, the e-CFR is maintained by the OFR and the GPO, which are committed to 
updating its content on a daily basis.  
918 Fdsys.gov (Federal Digital System), for instance, is a website administered by the GPO that 
contains material concerning all three branches of the Federal Government. Firstly, it enables 
interested persons to gain access not only to an online version of the Congressional Record, but also 
to a vast range of further legislative branch material, from bills introduced in either house of Congress 
to congressional committee reports and hearing transcripts. An electronic version of the U.S. Code 
and of the federal Constitution is also provided. Secondly, Fdsys.gov ensures access to executive 
branch information, rules, and other documents by making available an updated electronic edition of 
the Federal Register and of the CFR, even though presidential documents are also collected 
separately. Thirdly, it is possible to search on the website federal courts’ opinions, which are divided 
into categories based on degree of jurisdiction – district courts and courts of appeals for the different 
circuits – or on subject matter, and this is the case with the bankruptcy courts.  
919 The Legal Information Institute at Cornell University – Law School, for instance, offers on his 
website a reliable, constantly updated electronic version of the U.S. Code, an updated collection of 
Supreme Court decisions, accompanied by an archive of decisions beginning from 1990, as well as 
an electronic edition of the CFR and other material.  
920 An example thereof is given by the databases of Westlaw and LexisNexis, probably the two most 
important online legal research services for lawyers and legal professionals in the United States.  
193 
 
 
E. Publication of Information in the Federal Register 
 The FOIA requires agencies to publish automatically in the Federal Register certain 
information “for the guidance of the public.” Section 552(a)(1) of title 5, U.S. Code, in 
particular, identifies five categories of information and documents to be published in the 
Federal Register. The Government Accountability Office (GAO – formerly, General 
Accounting Office) has noted that section 552(a)(1) establishes what “has come to be known 
as the FOIA publication requirement.”921 The first category is concerned with information 
that not only describes central and field organization of a given agency, but also identifies 
employees to reach out to and methods to follow for the public to get information from or 
make requests to such an agency. Secondly, agencies have to publish statements aimed at 
explaining how they perform their functions and at setting forth the nature and requirements 
of all proceedings they carry out. Thirdly, agencies are required to publish in the Federal 
Register not only rules of procedure and information describing forms available at such 
agencies, but also instructions on the scope and content of administrative papers. The fourth 
category embraces “substantive rules of general applicability” adopted in execution of 
statutory provisions, and “statements of general policy or interpretations of general 
applicability” adopted by an agency922. Finally, agencies have to publish in the Federal 
Register any amendment, revision, or repeal of the rules and of the other information 
mentioned in the previous categories of subsection (a), paragraph (1). 
   
 
F. Proactive Disclosures: Publication of Agency Records and Information on Official 
Websites 
 Section 552(a)(2) is concerned with publication on official websites, and requires 
that agencies engage in proactive disclosures by routinely releasing records and information, 
and by making them available “for public inspection and copying.” According to the GAO, 
section 552(a)(2) establishes what “has come to be known as the FOIA reading room 
requirement.”923 The phrase “proactive disclosures” implies the obligation for agencies to 
                                                          
921 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Information Management. Update on Implementation of 
the 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments (August 2002), p. 4. 
922 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
923 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Information Management. Update on Implementation, supra 
note 921, ibid. 
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disseminate records and information without waiting for specific requests to be received. 
Such an activity is also referred to as “affirmative agency disclosure.”924 The adjectives 
“proactive” and “affirmative” emphasize the very fact that an agency has to disclose records 
and information by publishing them on their official websites in advance and regardless of 
the filing of any demand for information. To put it differently, in publishing records, 
information, and documents included among the categories subject to proactive disclosure, 
agencies need not be solicited by FOIA requests coming from the public. Paragraph (1) of 
subsection (a) also excludes any connection between divulgation of information and the 
filing of requests, and therefore the five categories of rules and information enumerated in 
paragraph (1) appear to fall within the scope of proactive disclosures. However, technically, 
they are not considered equivalent to the categories of records and information established 
in paragraph (2) by the Official Guide to the FOIA provided by the Department of Justice, 
which refers only to the latter the phrase “proactive disclosures.”925 A reason for this 
difference in classification the Department of Justice makes might lie in the fact that 
automatic publication in the Federal Register is an operation that is not tantamount to making 
information available to fulfill the obligation established in paragraph (2). The distinction 
between the publication of information pursuant to paragraph (1) and that required by 
paragraph (2), however, could only make sense in the past, prior to the Internet era, when 
information and documents to be proactively disclosed lay in physical structures belonging 
to agencies. At the time, it would be questionable at least to claim that such information and 
documents could be fully equated to those published in the Federal Register. The difference 
in the physical location between paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) information was evident. 
Another difference may probably be pinpointed in the fact that paragraph (1) requires the 
publication of rules, statements, and information aimed at providing an overall picture of the 
regulatory and organizational framework that governs the functioning of agencies. 
Therefore, paragraph (1) information may be considered to have a more general scope than 
the categories of information enumerated in paragraph (2). However, by and large, any 
possible distinction has been overcome by the usage of the Internet to disseminate 
information. Since today both the Federal Register and the information agencies have to 
publish proactively are made available online to anyone, the distinction between paragraph 
                                                          
924 Ibid. 
925 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Official Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, Proactive Disclosures 
(posted: August 10, 2009), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/proactive-
disclosures-2009.pdf.  
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(1) and paragraph (2) information does not make sense anymore, and ends up being just a 
historical legacy.  
 Subsection (a)(2) identifies five categories of records that agencies are required to 
proactively make available to people. Firstly, each agency has to publish its final opinions, 
including – the provision specifies – “concurring and dissenting opinions,” and orders, 
respectively rendered and issued in the adjudication of cases926. Secondly, an obligation of 
proactive disclosure is concerned with policy statements and interpretations that have been 
adopted by each agency but not published in the Federal Register. This subparagraph 
corroborates my assertion that paragraph (1) information and the one mentioned in paragraph 
(2) are closely related. Accordingly, it may be time to merge the two paragraphs into one. 
Thirdly, each agency has to disclose proactively manuals for and instructions to its 
administrative staff insofar as they “affect a member of the public.”927 Fourthly, each agency 
is also required to make available records that meet the two following conditions: they have 
already been released pursuant to subsection (a)(3), and thus in response to a FOIA request; 
and the agency that released them determines that because of the nature of the subject matter 
of such records, they “have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent 
requests for substantially the same records.”928 Fifthly, each agency is supposed to provide 
a general index of the records subparagraph (D) refers to, and thus an index devoted to 
records the access to which has been demanded again or may be demanded again after their 
disclosure.   
 Not all categories of information and documents that agencies have to make available 
not to respond to access requests but on their own initiative were originally provided for in 
the FOIA. The first three categories were already contained in the version of the FOIA that 
became effective in 1967. A 1966 report prepared by the House of Representatives 
characterized the agency material falling within these categories as “the end product of 
Federal admnistration,” which possesses “the force and effect of law in most cases.” 929 Such 
material, therefore, had “precedential significance” for the agency in the carrying out of its 
activities930, and nevertheless, access to it by the public was not guaranteed under section 3 
                                                          
926 Section 552(a)(2)(A). 
927 Section 552(a)(2)(C). 
928 Section 552(a)(2)(D). 
929 H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., Committee on Government Operations (May 9, 1966), 
reprinted in 1966 Source Book, at 28. 
930 Id., at 29. 
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APA931. In a famous 1975 decision – NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.932 – the Supreme Court 
argued that section 552(a)(2) “represents a strong congressional aversion to ‘secret [agency] 
law’,”933 and thus was conceived of by Congress as a means to cope with the traditional 
tendency of the executive branch to withholding information and with the possibility that 
agency employees be instructed to make secrecy prevail over disclosure934.  
 Section 4(4) of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, instead, added 
the fourth and fifth category of the information subject to proactive disclosure by inserting 
subparagraphs (D) and (E) into paragraph (2). The former, in particular, which turns out to 
be the most prominent amendment made over time to the system of proactive disclosures at 
statutory level, requires that agencies make available their “frequently requested records.”935 
The underlying idea of the category established by subparagraph (D) is that publishing on 
official websites of federal agencies or making available otherwise records agencies have 
already disclosed in response to FOIA requests may improve efficiency in the search for 
agency information by the public936. Therefore, this subparagraph establishes a relation 
between records an agency is required to disseminate and the subject of FOIA requests such 
an agency has received or expects to receive. If the sought information has already been 
released by a given agency in response to FOIA requests, that agency has to make the 
information available to the general public, so that anyone can benefit access to such 
information, previously disclosed only to individual requesters. By the same token, 
                                                          
931 Id., at 28 (pointing out that under section 3 APA, the categories of information and documents 
provided for in section 552(a)(2)(A)-(C) – especially, opinions and orders, whereby federal agencies 
decide on individual cases – “have been kept secret from the members of the public affected by the 
decisions.”)   
932 421 U.S. 132 (1975). 
933 Id., at 153 (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 761, 797 (1967)). 
934 Davis has observed that if such a case were to occur and thus if information and rules – namely, 
agency opinions and interpretations – were to be systematically excluded from access by interested 
persons, “the effect of non-disclosure [would] be to protect an outrageous system of secret law.” 
DAVIS, The Information Act, ibid.  
935 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA Post, Guidance on Submitting Certification of Agency Compliance with 
FOIA’s Reading Room Requirements (June 27, 2008), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-post-2008-guidance-submitting-certification-agency-
compliance-foias-reading-room (retrieved: May 8, 2016).  
936 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA Post, FOIA Counselor Q&A: ‘Frequently Requested’ Records (July 25, 
2003) (maintaining that making available to anyone records that have already been demanded and 
released “could be a basis for resolving [FOIA] requests most efficiently.”)  
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subparagraph (D) requires disclosure and online publication of records that have already 
been released and according to an assessment by the agency, it is likely that they will be 
frequently requested in the future937. Historically, agencies fulfilled the proactive disclosure 
obligations by making their records available in “conventional reading rooms,”938 i.e., places 
specifically aimed at containing collections of agency records in the traditional paper form. 
Before the advent of the Internet, citizens could only rely upon such rooms to consult records 
subject to proactive disclosure. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 required 
that agencies make available to the public “by computer telecommunications” subsection 
(a)(2) records created on or after November 1, 1996939. Therefore, November 1, 1996, was 
the “cut-off date:” agencies had to make available online to anyone records formed as of this 
date by inserting them into “electronic reading rooms.”940 Congress considered the online 
availability of records as a more efficient means for agencies to engage in proactive 
disclosures, and fixed at November 1, 1997, the date by which agencies had to create 
electronic reading rooms on their official websites941. Agencies, however, maintained their 
conventional reading rooms, as well942. Furthermore, subsection (a)(2) prescribes that 
agencies provide two types of indexes concerning records, information, and documents to 
be disclosed proactively. Firstly, agencies have to hold and make available to anyone 
“current indexes identifying information for the public” as to any material produced by 
agencies since the entry into force of the FOIA and subject to proactive disclosure. Secondly, 
agencies are required to provide in electronic form the index mentioned in subparagraph (E), 
i.e., the index of the frequently requested records that constitute the subject of subparagraph 
(D). 
                                                          
937 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA Update: Congress Enacts FOIA Amendments, Vol. XVII, No. 4 
(Fall 1996), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-congress-enacts-foia-
amendments; ID., FOIA Update: OIP Guidance: Amendment Implementation Questions, Vol. XVIII, 
No. 1 (Winter 1997), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/oip-guidance-amendment-
implementation-questions. 
938 FOIA Update: Congress Enacts FOIA Amendments, ibid. 
939 Section 4(7), Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), 
last part). 
940 FOIA Update: Congress Enacts FOIA Amendments, ibid.  
941 Ibid. (“The amendments [brought in by the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996] 
embody a strong statutory preference that this new electronic availability be provided by agencies in 
the form of on-line access, which can be most efficient for both agencies and the public alike, and 
they allow until November 1, 1997 for it to be provided.”)  
942 Ibid. (observing that as of 1997, “agencies will begin to maintain both conventional reading rooms 
and ‘electronic reading rooms’ in order to meet their FOIA subsection (a)(2) responsibilities.”)  
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G. Access to Agency Records and Information upon Request 
 Subsection (a)(3) provides that agencies have to ensure “any person”943 prompt 
access to requested records whenever the two following conditions are met: a FOIA request 
complies with all relevant rules944; and it “reasonably describes” the records945. Under the 
definition given by the Administrative Procedure Act, now codified at section 551(2) of title 
5, U.S. Code, the term “person” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or public or private organization that is not an agency946. In a famous passage 
from a 1978 decision, the Supreme Court contended that “[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to 
ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”947 This 
passage is important for the reference it makes to transparency as a weapon to prevent and 
fight corruption, but is also interesting for the usage of the phrase “informed citizenry.” How 
should the term “citizenry” be meant: narrowly or broadly? The former option implies that 
only American citizens are entitled to gain access to departments and agencies’ records 
pursuant to the FOIA. The latter, however, is to prefer, and as a result, foreign nationals, too, 
have a right to demand the release of executive branch information. In 1977, the Fifth Circuit 
provided elucidation on whom is entitled to file a FOIA request. Nothing in the definition of 
“person” established by Section 551(2) – the Circuit maintained – “suggests [Congress’s] 
intention to limit its plain terms to American individuals,”948 and therefore such a definition 
allows recognizing the right of access to departments’ and agencies’ records to aliens. 
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia observed in 1988 that had Congress 
intended to restrict the right to know to citizens, it would have expressly used the term 
“citizen” in the FOIA949.  
                                                          
943 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
944 Ibid. 
945 Section 552(a)(3)(A)(i). 
946 For the definition of agency, see infra. 
947 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 
948 Stone v. Export-Import Bank of United States, 552 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
949 See O’Rourke v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 684 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.D.C. 1988) (arguing 
that Congress “distinguishes between a ‘citizen’ and ‘any person’ when it wishes to do so.”) 
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 Under subsection (a)(6)(A)(i), an agency is supposed to respond to a FOIA request 
within twenty working days950. Such a period commences “on the date on which the request 
is first received by the appropriate component of the agency […].”951 The extension of the 
twenty-day period, which is an exception to the general rule, may bring about the opening 
of an additional phase within FOIA proceedings. An agency is allowed to draw out the time 
limit by which a FOIA request must be complied with if “unusual circumstances,” as defined 
in subsection (a)(6)(B)(iii), come about952. In such a case, the agency has to inform in writing 
the person who has filed a FOIA request both of the specific reasons justifying the extension 
of the time limit by which a response is due and of the date “on which a determination [on 
the matter] is expected to be dispatched.”953 The ordinary extension period is up to ten 
working days. If the agency determines that processing a given request will take longer, 
instead, the concerned person is permitted either to restrict the FOIA request or to reach an 
arrangement with the agency whereby it is stipulated “an alternative time frame for 
processing the request or a modified request.”954   
 In addition to setting out the reasons for the determination it has made, the agency is 
to notify the requester of his or her right “to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse 
determination.”955 An agency, indeed, is also required to decide on any appeal, presented to 
challenge the first determination on a FOIA request, within the same time frame – twenty 
working days, which are counted as of the receipt of the appeal956. If on appeal the agency 
upholds the denial of access in whole or in part, it has to acquaint the requester with the 
purview of the provisions of subsection (a)(4) addressing judicial review of the agency 
determination on the FOIA request957. In particular, subsection (a)(4)(B) confers jurisdiction 
                                                          
950 The original version of the FOIA required that agencies comply with FOIA requests within ten 
working days, but this term turned out to be too short to be observed. Accordingly, section 8(b) of 
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 extended to twenty days the time limit for 
agencies to process and respond to FOIA requests, which was thus doubled. It has been noted, 
however, that in practice, departments and agencies frequently do not even respect the twenty-day 
period. See THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Federal Open Government 
Guide, 4 (10th ed., Washington, D.C., 2009).   
951 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). 
952 Section 552(a)(6)(B)(i). 
953 Ibid.  
954 Section 552(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
955 Section 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
956 Section 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). 
957 See, namely, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(G). 
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over FOIA litigation upon district courts of the United States, which have the power “to 
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any 
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” The district court engage in de 
novo review of the matter, and may examine in camera the agency records under litigation 
to assess the legitimacy of withheld material, with respect to which the burden of proof is on 
the agency. The complainant, however, may not turn to the competent district court until all 
administrative remedies are exhausted958. By quoting Hidalgo v. FBI959, indeed, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed in Wilbur v. CIA960 that even though 
the “exhaustion of [administrative remedies towards] a FOIA request ‘is not jurisdictional 
because the FOIA does not unequivocally make it so,’ the FOIA administrative scheme 
‘favors treating failure to exhaust as a bar to judicial review’ […].”961      
 
 
H. The Scope of the FOIA 
 The FOIA applies only to the executive branch of government, and thus to federal 
departments and agencies. Section 552(f)(1), added by the 1974 FOIA Amendments Act962, 
defines the term “agency” by referring to section 551, which establishes definitions destined 
to apply to the administrative procedure963. Indeed, the definition of agency given by section 
551(1) is substantially identical to that originally contained in the Administrative Procedure 
                                                          
958 See, e.g., Trueblood v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 943 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1996) (“A plaintiff’s 
FOIA suit is subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if he fails to exhaust all 
administrative remedies.”); ExxonMobil Corp. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 828 F. Supp. 2d 97, 104 
(D.D.C. 2001) (pointing out that “a requester under FOIA must file an administrative appeal within 
the time limit specified in an agency’s FOIA regulations or face dismissal of any lawsuit complaining 
about the agency’s response [to his or her FOIA request].”); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 
(11th Cir. 1994) (“The FOIA clearly requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies before 
seeking redress in the federal courts.”); Voince v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 983 F.2d 667, 669 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (concluding that “the FOIA should be read to require that a party must present proof of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review.”)          
959 344 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
960 355 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
961 Id., at 677 (quoting Hidalgo, 344 F.3d, at 1258, 1259). 
962 Section 3 of the 1974 FOIA Amendments Act inserted at end of the FOIA subsections (d) and (e), 
of which the latter is the current subsection (f). 
963 Section 551, indeed, begins by clarifying that the definitions of this section apply to the whole 
subchapter II (“Administrative Procedure”) of chapter 5, title 5, U.S. Code. This subchapter includes 
not only the FOIA, but also the Privacy Act (Section 552a), the open meeting legislation (Section 
552b), and the regulation of rulemaking and adjudications (respectively, sections 553 and 554). 
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Act of 1946964. Under section 551(1), the term “agency” identifies each authority of the U.S. 
Government, which may also be based within the structure of or subject to review by another 
agency, but does not include the legislative and judicial branches of government – thus, 
Congress and the system of federal courts – as well as some other authorities. Section 
552(f)(1) specifies and extends such a definition by providing that agencies under the FOIA 
are executive and military departments, corporations that belong to or are controlled by the 
Government, any other entity within the federal executive branch – including the Executive 
Office of the President – and independent regulatory agencies. The definition of “agency” 
under section 552(f)(1) is – or, at least, appears to be – broader than that resulting from the 
APA, whose scope was identified in too a generic fashion. As the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia observed in 1997 by quoting a 1990 decision of the same Court, “the 
additional language of section 552(f)” entered the FOIA by the 1974 FOIA Amendments 
Act “‘to encompass entities that might have eluded the APA’s definition [of agency] in § 
551(1).’”965 As for the application of the FOIA to the Executive Office of the President, a 
House of Representatives report has determined that “the President’s immediate personal 
staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President” 
are excluded from the definition of agency, and thus are not subject to the FOIA966. An entity 
that is not part of the executive branch apparatus and thus is not encompassed in the 
definition of agency pursuant to the FOIA, however, may well adopt a policy on 
transparency of its own information and documents that is modeled upon FOIA provisions. 
It has been noted, for instance, that the Smithsonian Institution, which despite receiving 
                                                          
964 See Energy Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 917 F.2d 581, 583 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (arguing that the FOIA “ha[s] incorporated by reference” the definition of agency 
provided for in the APA and codified in section 551(1)).  
965 Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, 125 F. 3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Energy Research 
Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, ibid.).  
966 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 25, 1974), p. 15, reprinted in 
1975 Source Book, at 232 (quoted in Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 
U.S. 136, 156 (1980)). The language the House of Representatives employs in this regard is taken 
from a D.C. Circuit decision issued in 1971. See Soucie v. David, 448 F. 2d. 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). In such a decision, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that 
the Office of Science and Technology met the requirements for being considered an agency under 
the FOIA. Id., at 1071-1075. 
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federal funds, is not an agency under the FOIA, tends to follow a disclosure policy that turns 
out to be FOIA-oriented967.  
 The FOIA does not apply to the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal 
Government, nor to the agencies and bodies that are part of their structure. In Mayo v. U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office968, the Ninth Circuit held that since section 551(1) explicitly excludes 
Congress and the federal courts from the definition of “agency” under the provisions on the 
administrative procedure, such an exclusion must be meant so as to extend to the whole 
structure of the legislative and judicial branches. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit established 
that the Government Printing Office – now Government Publishing Office – is not subject 
to the FOIA because it is an agency within the legislative branch969. By the same token, in 
1993, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent 
agency within the judicial branch, it is not subject to the FOIA, as it does not constitute an 
“agency” under the act970. Even though the FOIA does not apply to entities belonging to the 
legislative or to the judicial branch, such entities, however, may well manage the release of 
their own records according to a FOIA-oriented policy. The Government Accountability 
Office, for instance, is an agency of the Legislative branch like the Government Publishing 
Office. Section 81.1 of title 4 CFR provides that even though the GAO is not subject to the 
FOIA, “GAO’s disclosure policy follows the spirit of the [FOIA] consistent with its duties 
and functions and responsibility to the Congress.”   
 
 
I. “Agency Record” Under the FOIA 
 The purpose of any FOIA request is to obtain the release of agency records whenever 
records are not made available proactively by the agency that holds them. As the Supreme 
Court noted in a 1980 decision, Forsham v. Harris971, originally – and for a long time – the 
                                                          
967 See THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Federal Open Government 
Guide, supra note 949, at 5 (pointing out that “[w]hile asserting its need to protect certain financial 
and donor data through exemptions that are broader than [those established by the FOIA], the 
Smithsonian has adopted the presumption of disclosure present in FOIA and many other provisions 
in the law.”)  
968 9 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1994). 
969 Id., at 1451. 
970 Andrade v. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 989 F. 2d 308 (9th Cir. 1993). 
971 445 U.S. 169 (1980). 
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FOIA did not contain a definition of “agency records.”972 Accordingly, courts tended to 
adapt the meaning of “record” set forth in trustworthy dictionaries to that the term assumed 
pursuant to the FOIA973. In Forsham, instead, the Supreme Court inferred the meaning of 
the term from two different statutes – the Records Disposal Act of 1943974 and the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978. As to the former, the definition of “records” contained in 
section 3301 of title 44, U.S. Code975, which according to the Supreme Court, fixed “[a] 
threshold requirement for agency records,”976 is no longer effective977. The Presidential and 
Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014978 re-wrote section 3301979. As noted above, the 
                                                          
972 Id., at 182-183. 
973 See Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Kan. 1971) (arguing that since none of 
the three branches of government has provided a clear definition of what a record held by an 
executive department or agency consists in, “reliance may be placed on a dictionary of respected 
ancestry for a reasonably accurate meaning of the word.”) 
974 Act of July 7, 1943, ch. 192, 57 Stat. 380 – “An Act to Provide for the Disposal of Certain Records 
of the United States Government,” which originally inserted sections 366-380 into title 44, U.S. 
Code. The act was significantly amended by Pub. L. 90-620, 82 Stat. 1254 (October 22, 1968), whose 
chapter 33 (“Disposal of Records”) inserted sections 3301-3314 into the title of the U.S. Code 
previously mentioned. Id., at 1299. 
975 See previous note. 
976 Forsham, 445 U.S., supra note 971, at 183. 
977 Section 3301, inserted by Pub. Law 90-620 of 1968, defined records as “all books, papers, maps, 
photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical 
form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States Government under 
Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for 
preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, 
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the 
informational value of data in them.” The definition explicitly excluded from records as meant in 
this section “[l]ibrary and museum material made or acquired and preserved solely for reference or 
exhibition purposes, extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of reference, and 
stocks of publications and of processed documents […].” 
978 Pub. L. 113-187, 128 Stat. 2003 (November 26, 2014). 
979 Section 5(a), Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014. Currently, section 
3301(a)(1)(A) provides that as far as the chapter devoted to the disposal of records is concerned, the 
term “record” includes “all recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or 
received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public 
business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as 
evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities 
of the United States Government or because of the informational value of data in them […].” 
According to subparagraph (B), which takes up most of the wording of the former version of section 
3301 as to the borders of the scope of the definition of “record,” this definition does not extend to 
two categories of material: “(i) library and museum material made or acquired and preserved solely 
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Supreme Court also referred to the definition of “presidential records,” established by the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978 and codified at section 2201 of title 44, U.S. Code. The 
Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014 brought some minor 
amendments to this section980. However, section 2201(2)(B)(i) explicitly excludes agency 
records from the scope of the definition of “presidential records.”  
 Section 3 of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 established a specific 
definition of “record,” which was expressly destined to extend to any other term used to 
identify information, broadly meant, for purposes of the FOIA. Therefore, by pursuing the 
clear purpose to prevent the risk that the definition was subject to a narrow interpretation, 
Congress provided that agency records consisted in “any information that would be an 
agency record subject to the requirements of [section 552, title 5, U.S. Code] when 
maintained by an agency in any format, including an electronic format.” Such a definition is 
still effective981, but the OPEN Government Act of 2007 extended it to any information that 
possesses all the features described by the definition itself and “is maintained for an agency 
by an entity under Government contract, for the purposes of records management.”982 
However, judicial interpretation as to what constitutes an agency record long preceded this 
evolution at statutory level. After the Forsham decision mentioned above, a fundamental 
step ahead is represented by Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts983, wherein the Supreme Court 
pinpoints two vital components to the existence of an agency record. Previous reconstruction 
of the meaning of “record” under the FOIA by the Supreme Court underpinned such a step 
ahead. The Court, indeed, states that the two necessary elements for identification of agency 
records can be inferred from Kissinger984 and Forsham985. Firstly, by quoting Forsham, the 
                                                          
for reference or exhibition purposes; [and] (ii) duplicate copies of records preserved only for 
convenience.” 
980 Section 2201(2) defines “presidential records” as “documentary materials, or any reasonably seg-
regable portion thereof, created or received by the President, the President’s immediate staff, or a 
unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise or assist the 
President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying 
out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President.” 
981 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)(A). 
982 Section 552(f)(2)(B). 
983 492 U.S. 136 (1989). 
984 445 U.S. 136, supra note 966. 
985 In Tax Analysts, the Supreme Court recalls the conclusion it reached in its two previous decisions 
as far as agency records are concerned. The Court notes that Kissinger dealt with various FOIA 
requests aimed at obtaining summaries of telephone conversations in which Henry Kissinger had 
participated, but only one of such requests required to identify what constituted agency records. See 
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Supreme Court holds that a prerequisite to the existence of an “agency record” under the 
FOIA is that a federal department or an agency must “either create or obtain” the requested 
material986. In Forsham, indeed, the Court, by referring to the definitions of “records” and 
“presidential records” provided for – respectively – in sections 3301 and 2201 of title 44, 
U.S. Code, argued that “it is not insignificant that Congress has associated creation or 
acquisition with the concept of a governmental record.”987 Secondly, the Supreme Court 
requires that the agency be “in control of the [sought information] at the time the FOIA 
                                                          
Tax Analysts, 492 U.S., at 143. The subject of the request were summaries of conversations Kissinger 
had while he was serving as Assistant of the President for National Security Affairs. These 
conversations could not be considered as National Security Council records, as they involved 
Kissinger “in his capacity as a Presidential adviser only.” Kissinger, 445 U.S., at 156. He was a 
member of the Office of the President, which, unlike the National Security Council, is not an agency 
under the FOIA. Ibid. Therefore, the summaries of such conversations did not fall within the 
definition of “agency records” at the time of their formation. Even though Kissinger later (1973 
through 1977) served as Secretary of State, and the Department of State is subject to the FOIA, the 
conversations at issue did not acquire the status of “agency records” under the FOIA “when they 
were removed from White House files and physically taken to Kissinger’s office at the Department 
of State.” Id., at 157. It would be wrong – the Supreme Court argued – “to hold that the physical 
location of the notes of telephone conversations renders them ‘agency records.’” Those notes “were 
not in the control of the State Department at any time. They were not generated in the State 
Department.” The Court observed that “[i]f mere physical location of papers and materials could 
confer status as an ‘agency record,’ Kissinger’s personal books, speeches, and all other memorabilia 
stored in his office would have been agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA.” Ibid. 
Furthermore, in Tax Analysts, the Supreme Court refers to Forsham. Tax Analysts, id., at 144. In 
Forsham, the FOIA request under consideration before the Supreme Court was concerned with raw 
data on which a study conducted by a private medical research organization was based. Even though 
it was funded through federal resources, the study was held all the time by the private organization. 
The fact that the funding of the study was to ascribe to the executive branch of the Federal 
Government – the Court pointed out – was not a sufficient element to render such raw material as 
“agency records” pursuant to the FOIA. Indeed, both the definition of “agency” and Congress’s 
policy towards records held by federal grantees indicate that “Congress did not intend that grant 
supervision short of Government control serve as a sufficient basis to make the private records 
‘agency records’ under the Act, and reveal a congressional determination to keep federal grantees 
free from the direct obligations imposed by the FOIA.” Forsham, 445 U.S., at 182. The FOIA – the 
Supreme Court contended later on – “deals with ‘agency records,’ not information in the abstract.” 
Accordingly, the FOIA “applies to records which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which 
merely could have been obtained. To construe the FOIA to embrace the latter class of documents 
would be to extend the reach of the Act beyond [congressional intent].” Id., at 186 (italics in original). 
986 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S., supra note 983, at 144. 
987 Forsham, 445 U.S., supra note 971, at 184. 
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request is made.”988 Especially the D.C. Circuit has given substance to the concept of agency 
control over records under the FOIA989.  
 
 
J. The Charging of Fees 
 According to a general rule subject to some limitations, federal agencies charge any 
person with a fee for processing their FOIA request. Most of the provisions brought in by 
the FOIA Amendments Act of 1986, which established the framework regulation of this 
matter, are still effective. By implementing some of these provisions, the Office of 
Management and Budget issued the Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and 
Guidelines in March 1987990 [hereinafter – OMB Fee Guidelines]. Agencies were assigned 
a deadline, by which they had to promulgate regulations aimed at implementing the OMB 
Fee Guidelines. Some amendments to the FOIA, however, were added in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. As already noted, in particular, the OPEN Government Act of 2007 
inserted in the FOIA the definition of “representative of the news media,” which is relevant 
to the charging of fees. The FOIA identifies three different categories of requests, and lays 
down principles agency regulations have to comply with in determining the amount of fees, 
which differs for the three categories. The first category is concerned with the commercial 
use of the material identified in a FOIA request. When records are requested for commercial 
use, fees must consist of “reasonable standard charges for document search, duplication, and 
review […].”991 The OMB Fee Guidelines define “commercial use” as “a use or purpose that 
furthers the commercial, trade, or profit interests of the requester or the person on whose 
behalf the request is being made.”992 It is the use of the sought information that counts to 
determine whether a FOIA request falls within this category, not the identity of the 
                                                          
988 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S., supra note 983, at 145. 
989 See Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting 
that this very Court of Appeals Circuit “has identified four factors relevant to a determination of 
whether an agency exercises sufficient control over a document to render it an ‘agency record.’”) 
Those factors are the following: “(1) the intent of the document’s creator to retain or relinquish 
control over the records; (2) the ability of the agency to use and dispose of the record as it sees fit; 
(3) the extent to which agency personnel have read or relied upon the document; and (4) the degree 
to which the document was integrated into the agency’s record system or files.” Ibid. (quoting Tax 
Analysts v. Dep't of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).   
990 52 Fed. Reg. 10012 (March 27, 1987). 
991 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I). 
992 OMB Fee Guidelines, at 10017-10018. 
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requester993. Accordingly, a commercial enterprise – the OMB Fee Guidelines observe – 
may well file under the FOIA a request that does not meet the “commercial use” criterion, 
while it is possible that a request from a non-profit organization does994. The agency 
processing a given FOIA request should seek to obtain some elucidation when it is not 
immediately apparent whether the requested information will be subject to commercial 
usage995. The second category refers to a FOIA request filed “by an educational or 
noncommercial scientific institution,” provided that the purpose of obtaining the release of 
the sought material consists in “[pure] scholarly or scientific research,” or filed by a 
representative of the news media. Such a FOIA request calls for a fee that just equates to the 
cost of document duplication996. The OMB Fee Guidelines include a wide range of types of 
schools in the term “educational institution,”997 but clarify that a FOIA request does not fit 
into this category if “it serves [not] a scholarly research goal of the institution,” but rather an 
individual goal, even if the requester is a professor998. In defining “representative of the news 
media,” instead, the OPEN Government Act of 2007 takes up what the OMB Fee Guidelines 
already provided for, with respect – for instance – to the term “news.”999 As the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia pointed out in a 1989 decision, National Security 
Archive v. Dep’t of Defense,1000 a request from a representative of the news media is not 
considered as such for purposes of the charging of fees when it is filed in performing a 
function that proves different from the function of disseminating news1001. The third category 
of requests, finally, may be considered the residual category, as it encompasses requests that 
do not belong either to the first or to the second category, and requires the payment of both 
search and duplications fees1002.   
                                                          
993 Id., at 10013. 
994 Ibid. 
995 Id., at 10018. 
996 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). 
997 OMB Fee Guidelines, at 10018. 
998 Id., at 10014. 
999 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (identifying the term “news” as “information that is about current 
events or that would be of current interest to the public.”) 
1000 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
1001 Id., at 1387 (holding that an entity that carries out “news media activities” on a regular basis may 
not be considered a representative of the news media and benefit its treatment as to application of 
fees “when it requests documents […] in aid of its nonjournalistic activities.”) 
1002 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). 
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 Agencies may not charge a fee or have to reduce it if disclosure of the requested 
information “is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public 
understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the 
commercial interest of the requester.”1003 In 1987, the Department of Justice issued fee 
waiver policy guidance1004, which directed agencies to take into account several factors in 
determining when fees should not be charged. Firstly, the guidance requires the existence of 
a public interest in disclosure. In this regard, the public interest implies that the release of 
the requested information be capable of facilitating people’s understanding of operations or 
activities carried out by the Federal Executive. By referring to the need for comprehensibility 
of executive branch business, the guidance appears to allude to the concept of transparency, 
which indeed the public interest in disclosure is intended to realize. Secondly, even if the 
requester has a commercial interest that adds to the public interest in the sought information, 
the latter must prevail. The factors federal agencies have to consider are also found in section 
16.11(k) of title 28, CFR. The application of a fee waiver, therefore, is subject to “a two-
pronged test the requester must satisfy.”1005 The requester bears the burden to demonstrate 
that the statutory and regulatory standards for a fee waiver are met1006.           
  
 
K. The FOIA Exemptions 
1. The Need to Strike a Balance Between the People’s Right to Know and Agencies’ 
Interest in Keeping Certain Information Secret 
 Disclosure of agency records cannot occur across the board, and indeed the FOIA 
provides for specific exemptions to freedom of information. House of Representatives 
Report No. 1497 of 1966, which accompanied S. 1160, i.e., the original version of the FOIA, 
observed that by enacting the FOIA, Congress intended “to reach a workable balance 
between the right of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information 
                                                          
1003 Section 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). 
1004 FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1987), pp. 3-10. 
1005 FedCURE v. Lappin, 602 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (D.D.C. 2009). See also Institute for Wildlife 
Protection v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228 (D. Or. 2003); 
Sloman v. Dep’t of Justice, 832 F. Supp. 63, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Perkins v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
754 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010).   
1006 See. e.g., Reynolds v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 391 F. App’x 45, 46 (2nd Cir. 2010); Perkins, 
ibid.; In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health, 543 F. Supp. 2d 83, 97 (D.D.C. 2008).       
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in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.”1007 In a 
1982 decision, FBI v. Abramson1008, the Supreme Court pointed out that Congress was well 
aware that “legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of 
certain types of information,” and accordingly, inserted into the FOIA “specific exemptions 
under which disclosure could be refused.”1009 As maintained in John Doe Agency v. John 
Doe Corp.1010, “[the FOIA’s] broad provisions favoring disclosure, coupled with the specific 
exemptions, reveal and present the ‘balance’ Congress has struck.”1011 The FOIA 
exemptions, therefore, embody an inevitable compromise between people’s right to know 
and agencies’ interest in denying access to some of the information they hold. In Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice1012, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia highlighted the balance the FOIA calls for “between the right of the public to 
know what their government is up to and the often compelling interest that the government 
maintains in keeping certain information private, whether to protect particular individuals or 
the national interest as a whole.”1013 The reference to the right of access ensured by the FOIA 
                                                          
1007 H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1966 Source Book, at 27. 
1008 456 U.S. 615 (1982). 
1009 Id., at 621. See also, e.g., Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 
871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); United Techs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 601 F.3d 557, 559 
(D.C. Cir. 2010).  
1010 493 U.S. 146 (1989). 
1011 Id., at 153 (referring to Mink, 410 U.S., supra note 858, at 80). 
1012 265 F.Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003). In this case, the ACLU files a FOIA request to the Department 
of Justice to obtain the release of statistical data documenting how – rectius, how many times – the 
Department has exercised its new information gathering powers, powers concerning surveillance 
activities and the like for purposes of terrorism prevention, since the USA PATRIOT Act provided 
for those powers. By delivering a memorandum opinion on behalf of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia, Judge Huvelle rules that the statistical information sought through the FOIA request 
may be withheld on national security grounds. The Court, therefore, detects a legitimate invocation 
of Exemption 1 of the FOIA by the Department of Justice. For an analysis of the information 
gathering powers added by the USA PATRIOT Act, id., at 22-25 (memorandum opinion, Huvelle, 
J.). Under the U.S. legal system, a memorandum opinion is an opinion featured by conciseness, as 
the court preparing it determines that the legal principles at issue are well established, and thus do 
not call for a broad explanation. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 1201 (9th ed., 2009). In other words, 
the limited dimension that features memorandum opinions is due to the fact that they lack any really 
innovative content, and thus provide substantial contribution to none of the legal issue they deal with.          
1013 Id., at 27.   
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as anyone’s right to know “what their Government is up to” has had notable success, as it is 
frequently quoted in federal court decisions1014.  
 
2. Disclosure as the “Dominant Objective” of the FOIA 
 The fact that the FOIA provides for a series of exemptions does not mean that their 
usage may be abused by federal agencies. As early as 1964, a Senate report accompanying 
S. 16661015, a bill that was aimed at bringing in a FOIA during the 88th Congress (1963-
1965), made it clear that “[s]uccess [in the application of a FOIA] lies in providing a 
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places 
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.”1016 In Mink, the Supreme Court noted that 
the FOIA represents an “attempt to provide [such a] formula.”1017 However, as the Court 
stressed in a 1976 decision, Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose1018, “limited exemptions do not 
obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the 
[FOIA].”1019 The consequence that ensues is clear: The FOIA exemptions “must be narrowly 
construed.”1020 As the Mink opinion already noted, the exemptions “are explicitly made 
exclusive” by subsection (c)1021 – now subsection (d). Not only does this subsection exclude 
that the FOIA constitutes authority to withhold information from Congress; it also forbids 
federal agencies from denying access to their records to the public beyond the limits 
                                                          
1014 See Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-773 (1989) (referring 
to Mink, 410 U.S., supra note 858, at 105 (which in turn quotes HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, The 
New York Review of Books (October 5, 1972), p. 7) (noting that in his dissenting opinion in Mink, 
Justice Douglas described the philosophy the FOIA is based upon by quoting Henry Steele 
Commager, according to whom the Founding Fathers of the American Republic “thought secrecy in 
government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny, and committed itself to the principle that 
a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up 
to.” (emphasis added)). See also, e.g., National Archives And Records Administration V. Favish, 541 
U.S. 157, 171 (2004).  
1015 S. 1666, also known as the “Freedom of Information Bill,” had the purpose “to clarify and protect 
the right of the public to information, [as well as] other purposes.” On July 28, 1964, the Senate 
passed by voice vote the bill, which however never became a public law of Congress.   
1016 S. Rep. No. 88-1219, 88th Congress, 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1966 Source Book, at 93. 
1017 Mink, 410 U.S., at 80. 
1018 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
1019 Id., at 361. 
1020 Ibid. Courts frequently repeat such a precept. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Inc. v. Office of 
Management and Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (contending that the FOIA exemptions 
“are construed narrowly in keeping with FOIA’s presumption in favor of disclosure.”)   
1021 Mink, 410 U.S., supra note 858, at 79. 
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“specifically stated” in the FOIA1022. Accordingly, the burden of proving the legitimacy of 
applying one or more exemptions in response to a FOIA request is imposed upon the 
agency1023.     
 
3. The “Reasonably Segregable” Obligation 
 The principle of the necessary prevalence of disclosure over secrecy entails a further 
corollary: Agencies are supposed to separate within a given record the portions to keep secret 
from such portions as may be released. The FOIA expressly provides for such a prescription. 
It is based on the assumption that even if a record or multiple records contain information, 
the disclosure of which could jeopardize essential interests, they may also contain 
information the access to which by the public does not generate the same risk1024. In addition 
to establishing the exemptions to freedom of information, indeed, subsection (b) of the FOIA 
imposes upon federal agencies what the U.S. Department of Justice’s Guide to the Freedom 
of Information Act calls the “‘reasonably segregable’ obligation.”1025 In particular, 
subsection (b) prescribes that each agency release to a person requesting a certain record 
“[a]ny reasonably segregable portion” of the record after deleting such portions as can be 
lawfully withheld, because they fall within one or more exemptions1026.     
                                                          
1022 5 U.S.C. § 552(d). 
1023 See Public Citizen, 598 F.3d, ibid. (referring to Loving v. Dep’t of Defense, 550 F.3d 32, 37 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008)) (underlining that the agency processing a FOIA request “bears the burden of showing 
that a claimed exemption applies.”). See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 
612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (pointing out that when an agency responds to a FOIA request by 
withholding records – either in whole or in part – this agency “bears the burden of proving the 
applicability of claimed exemptions.”)  
1024 See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(contending that “[it has] long been the rule [in the D.C. Circuit] that non-exempt portions of a 
document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.”); Shiller 
v. National Labor Relations Board, 964 F.2d 1205, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding the case to the 
district court for further proceedings, for the lower court failed to enforce the obligation imposed 
upon the Board by the FOIA “to disclose reasonably segregable information.”) A district court, 
indeed – the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observes -- commits an error that consists 
in a violation of law if it “‘simply approve[s] the withholding of an entire document without entering 
a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof.’” Ibid. (quoting Powell v. United States Bureau of 
Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239, 1242 note 4 (D.C. Cir.1991) (which in turn quotes Church of Scientology v. 
Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1979))).  
1025 Procedural Requirements, in DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act (2009 
ed.) (online version, updated: September 4, 2013) (retrieved: May 11, 2016), p. 55.  
1026 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(sentence immediately following the exemptions). 
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4. The Exemptions Enumerated in the FOIA 
 Subsection (b) of section 552 enumerates nine exemptions to the mandatory 
disclosure imposed upon agencies. Exemption 1 permits agencies to withhold from access 
information on national security and foreign affairs that has been properly classified pursuant 
to an Executive order issued by the President of the United States. In particular, subsection 
(b)(1) exempts from disclosure – whether proactive or upon request – information that meets 
the two following requirements: it is concerned with matters that are “specifically authorized 
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy;” and the information “[is] in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order.”1027 Therefore, by enacting the FOIA, Congress recognized the 
authority of the executive branch to establish the amount of secrecy that is necessary to 
protect the interests of the United States in the domains of national security and foreign 
affairs. It is the U.S. President, indeed, who determines the actual scope of this exemption 
by issuing an executive order governing classification of national security information. 
Exemption 2 covers information “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices 
of an agency.”1028 Under Exemption 3, agencies may deny access to requested information 
by applying provisions contained in federal statutes other than the FOIA that authorize the 
withholding of information. Therefore, such nondisclosure provisions end up being 
incorporated into the FOIA by means of Exemption 3. Their incorporation into the FOIA, 
however, occurs only if one of the two following requirements, which thus act disjunctively, 
is met: a nondisclosure provision prescribes the withholding of certain information from the 
public “in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue;” or it “establishes particular 
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.”1029 
Furthermore, as already noted above, the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 added a requirement that 
applies to statutes that have become effective since the enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act 
of 2009. Agencies may call upon such statutes to deny access to records only if the statutes 
– namely, their nondisclosure provisions – expressly mention Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The 
National Security Act of 19471030, as amended, constitutes an example of a federal statute 
other than the FOIA that contains nondisclosure provisions. In particular, a provision of this 
                                                          
1027 Section 552(b)(1)(A),(B). 
1028 Section 552(b)(2). 
1029 Section 552(b)(3)(A)(i),(ii). 
1030 Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (July 26, 1947), currently codified at 50 U.S.C. 3001 et seqq. 
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act, in its current version as codified at section 3024(i)(i), of title 50, U.S. Code, vests in the 
Director of National Intelligence the authority “[to] protect intelligence sources and methods 
from unauthorized disclosure.” Exemption 4, instead, shields from indiscriminate access 
trade secrets and commercial or financial information contained in agency records. 
Departments and agencies gather such secrets and information in the course of their relations 
with persons (individuals and businesses), who submit such information either voluntarily 
or because they are required to, but in any event they rely upon confidentiality. Actually, 
both parties to the relation – the private and the public one – benefit from confidentiality 
being kept on commercial or financial information, as well as on trade secrets. Exemption 5 
allows agencies to withhold from access “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or 
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with 
the agency.”1031 Despite textually referring only to the so-called deliberative process 
privilege, which is aimed at ensuring the candid exchange of opinions and communications 
within an agency or between agencies in the carrying out of administrative activity, this 
exemption has a broader scope. Exemption 5, indeed, is traditionally believed to include the 
presidential communications privilege, and the attorney-client privilege, as well. The latter 
covers communications and material pertaining to legal assistance furnished to federal 
agencies1032. Exemptions 6 and 7(C), instead, protect the right to privacy. Exemption 6 
allows agencies to deny the release of information that is concerned with one or more 
individuals and contained in personnel and medical files, and similar files, whenever 
disclosure of such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”1033 The same wording is found in Exemption 7(C). Indeed, this exemption (or 
subexemption), too, provides for the ability to respond to FOIA requests by refusing access 
whenever the disclosure of the requested information “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”1034 Exemption 7 encompasses six 
subexemptions agencies are allowed to invoke to withhold records and information 
                                                          
1031 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
1032 See In re Country of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 418 (2nd Cir. 2007). See also Fox News Network, LLC 
v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that the privilege exists 
even if a third party is involved in the relationship between the attorney and the client, because “the 
common interest doctrine,” which requires the confidentiality of the communications exchanged 
between the parties, applies regardless of the number of parties to this relationship). It is evident, 
however, that an eccessive number of parties would thwart the rationale of the privilege. 
1033 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 
1034 Section 552(b)(7)(C). 
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“compiled for law enforcement purposes,”1035 provided that the conditions established for 
the application of each subexemption are met. Overall, the subexemptions are aimed at 
protecting the confidentiality of information and records relevant to law enforcement 
proceedings when the disclosure of such information and records could reasonably result in 
causing harm to concerned individuals and their privacy or to activities carried out by law 
enforcement agencies1036. Exemption 8 is concerned with such material as bank examination 
reports and related documents that is of interest to agencies “responsible for the regulation 
or supervision of financial institutions.”1037 According to courts, such an exemption pursues 
two purposes, the primary of which is “to ensure the security of financial institutions,”1038 
which could be jeopardized by the disclosure of “candid evaluations of financial institutions 
[…].”1039 The secondary purpose is “to safeguard the relationship between the banks and 
their supervising agencies.”1040 This exemption, as interpreted by courts, appears to be 
inconsistent with the rationale the whole set of the FOIA exemptions is based on, a rationale 
that entails a narrow interpretation of the exemptions. It has been noted, indeed, that 
                                                          
1035 Section 552(b)(7). 
1036 The content of the different exemptions (or subexemptions) may be summed up as follows. 
Exemption (7)(A) covers records the disclosure of which would reasonably be expected to undermine 
the effectiveness of law enforcement proceedings. The second subexemption allows law enforcement 
agencies to withhold information, whose release would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or to 
an impartial adjudication. As already explained, the third subexemption is aimed at safeguarding the 
privacy of a person involved in law enforcement activities. Under paragraph 7(D), instead, agencies 
have authority to shield from public access records, whose release could reasonably result in 
disclosing “the identity of a confidential source […], and, in the case of a record or information 
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an 
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a 
confidential source.” Exemption 7(E) allows federal agencies to not make available to FOIA 
requesters documents setting forth techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, as well as guidelines for investigations or prosecutions, when the disclosure of such 
material could reasonably foster or facilitate “circumvention of the law.” Finally, paragraph 7(F) 
permits agencies to refuse the release of information, whose disclosure “could reasonably be 
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”     
1037 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8). 
1038 Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978).   
1039 National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. National Credit Union Administration, 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 124, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2003). 
1040 Consumers Union, 589 F.2d, at 534. 
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Congress meant the scope of Exemption 8 to be broad1041, and thus “has left no room for a 
narrower interpretation [of this exemption].”1042 Finally, Exemption 9, the rare invocation of 
which by agencies is often pointed out to demonstrate its scarce significance within the 
overall framework of the FOIA exemptions, allows withholding from access both geological 
and geophysical information and maps of wells. 
 
5. The Exclusions 
 Other than the exemptions, there exist also some so-called exclusions, which consist 
in a further instrument to protect from disclosure information held by law enforcement 
agencies. The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 inserted into the FOIA a new 
subsection (c)1043, devoted to the exclusions. Subsection (c) is divided into three paragraphs, 
each of which corresponds to an exclusion agencies may deploy. The three exclusions have 
in common the effect that their application produces on agency records: Such records are 
treated as if they were not subject to the FOIA. To put it differently, an agency appealing to 
an exclusion is allowed to exclude from the FOIA’s scope the records covered by the 
exclusion. The mechanism for the functioning of the exclusions, therefore, may not be 
equated to the one governing the application of the exemptions. In particular, since the 
exclusions allow agencies to bring information that constitutes the subject of FOIA requests 
out of the FOIA scope, it appears to be clear the difference between the exclusions 
themselves and the so-called “Glomarization.”1044 The latter term refers to situations in 
                                                          
1041 Id., at 533 (contending that if Congress “has intentionally and unambiguously crafted a 
particularly broad, all-inclusive definition, it is not our function [as federal judges], even in the FOIA 
context, to subvert that effort.”) 
1042 McCullough v. FDIC, No. 79-1132, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, at 2 (D.D.C. July 28, 1980).   
1043 Accordingly, subsections (c) through (e) of section 552 were rearranged so as to become 
subsections (d) through (f). 
1044 The name “Glomarization” stems from a CIA operation conducted in the 1970s to recover a 
Soviet submarine that had sank in the Pacific Ocean in 1968. The operation, indeed, involved usage 
of a barge called “Glomar Explorer.” After the press discovered the operation, FOIA requests were 
filed to obtain some details, but the CIA replied that it could not either confirm or deny the existence 
of the operation. In particular, the cases concerning – respectively – a FOIA request filed by a reporter 
and another one filed by the Military Audit Project, a nonprofit organization, eventually got to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In both cases, the D.C. Circuit 
“formally recognized the logic of the CIA’s response, accepting that the existence or nonexistence 
of the requested records was itself a classified fact protectable by FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3.” 
MICHAEL D. BECKER, Piercing Glomar: Using the Freedom of Information Act and the Official 
216 
 
which federal agencies, in the interest of national security or of the effectiveness in law 
enforcement proceedings, and thus – essentially – in the context of Exemptions 1 and 3 or 
Exemption 7 cases, refuse either to confirm or to deny the existence of certain records and 
information that have been requested1045. Even though confusion as to the application of the 
two mechanisms may arise in litigation1046, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
correctly observed in 2012 that the procedure by which these mechanisms operate is different 
because the level of secrecy agencies may depend on is greater in the exclusions than in the 
event of a Glomar response to a FOIA request. When an exclusion applies, indeed, agencies 
– as noted above – are allowed to consider the sought records as not covered by the scope of 
the FOIA. A Glomar response, instead, requires in any event that the agency satisfy its 
burden of proving that the material sought falls within the scope of a given exemption, even 
though such an agency is not obliged to take an official stand on the existence of the 
records1047. The memorandum from Attorney General Edwin Meese III on the FOIA 
amendments brought in in 1986 in the specific interest of law enforcement1048 conceded that 
a Glomar response is capable of protecting records from disclosure. Yet, its potential for 
coverage of records is limited by the fact that a Glomar response always acts in connection 
with one or more FOIA exemptions. In other words, such a mechanism may be applied only 
to prevent the release of specific records, after their inclusion into a given FOIA exemption 
is demonstrated. The memorandum argues that “Glomarization” turns out to be “inadequate 
to guard against the harm caused by the very invocation of a particular exemption,” nor may 
it prevail over multiple FOIA requests aimed at obtaining the disclosure of a vast range of 
                                                          
Acknowledgement Doctrine to Keep Government Secrecy in Check, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 673, 682 
(2012) (referring to JAMES X. DEMPSEY, The CIA and Secrecy, in ATHAN G. THEOHARIS (ed.), A 
Culture of Secrecy: The Government versus the People’s Right to Know, 46 (Lawrence, Kansas, 
University Press of Kansas, 1998). 
1045 See Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Phillippi v. CIA, id., at 1013 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976).   
1046 See Light v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-1660, 2013 WL 3742496, at 11-12 (D.D.C. July 17, 2013). 
1047 See Memphis Publishing Co. v. FBI, No. 10-1878, 2012 WL 269900, at 6-7 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 
2012) (contending that while in the context of Glomarization “the agency must reveal the fact of and 
grounds for any withholdings [of records and information],” the exclusions “permit the government 
to treat requests for records as falling outside the scope of the [FOIA].”)  
1048 See Attorney General’s Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act for Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Law Enforcement Amendments 
(December 1987), available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/86agmemo.htm. 
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records. In such situations, “the more delicate exclusion mechanism” should apply, as it 
“affords a higher level of protection […].”1049 
 
 
L. Memoranda Issued By the President and the Attorney General on Implementation 
of the FOIA: Present and Past Experiences  
1. President Obama on Transparency and the FOIA 
 Each presidential administration adopts its own policy on disclosure of agency 
records and thus its own guidelines for implementation of the FOIA. On his first full day 
upon taking office, January 21, 2009, President Obama issued two different – yet related – 
memoranda: one on transparency and open government [hereinafter – Transparency 
Memo]1050, and the other specifically devoted to the FOIA [hereinafter – FOIA Memo]1051. 
Splitting formally issues concerning transparency from issues concerning the FOIA into two 
presidential documents proves a wise choice. The scope of transparency, indeed, does not 
coincide with access to agency records and information, for the very concept of transparency 
is broader. American scholars, however, tend to not pierce too much into this concept. They 
often underestimate the principle that a transparent agency is an agency that not only 
publishes online or releases upon request its records, but also makes understandable the 
information included in those records. Fenster is one of the scholars who has grasped the 
difference between accessibility and understandability of information by observing that 
“government information laws [such as the FOIA usually] require simply that information 
be made available, not that it should be useful or understandable to the public.”1052 On the 
one hand, a commitment to ensuring that executive branch information be easily 
comprehended by citizens is not easy to honor, and raises some issues, both theoretical and 
practical1053. On the other hand, comprehensibility is an added value of information, which 
benefits not only the public, but agencies as well. As Fenster himself has argued, 
                                                          
1049 Ibid.  
1050 Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [Transparency Memo]. 
1051 Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the 
Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009) [FOIA Memo]. 
1052 MARK FENSTER, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885, 942 (2006). 
1053 Ibid. (“Imposing some form of a comprehensibility requirement on government is fraught with 
difficulties, from the problem of definition (what precisely constitutes ‘comprehensible’?) to 
enforcement issues (are courts to evaluate what constitutes ‘comprehensible’?).”)  
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“[g]overnment disclosures more readily produce better public understanding and decision-
making not merely when they are made available as raw information, but when they are 
made available in a way that the public can understand.”1054 Despite embracing the added 
value of comprehensibility, however, transparency is inextricably intertwined with access to 
information, which constitutes the core of transparency. Accordingly, openness, a concept 
that is realized either by publishing information proactively or by disclosing it in response 
to a specific request, is frequently conceived of as a synonym to transparency. In the 
Transparency Memo, President Obama states that his administration “is committed to 
creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government,”1055 and pinpoints transparency 
as one of the cardinal components of his open Government program1056. The Transparency 
Memo also concedes that access to information held by departments and agencies is an 
integral part of transparency by contending that transparency, which promotes 
accountability, requires that the executive branch make available to American citizens 
information “about what their Government is doing.”1057 
 In his FOIA Memo, President Obama directs agencies to make disclosure prevail 
over secrecy whenever possible. In corroboration of the close relation existing between 
transparency and access to agency records, the FOIA Memo begins with the following 
sentence: “A democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires 
transparency.”1058 The FOIA Memo considers the FOIA to be not only an instrument aimed 
at realizing accountability through transparency, but – more generally – “the most prominent 
expression of a profound national commitment to ensuring an open Government.”1059 The 
FOIA Memo establishes a criterion executive departments and agencies are supposed to 
follow when applying FOIA provisions: “In the face of doubt, openness prevails [over the 
withholding of information].” Therefore, the FOIA Memo invites agencies to opt for 
disclosure whenever they are not sure whether the application of a given FOIA exemption is 
necessary to protect an essential interest of the United States. Furthermore, agencies are 
expressly forbidden from invoking one or more FOIA exemptions “merely because public 
                                                          
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Transparency Memo, supra note 1050, ibid. 
1056 The other two components are public participation in the formation of Federal Executive’s 
policies, and collaboration, which “actively engages Americans in the work of their Government.” 
Ibid. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 FOIA Memo, supra note 1051, ibid.  
1059 Ibid.  
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officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, 
or because of speculative or abstract fears.” This prescription aimed at preventing any misuse 
or abuse in the usage of the FOIA exemptions is a direct consequence of the principle that 
“a presumption in favor of disclosure […] should be applied to all decisions involving 
FOIA.” Such a presumption – the FOIA Memo continues – also requires that agencies “take 
affirmative steps to make information [available to anyone without waiting] for specific 
requests from the public,” and thus engage in the proactive disclosure of records, 
information, and documents1060. 
 
2. Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum on Implementation of the FOIA 
Compared To the Memoranda Issued By Ashcroft in 2001 and By Reno in 1993 
 On March 19, 2009, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., issued a memorandum on 
implementation of the FOIA [hereinafter – Holder FOIA Memo]1061. The Holder FOIA 
Memo is explicitly aimed at confirming President Obama’s commitment to considering 
transparency and open Government as the cardinal values of his administration and at 
ensuring that such a commitment be honored. The presumption in favor of disclosure any 
FOIA decision has to be based on – the Holder FOIA Memo observes – has two major 
implications. Firstly, agencies should not withhold information from access just because one 
or more FOIA exemptions have standing to operate. To put it differently, the application of 
FOIA exemptions should not be an automatic consequence of the legitimacy of the 
exemptions in a given case, according to an agency’s assessment. The Holder FOIA Memo, 
accordingly, “strongly encourage[s] agencies to make discretionary disclosures of 
information,” and thus to exercise discretion to release requested information even when one 
or more FOIA exemptions may be lawfully invoked1062. As the Supreme Court underlined 
in Mink, indeed, the withholding of information falling within a given FOIA exemption is 
not mandatory, as Congress meant to establish in section 552(b) the categories of 
                                                          
1060 Ibid.  
1061 Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act (Mar. 19, 2009) [Holder FOIA Memo], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf. 
1062 The underlying principle is that in enacting the FOIA, Congress conceded that agencies enjoy 
the necessary discretion to prefer openness to secrecy when they deem the release of information to 
not endanger an essential interest the protection of which could justify the application of a FOIA 
exemption. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979) (contending that “Congress did 
not limit an agency’s discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA.”)     
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information that federal agencies “must have the option to keep confidential, if it so 
chooses.”1063 Secondly, agencies should abide by the “‘reasonably segregable’ obligation” 
as much as possible, and thus ensure partial disclosure whenever the record or records 
requested under the FOIA may not be released but not even withheld in their entirety. The 
Holder FOIA Memo, indeed, reminds agencies that “the FOIA requires them to take 
reasonable steps to segregate and release nonexempt information.”1064 However, there is just 
a presumption in favor of disclosure, a presumption that may be overcome whenever the 
withholding of information is necessary to protect the essential interests the FOIA 
acknowledges. 
 Furthermore, the Holder FOIA Memo expressly rescinds the former memorandum 
on implementation of the FOIA, issued by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft on October 
12, 2001 [hereinafter – Ashcroft FOIA Memo]1065. This notorious memorandum, which – in 
turn – superseded the memorandum on the FOIA issued by Attorney General Janet Reno on 
October 4, 1993 [hereinafter –Reno FOIA Memo]1066, revealed President George W. Bush’s 
penchant for secrecy1067. As has been noted, the Ashcroft FOIA Memo “mark[ed] a dramatic 
shift from the [disclosure] policies espoused in the Reno memo.”1068 The attacks of 
September 11, 2001, on U.S. soil certainly affected the development of such a penchant1069. 
                                                          
1063 Mink, supra note 858, at 80.  
1064 Holder FOIA Memo, supra note 1061, ibid. 
1065 Attorney General Ashcroft’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act (October 12, 2001) [Ashcroft FOIA Memo], available 
at https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm. 
1066 Attorney General Reno’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act (October 4, 1993) [Reno FOIA Memo], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-attorney-general-renos-foia-memorandum. 
1067 See, e.g., TIMOTHY W. MAIER, Bush Team Thumbs Its Nose at FOIA, Insight on the News (April 
29, 2002), at 20 (quoted in KEITH ANDERSON, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom 
of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 Ohio St. L. J. 1605, 1623 (2003)) (statement of Tom 
Blanton) (“The Bush Administration is mounting the most sustained assault on open government 
since the early Reagan administration or perhaps even since President Gerald Ford vetoed the FOIA 
amendments in 1974.”) On the phrase “penchant for secrecy,” see STEVEN AFTERGOOD, Secrecy 
News (September 19, 2002) (quoted in METCALFE, The nature of government secrecy, supra note 10, 
at 305 note 3 (“For good and sufficient reason, the coinage ‘penchant for secrecy’ is well on its way 
to becoming a cliché, having been used to describe the Bush Administration some 200 times in the 
past year.”)  
1068 PAUL M. SCHOENHARD, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online: A New Approach 
From an Existing Framework, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 497, 503 (2002). 
1069 A famous statement of President Bush reads as follows: “We’re an open society, but we’re at war 
[…]. Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms against us.”) 
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The Ashcroft FOIA Memo starts off by assuring that the Bush administration is committed 
to complying with FOIA provisions and by conceding that “a well-informed citizenry,” other 
than acting as a deterrent for any wrongdoing, is crucial to a Government that is effectively 
accountable to the American people1070. The Ashcroft FOIA Memo, however, also 
underscores that the Federal Executive is “equally committed to protecting other 
fundamental values,” some of which are mentioned: national security; law enforcement; the 
confidentiality of sensitive business information; privacy. In addition, Exemption 5 of the 
FOIA and the various privileges it includes – namely, the deliberative process privilege, the 
presidential communications privilege, and the attorney-client privilege – are expressly 
referred to as a further limit to the disclosure of executive branch information1071.  
 Accordingly, the Ashcroft FOIA Memo encourages departments and agencies “to 
carefully consider the protection of all such values and interests when making disclosure 
determinations under the FOIA.”1072 Contrary to the spirit of the Holder FOIA Memo, it is 
established an evident presumption against openness, and thus in favor of secrecy. Agencies 
are instructed to exercise their discretionary powers to release agency records and 
information “only after full and deliberate consideration” of the values and interests to which 
the memorandum refers. In other words, agencies should opt for disclosure of records, 
information, and documents only when they cannot detect any trace of legitimacy for the 
invocation of one or more FOIA exemptions. The Ashcroft FOIA Memo, indeed, establishes 
                                                          
BRAD KNICKERBOCKER, Security Concerns Drive Rise in Secrecy, Christian Sci. Monitor (December 
3, 2001), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1203/p1s3-ussc.html. But see also 
METCALFE, The nature of government secrecy, supra note 10, at 305 note 2 (arguing that “the Bush 
Administration already was beginning to earn a well-deserved reputation for secrecy even before the 
events of September 11, 2001.”); ALASDAIR ROBERTS, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the 
Information Age, 36 (Cambridge University Press, 2006) (contending that “[i]n the United States, 
the process of rebuilding [the] walls of secrecy had begun even before the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001.”) While at the beginning of the 1990s, the Federal Government had taken on initiatives 
aimed at declassifying a vast amount of sensitive information related to the Cold War era, the need 
for secrecy was back at the forefront among government concerns towards the end of that decade. 
Ibid.   
1070 Ashcroft FOIA Memo, supra note 1065, ibid. 
1071 Ibid. (“Congress and the courts have long recognized that certain legal privileges ensure candid 
and complete agency deliberations without fear that they will be made public. Other privileges ensure 
that lawyers' deliberations and communications are kept private. No leader can operate effectively 
without confidential advice and counsel. Exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), 
incorporates these privileges and the sound policies underlying them.”) 
1072 Ibid.  
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a “sound legal basis” standard, to which the withholding of information from access by the 
public is subject. Such a standard pinpoints the minimum threshold not only for the denial 
of FOIA requests by agencies, but also for the intervention of the Department of Justice in 
judicial proceedings in defense of agencies withholding information. The Ashcroft FOIA 
Memo states that the Department of Justice will be committed to defending agency 
determinations that refuse the release of records and information “unless they lack a sound 
legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies 
to protect other important records.” Therefore, if such conditions are not met, agencies may 
depend on the Department of Justice taking care of the defense of any determination of 
withholding information before federal judges. As has been argued, departments and 
agencies are invited “to be more aggressive in denying FOIA requests and not be concerned 
about going to court.”1073 It appears to be quite surprising that someone has gone so far as to 
hold that under the Ashcroft FOIA Memo, the authentic spirit of the FOIA was preserved1074. 
This memorandum, actually, implements what has been emphatically labeled as a 
“Government’s information clampdown.”1075 Such a policy also includes the removal of a 
good deal of information formerly published on federal agencies’ official websites or the 
restriction of access to material still available online1076. If on the one hand the Ashcroft 
FOIA Memo does not formally amend any FOIA provisions1077, for – as a set of guidelines 
– it has no authority to do so, it has been observed on the other hand that it brings about a 
passage from a principle of right to know, inherent to the FOIA, to a principle of need to 
know1078. Uhl has argued that the Ashcroft FOIA Memo “effectively requires the public to 
                                                          
1073 MAIER, Bush Team Thumbs Its Nose at FOIA, supra note 1067, ibid. (quoted in ANDERSON, Is 
There Still a ‘Sound Legal Basis.’, supra note 1067, at 1622) (statement of Professor Robert Vaughn). 
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1075 SCHOENHARD, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online, supra note 1068, at 502. 
1076 Id., at 502-503, 516-520. 
1077 See ANDERSON, Is There Still a ‘Sound Legal Basis.’, supra note 1067, at 1622 (arguing that 
“while the Justice Department has recognized this memorandum as a shift in overall FOIA policy, 
the statutory language has not changed.”) 
1078 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Information Management. Update on Implementation, 
supra note 921, ibid. (noting that according to some FOIA requesters, the polices on the FOIA 
adopted by the Department of Justice in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks marked “a shift from a 
‘right to know’ to a ‘need to know’ that could discourage the public from making requests.”) See 
also LAURA PARKER et al., Secure Often Means Secret, USA TODAY (May 16, 2002), currently 
available at http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=security/legislation/national-secrets/secret-
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have a ‘need to know’ the information it requests, the same legal standard that existed prior 
to the enactment of FOIA in 1966.”1079 Such a burden of proof on the part of FOIA requesters 
ends up offering agencies “a green light”1080 – actually, not far from consisting in a blank 
check – to restricting access to executive branch information.  
 Furthermore, it has been noted1081 that just a few days after the Ashcroft FOIA Memo 
was issued, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz adopted a similar memorandum 
within the Department of Defense [hereinafter – Wolfowitz Memo]1082. That the Wolfowitz 
Memo perfectly fits into the climate following the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is showed by 
a statement according to which “the security of information critical to the national security 
[of the United States] will remain at risk for an indefinite period.”1083 The Wolfowitz Memo 
also invites the agencies within the Department of Defense to take into full consideration the 
possibility of withholding not classified information because that information, despite not 
possessing a classification marking, “can often be compiled to reveal sensitive conclusions.” 
As Schoenhard has correctly observed1084, such a statement embodies the so-called mosaic 
theory or “mosaic approach.”1085 In 1991, the Department of Justice explained that such an 
approach rests on “the concept that apparently harmless pieces of information, when 
assembled together, could reveal a damaging picture.”1086 Deyling has pointed out that this 
                                                          
information.txt (statement of Gary Bass, executive director of OMB Watch) (“We seem to be shifting 
to the public’s need to know instead of the public’s right to know.”); TOM BEIERLE – RUTH 
GREENSPAN BELL, Don’t Let ‘Right to Know’ Be a War Casualty, Christian Sci. Monitor, December 
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1079 KRISTEN E. UHL, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to 
Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 261, 285 
(2003). 
1080 Id., at 286. 
1081 See SCHOENHARD, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online, supra note 1068, at 505. 
1082 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s Memorandum to the Department of Defense 
Concerning Operations Security Throughout the Department of Defense (October 18, 2001) 
[Wolfowitz Memo], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/10/wolfowitz.html. 
1083 Ibid.  
1084 See SCHOENHARD, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online, supra note 1068, at 506. 
1085 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, in ID., Freedom of Information 
Case List, 425 (1991 ed.) (quoted in ROBERT P. DEYLING, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review 
in Litigation over National Security Information under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 Vill. L. 
Rev. 67, 84 (1992)). 
1086 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, ibid.  
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theory, which represents an “amorphous yet effective” argument against disclosure1087, was 
recognized by the executive order on classification of national security information issued 
by President Reagan on April 2, 19821088. Section 1.3(b) of the executive order, indeed, 
empowered an original classification authority to classify information also when it 
determined that the unauthorized disclosure of such information, “either by itself or in the 
context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national 
security.”1089 It is correct to say that the mosaic theory made a comeback during the Bush 
administration, as shown by Center for National Security Studies v. Dep’t of Justice1090, 
which Pozen has defined “a landmark post-9/11 mosaic theory case […].”1091 Schoenhard 
has argued that the mosaic theory appears to be reasonable in its purely theoretical 
formulation, yet it is inconsistent with Congress’s intent that the FOIA exemptions should 
be narrowly construed and interpreted1092. The Wolfowitz Memo concludes by contending 
that it is necessary for theepartment of Defense “[to] deny our adversaries the information 
essential for them to plan, prepare or conduct further terrorist or related hostile operations 
against the United States and this Department.”1093  
 The Holder FOIA Memo adopted a new standard for the defense of agencies by the 
Department of Defense in FOIA litigation. In conformity with the presumption of disclosure 
this memorandum establishes, the Department of Justice will take the commitment to 
defending before a court an agency that has denied access to records and information if two 
pre-fixed requirements are disjunctively met. The Department of Justice will provide its 
defense to an agency that either “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest 
protected by one of the statutory exemptions,” or is supposed to withhold the requested 
information, as “[its] disclosure is prohibited by law.”1094 The standard established by the 
                                                          
1087 DEYLING, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review, supra note 1085, ibid. 
1088 President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12356 (“National Security Information”), April 2, 
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Holder FOIA Memo results in a reversal of that contained in the Ashcroft FOIA Memo, 
which – in turn – replaced the so-called “foreseeable harm” standard, effective under the 
Clinton administration. As Schoenhard has noted, the Clinton administration “embarked on 
a campaign to release unprecedented quantities of information to the public.”1095 On October 
4, 1993, President Clinton adopts a memorandum encouraging agencies to comply with “the 
letter and spirit” of the FOIA above all by engaging in proactive disclosures and making 
executive branch information available online1096. On the same day, Attorney General Reno 
issues a memorandum on implementation of the FOIA setting forth the “foreseeable harm” 
standard as the criterion under which the Department of Justice will defend in court an 
agency determination of withholding information. Such a criterion is based on “a 
presumption of disclosure.”1097 In light of the “principle of openness in government,” 
agencies are instructed to respond to FOIA requests by a denial only after considering the 
potentially beneficial consequences of disclosure. The Reno FOIA Memo expressly states 
that under the Clinton administration, the DOJ will not support in court agency decisions to 
withhold information merely based on the existence of a “substantial legal basis” for 
applying a FOIA exemption. Accordingly, the DOJ will defend the withholding of 
information from public access in FOIA litigation only when an agency “reasonably foresees 
that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by that exemption.” Such a standard 
– the Reno FOIA Memo continues – “serves the public interest by achieving the Act’s 
primary objective – maximum responsible disclosure of government information – while 
preserving essential confidentiality.” If it is so, it is impossible not to agree with Piotrowski, 
who has observed that the standard set forth by the Ashcroft FOIA Memo “differ[red] in 
tone and fact from the ‘foreseeable harm’ standard used by the Clinton Administration.”1098 
The presumption of disclosure has taken prominence again with the Holder FOIA Memo, 
which has substantially brought the line separating openness and secrecy back to the level 
that existed under President Clinton. As Metcalfe has argued, the Holder FOIA Memo “re-
institutes […] the ‘foreseeable harm’ standard and its twin concept of ‘discretionary 
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disclosure’ to govern the defense of FOIA litigation and thus FOIA decisionmaking 
governmentwide.”1099   
 
 
M. Specific Issues Concerning Two FOIA Exemptions 
1. Exemption 5: Agencies May Not Be Forced To “Operate in a Fishbowl”  
 As Senate Report No. 813 of 1966 points out, Exemption 5 is aimed at enabling the 
“frank discussion of legal and policy issues in writing” within each agency and between 
agencies, which would be impossible if all documents containing internal opinions and 
communications “were to be subjected to public scrutiny.”1100 The efficiency of the 
executive branch – the report continues – would be severely undermined if in giving and 
receiving advice, exchanging views, and formulating polices, agencies “were prematurely 
forced to ‘operate in a fishbowl.’”1101 The image of a fishbowl to refer to an excessive level 
of openness – in this case a synonym to transparency – is found in House of Representatives 
Report No. 1497 of 1966, as well. The message the House of Representatives intends to 
convey is the same as the Senate’s: In the conduct of agency business, “a full and frank 
exchange of opinions would be impossible if all internal communications were made 
public.”1102 The fishbowl in which the whole executive branch would end up being inserted 
if it was not allowed to keep at least part of its internal activities secret would compromise 
the frankness of “advice from staff assistants and [of] the exchange of ideas among agency 
personnel […].”1103 I see it proper to clarify that I just used the phrase “at least part of its 
internal activities secret” on purpose, since – apart from what I will stress later about the 
difference between the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications 
privilege – the statutory language itself excludes that the secrecy of such activities could be 
absolute. Exemption 5 of the FOIA, indeed, allows agencies to withhold from access inter-
agency and intra-agency memoranda and letters when they “would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” The original version of the 
FOIA, instead, was slightly different in this regard, as it made reference to memoranda and 
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Reg. L. News, 6 (2009). 
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letters “which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency.” 
House Report No. 1497 of 1966 explains this clause by noting that “any internal 
memorandums which would routinely be disclosed to a private party through the discovery 
process in litigation with the agency would be available to the general public.”1104 As early 
as 1969, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia conceded that “the free and 
uninhibited exchange and communication of opinions, ideas, and points of view” between 
the employees of an agency and of different agencies interacting with one another proves 
essential to the functioning of a ponderous administrative state like that of the United States 
at federal level1105. In brief, the purpose of Exemption 5 of the FOIA is to protect the quality 
of agency decision-making in its formation1106.  
 The scope of Exemption 5 is considered to include not only the deliberative process 
privilege, aimed at safeguarding – as just noted – the quality of agency decision-making, but 
also the presidential communications privilege. That Exemption 5 is capable of embracing 
either privilege could already be inferred by House Report No. 1497, which pinpoints the 
purpose of the exemption as that to ensure the candor not only of the exchange of ideas 
among agency personnel, but also of the advice expressed by “staff assistants.”1107 The 
presidential communications privilege, indeed, protects from disclosure White House 
communications – namely, advice the President receives from the members of his staff and 
other advisors. The phrase “staff assistants” House Report No. 1497 uses, therefore, may be 
interpreted so broadly to contemplate the need for secrecy that the presidential 
communications privilege implies. Furthermore, the close relation between the deliberative 
process privilege and the presidential communications privilege is shown by the historical 
roots of the former. Weaver and Jones, indeed, have pointed out that the deliberative process 
                                                          
1104 Ibid. See also Mink, 410 U.S., supra note 858, at 90 (holding that pursuant to Exemption 5, “the 
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1105 Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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Source Book, at 44) (arguing that “the quality of administrative decision-making would be seriously 
undermined if agencies were forced to ‘operate in a fishbowl’ because the full and frank exchange 
of ideas on legal or policy matters would be impossible.”)    
1107 H.R. Rep. No. 1497, reprinted in 1966 Source Book, at 31.  
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privilege “originated in the principles underlying the English ‘crown privilege.’”1108 The 
presidential communications privilege sensu stricto is aimed at shielding from access by the 
public advice and opinions that the President’s aides and staff members direct to the 
President himself in his decision-making process. In this sense, the presidential 
communications privilege constitutes the core of executive privilege, as applied not to the 
political sphere of the relations between the legislative and executive branches, but within 
the scope of the FOIA1109. The deliberative process privilege and the presidential 
communications privilege share the objective to protect executive branch decision-making, 
either at presidential or at agency level. It is interesting in this regard the definition given by 
Cann of the executive privilege provided for in Exemption 5 as “decisional executive 
privilege,” a definition that emphasizes that the purpose of the privilege is “to preserve the 
integrity of the decision-making process.”1110 Executive privilege as contemplated in 
Exemption 5 of the FOIA – the Author has explained – “means to ensure that an option, 
piece of advice, or information is not withheld from the decision maker’s consideration out 
of fear that the advice will be held up to public ridicule at a later date.”1111 Courts, too, have 
assimilated the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege 
because of their common purpose to safeguard and thus to improve the quality of decision-
making entrusted to the executive branch. In Nixon v. Sirica1112, one of the cases concerned 
with access to Watergate tape-recordings, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
first observed that a claim of executive privilege entails careful consideration and balancing 
of two conflicting public interests – that in keeping confidentiality of executive branch 
information and that in obtaining access to such information, with all related boons that 
disclosure may bring1113. The Court then contended that since the presidential 
communication privilege is aimed at “protect[ing] the effectiveness of the executive 
decision-making process,” it turns out to be very similar to the privilege provided for in 
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Exemption 5 of the FOIA1114. In 2008, the same court held that Exemption 5 encompasses 
both the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege in its 
scope1115.   
 However, Exemption 5 does not operate in the same manner with respect to the 
deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege. Even though 
the two privileges share a common substratum – which consists in executive privilege1116 – 
their scope is not entirely equivalent, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
highlighted in In re Sealed Case1117, the leading case as to the distinction between these 
privileges. Firstly, the Court concedes the basic difference between the deliberative process 
privilege and the presidential communications privilege. Indeed, even though they are both 
“designed to protect executive branch decisionmaking,” the former is concerned with the 
executive branch as a whole, as it protects the candor of departments’ and agencies’ decision-
making, while the latter applies “specifically to decisionmaking of the President.”1118 
Secondly, the Court notes that the latter also turns out to be a stronger privilege1119. Unlike 
the deliberative process privilege, indeed, the presidential communications privilege ensures 
the ability to keep secret “documents in their entirety, and [therefore] covers final and post-
decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.”1120 Even though the primary purpose 
of the presidential communications privilege is to shield from access the “candid advice” the 
President receives from his aides and staff members, and thus may appear to be concerned 
only with predeliberative material, precedent suggests that the scope of the privilege goes 
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beyond “the deliberative or advice portions of documents.”1121 The deliberative process 
privilege, instead, has been traditionally meant as allowing for only the withholding of 
predecisional memoranda, letters, and communications in general within an agency or 
between agencies. As Weaver and Jones have observed, since this privilege is aimed at 
ensuring the frank exchange of ideas and opinions between agency employees and thus at 
safeguarding the quality of agency decision-making in its formation, “[such] concerns are 
not present with postdecisional communications.”1122 If an agency has already made a 
decision, such a decision becomes of public domain – the Authors continue – because “there 
are no deliberations to be stifled [by access to them by the public].”1123 The scope of the 
presidential communications privilege, however, is not unlimited. Not only did the Supreme 
Court in Nixon hold that despite being rooted in the U.S. Constitution, executive privilege 
may not be considered absolute1124. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also 
limited the presidential communications privilege on the side of the range of persons to 
whom it applies by contending in In re Sealed Case that “[n]ot every person who plays a role 
in the development of presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed from the 
President, can qualify for the privilege.”1125 The staff of the President’s advisors who work 
for federal agencies, in particular, may not invoke the privilege to refuse the release of their 
communications1126. The presidential communications privilege, instead, applies “to 
communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate 
White House adviser's staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigating 
and formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular matter to which the 
communications relate.”1127  
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2. Exemption 1: The Exemption Pertaining to National Security 
a. The FOIA Amendments Act of 1974: In Camera Inspection of Classified Information  
 The FOIA Amendments Act of 1974, which Congress passed after President Ford 
exercised its veto power1128, amended significantly Exemption 1 of the FOIA to overrule the 
restrictive interpretation of this exemption set out by the Supreme Court in Mink1129. 
Congress’s Conference Report on the 1974 amendments, indeed, expressly states that 
Exemption 1 of the FOIA was amended so as to permit, contrary to what the Supreme Court 
ruled in Mink, “in camera examination [of documents withheld pursuant to section 
552(b)(1)] at the discretion of the court.”1130 The report underscores that albeit not 
mandatory, in camera examination will be “necessary and appropriate” on many occasions. 
Before issuing an order that subjects classified documents to in camera inspection, however, 
the court – the report argues – has to provide the agency who holds such classified material 
with “the opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits that the 
documents are clearly exempt from disclosure.”1131      
 Under the version of the FOIA that became effective in 1967, exemption 1 consisted 
in a very laconic provision that allowed agencies to withhold from access matters 
“specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national 
defense or foreign policy.” In Mink, the Supreme Court ruled that judicial review in an 
Exemption 1 case was restricted to determining whether the competent agency had duly 
classified information pertaining to either the domain of national security or that of foreign 
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affairs. Courts, instead, were not allowed to assess the “soundness” of classification 
decisions1132, which therefore were always legitimate, i.e., compatible with the FOIA, 
provided that classification proceedings had been followed. To put it differently, the Mink 
majority opinion argued that federal judges were just empowered to ascertain whether the 
information the access to which had been denied to a FOIA requester was in fact stamped as 
classified, but not also whether the classification complied with the standards established in 
the ad hoc Executive order. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that Exemption 1 may not 
be interpreted so as to entrust courts with authority to conduct “in camera inspection of a 
contested document bearing a single classification,” and accordingly, as to material subject 
to classification, courts were not permitted to “separate the secret from the supposedly 
nonsecret [portion of a document] and order disclosure of the latter.”1133  
 The amendments brought to Exemption 1 in 1974 expressly allowed courts to 
conduct in camera inspection of classified material to determine whether such material had 
been properly classified. As a result, courts may review de novo the withholding of 
information determined by agencies even when classified information is at issue in a FOIA 
case1134. As correctly argued, by amending Exemption 1, Congress meant “to empower 
courts to exercise ‘effective judicial review of executive branch classification decisions’ in 
order to rectify the ‘widespread overclassification abuses in the use of classification 
stamps.’”1135 Under the new version of Exemption 1, as a note published in the Yale Law 
Journal explained, “courts will be expected to review both the procedural and substantive 
adequacy of executive classification.”1136 The Conference Report, however, also concedes 
that agencies operating in the fields of national security and foreign affairs “have unique 
insights into what adverse effects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular 
classified record.”1137 Accordingly, in determining whether the material withheld from a 
FOIA requester has been properly classified, federal courts are supposed to “accord 
substantial weight” to agency affidavits, i.e., opinions – rectius, declarations – agencies 
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uneasiness, on a doubt he wants satisfied before he takes responsibility for a de novo determination.”) 
1135 Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, supra note 1129, at 402 
(quoting 120 Cong. Rec. S9316 (May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy)). 
1136 Id., at 403. 
1137 H. Rept. 93-1380 – S. Rept. 93-1200, supra note 1130, at 229. 
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deploy to describe the content of such material and set out the reasons for its 
classification1138.   
 
b. Judicial Deference to Agency Determinations on Classified Information 
 Executive branch expertise in the domains of national security and foreign affairs, 
and the usage of agency affidavits are the main reasons for a phenomenon that has always 
been peculiar to those domains – judicial deference to agency determinations. Since the 
enactment of the FOIA, indeed, courts have shown a marked tendency to being deferential 
towards agency classification decisions. As Pozen has noted, in Exemption 1 cases, courts 
“do not typically assess whether the alleged risks of disclosure [, which, according to an 
agency determination, justify the classification of certain information] would be likely to 
materialize, or weigh those risks against other interests.”1139 The expertise of agency officials 
in the fields of national security and foreign affairs underpins such a deference. Furthermore, 
judicial deference goes beyond the scope of Exemption 1. Since Exemption 3 incorporates 
into the FOIA those provisions contained in other federal statutes granting agencies authority 
to withhold information from general access, deference usually extends to such provisions, 
as well, whenever they are concerned with national security. Judicial deference, for instance, 
extends to the National Security Act of 19471140, as amended, insofar as it contains 
nondisclosure provisions. As noted above, under current section 3024(i)(i) of title 50, U.S. 
Code, the Director of National Intelligence is empowered to deny the general public access 
to information concerning “sources and methods” used by agencies belonging to the 
Intelligence Community. In FOIA cases concerning application of this provision, indeed, 
agency affidavits are expected to sustain the withholding of information, and hence judicial 
deference is most likely to ensue1141. 
                                                          
1138 Ibid. See DEYLING, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review, supra note 1085, at 78 (noting that 
such passages from the Conference Report “as been cited often by the courts since 1974 as definitive 
evidence that Congress meant the courts to show deference toward executive agency claims that 
information is properly classified.”)   
1139 POZEN, The Mosaic Theory, supra note 1088, at 637. 
1140 Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (July 26, 1947), currently codified at 50 U.S.C. 3001 et seqq. 
1141 See Center for National Security Studies, 331 F.3d, supra note 1090, at 939 (Taft, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has accorded the same high level of 
deference to Exemption 3 as it is used to applying in Exemption 1 cases, insofar as Exemption 3 is 
the means whereby the National Security Act of 1947 is incorporated into the FOIA). That specific 
FOIA litigation, however, was concerned with Exemption 7, and by rendering a dissenting opinion, 
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 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia clarified such a deferential 
approach in a case decided three years after Exemption 1 was amended, in 1977, by 
observing that “[f]ew judges have the skill or experience to weigh the repercussions of 
disclosure of intelligence information.”1142 If an agency has followed classification 
procedures and has provided elucidation – through affidavits – on the reasons for stamping 
as classified the material at issue in a FOIA case in a way that appears to be logic and 
coherent, the court should determine that such an agency has met the burden of proof for the 
withholding of documents and information. Whether or not an in camera inspection of 
classified information is conducted – the D.C. Circuit continued – the court “need not go 
further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity [, i.e., the veracity of 
agency affidavits,] when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith.”1143 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia again pinpointed – probably, even more effectively – 
the essence of judicial deference in a 1980 decision – Halperin v. CIA1144 – by contending 
that judges usually “lack the expertise necessary to second-guess […] agency opinions in [a] 
typical national security FOIA case.”1145 Accordingly, the Court concluded, a “court must 
not substitute its judgment for the agency’s regarding national defense or foreign policy 
implications [of the disclosure of classified material].”1146  Even though scholars have at 
                                                          
Judge Taft objects to the majority opinion’s decision to grant analogous deference to an Exemption 
7 case.    
1142 Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
1143 Ibid. In that specific case, the plaintiff contested the adequacy of the affidavits filed by the CIA, 
but the Court of Appeals held that from what was on the record nothing led “to presume bad faith on 
the part of the CIA.” Id., at 698.  
1144 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
1145 Id., at 148. 
1146 Ibid.  
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times challenged the propriety1147 or legitimacy1148 of such an approach, deference to agency 
determinations has always been a prominent feature of FOIA litigation pertaining to 
classified or otherwise sensitive information1149.  
 Even though it is possible to discuss about its extent, some judicial deference is 
inevitable, for it is inherent in the formulation of Exemption 1. By establishing this 
exemption, indeed, Congress delegated to the executive branch the authority to pinpoint the 
general categories of information subject to classification. Therefore, courts may not 
challenge such rules, standards, and procedures as are established in the executive order on 
national security classification that is effective at the time of FOIA litigation. A different 
                                                          
1147 See SCHULHOFER, Oversight of national security secrecy in the United States, supra note 581, at 
23 (objecting to the idea that the Executive is the only branch of government possessing “the 
knowledge and experience necessary to make sound judgments about when to maintain secrecy in 
national security affairs.”) Congress – he continues – has its own expertise in matters concerning the 
military sphere, and the domains of national security and foreign affairs. The judiciary is the only 
branch of the Federal Government that lacks significative expertise in such domains, yet courts are 
definitely skillful at weighing up contrasting interests in openness and confidentiality, since they are 
called upon to rule on FOIA litigation, as well as on civil and criminal litigation involving classified 
information, on a regular basis. Therefore, since judges are able to appreciate to the core “the value 
of both secrecy and transparency,” Schulhofer maintains, they should play “an indispensable [role] 
in a sound system for making information-access decision.” Ibid; 27-35. See also Ray v. Turner, 
supra note 1128, at 1194 (noting that the Members of Congress who advocated the version of the 
1974 FOIA amendments that was eventually passed “stressed the need for an objective, independent 
judicial determination [on classified information], and insisted that judges could be trusted to 
approach the national security determinations with common sense, and without jeopardy to national 
security.”)  
1148 See BARRY SULLIVAN, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the 
People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 Maryland L. Rev. 1, 69-70 (2012) (arguing that both the idea 
that the release of records and information is nothing more than the result of an agency’s discretionary 
decision and judicial deference to agency determinations on withholding of information are not 
“consistent with a proper understanding of FOIA or the constitutional ‘right to know.’”) 
1149 See AFTERGOOD, Reducing Government Secrecy, supra note 14, at 407 (highlighting the high 
level of deference that is accorded to the executive branch in the fields of national security and 
foreign affairs by federal courts, which “almost never overturn agency classification decisions.”) As 
to cases decided in the past ten years that have conceded the traditional, deferential approach of the 
courts in cases concerning classified information see, e.g., James Madison Project v. CIA, 605 F. 
Supp. 2d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2009); Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 101 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(noting that courts “generally defer to agency expertise in national security matters.”); Makky v. 
Chertoff, 489 F.Supp. 2d 421, 441 note 23 (D.N.J. 2007) (finding that a court is generally “not in a 
position to second-guess agency decisions relating to the segregability of non-exempt information 
[from such information as may be disclosed] when the information withheld implicates national 
security concerns.”)      
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conclusion in this regard would undermine the separation of powers the American Republic 
is based upon. S. 2543 was not the bill that eventually became the FOIA Amendments Act 
of 19741150, and by proposing a new version of Exemption 1, this bill provided for a clause 
– “standards set out in Executive orders or statutes” – that was later rejected1151. The Senate 
report accompanying the bill, however, contains interesting elucidation of the role of courts, 
as it makes it clear that courts are supposed to conduct de novo review of agency 
determinations of withholding classified information by applying the standards provided for 
in the executive order on classification1152. Courts – the report states – have to determine, 
inter alia, whether the withheld material relevant to a given FOIA case has been classified 
“in accordance with the standards set forth in the applicable executive order.”1153 As Deyling 
has argued, the classification system as a whole “reflects the myriad policy decisions that 
collectively form the nation’s perception of its ‘security’ interests [, and such] policy choices 
are not what the courts are empowered to decide in [Exemption 1] cases.”1154  
 
c. Agency Affidavits 
 Courts tend to be deferential towards agency affidavits, provided that the affidavits 
are detailed enough not only to describe the classified material at issue accurately, but also 
                                                          
1150 See supra note 1128. 
1151 See Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, supra note 1129, at 
405 note 23. This paper, however, provides an interpretation of the role of courts in Exemption 1 
cases that seems to me quite confusing. In particular, I am referring to the following sentence, quite 
mysterious in its meaning: “The legislative history of the new (b)(1) exemption […] indicates that 
courts are to apply the statutory standard to the executive order itself and to require merely that the 
order cover material which would affect national defense or foreign policy in a general way.” Id., at 
405. According to the paper, the legislative history of the exemption, indeed, is deemed to lead to 
the conclusion that the role of courts is substantially restricted to determine whether in the executive 
order governing the classification system, the executive branch has established “classification criteria 
for information clearly outside the area of national defense or foreign policy.” Id., at 404. Such an 
interpretation of the role of courts in Exemption 1 cases is far too narrow. It underestimates the 
subsection (b)(1) clause that relates Exemption 1 to matters “in fact properly classified” pursuant to 
the Executive order on national security classification. The paper itself, indeed, concedes that an 
interpretation empowering courts to review agency classification decisions both on substantial and 
procedural aspects “has much to recommend it […].” Ibid. 
1152 See S. Rept. No. 93-854, reprinted in 1975 Source Book, at 182 (“Congress could leave ultimate 
classification decisions to the courts, under only a general national defense or foreign policy standard, 
but the committee prefers to rely on de novo judicial review under standards set out in Executive 
orders or statutes.”) 
1153 Ibid.  
1154 DEYLING, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review, supra note 1085, at 89. 
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to explain why the decision to keep the material secret is sound. The role affidavits play in 
FOIA cases concerning access to classified information was illustrated by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in a 1980 decision, Lesar v. Dep’t of Justice1155, which 
explained what the Conference Report meant when it directed courts to assign “substantial 
weight” to agency affidavits. The interpretation of the “substantial weight” requirement 
given by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia identifies the threshold for in 
camera inspection of classified documents, and ends up espousing a theory in favor of 
judicial deference. If the affidavits are detailed enough to lead to determining that the 
withheld material reasonably falls within Exemption 1, and if the content of those affidavits 
“is not challenged by contrary evidence in the record or evidence of agency bad faith,” the 
Court contends, “summary judgment for the Government is appropriate without an in 
camera review of the documents.”1156 In consideration of the expertise the executive branch 
boasts in national security and foreign affairs, courts tend not to embark on assessments of 
the risks that the disclosure of classified information entails, for courts themselves 
acknowledge that such assessments would not be able to replace agency affidavits1157. 
However, courts have made it clear that for agency affidavits to be dependable and thus to 
entail a deferential approach to FOIA litigation by judges, the affidavits have to describe in 
detail the content of the classified material at issue, and persuade the court that the decision 
to subject such material to classification and to keep it as such by denying access to a given 
FOIA requester proves reasonable1158.        
                                                          
1155 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
1156 Id., at 481. 
1157 See Cozen O’Connor v. Dep’t of Treasury, 570 F.Supp. 2d 749, 773 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding 
that judges are not able to envision the possible effects of the disclosure of classified documents 
instead of agencies, for the former possess “neither the expertise not the qualifications to determine 
the impact [of disclosure] upon national security or international relations.”); Edmonds v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 405 F.Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Schlesinger v. CIA, 591 F.Supp. 60, 67 
(D.D.C. 1984)) (tracing out that in FOIA cases pertaining to the domains of national security or 
foreign affairs, only agencies have the required expertise “to assess the risk of disclosure [of 
classified documents and information].”); Center for National Security Studies, 331 F.3d, supra note 
1089, at 927 (pointing out that as far as FOIA litigation is concerned, the D.C. Circuit has 
“consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and [has] found 
it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”)      
1158 See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing that in order for an agency 
withholding decision to be upheld by a court in an Exemption 1 case, “little proof or explanation is 
required [, provided that there is] a plausible assertion that information is properly classified.”); Am. 
Civ. Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 
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N. Classification of National Security Information  
1. Development of a System of Classified Information 
 The classification system consists of a set of rules and standards, as well as sanctions 
for their violation1159, which govern the keeping of secrets in the domains of national security 
and foreign affairs. Moynihan notes that the system of classification aimed at protecting a 
good deal of information from public access aroused gradually in the twentieth century as 
part of the development of the administrative state1160. The Moynihan Commission Report 
argues that to be more precise, the term “government secrecy,” meant as referred to the set 
of provisions and instruments aimed at excluding certain information from public access, 
should be replaced by “administrative secrecy” or “secrecy by regulation.”1161 A long series 
of executive orders on classification of national security information that have been issued 
by the different presidents of the United States since at least the middle of the twentieth 
century embody such administrative secrecy. In Egan, the Supreme Court stressed that after 
World War I, the executive branch of the Federal Government gradually created a system of 
classification of national security information “graded according to sensitivity [of the 
material protected].”1162 After World War II, then, the management of such a classification 
system was entrusted to various civilian agencies within the executive branch, such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, whose mission consisted in 
                                                          
473 F.3d 370, 374-375 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The CIA’s arguments need only to be both ‘plausible’ and 
‘logical’ to justify the invocation of a FOIA exemption in the national security context.”); Larson v. 
Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that whenever an agency’s affidavits are 
deemed to prove with “reasonable specificity” that the withheld information falls within the claimed 
exemption(s) “and evidence in the record does not suggest otherwise, […] the court should not 
conduct a more detailed inquiry to test the agency’s judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether 
the court agrees with the agency’s opinion.”)    
1159 The explicit provision for sanctions to apply to the violations of rules on the classification of 
information recalls the definition, elaborated by Shils, of secrecy as “the compulsory withholding of 
knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure.” EDWARD A. SHILS, The Torment 
of Secrecy. The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies, 26 (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1956).   
1160 See MOYNIHAN, Secrecy, supra note 15, at 59 (contending that secrecy in the United States turns 
out to be “an institution of the administrative state that developed during the [two] great conflicts of 
the twentieth century.”) 
1161 Moynihan Commission Report, at 5. 
1162 Egan, 484 U.S., supra note 43, at 527 (referring to Note, Developments in the Law – The National 
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1193-1194 (1972)). 
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the gathering of intelligence information or in any event pertained to national security1163. 
At the same time, presidents began to issue specific executive orders whereby they laid down 
rules and standards for the classification of information concerning national security and 
foreign affairs, and delegated the authority to classify information to the heads of the 
agencies mentioned above1164, as well as to other high-ranking officials and members of the 
Cabinet. 
 Since 1940, each President has issued one or more executive orders to establish rules, 
standards, and procedures on classification of information pertaining to the domains of 
national security and foreign affairs1165. By amending the National Security Act of 1947, 
section 802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 19951166 expressly 
conceded that the President of the United States has authority to “establish procedures to 
govern access to classified information,” and all departments and agencies have to comply 
with such procedures1167. As Kosar has observed, such a provision “made into law what had 
hitherto been a practice – allowing the President to have a lead role in devising classified 
information policy.”1168 All executive orders on classification address the same issues, i.e., 
such issues as are essential to a system of classified information. Those issues may be turned 
into the following questions: Who has authority to classify information and documents 
within the executive branch? What are the levels of classification and the corresponding 
markings that may be applied to information? What do such levels consist of – and thus what 
degree of danger to the country do they imply? Who is authorized to gain access to classified 
information within the executive branch? How long is classified information required to 
remain classified? Executive orders on classification usually repeat a sort of stock phrase 
that forbids agencies from exercising their authority to classify information just to cover up 
mistakes or wrongdoing1169. By inserting such a phrase, Presidents prove that they are fully 
                                                          
1163 Id., at 527-528. 
1164 Id., at 528. 
1165 For a list of all executive orders on classified information issued over the years, see KEVIN K. 
KOSAR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526, CRS Report for Congress 
(December 10, 2010), p. 3. 
1166 Pub. L. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3435 (October 14, 1994). 
1167 This provision was originally codified at section 435 of title 50, U.S. Code, while now constitutes 
50 U.S.C. § 3061(a).  
1168 KOSAR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526, supra note 1165, at 5. 
1169 See Executive Order 13292 (March 28, 2003 – President George W. Bush), 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 
(March 28, 2003). Section 1.7 provides that under no circumstances may information be classified 
for the following purposes: “(1) [to] conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; 
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aware of the possible misuse of government secrecy, a concept that – as noted above – has 
its core in the very classification system. Congress specifically addressed the so-called over-
classification, a term that refers to all situations in which executive branch secrecy appears 
to be excessive and thus unnecessary, by enacting the Reducing Over-Classification Act of 
20101170. Each new executive order on classification repeals the one issued by the former 
President1171.        
 
2. The Present Regulation of Classified Information Pertaining to National Security: 
Executive Order 13526 of 2009 
a. Classification Levels and Types of Information That May Be Classified 
 Currently, Executive Order 13526, issued by President Obama in late December 
2009,1172 lays down rules, standards, and procedures for the classification of sensitive 
information concerning the fields of national security and foreign affairs. Section 1.2(a) E.O. 
maintains the three traditional classification levels – “Top Secret,” “Secret,” and 
“Confidential.” The executive order, therefore, does not provide for anything new in this 
regard. “Top Secret” is the classification level that implies the highest potential threat to the 
country, and original classifiers may apply it to information, “the unauthorized disclosure of 
which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security [of the United States].”1173 The minimum classification level is “Confidential,” and 
                                                          
(2) [to] prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) [to] restrain competition; or 
(4) [to] prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of 
the national security.” An identical provision was found in one of the executive orders issued by 
President Clinton on classification between 1994 and 1995 – Executive Order 12958, issued on April 
17, 1995 (section 1.8), and in Executive Order 12356 of 1982, issued by President Reagan.   
1170 The Senate report accompanying the House of Representatives bill that was eventually signed 
into law explained that the purpose of the act is to “prevent federal departments and agencies from 
unnecessarily classifying information or classifying information at a higher and more restricted level 
than is warranted.” S. Rept. 111-200, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 27, 2010), p. 1. By doing so – the 
report continues – the act should “promote information sharing across departments and agencies and 
with State, local, tribal and private sector counterparts, as appropriate.” Ibid.   
1171 But see KOSAR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526, supra note 1165, at 4 
(noting that an executive order issued by President Truman on February 1, 1950, Executive Order 
10104, 15 F.R. 597 (February 3, 1950), the purpose of which was to protect from public access 
information concerning military and naval installations deemed to be vital to the country, has never 
been repealed expressly and thus is still effective, at least formally).   
1172 Executive Order 13526 (“Classified National Security Information”), supra note 94. 
1173 Section 1.2(a)(1), E.O. 13526. 
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just requires that the release of information could bring damage to national security, while 
the intermediate level – the “Secret” level – refers to “serious damage.”1174 It is evident that 
only original classification authorities, by exercising a discretionary power based on their 
expertise in the fields of national security and foreign affairs, may gauge the degree of 
damage the disclosure of certain information is capable of bringing about. That original 
classifiers are assigned discretion in determining what information is to be stamped as 
classified is corroborated by regulations on classifications published in 2010 in the CFR and 
in the Federal Register1175. Section 2001.10 of title 32, CFR, indeed, specifies that an original 
classification authority does not have to prepare a written statement that describes the 
damage to national security to justify the classification of information at the time in which 
the classification decision is made. However, such authority is supposed to sustain in writing 
its classification decision whenever this decision is challenged. Since there is no trace of any 
standard or requirement concerning the reasons the authority may set forth to justify its 
classification decision, the provision suggests that the assessment of the potential threat to 
the United States posed by disclosure of the information is totally entrusted to the discretion 
of the authority. However, a discretionary classification decision may be incorrect or become 
outdated due to evolution of events. The guidance that each agency follows in adopting its 
classification decisions needs periodic updating, as well. Accordingly, section 1.9 E.O. 
prescribes that the heads of agencies conduct a comprehensive review of classification 
guidance “on a periodic basis.” It is made clear that the review must target not only the 
guides that agencies issue to establish policies and detail regulation on classification, but 
also individual classification decisions to verify whether they are still in accordance with the 
required standards1176. 
 Section 1.4 E.O. enumerates the types of information that may be subject to 
classification markings. As the case with classification levels, the executive order did not 
bring in any significant novelty in this regard. The types of information identified, indeed, 
are nothing else than mere specification of the two sectors that constitute the scope of any 
executive order on classified information issued over time – national defense and foreign 
                                                          
1174 Section 1.2(a)(2), E.O. 13526. 
1175 See “Classified National Security Information; Final Rule,” 32 CFR 2001, 75 Fed. Reg. 37254 
(June 28, 2010). 
1176 Section 1.9(a),(b), E.O. 13526. 
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relations of the United States. Covert action is mentioned, as well,1177 and this fact is 
interesting because Executive Order 13292, issued by President Bush in 2003, for instance, 
failed to mention explicitly covert action, and just made a generic reference to “special 
activities,” which were included in the broader category of “intelligence activities.”1178 As I 
sought to underscore above, however, it has been long conceded that threats that directly 
imply the military defense of the country and other activities that fall within the concept of 
national defense, such as intelligence activities, do not exhaust the scope of national security. 
That the concept of national security the executive order contemplates extends beyond the 
purely military domain may be inferred from subsection (e), which is concerned with such 
“scientific, technological, or economic matters” as bear on national security. Furthermore, 
subsection (g) includes among the types of information that may be classified the 
information that pertains to “vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, 
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security [of the 
United States].” Such a wide formulation appears to entail some sort of overlapping between 
the concepts of national security and homeland security. It is not clear, indeed, what is the 
line of demarcation between the category of critical infrastructure, which falls within the 
scope of homeland security, and that of infrastructures related to national security, which 
subsection (g) mentions. Section 1.7, instead, repeats the provision, already pointed out 
above, against the usage of classification to conceal mistakes or wrongdoing or just to keep 
a greater amount of secrecy than is strictly necessary. Subsection (c) establishes conditions 
on which information already declassified and thus made available to the public may be 
subject to a classification marking again. Subsection (d) provides that a request for access to 
information filed pursuant to the FOIA, the Presidential Records Act, or the Privacy Act of 
19741179 afford a classification authority the chance to classify or reclassify the requested 
information. Furthermore, section 1.8 contemplates the case in which persons that lawfully 
handle classified information challenge the classification level assigned to certain 
information by claiming that such a level is improper1180. The classification level of 
information may be impugned in conformity with specific procedures agencies have to lay 
                                                          
1177 Subsection (c) expressly includes covert action in the “intelligence activities” that fall within the 
scope of the executive order. 
1178 Section 1.4(c), E.O. 13292, supra note 1153. 
1179 Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (December 31, 1974), codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a.  
1180 See KOSAR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526, supra note 1165, at 12 
(observing that “for example, if two agencies classified the same piece of information at different 
levels [of classification], each agency may contest the other’s classification marking.”)  
243 
 
down1181. Moreover, classification may be concerned with only some portions of a 
document. Section 2001.21(c) of CFR regulations requires that the classification authority 
mark each portion of a document “to indicate which portions are classified and which 
portions are unclassified by placing a parenthetical symbol immediately preceding the 
portion to which it applies.”    
 
b. Original Classification Authority and Derivative Classification Authority 
 Section 1.3 E.O. assigns original classification authority to the President of the 
United States, the Vice President, agency heads and officials designated by the President, 
and any other U.S. government official delegated by a person having original classification 
authority1182. Under subsection (c)(2), only the President, the Vice President, or an agency 
head or official designated by the President may delegate “Top Secret” original classification 
authority. Furthermore, subsection (c)(4) specifies that delegations of original classification 
authority must always be in writing, and, as a general rule, may not be in turn delegated to 
another official. Paragraph (5) adds that such delegations have to be communicated to the 
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. The act of delegation has to identify 
the official by name or position. Subsection (d) requires that all original classification 
authorities receive training concerning classification, over-classification – which is 
conceived of as a pathological phenomenon to avoid and thus classifiers are trained to 
consider it as such – and declassification at least once a calendar year. By issuing an order 
                                                          
1181 Under section 1.8(b), such procedures must ensure that the person challenging a classification 
decision not be punished, that an impartial official or panel conduct an impartial review of the 
classification decision at issue, and that those who bring action against a classification decision be 
apprised of their right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel 
(ISCAP). Section 2001.14(b) of CFR regulations requires that agencies adopt a system for processing 
and tracking classification challenges, and take them into consideration separately from any FOIA 
request or other access request that agencies may have received. An agency has to respond in writing 
to a classification challenge within 60 days or within the date the agency identifies. If no response is 
provided within 120 days, the challenger is entitled to turn to the ISCAP. Section 2001.14(c) states 
that regardless of these provisions governing the filing of formal classification challenges, the status 
of certain classified information may be challenged informally. It is added that “informal inquiries 
should be encouraged as a means of holding down the number of formal challenges and to ensure 
the integrity of the classification process.”       
1182 Subsection (c)(1) specifies that delegations of original classification authority must be kept to the 
minimum required to ensure implementation of the executive order.  
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attached to E.O. 135261183, President Obama established a list of officials, designated as 
original classifiers with authority to mark information as “Top Secret” or “Secret.” Among 
the officials and members of the Cabinet to whom the original classification authority to 
apply “Top Secret” marking is granted by the President are the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, also known as the National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the Secretary of State, of Defense, 
and of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence. Another lead of the 
tendency of the scope of national security and homeland security to overlapping, therefore, 
can be detected in the authority assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security to classify 
information as “Top Secret.” Since this marking applies to situations in which the 
unauthorized disclosure of the information at issue is reasonably deemed capable to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to national security, the Secretary may deal with such 
information, which refers to the core of national security. However, the Secretary is also the 
head of the Department of Homeland Security. Accordingly, since classified information 
pertains to national security, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may determine that 
certain information is subject to the highest classification level, the Department of Homeland 
Security handles classified information and thus addresses national security issues. Section 
1.6 pinpoints a series of data to attach to information that is originally classified, such as the 
name and position of the original classifiers, and the duration of classification.  
 Unlike original classification authority, derivative classification authority consists in 
reproduction or usage of originally classified information to create new classified material. 
Even though such material is indeed new, it is based upon information that already has a 
classification marking applied by an original classifier. Part 2 of the executive order is 
devoted to derivative classification1184. Persons enjoying original classification authority 
may employ material they have classified to produce further classified material, but 
executive branch officials other than original classifiers usually engage in derivative 
classification. Section 2.1(b) requires that derivative classification authorities be identified 
by name and position within a given department or agency, “observe and respect original 
                                                          
1183 PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA, Order of December 29, 2009 (“Original Classification 
Authority”), 75 Fed. Reg. 735 (January 5, 2010). 
1184 Section 2.1(a) defines derivative classifiers as “[p]ersons who reproduce, extract, or summarize 
classified information, or who apply classification markings derived from source material or as 
directed by a classification guide […].” 
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classification decisions,”1185 and – accordingly – maintain the classification markings that 
pertain to the originally classified material they handle and use to create additional classified 
information1186. Subsection (d) provides that like original classifiers, derivative classifiers 
must go through proper training, which has to occur at least once every two years.    
 
c. Declassification 
 Section 1.5 E.O. provides that information may not be subject to classification 
indefinitely, and when certain information is classified, it must be identified the moment in 
which the classification status will cease. Subsection (a), indeed, requires that when applying 
a classification marking, an original classifier “establish a specific date or event for 
declassification based on the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information.” 
Upon reaching the date or event, the information shall be automatically declassified. 
Subsection (b) establishes ten years from the date of the original classification as the ordinary 
– and residual – duration of classification, which applies whenever the original classification 
authority cannot identify a specific date or event for declassification. Once the ten-year 
period has elapsed, information will be declassified. The original classification authority, 
however, may extend the duration of classification up to 25 years from the date of the 
original decision if the authority deems it proper “[for] the sensitivity of the information 
[…].” Subsection (a), however, exempts both from the ordinary duration of classification 
and from the 25-year limit “information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected 
to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key 
                                                          
1185 Section 2.1(a)(2). Section 2001.22(d) of CFR regulations specifies that the reason for original 
classification of the material that derivative classifiers use be not reproduced in derivative 
classification.  
1186 Section 2001.21(b) of CFR regulations provides that the highest level of classification of an 
originally classified document is determined by considering the highest level of classification that is 
assigned to any single portion within the document, and has to be marked “in a way that will 
distinguish it clearly from the informational text.” As paragraph (2) specifies, when a document 
contains information that is subject to different levels of classification, the highest level of 
classification that is found in the document is the overall classification marking of the document. 
Paragraph (2) explains this rule by providing an example of how such a mechanism works in practice: 
If some information within a given document is marked “Secret” and other information contained in 
the same document possesses instead the “Confidential” level of classification, the overall marking 
of the document will be “Secret.” Section 2001.22(f) directs derivative classifiers to stick to the rules 
provided for in section 2001.21(b) in identifying the highest level of classification of the documents 
they classify.  
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design concepts of weapons of mass destruction […].” Such information, therefore, may 
exceed the duration of classification as established in subsection (b).  
 Declassification is a process by which classified information loses its classification 
status and thus becomes of public domain1187. Part 3 of the executive order deals with 
declassification and downgrading of classified information. Original classification 
authorities are usually engaged in declassification1188, which may be the consequence of an 
assessment on persistence of the reasons for original classification. In such a case, 
declassification ensues from a determination that excludes the persistent soundness of those 
reasons. The result of the assessment, however, may also be the opposite, and thus the 
original classification authority may conclude its review by finding that certain information 
is to be exempted from declassification either in whole or in part. Furthermore, 
declassification may be triggered by formal classification challenges, as well as by FOIA 
requests1189. Both situations, indeed, provide an original classification authority with a 
chance to review the classification status of certain information.  
 Section 3.3 E.O. provides for an automatic declassification mechanism, which 
applies to “all classified records that (1) are more than 25 years old and (2) have been 
determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, […] 
whether or not the records have been reviewed.”1190 Subsection (b), however, enumerates 
nine exemptions to automatic declassification, the scope of which is concerned with diverse 
aspects of the national defense and foreign relations of the United States1191. Other 
provisions result in further limiting the application of automatic declassification. Subsection 
(f), for instance, empowers the Secretary of State to determine when negotiations of the 
                                                          
1187 Section 1.6(h) specifies that each declassified piece of information must be marked as such, i.e., 
as declassified, before being made available to the general public.  
1188 Section 3.1(b) identifies the persons who are authorized to declassify or downgrade classified 
information. Such persons are – first of all – those who applied the original classification marking to 
the information at issue, also referred to in the executive order as “the originator[s],” if they still 
possess original classification authority, or the successors in function, if the original classifiers do 
not hold the position anymore. Secondly, a supervisory official of either the originators or their 
successors may declassify information.    
1189 See KOSAR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526, supra note 1165, at 14 
and note 43. 
1190 Section 3.3(a). 
1191 Since all those exemptions are aimed at responding to the need to protect the national security of 
the United States, and thus their legal basis is Exemption 1 of the FOIA, the fact that the number of 
exemptions to automatic declassification equates to the number of FOIA exemptions appears to be 
nothing more than a mere coincidence. 
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United States with a foreign government or an international organization involve information 
that must remain classified for a period longer than 25 years from the date of its creation. 
The authority to determine when the exemptions to automatic declassification apply is vested 
in the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. In particular, subsection (j) 
requires that one year before certain information is subject to automatic declassification, 
each agency notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office of any specific 
information that the agency intends to exempt from automatic declassification. The 
notification must set out the reasons that, according to the agency, justify application of a 
given exemption. The decision made by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals 
Panel may be appealed to the National Security Advisor and thus to the President of the 
United States.  
 The executive order also provides for declassification review processes. Under 
section 3.4, agencies have to engage in systematic declassification review of records that 
have been exempted from automatic declassification. Section 3.5, instead, provides for a 
mandatory declassification review process, which is triggered by a request for 
declassification. Such a request, which must be detailed enough to enable the agency to 
pinpoint the document(s) containing the sought information, may be filed by any person, and 
it is responsibility of the original classification authority to conduct the review. The request 
may not be processed if it pertains either to an operational file exempted from disclosure 
pursuant to the FOIA or to information involved in pending litigation1192. In addition, 
subsection (b) exempts from mandatory declassification review the information created by 
the incumbent President or Vice President of the United States or by their respective staff 
members, and the information created by committees, commissions, or boards appointed by 
the incumbent President, or by other entities within the Executive Office of the President 
whose sole function is to advise and assist the President1193. Declassification review of 
certain types of highly sensitive information is subject to special procedures, which the 
competent authority has to lay down. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, for instance, are required to establish special procedures – respectively – for the 
                                                          
1192 Section 3.5(a)(2),(3). 
1193 Under subsection (g), documents that must be submitted “for prepublication review or other 
administrative process pursuant to an approved nondisclosure agreement” are outside the scope of 
mandatory declassification review, as well.  
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review of cryptologic information, and for the review of information concerning intelligence 
sources, methods, and activities1194.     
 
3. The Department of Homeland Security and Classified Information 
 State and local authorities, as well as the private sector, need to gain access to 
classified information in order for them to have a role in homeland security, and such access 
is subject to specific regulation. The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan for 
Fiscal Years (FY) 2012-2016 underscored that the fulfilment of the missions the DHS is 
entrusted with requires cooperation not only with public authorities at different government 
levels, but also with individuals, communities of people, and businesses1195 – briefly, what 
in Europe is often referred to as the whole civilian society. All these subjects participate in 
the so-called homeland security enterprise1196, within which the DHS has to ensure a high 
level not only of sharing but also of protection of information1197. Participants in the 
homeland security enterprise are usually referred to in executive branch documents as state, 
local, tribal, and private sector (SLTPS) entities. As noted above, they need to gain access 
to classified information handled by the DHS in order for them to participate effectively in 
activities pertaining to homeland security. Executive order 13549, issued by President 
Obama on August 18, 2010,1198 is aimed at governing access to such information, and thus 
at identifying the amount of sensitive information that may flow from the Federal Executive 
to SLTPS entities. The program the executive order sets forth ensures that “security 
standards governing access to and safeguarding of classified material” be applied in 
                                                          
1194 Section 3.5(f). 
1195 Cooperation between public entities and between them and the private sector in a broad sense is 
deemed to be crucial “to the Department [of Homeland Security]’s success in carrying out its core 
missions and operational objectives.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012-2016 (February 2012), p. 23.  
1196 The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review defined the homeland security enterprise 
(HSE) as the “collective efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
nongovernmental, and private-sector partners – as well as individuals, families, and communities – 
to maintain critical homeland security capabilities.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2010 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (February 2010), p. 12.     
1197 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy (January 
2013), p. 8 (stating that one of the principles the DHS has to take into account is that “[i]nformation 
sharing and safeguarding are force multipliers that enable the HSE to achieve its mission objectives 
faster and at reduced risk and cost.”) 
1198 “Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector 
Entities,” 75 Fed. Reg. 51609 (August 23, 2010).  
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accordance with the general executive order on classification in the national security 
domain1199. The Secretary of Homeland Security is required to issue a directive to lay down 
procedures and standards for implementation of such security standards by SLTPS entities. 
The Secretary issued the directive in February 2012. The express purpose of the directive is 
to “instill uniformity and consistency in the application of the security standards” mentioned 
above whenever SLTPS entities need to gain access to classified information1200.   
 The Reducing Over-Classification Act, signed into law on October 7, 2010,1201 
addressed access by SLTPS entities to classified information held by the executive branch 
of the Federal Government. The act is aimed not only at preventing the over-classification 
of sensitive information pertaining to homeland security, but also at promoting the sharing 
of information – whether or not it is classified – within all subjects involved in the homeland 
security enterprise. The findings of the act underline that the over-classification of 
information results in hindering the flow of classified information within the Federal 
Government and with the other components of the homeland security enterprise. Over-
classification, indeed – it is observed – makes it harder to pinpoint such information as the 
Federal Executive is allowed to disclose to foster cooperation in the achievement of DHS 
missions, and what subjects should that information be shared with1202. By amending the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Reducing Over-Classification Act provided for the 
establishment of a new authority within the DHS – the Classified Information Advisory 
Officer (CIAO), who is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Under section 
124m(b) of title 6, U.S. Code, the CIAO is responsible – inter alia – for the administration 
of training programs meant to assist SLTPS entities “in developing plans and policies to 
respond to requests [of access to classified information].”1203 By devising and managing 
such programs, therefore, the Federal Executive provides personnel employed at different 
government levels and subjects of the private sector with instructions on disclosure of the 
classified information that has been shared with them. A general rule in the U.S. legal system 
                                                          
1199 Section 1.2, E.O. 13549. 
1200 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Classified National Security Information Program for State, 
Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities – Implementing Directive (February 2012), p. 5. 
1201 Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat. 2648 (October 7, 2010), codified in part at 6 U.S.C. § 124m. 
1202 See 6 U.S.C. § 124m note, Findings (3) (“Over-classification of information causes considerable 
confusion regarding what information may be shared with whom, and negatively affects the 
dissemination of information within the Federal Government and with State, local, and tribal entities, 
and with the private sector.”) 
1203 6 U.S.C. § 124m(b)(1)(A). 
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requires that access to such information be restricted to those who possess appropriate 
security clearances. Accordingly, the training programs administered by the CIAO have also 
to instruct SLTPS personnel “on the means by which such personnel may apply for security 
clearances.”1204 Furthermore, section 6(b) of the Reducing Over-Classification Act, codified 
at section 3061 note of title 50, U.S. Code, provides for a twofold evaluation of classification 
policies and rules that the inspector general of each department or agency with original 
classification authority has to conduct1205. Firstly, the offices of inspector general (OIGs) are 
required to assess policies and rules on classification adopted by their department or agency, 
as well as the implementation of such policies and rules, i.e., procedures followed, 
classification markings applied, tools and techniques used for the classification of electronic 
documents and for declassification, et cetera. Secondly, the OIGs have to detect in detail 
such rules, procedures, and practices of the department or agency under scrutiny as are 
deemed to “be contributing to persistent misclassification of material […].”1206  
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the OIG for the Department of 
Homeland Security by amending the Inspector General Act of 19781207, codified at 5 U.S.C. 
Appendix1208. The original version of the Inspector General Act of 1978 did not devise the 
office of inspector general as a structure to apply to the whole executive branch. Section 2 
of the act, indeed, defined offices of inspector general as “independent and objective units” 
that were established only within twelve departments and agencies of the Federal 
Executive1209. The number of such offices has increased over time. Section 2 of the current 
                                                          
1204 Section 124m(b)(1)(C). 
1205 It is specified that in performing the evaluation, the inspectors general may rely on the assistance 
of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). The ISOO is a component of the National 
Archives and Records Administration, and exercises management and oversight functions over the 
comprehensive system of classified information on the basis of guidance it receives from the National 
Security Council.  
1206 50 U.S.C. § 3061 note – section 6(b)(1)(A), Reducing Over-Classification Act. 
1207 Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (October 12, 1978).  
1208 The Appendix of title 5, U.S. Code, also contains the codification of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (see infra), and of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In addition, the Appendix 
includes a long series of reorganization plans issued by different presidents of the United States over 
the years. The main purpose of such plans is to establish new agencies within the executive branch 
of the Federal Government, and to assign them administrative functions.   
1209 The federal entities that the original version of the Inspector General Act of 1978 endowed with 
an OIG were the following: the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Commerce; the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Department of the Interior; the Department of 
Labor; the Deparmtent of Transportation; the Community Services Administration; the 
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version of the act, as codified, identifies three main functions of OIGs: to conduct audits and 
investigations concerning programs and operations the departments and agencies with a OIG 
carry out; to ensure coordination and recommend the adoption of policies aimed at 
improving economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as at preventing fraud and abuses, 
in the administration of such programs and operations; to acquaint the head of the department 
or agency a given OIG is based in and Congress on a regular basis with “problems and 
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and [with] the 
necessity for and progress of corrective action.”1210 The Inspector General Reform Act of 
2008 brought in significant amendments to the act1211. Of great interest is, however, above 
all section 8I of 5 U.S.C. App., which lays down special provisions concerning the OIG at 
the Department of Homeland Security. This OIG may need access to sensitive information 
concerning one of the six matters enumerated in subsection (a)(1) when the OIG itself is 
conducting audits and investigations, or it may issue a subpoena to obtain the release of such 
information. The matters enumerated pertain mainly to intelligence and national security in 
general, and to law enforcement proceedings, and thus recall – essentially – exemptions 1 
and 7 of the FOIA. Paragraph (1) requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
specifically authorize the access to information on these matters by the OIG. Paragraph 2 
empowers the Secretary to enjoin the OIG from carrying out an audit or investigation or 
from issuing a subpoena, if the Secretary determines that such bar from taking action is 
necessary to keep information on the matters mentioned above secret, to preserve national 
security, or “to prevent a significant impairment to the interests of the United States.” 
Subsection (b), however, clarifies that the authority vested in the Secretary of Homeland 
Security may not be invoked to restrict access to information on such matters by Congress. 
                                                          
Environmental Protection Agency; the General Services Administration; the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration; the Small Business Administration; the Veterans’ Administration.    
1210 5 U.S.C. App. – Section 2(3), Inspector General Act of 1978. 
1211 One of the stated purposes of the act was to increase the OIGs’ independence from the governing 
bodies of the departments and agencies in which they are based. Furthermore, the Inspector General 
Reform Act of 2008 established a new entity – the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency (CIGIE) – by redesigning sections 11 and 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as 
sections 12 and 13, and by adding a new section 11. Structured as an entity enjoying independence 
within the Federal Executive, the CIGIE has a twofold mission. In addition to providing for the 
improvement of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of administrative business, the CIGIE has to 
ensure that executive branch personnel feature a high level of professionalism.      
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 In August 2013, the OIG of the Department of Homeland Security issued a report on 
classification policies, rules, and procedures followed by the Department1212. The OIG 
specifically directed its review at activities carried out by the Office of the Chief Security 
Officer (OSCO) and by the components of the DHS having original classification 
authority1213. The OIG points out that by releasing the report, the obligation to conduct the 
twofold evaluation provided for in section 3061 note of title 50, U.S. Code, is fulfilled. 
Indeed, not only does the report appraise the DHS’s policies, rules, and procedures on 
classification; it also sifts them to detect what proves improper or misleading in the 
classification process considered as a whole1214. The report finds that classification policies, 
rules, and procedures followed by the DHS are consistent with federal regulation. The OSCO 
and DHS components with original classification authority have successfully implemented 
and managed the security program referred to in Executive Order 135261215, and – more 
generally – have complied with federal prescriptions and standards concerning the 
classification of information1216. Since – as the report notes – “[o]riginal classification 
precedes all other aspects of the security classification system,”1217 the positive performance 
of the DHS as to original classification constitutes the achievement of an important goal. 
The report, however, also concedes that the impact of original classification ascribable to 
authorities within the DHS on the entire system turns out to be marginal, for just a few  
                                                          
1212 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL – DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Reducing Over-
Classification of National Security Information (August 2013). 
1213 The report contains a list of DHS components empowered to originally classify information. 
Such components are the following: the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency; the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; the National Protection and 
Programs Directorate; the Office of Inspector General; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the 
Science and Technology Directorate; the Transportation Security Administration; the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection; the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the United States Secret Service. Id., at 
4.  
1214 Id., at 5; Appendix A, id., at 23. 
1215 Id., at 9 (contending that “DHS’ commitment to ensuring that the security program is 
implemented effectively as established under [Executive Order 13526] is evident throughout the 
Department’s components and offices.”) 
1216 Other than Executive Order 13526, the relevant federal regulation includes the Reducing Over-
Classification Act as codified, the 2010 regulations on classifications published in CFR (see supra 
note 1087), and a 2009 directive that pertains to classification markings and applies to the Intelligence 
Community – Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 710, Classification and Control 
Markings System (September 2009).   
1217 Reducing Over-Classification of National Security Information, supra note 1212, at 3.  
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original classification authorities of the DHS have taken the initiative to classify documents 
for the first time1218. As far as the second aspect of the assessment entrusted to the OIG is 
concerned, the report suggests deploying a new classification management tool1219. 
According to the results of the review, even though only a relatively small number of the 
scrutinized documents contains “declassification, sourcing, and marking errors,”1220 all 
classification management tools have been deemed outdated. Since such tools are essential 
to classifying electronic documents, a poor status of update processes1221 brings about an 
increase in marking and declassification errors. The new management tool of which the 
report recommends the adoption is regarded as capable to “reduce errors in classification 
and declassification and eliminate some current marking issues.”1222            
   
 
                                        
III. Other Sunshine Laws 
A. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
1. The Purposes and Main Contents of the FACA 
 In the 1970s, Congress passed two statutes that are usually grouped as open meeting 
legislation. The Federal Advisory Committee Act [hereinafter – FACA] was enacted in 
19721223, while the Government in the Sunshine Act [hereinafter – GITSA] was passed in 
19761224. Congress enacted these statutes in a period in which such events as the Watergate 
scandal and the Vietnam War generated widespread disaffection towards the U.S. 
Government1225. In an attempt to fight such disaffection, the two statutes increased the level 
                                                          
1218 Id., at 14 (observing that “[m]ost DHS components and offices are consumers of intelligence 
information and rarely have to make original classification decisions.”) 
1219 Id., at 9 (noting that the utility a classification management tool provides consists in “allow[ing] 
users to automatically apply classification markings to electronic documents.”)     
1220 Id., at 5. 
1221 Id., at 9 (pointing out that at the time the report is issued, DHS components using a classification 
management tool – according to the review, not all of them employ one – have not brought it up to 
date to implement the rules and standards established in Executive Order 13526, the executive order 
on national security information). 
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (October 6, 1972), codified at 5 U.S.C. App. (Appendix) §§ 1-
16. 
1224 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (September 13, 1976), codified at 5 U.S.C. 552b. 
1225 See REEVE T. BULL, The Government in the Sunshine Act in the 21st Century – Final Sunshine 
Act Report (March 10, 2014), p. 2 (arguing that in the period beginning in the second half of the 
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of transparency and accountability of the Federal Government, and especially of its 
executive branch. 
 As a 2011 report containing recommendations set out by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States1226 noted, the FACA “governs the process whereby the 
President or an administrative agency obtains advice from groups that include one or more 
non-federal employees.”1227 By enacting the FACA, Congress intended to put a curb on the 
executive branch long-standing practice of establishing public-private advisory committees, 
and thus on the ability of the executive branch to seek advice from the private sector. 
Congress, however, recognized the importance of such interaction between public and 
private sectors as advisory committees realize1228. In the findings and purposes of the FACA, 
                                                          
1960s and concluding in the first half of the next decade, “the Watergate scandal, the Vietnam War, 
and other high profile events […] eroded the confidence of the American public in the good faith of 
their elected leaders […].”) 
1226 The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) is an independent federal agency, 
which also includes members from the private sector. The ACUS was established by the 
Administrative Conference Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (August 30, 1964), codified at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seqq., and began to work in 1968. Section 591 identifies the following purposes 
of the subchapter of title 5, U.S. Code, devoted to the ACUS: to provide arrangements that may 
facilitate the study of mutual problems, the exchange of information, and the development of 
recommendations by federal agencies; to promote public participation and efficiency in the 
rulemaking process; to reduce the amount of litigation in the regulatory process; to improve the use 
of science in the regulatory process; to improve the effectiveness of laws applicable to the regulatory 
process. For the achievement of these purposes, section 594 establishes the powers of the ACUS, 
among which are the power to analyze the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative 
procedure used by administrative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make 
recommendations to federal agencies, as well as to the President and to Congress, and the power to 
ensure “interchange among administrative agencies of information potentially useful in improving 
administrative procedure.” 
1227 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, The Federal Advisory Committee Act. 
Issues and Proposed Legislation, Proposed Recommendation (December 8-9, 2011), p. 1.  
1228 See House Committee On Government Operations, The Role and Effectiveness Of Federal 
Advisory Committees, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1731, 91st, Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reprinted in Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (Pub.L. 92-463) Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and other 
Documents, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Senate 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 
1978) (Washington, D.C., Gov’t. Print. Off., 1978) [hereinafter – 1978 FACA Source Book], p. 217 
(observing that federal advisory committees “provide […] a means by which the best brains and 
experience available in all fields of business, society, government and the professions can be made 
available to the Federal Government at little cost.”) This is an entrenched conviction of Congress. 
As early as 1957, the House of Representatives prepared a report in which it underlined the same 
principle: Establishment of advisory committees enables the Government – namely, the executive 
branch – to rely “at little or no cost [upon] the best technical brains and experience of all fields of 
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it is specified that to cape with the tendency to increase in the number of advisory 
committees, the executive branch be instructed to establish such committees only when it 
deems them to be necessary, so that “their number […] be kept to the minimum 
necessary.”1229  
 One of the main purposes of the FACA is to promote the transparency of federal 
advisory committees and of their activities. As Bull has maintained, the FACA lays down 
“transparency requirements to ensure that committees operate publicly and that everyday 
citizens have the opportunity to express their views to committee members.”1230 Section 
10(a)(1) of the Appendix of title 5, U.S. Code, applies a principle of publicity to each 
advisory committee meeting, which indeed “shall be open to the public.” The public, 
therefore, is granted a right to attend federal advisory committee meetings. Such a right is 
made effective by requiring that “timely notice” of each meeting be published in the Federal 
Register, unless the U.S. President determines that giving notice of a certain meeting is 
improper “for reasons of national security […].”1231 Section 10(a)(3) substantiates the 
participation of the public by allowing interested persons not only to attend and appear 
before advisory committees, but also to express their views by filing statements. 
Furthermore, section 10(b) prescribes that advisory committee records be made available to 
any person. Subsection (c), instead, requires that advisory committees keep “[d]etailed 
minutes of each meeting,” which have not only to mention every person present at a given 
meeting, but also to provide an accurate, complete account of matters discussed and 
conclusions reached. The minutes must also contain “copies of all reports received, issued, 
or approved by the advisory committee [during that meeting].” 
 
 
 
                                                          
business, industrial, or professional endeavor.” H.R. Rep. No. 85-576, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 
17, 1957), reprinted in 1978 FACA Source Book, at 47. The report, however, also criticized the 
secrecy that featured advisory committees and the business they carried out. In consideration of “the 
veil of secrecy which now surrounds the activities of these groups,” the report contended, “it is 
possible and entirely probable that some of them are established not for the primary purpose of giving 
advice.” Id., at 48.     
1229 5 U.S.C. App. § 2(b)(2). 
1230 REEVE T. BULL, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Issues and Proposed Reforms, Draft 
Report for Committee Review (September 12, 2011), p. 4. 
1231 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(a)(2). 
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2. The FACA Regulations Adopted By the GSA in 2001 
 Since 1977, when Executive Order 120241232, issued by President Carter, entrusted 
the General Services Administration (GSA) with an oversight function over the FACA, the 
GSA has administered the act and has been empowered to adopt relevant regulations. 
Interesting to note is that the GSA appears to oppose the common opinion that includes the 
FACA in the category of open meeting legislation, and considers the act as capable of 
favoring participation and transparency in the public sector. In 2001, indeed, the GSA stated 
that according to the FACA, “the only purpose of Federal advisory committees is to provide 
independent advice and recommendations to the Executive Branch of government.”1233 
Accordingly, the FACA – the GSA continued – “is neither a public participation statute nor 
a collaborative process between the government, a Federal advisory committee, and the 
public.”1234 In 2000, the GSA issued proposed rules on the FACA, which were subject to 
public comments. The final rules were published on July 19, 2001,1235 and are still effective. 
In the CFR, those rules are found in part 102-3 (“Federal Advisory Committee 
Management”) of title 41, as a result of the cross-reference made to this part by part 101-
61236. What is relevant the most to my work is subpart D (“Advisory Committee Meeting 
and Recordkeeping Procedures”). Section 102-3.150 requires that advisory committees 
publish in the Federal Register at least fifteen days before a meeting takes place a notice 
containing detailed information about the meeting. The notice, in particular, has to 
communicate not only the time, date, place, and purpose of the meeting, but also the agenda 
or simply the topics that will be addressed at the meeting1237. The notice must also specify 
whether the meeting will be – in whole or in part – open to the public, and if it will not be, 
reasons for excluding the public from the meeting must be set forth by mentioning one or 
more of the exemptions established in the GITSA “as the basis for closure.”1238 An advisory 
committee is allowed to give a shorter notice of a meeting by publishing it in the Federal 
                                                          
1232 42 Fed. Reg. 61445 (1977). 
1233 GSA Committee Management Secretariat, to Administrative Conference (March 1, 2011) 
(quoted in JAMES T. O’REILLY, Federal Advisory Committee Act: Inhibiting Effects Upon the 
Utilization of New Media in Collaborative Governance & Agency Policy Formation, Draft Report to 
the Administrative Conference of the United States (April 15, 2011), p. 5). 
1234 Ibid.  
1235 66 Fed. Reg. 37727 (July 19, 2001); 41 CFR part 101-6.1001 – Cross reference to the Federal 
Management Regulation (FMR) (41 CFR ch. 102, parts 102-1 through 102-220). 
1236 See previous note. 
1237 41 CFR §102-3.150 (a)(2),(3). 
1238 Section 102-3.150 (a)(4). 
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Register less than fifteen days before the meeting is held only if “exceptional circumstances” 
come about, and provided that reasons for the reduced notice are set out in the notice 
itself1239.  
 Sections 102-3.155 and 102-3.170 deal with – respectively – the closure of a meeting 
to the public and access to advisory committee records. Section 102-3.155 establishes a 
specific proceeding for the closure – in whole or in part – of a meeting. First of all, the 
Designated Federal Officer (DFO) has to submit a request to the head of the agency or to the 
Secretariat in the case of an independent presidential advisory committee, citing one or more 
exemptions of the GITSA that justify a secret meeting in that specific case. The head of the 
agency or the Secretariat is granted a sufficient period of time – usually, thirty calendar days 
– to make a determination on the legitimacy of the request. The General Counsel of the 
agency or the General Counsel of the GSA in the case of an independent presidential 
advisory committee is supposed to review all requests for a closed-door meeting. If the head 
of the agency or the Secretariat determines that the request is legitimate, the competent 
agency official has to issue a determination establishing that the meeting is not to be open to 
the public in whole or in part. Subsection (d) recognizes anyone’s right to gain access to a 
copy of such a determination. Section 102-3.170, instead, addresses access to advisory 
committee records, and underlines the importance that the public be put into condition to 
gain “[t]imely access” to such records. It is made reference to section 10(b) of the FACA, 
and recalled that under that section, federal advisory committees have to ensure “the 
contemporaneous availability” of their own records to anyone who requires access to them. 
In this context, the adjective “contemporaneous” means that a person making a request for a 
record that pertains to a given advisory committee meeting is entitled to gain access to such 
a record as soon as the record itself is formed. Section 102-3.170 states that the requirement 
of timely access to advisory committee records, “when taken in conjunction with the ability 
to attend committee meetings, provide a meaningful opportunity to comprehend fully the 
work undertaken by the advisory committee.”1240 In light of what I explained above about 
the concept of transparency, it is evident that this clause of section 102-3.170 acknowledges 
such a concept, which requires agencies to make records and information not only merely 
available to anyone – especially by publishing them online or in the Federal Register and by 
releasing records whenever no essential interest calls for the invocation of an exemption – 
                                                          
1239 Section 102-3.150 (b). 
1240 (Italics added). 
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but also understandable. Moreover, this section expressly allows advisory committees to 
withhold from access records concerning their meetings by applying one or more FOIA 
exemptions. It is specified, however, that in the event of a “reasonable expectation”1241 that 
the sought records fall within the scope of a FOIA exemption, “agencies may not require 
members of the public or other interested parties to file requests for non-exempt advisory 
committee records […].” Even though such language is somewhat obscure, it appears to 
exonerate persons interested in gaining access to records that are likely to be included in the 
scope of a FOIA exemption from the burden of pinpointing in detail the requested material, 
so that disclosure may be in conformity with the reasonably segregable obligation.  
 
 
B. The Government in the Sunshine Act (GITSA) 
1. The Essential Content of the GITSA 
 The GITSA requires that the public be permitted to attend any portion of any meeting 
held by multi-member agencies. The meaning of “agency” under the GITSA ensues from a 
combination of two elements. Firstly, section 552b(a)(1) contains a cross-reference to the 
definition of “agency” provided for in section 552(f), and therefore incorporates a definition 
that dates back to the APA, but also encompasses the subjects added by the FOIA1242. In 
other words, if only this element were to pinpoint the term “agency” pursuant to the GITSA, 
the same entities that are subject to the FOIA would also be supposed to comply with the 
open meeting requirements established by the GITSA. Another element of the definition of 
“agency,” however, is peculiar to the GITSA: the multi-member composition of the directing 
body of the agency. Section 552b(a)(1), indeed, provides that the GITSA applies to any 
agency “headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a 
majority of whom are appointed to such position by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate […].” The GITSA also applies to “any subdivision” of multi-member agencies 
                                                          
1241 (Italics in original). 
1242 See Falwell v. Executive Office of the President, 113 F.Supp. 2d 967, 969 (W.D. VA. 2000) 
(referring to Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). In 
Rushforth, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the GITSA did not 
apply to the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), an agency within the Executive Office of the 
President, by depending on a correspondence between the entities subject to the FOIA and those 
subject to the GITSA. Rushforth, 762 F.2d, at 1043 (“Inasmuch as the Council of Economic Advisers 
is not an agency for FOIA purposes, it follows of necessity that the CEA is, under the terms of the 
Sunshine Act, not subject to that Act either.”)    
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that conducts business on behalf of them. Under section 552b(b), agencies subject to the 
GITSA have to ensure that “every portion of every meeting [they hold] be open to public 
observation.” In an early comment on the GITSA, Bullock observes that the explicit 
reference to “public observation” suggests that the GITSA limits itself to granting anyone a 
mere right to attend agency meetings, while it fails to provide “[specific] opportunities for 
public participation.”1243 In other words, the open meeting requirements established by the 
GITSA do not ensure a truly effective participation in the agency decision-making process 
by interested persons, who are recognized the status of pure spectators. That the public being 
allowed to attend multi-member agency meetings is tantamount – substantially – to a mute 
audience finds confirmation in section 552b(k). This section makes it clear that the public 
attending an agency meeting is entitled to nothing more or nothing less than what is granted 
by the FOIA, i.e., the right of access to the records concerning such a meeting. In particular, 
subsection (f)(2) requires that each agency subject to the GITSA make “promptly” available 
to the public the transcript, electronic recording, or minutes of any portion of a meeting.  
 
2. The Tricky Definition of “Meeting”  
 It is essential to pinpoint an agency meeting under the GITSA, i.e., to determine when 
there is a meeting that triggers the application of GITSA open meeting requirements. Section 
552b(a)(2) defines the term “meeting” by referring both to the number of agency members 
involved and to the activity carried out in the meeting. As to the former, there is a meeting 
when “at least the number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf 
of the agency” gathers to make deliberations. Section 552b(a)(3) specifies that pursuant to 
the GITSA, agency members are the individuals who belong to the collegial body that directs 
a given agency, and thus to the body that constitutes the head of the agency. As to the latter, 
the deliberations agency members gather to make must “determine or result in the joint 
conduct or disposition of official agency business […].” Most of the components of such a 
definition of “meeting,” however, are only identified in a generic manner by the GITSA, and 
thus their application calls for a thorough interpretation. Bull has argued that “[l]ikely no 
interpretive issue related to the Sunshine Act has proven more contentious than [the 
definition of meeting].”1244 The GITSA, for instance, does not establish a specific, pre-fixed 
                                                          
1243 J.F. BULLOCK, The Government in the Sunshine Act – An Overview, 1977 Duke L. J. 565, 567 
note 10 (1977). 
1244 BULL, The Government in the Sunshine Act in the 21st Century, supra note 1225, at 6.  
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quorum of agency members that, when it is reached, entails the application of GITSA open 
meeting requirements. As Senate report No. 354 of 1975 – a report accompanying S. 5, the 
bill introducing the GITSA – underlined, the quorum relevant to the GITSA may vary 
depending on the context and the agency involved. The required quorum – the report notes 
– usually consists in a simple majority, but in some cases – for instance, when a hearing is 
held or when individual members of a given agency gather to act on behalf of the agency 
itself – the quorum “may be less than a majority of the agency, and as few as two agency 
members.”1245  
 
3. The Ten Exemptions to the GITSA 
 Subsection (c) enumerates ten exemptions agencies may invoke to close an entire 
meeting or any portion of a meeting to the public. Those exemptions are patently modeled 
upon the exemptions to mandatory disclosure provided for in the FOIA, even though the 
former are more numerous. As with the FOIA exemptions, Senate report No. 354 prescribes 
that the exemptions to the GITSA “[may] not be used to circumvent the spirit of openness 
which underlies this legislation.”1246 In particular, exemptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 
correspond to the same exemptions to the FOIA, and even the language whereby the 
exemptions are formulated is almost entirely identical. Instead, there is no trace of the need 
to protect from access both geological and geophysical information, as well as maps of wells, 
and thus the reasons for secrecy Exemption 9 of the FOIA incorporates may not be invoked 
to close up a meeting under the GITSA.  
 Furthermore, Exemption 5 of the GITSA differs completely from the corresponding 
number of exemption in the FOIA. Instead of referring to the deliberative process privilege 
and to the presidential communications privilege – application of the letter is hard to 
conceive of with respect to the GITSA – as well as to the attorney-client privilege, 
Exemption 5 of the GITSA is concerned with the accusation of any person – an individual 
or a corporation – of a crime or with formal censure directed at any person. As the Senate 
report clarifies, censure as meant pursuant to the GITSA “includes formal reprimands.”1247 
Permitting the public to attend an agency meeting aimed at discussing a person’s alleged 
                                                          
1245 S. Rep. No. 94-354, 94th Cong., p. 19, reprinted in Government in the sunshine act, S. 5 (Public 
Law 94-409: source book, legislative history, texts, and other documents (Washington, D.C., Gov’t. 
Prin. Off., 1977) [hereinafter – 1977 GITSA Source Book], p. 214.  
1246 Id., at 20, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 215. 
1247 Id., at 22, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 217. 
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crimes and the possibility of turning to the Department of Justice to solicit prosecution or 
aimed at considering the filing of formal censure against a person – the report observes – 
“could irreparably harm the person’s reputation.”1248 At close of discussion in the meeting, 
indeed, the agency may well decide not to accuse the person under examination of a crime 
or to not file formal censure. Yet, the mere discussion of the conduct of the person involved 
would cause harm to the person’s reputation if the meeting devoted to discussion of his or 
her position were open to anyone, thereby rendering such a conduct of public domain. Since 
the production of such harm would be “very unfair,” and thus is to avoid, the report 
continues, the agency “has the latitude to close the meeting,” whether or not investigatory 
records concerning the involved person are considered during the discussion1249. The report, 
however, also specifies that Exemption 5 may not be subject to such an extensive 
interpretation as to allow agencies to exclude the public from “every meeting placing a 
company in a bad light.”1250  
 A ground for keeping a meeting or a portion of a meeting secret that appears to recall 
the deliberative process privilege provided for in Exemption 5 of the FOIA is found in 
Exemption 9 of the GITSA. Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (9) allows an agency that 
regulates currencies, securities, commodities, or financial institutions to close a meeting to 
the public when the “premature disclosure” of the records and information relevant to the 
meeting could either foster financial speculation in the respective market or “significantly 
endanger the stability of any financial institution.”1251 This aspect of the exemption – perhaps 
it may be better to call it a subexemption – is related to Exemption 8, which – similarly to 
the corresponding exemption of the FOIA – allows holding a closed-door meeting when the 
subject of the meeting involves material produced or used by “an agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervision of financial institutions.” Reference to the deliberative process 
privilege, instead, may be inferred from subparagraph (B) of paragraph (9), which empowers 
each agency subject to the GITSA to close a meeting concerning information, the disclosure 
of which “[would] be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency 
action […].” Senate Report No. 354, actually, suggests that the whole Exemption 9 is based 
on a rationale that is very close to that of Exemption 5 of the FOIA. The report, indeed, 
points out that paragraph (9) “applies in certain specific instances where premature 
                                                          
1248 Ibid.  
1249 Ibid.  
1250 Ibid. 
1251 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(sentence following subparagraph (b)). 
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disclosure of information would destroy an agency’s ability to perform its functions 
effectively.”1252 The need to protect a meeting from public observation, however, is more 
evident – and thus more compelling – in the situations contemplated in subparagraph (b), 
wherein the confidentiality of discussion between agency members during a meeting avoids 
the risk that the implementation of the agency’s plans be seriously undermined by the 
disclosure of information and records under consideration in the meeting. Similarly to 
Exemption 5 of the FOIA, whose purpose is to ensure that agency employees candidly 
exchange their ideas and opinions concerning legal and policy issues, the exemption 
provided for in paragraph (9)(b) is aimed at ensuring frank discussion in a meeting. The 
Senate report formulates an example, wherein a meeting is devoted to discussion of the 
strategy a given agency should follow in stipulating new contractual conditions for its 
employees. The contextual disclosure of possible options thereupon, caused by the openness 
of the meeting to the public – the report argues – “might make it impossible to reach an 
agreement [between the members of the heading body of the agency].”1253 Agencies, 
however, may not invoke paragraph (9)(b) to close a meeting whenever they have already 
disclosed to the public, whether voluntarily or by law, “the content or nature of its proposed 
action […].”1254 Since this exemption applies when an agency deems it necessary to resort 
to secrecy – the Senate report observes – “it would be contrary to the intent of this provision 
for an agency to rely on it when the public is already aware of the actions being considered, 
or where the Administrative Procedure Act or other statute requires the agency to publicly 
announce its proposal before taking final action.”1255  
 Finally, Exemption 10 of the GITSA allows an agency to exclude the public from a 
meeting aimed at discussing the issuance of a subpoena, the agency’s participation in civil 
proceedings, or the filing of an action with a foreign court or an international tribunal. The 
scope of this exemption also includes meetings wherein an agency considers the initiation, 
conduct, or disposition of formal agency adjudication pursuant to section 554 of title 5, U.S. 
Code. Overall, this exemption is aimed at enabling an agency to discuss frankly what legal 
strategy to adopt in a case before the agency itself or in the courts1256. Allowing the public 
to attend a meeting devoted to the discussion of such aspects could affect the merits of the 
                                                          
1252 S. Rep. No. 354, at 24, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 219. 
1253 Ibid.  
1254 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B)(ii). 
1255 S. Rep. No. 354, at 25, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 220. 
1256 Id., at 26, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 221. 
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litigation1257. As far as formal adjudications are concerned, the Senate report specifies that a 
meeting may be closed to the public by applying Exemption 10 only if the meeting is aimed 
at discussing a particular case or a homogeneous series of cases, each of which satisfies the 
requirements for closure. The exemption, instead, may not apply to a meeting wherein an 
agency “discusses its adjudication policies in general, such as the policy that should be 
adopted towards all those that may violate a particular law.”1258   
 
4. Costs Arousing From Application of the GITSA 
a. A Series of Costs 
 Since the enactment of the GITSA, it has been noted that the application of this act 
entails some operational costs, which may be explained as agencies’ reaction to the GITSA 
transparency obligations. Such costs ensue mostly from usage of techniques whereby 
agencies circumvent the application of the open meeting requirements established by the 
GITSA. The effect such techniques produce, therefore, end up substantially equating to that 
of the exemptions: In either case, multi-member agencies’ decision-making process is 
shielded from public observation. A first type of cost that has emerged in practice is the 
tendency of agencies to refraining from making collegial decisions. In other words, to avoid 
triggering the obligation to comply with the GITSA, agencies soon began delegating to 
individual members of their heading body the power to make determinations on behalf of 
the agencies themselves1259. Another practice aimed at circumventing the law consists in 
having staff members and assistants, instead of the members of the heading body of agencies, 
gather to discuss legal and policy issues. The meetings of staff members and assistants end 
                                                          
1257 Ibid. (“Public disclosure of an agency’s legal strategy in a case before the agency or in the courts 
could make it impossible to litigate successfully the action.”)   
1258 Ibid.  
1259 See KATHY BRADLEY, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its 
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 Fed. Comm. L. J. 473, 482-483 (1997) 
(referring to DAVID M. WELBOM et al., Implementation and Effects of the Federal Government in 
the Sunshine Act, 236 (Washington, D.C., Administrative Conference of the United States, 1984) 
(noting that a study on implementation of the GITSA conducted seven years after the enactment of 
the act “found that there was a shift in decisionmaking away from collegial processes and toward 
segmented individual processes.”)  
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up being the place wherein substantial decisions are made, whether or not there is a 
subsequent, formal meeting between agency members1260.  
 
b. Notation Voting 
 The most important of the techniques aimed at circumventing open meeting 
obligations, however, appears to be the so-called notation (or notational) voting. The purpose 
of notation voting is to allow agency members to have such discussions as are necessary for 
the carrying out and disposal of agency business in writing, i.e., through exchange of written 
communications,1261 and thus without holding a formal meeting. In addition to exchange of 
communications, notation voting, as the name of this technique suggests, consists in voting 
serially and in writing on agency business1262, and thus on what actions to take in performing 
agency functions. In a 1978 decision, Communication Systems, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission1263, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 
that notation voting was a practice compatible with the GITSA. The Court refers to section 
552b(b), which requires that agency comply with the GITSA when they “jointly conduct or 
dispose of agency business […].” Such a provision is considered to be “ambiguous,” as it 
does not clarify whether it applies only to actual meetings of agency members, characterized 
by “face-to-face communications,” or extends to “more remote communications,” which 
occur – for instance – when agency business is conducted “by circulating written memoranda 
or voting sheets.”1264 According to the Court, however, the legitimacy of notation voting can 
                                                          
1260 The 1984 study on implementation of the GITSA mentioned previously noted that meetings of 
staff members “were much more likely to take place before the scheduled open meetings.” BRADLEY, 
Do You Feel the Sunshine?, id., at 483 note 59 (referring to WELBOM et al., id., at 223).  
1261 See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Recommendation 2014-2, 
Government in the Sunshine Act (June 5, 2014), p. 2 (defining notational voting as a proceeding by 
which agency members “communicate with one another and reach a decision via the exchange of 
written documents.”)  
1262 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 64 Decisions of the Comptroller General of the United 
States – October 1, 1984 to September 30, 1985, 737 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Print. Off., 1986) 
(referring to Senate Rep. No. 98-561, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 78-79 (1984)) (wherein the Senate 
Appropriations Committee expressed concern about the fact that the then-existing Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) had held no open meetings whatsoever since October 1982, even 
though it had taken almost 3,000 votes on diverse matters)). Such a practice prompted the Committee 
to question the ICC’s compliance “with the spirit and intent of the [GITSA].” Id., at 736 (referring 
to Senate Rep. No. 561, ibid.). 
1263 595 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
1264 Id., at 799. 
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be inferred from the legislative history of the GITSA. The Court, in particular, relies upon a 
congressional report, the Conference Committee Report on the GITSA1265, which 
determined that section 552b(b) may not be interpreted so as to “prevent agency members 
from considering individually business that is circulated to them sequentially in writing.”1266 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognizes the legitimacy of notation 
voting by using very practical arguments. Agencies may deploy notation voting – the Court 
observes – “to expedite consideration of less controversial cases without formal meetings 
[…].” If the holding of a formal meeting were to be necessary for the conduct of any agency 
action, “the entire administrative process would be slowed – perhaps to a standstill.” 
Therefore, a formal meeting – the Court continues – may be just devoted to discussion of 
“serious issues that require joint face-to-face deliberation.”1267      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1265 S. Rep. No. 94-1178, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (August 27, 1976), reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source 
Book, at 783. 
1266 S. Rep. No. 1178, at 11, reprinted in 1977 GITSA Source Book, at 793. In like manner, during 
floor debate on the GITSA, Rep. Flowers maintained that section 552b(b) “would not preclude 
agencies from disposing of noncontroversial matters by written circulations.” 122 Cong. Rec. 24184 
(July 28, 1976). 
1267 Communication Systems, 595 F.2d, supra note 1263, at 800-801. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 The U.S. model of transparency at federal level proves satisfactory. I have used the 
very term “model” throughout the work to stress that the United States experience is usually 
taken into consideration as a sort of archetype of how the need for public scrutiny and the 
interest of the executive branch in keeping a certain level of secrecy may be held together in 
a successful fashion. The U.S. model, indeed, possesses all such elements as Mendel has 
identified for the existence of comprehensive FOI legislation. Here, the adjective 
“comprehensive” is used to mean that FOI legislation may be properly considered as such 
only if domestic statutes of the country at issue go beyond the mere regulation of the right 
of access to documents, data, and information held by public authorities. Mendel, in 
particular, has pinpointed a series of criteria with which every FOI legislation ought to 
comply. The criteria are the following: maximum disclosure of – at least – administrative 
records; obligations to publish information imposed on administrations and other public 
entities; promotion of open government; the limited scope of exemptions to FOI legislation, 
and thus to mandatory disclosure; processes to facilitate access to public authorities’ records; 
(reasonable) costs for access; the provision for open meetings, i.e. meetings of 
administrations the general public is allowed to attend, whether or not the public is also 
recognized an active role; prevalence of openness over secrecy; protection for 
whistleblowers1268. The analysis conducted in this work has shown that the U.S. legal system 
considers – and applies – all these criteria in shaping its own system of transparency in the 
public sector.  
 Nevertheless, the U.S. model of transparency does not turn out to be flawless. The 
analysis has also led to detect some paradoxes, the assessment of which is mixed. Some of 
those paradoxes, indeed, may be considered to contribute to the success of the system, while 
some others certainly do not. A first paradox, which is ascribable to the first group, i.e., 
among the paradoxes producing positive outcomes, stems from considering the U.S. system 
                                                          
1268 More precisely, Mendel pinpoints the components of a comprehensive FOI regime by employing 
the following formulas: “maximum disclosure;” “obligation to publish;” “promotion of open 
government;” “limited scope of exceptions;” “processes to facilitate access;” “costs;” “open 
meetings;” “disclosure takes precedence;” “protection for whistleblowers.” THOMAS MENDEL, 
Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, 29-41 (UNESCO, 2008).  
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as a whole. Even though scholars tend not to dwell too much on the concept of transparency 
– or, at least, not as much as scholarship does in Europe – the model of transparency the 
United States possesses is advanced. The U.S. experience, indeed, has traditionally identified 
with such terms as “sunlight” and “sunshine” what has been long referred to as the scope of 
transparency in European countries. Therefore, a conclusion that may be reached in this 
regard is that one of the features that appear to make the U.S. experience so unique actually 
boils down to a matter of different terms used in the United States and overseas to describe 
the same phenomenon – transparency in the public sector.  
 The concept of secrecy, too, has had autonomous development in the United States. 
It is not a coincidence that the study of the more specific concept of “government secrecy,” 
meant essentially as executive branch secrecy, gained momentum in the early 1970s. That 
was a time in which President Nixon’s attempt to cover up the Watergate scandal – namely, 
to prevent the disclosure of White House conversations related to the affair – and the need 
to engage in early assessment of the implementation of the FOIA, become effective on July 
4, 1967, prompted the members of Congress and scholars to pierce into such a concept. The 
very Watergate scandal and its judicial aftermath constituted at the time – and actually still 
does – manifest evidence of the veracity of what Sen. Edward M. Kennedy stated at the 1973 
Senate subcommittee hearing mentioned in Chapter 1: Secrecy tends to foster the 
commission of wrongdoing. At the same hearing, however, Attorney General Richardson 
identified a paradox that features the relation between transparency and secrecy and thus can 
be added to the series of paradoxes I have detected. The Attorney General, indeed, observed 
that despite the risk of its misuse, government secrecy is inevitable, as it serves the purpose 
to protect some vital interests to the country. The Attorney General also underlined that the 
President of the United States has authority to maintain a certain level of secrecy, and this 
authority derives both from his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and from 
his power in the domain of foreign affairs. What are the interests, the protection of which is 
ensured by government secrecy? An answer may be to refer to the interests the exemptions 
established by the FOIA underlie. However, it is more proper to recall the address that 
another Attorney General – Edward Levi – delivered before the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York in 1975. I agree with Chesney, indeed, that Levi’s address grasps the 
essence of the relation between transparency and secrecy. In particular, Levi deserves credit 
for identifying clearly some of the basic interests a legal system may not fail to preserve by 
resort to secrecy: national security; foreign affairs; law enforcement. In addition to the need 
for secrecy that agencies must depend on in the course of their decision-making process, 
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indeed, these interests embody typical matters wherein the executive branch of the Federal 
Government hold records and information, the disclosure of which could undermine the 
protection of the underlying interests. To put it differently, while the FOIA exemptions also 
include interests that are aimed at preserving above all the position of individuals that get in 
touch with federal agencies, such as privacy and interests related to trade secrets, Levi’s 
address identifies a pregnant meaning of government secrecy. The Moynihan Commission 
Report, however, has further restricted the concept of government secrecy by identifying it 
with the system of classification of national security information. Indeed, the classification 
system, the scope of which is concerned with not only the domain of national security but 
also that of foreign affairs, constitutes the core of government secrecy, and – as I have sought 
to show – has implications for all three branches of the Federal Government. The national 
security domain, furthermore, is fertile soil for the resort to deep secrets by the executive 
branch. The distinction between deep and shallow secrets follows a purely theoretical 
approach to secrecy, and was not even devised with respect to the public sector. It is 
noteworthy, however, especially if this distinction is appealed to in order to express a sort of 
warning against the usage of deep secrets. Kitrosser has argued that only shallow secrets are 
compatible with the U.S. Constitution, for they may be checked within the three branches of 
the U.S. Government. By exercising its power of inquiry into the executive branch and its 
conduct, however, Congress is capable of bringing deep secrets to light. More generally, 
Congress’s oversight function results in reducing the amount of executive branch secrecy. 
Nevertheless, I have dwelled on Nixon’s incoherence to warn against overestimation of the 
congressional oversight function, or – at least – to point out the risk that this function be 
exploited by one or more members of Congress to gain importance on the political scene, as 
indeed was the case with Nixon. Despite belonging to an era completely different from the 
current one, the Hiss-Chambers case is of interest for two reasons. First of all, then-
Representative Nixon could rely on a good deal of investigation files and information handed 
to him by FBI agents. This fact shows, as the recent affair concerning the “Operation Fast 
and Furious” – mentioned later in the work – also does, that the exercise of the congressional 
oversight function requires cooperation by executive branch personnel. Furthermore – and 
above all – Nixon’s behavior in the Hiss Chambers case, seemingly moved by the objective 
to give the value of transparency the maximum implementation, contrasts with the claim of 
absolute secrecy he tried to raise with respect to the Watergate scandal. The full access 
doctrine, however, puts emphasis on the importance of the congressional oversight function. 
I have argued that this doctrine, actually, does not bring any novel contribution to the debate 
269 
 
over the amount of executive branch information, the access to which is to be ensured to 
Congress, except for one aspect. This theory, indeed, underlines that Congress needs to gain 
broad access to information even in matters that traditionally feature a high level of secrecy 
such as the gathering of foreign intelligence and the conduction of covert action.  
 Since the system of classified information pertains to the fields of national security 
and foreign affairs, and constitutes the core of government secrecy, I have seen it fit to look 
through the concept of national security. This concept, however, has flexible content, which 
tends to adjusts over time to the mutable set of threats to the country that the Federal 
Executive identifies in its strategic documents. Therefore, it is impossible to provide a single, 
stable definition of national security. Scholars have long agreed, however, that the scope of 
national security is much broader than the military domain. Whether or not the military 
domain is involved, a good deal of national security information is subject to classification. 
The unauthorized disclosure of classified information may occur as a result of leaks and 
whistleblowing, activities whereby employees or other persons somehow related to the 
executive branch make available to people information that was supposed to remain secret. 
Despite stirring up debate in the public opinion, however, the dissemination of classified 
information usually does not bring about any immediate effects in the national security 
domain both at statutory and at administrative level. WikiLeaks disclosures of a huge amount 
of classified information pertaining to national security, foreign affairs, as well as purely 
military operations of the United States, for instance, have shown that there may well not be 
any direct reaction by the U.S. Government to the unauthorized disclosure of information. 
The affair concerning WikiLeaks disclosures is interesting above all for pointing out the 
need to change the approach towards leaks. WikiLeaks, indeed, is not a traditional 
newspaper capable of acting as an intermediary that sifts the information received before 
publishing it.  
 As the case with national security, the concept of homeland security does not have a 
single definition. This concept gained momentum in the aftermath of the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, when it was addressed both at statutory and administrative level. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security, which 
represents an extraordinary reorganization of the administrative structure of the Federal 
Executive, as it absorbed twenty-two federal agencies, each of them having their own 
missions previously. The same act also added a new exemption to the mandatory disclosure 
imposed upon agencies under the FOIA by incorporating a non-disclosure provision 
concerning the critical infrastructure information handled by the Department of Homeland 
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Security into the scope of Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The concept of homeland security has 
gone through a gradual development since its stable adoption in the early years of the twenty-
first century. When the new department was established, homeland security was essentially 
aimed at coping with the terrorism threat. The scope of the concept, however, gradually 
extended to several other matters, such as natural disasters and accidents caused by human 
activities that occur on U.S soil, border and maritime security. 
 I have tried to advance a possible distinction between the concepts of national 
security and homeland security. Such a distinction indicates the latter includes all threats and 
events that exhaust their effects on U.S. soil, and thus within a merely domestic context. 
National security, instead, extends to the threats posed to the country that are concerned with 
an international context, and thus involve operations conducted by intelligence agencies 
abroad. This possible distinction takes up some considerations raised at a 2012 House of 
Representatives subcommittee hearing, and is in accordance with a position expressed by 
Morag. At that hearing, furthermore, it was observed that the large number of strategy 
documents that the White House and the Department of Homeland Security issue on a 
regular basis end up – or, at least, may end up – hampering the accomplishment of the 
multiple homeland security missions those documents pinpoint. One may wonder what the 
point is in analyzing the concepts of national security and homeland security, and in seeking 
to trace a line of demarcation between their scopes. The fact that both concepts do not have 
pre-fixed, stable content results in assigning great discretion to the federal departments and 
agencies that classify information – especially, to the original classification authorities – in 
pinpointing material to subject to classification. Another paradox ensues in this regard. The 
Department of Homeland Security was created to ensure better coordination within the 
Federal Executive for the management of homeland security and thus to achieve an increase 
in the rationalization of the system. The concept of homeland security, however, has made 
the content of national security blurrier. This assumption is shown, for instance, by the fact 
that a component of homeland security is homeland defense, which derives from the 
traditional concept of civil defense. Accordingly, homeland defense implies the organization 
of a reaction against any attack or event causing damage to the United States, and thus 
appears to have connections with the concept of national security. Furthermore, it must be 
taken into consideration that the Secretary of Homeland Security and some authorities within 
the Department of Homeland Security are empowered to classify information originally. The 
types of information that may be classified under the executive order on classification refer 
to the fields of national defense and foreign relations, but the obscure distinction between 
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national security and homeland security may result in making obscure the identification of 
the material to classify, as well. Therefore, original classification authorities appear to have 
great discretion – maybe even greater than the one they had in the past – in selecting the 
information to classify.         
 Chapter 2 has been devoted to the relation between transparency and secrecy in the 
legislative and in the judicial branch of the Federal Government. The present chapter has 
been aimed at providing a more complete picture of the compromise between transparency 
– meant in this chapter as not merely related to access to information – and secrecy by 
showing that the way in which this compromise is reached in the other two branches has 
unexpected connections with executive branch secrecy. As far as Congress is concerned, 
first of all, a further paradox is concerned with usage of the term “secrecy” in the U.S. 
Constitution. Even though government secrecy is usually referred to the executive branch, 
the Constitution mentions this term in the article devoted to the legislative branch, Article I, 
and especially in Section 5, Clause 3, which allows the two Houses of Congress to resort to 
secrecy in the journal reporting on their proceedings. The Congressional Record, which has 
been Congress’s official gazette since its creation, represents a form of transparency that is 
typical of the legislative branch, and that does not leave much room for secrecy. After all, 
Congress’s primary function, the law-making function, requires a high level of transparency, 
and indeed Kitrosser has observed that legislative proceedings are featured by “macro-
transparency.”1269 The specific rules governing the activities of the two Houses of Congress 
and of congressional committees, however, take into consideration the need for secrecy, and 
this very topic reveals some connections with the regulation of executive branch secrecy. 
Even though those connections are purely theoretical, they are interesting insofar as they 
point out the existence of common principles concerning limits to transparency. Firstly, 
history shows that secret sessions of the two Houses of Congress – especially those of the 
Senate, which has met in secret much more frequently than the House of Representatives – 
are held to discuss matters pertaining to national security and foreign affairs. Such sessions, 
therefore, appear to constitute a further application of the concept of government secrecy, 
provided that government is meant as including not only the Executive but the three 
branches. Secondly, the grounds for secrecy the members of Congress may invoke especially 
                                                          
1269 For an analysis of legislative proceedings in the United States from a foreign scholar’s 
perspective, see FULCO LANCHESTER, “Drafting” e procedimento legislativo in Gran Bretagna e 
negli Stati Uniti d’America (Roma, Bulzoni, 1990). 
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for the closure of committee and subcommittee meetings and hearings recall the exemptions 
of the FOIA. Meaningful thereof is Rule XXVI(5)(b) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
which by establishing the reasons that may justify the exclusion of the public from a 
committee or subcommittee meeting recalls several FOIA exemptions quite clearly. Indeed, 
among the matters, the discussion of which may justify secrecy, are national security and 
foreign affairs, matters pertaining to committee staff personnel or purely internal procedures, 
the need to protect an individual’s privacy, information relevant to law enforcement 
investigations, financial or commercial information and trade secrets. Secrecy in judicial 
proceedings, too, is related – at least indirectly – to executive branch secrecy. The state 
secrets privilege and the Classified Information Procedure Act are the instruments allowing 
for a balance between transparency and secrecy – respectively – in civil litigation and in 
criminal proceedings. Therefore, these instruments – the former a common law evidentiary 
privilege, the latter a federal statute – point out in civil and criminal litigation such need to 
reach a compromise between transparency and secrecy as the FOIA ensures whenever the 
disclosure of agency records and information is involved. Since the state secrets privilege 
may be invoked by the U.S. Government in the interest of national security, and the CIPA is 
aimed at governing the usage of classified information in criminal proceedings, Exemption 
1, the national security exemption, represents the main reference within the FOIA.   
 As I already noted in the Introduction, Chapter 3 is the core of the present work, as 
it addresses the relation between transparency and secrecy in the executive branch. I have 
deliberately analyzed executive privilege and the FOIA in the same chapter to point out that 
there are connections between them, as well. Furthermore, by analyzing them I have 
pinpointed another paradox. While executive privilege is just at times invoked by U.S. 
presidents – here, I have adopted the common acceptation of executive privilege as the 
ability of the President to withhold information from Congress – it is usually analyzed by 
following a somewhat theoretical approach. Scholars, instead, appear to follow a less 
theoretical approach when they deal with the FOIA, the interpretation of which is mostly left 
to courts, and the other sunshine laws at federal level – the FACA and the GITSA. If this 
approach may be understandable for the FACA and the GITSA, which appear to be ancillary 
in the overall system of transparency, it is more surprising with respect to the FOIA. Even 
though many articles and books have addressed the FOIA over time, court decisions and 
congressional reports – rather than scholars’ views – appear to be the main sources to draw 
upon for discussion over FOIA provisions. A typical example of the theoretical approach 
that tends to feature the way executive privilege is addressed is Berger’s attempt to deprive 
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executive privilege of any constitutional foundations by deploying both legal arguments and 
historical precedents that mostly pertain to the British experience. The primary purpose of 
Berger is to prove that Congress’s power of inquiry into the executive branch is at the heart 
of the constitutional architecture devised by the Framers. The consequence of such an 
assumption is that Congress may be never denied access to the information it needs when it 
is conducting investigations over the executive branch. As I noted above, it is undeniable 
that Congress’s oversight function contributes significantly to increase transparency in the 
executive branch. However, it is not a coincidence that Berger depends on the British 
experience – namely, on investigations carried out by the British Parliament in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – to pinpoint historical precedents capable of 
supporting his theory. As some scholars objecting to his theory have stressed, indeed, the 
presidents have withheld information from Congress since the George Washington 
administration. Therefore, history already proved what the Supreme Court explicitly 
conceded in Nixon: Executive Privilege is an implicit power of the President, which enjoys 
constitutional underpinnings. Berger’s laudable endeavor to base on both history and law the 
executive branch obligation to comply with any request for information made by Congress 
with no exception whatsoever is not tenable. In Nixon, however, the Supreme Court also 
contended that executive privilege is not absolute, as instead President Nixon claimed. 
Nixon’s attempt to justify an excessive level of secrecy through executive privilege had 
direct implications for the subsequent usage of the privilege. For at least twenty years, 
indeed, the U.S. presidents seldom invoked executive privilege. The privilege has revived 
since the Clinton administration. I have mentioned the recent invocation of executive 
privilege by President Obama to deny access to certain documents to a House committee 
inquiring into the “Operation Fast and Furious.” In this case, the President claimed the 
application of executive privilege to protect not national security, but the confidentiality of 
executive branch communications that were not directly related to the presidential decision-
making process, as they occurred within the Department of Justice.  
 Part II of Chapter 3 has been devoted to the FOIA. Overall, the experience with the 
FOIA proves successful. When it became effective in 1967, the FOIA brought a significant 
improvement in the level of openness that federal agencies had to ensure. Even though the 
policy of full disclosure the FOIA is based upon was realized especially after the enactment 
of the 1974 FOIA Amendments Act, it was quite clear from the outset the enactment of the 
act resulted in overcoming section 3 APA, whose broad, generic clauses had been used by 
agencies to apply a high level of secrecy. In other words, the previsions in favor of disclosure 
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that section 3 APA contained were circumvented on a regular basis. In addition to those 
brought in by the 1974 statute, the FOIA has been subject to some other major amendments 
over the years. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 and the OPEN 
Government Act of 2007 constituted the two most important steps in the evolution of FOIA 
provisions. The latter mostly dealt with FOIA procedural requirements. The former, instead, 
above all provided for the online availability of agency records and information, addressed 
proactive disclosures, and established a definition of “agency record.” By inserting into the 
system of proactive disclosure the category of “frequently requested records,” the Electronic 
Freedom of Information Act of 1996 brought a significant improvement to this system. 
Agencies, indeed, are required to make available to the general public records that have 
already been released in response to individual FOIA requests and that have become the 
subject of multiple requests or, according to an agency determination, will probably become 
the subject of multiple FOIA requests. The purpose of the amendment that inserted this new 
proactive disclosure obligation was to increase the efficiency of the processing of FOIA 
requests, since records that are frequently requested or it is likely that they will be frequently 
requested in the future are already made available by the agency without waiting for further 
requests. Proactive disclosure is one of the two components of openness, and – in turn – may 
consist in two different activities: the publication of information in the Federal Register, the 
official gazette of the executive branch, and the publication of records and information on 
agency official websites. The release of the frequently requested records falls within the 
latter activity. Both activities, however, must be considered as included in the system of 
proactive disclosure, even though the official guide to the FOIA, prepared – and updated on 
a regular basis – by the Department of Justice, seems to suggest otherwise. The other 
component of openness is the release of records and information in response to a FOIA 
request. Agencies have to comply with FOIA requests filed by any person without 
considering the reasons that move a given person to file a request for information, unless the 
agency processing the request determines that one or more FOIA exemptions apply. The 
general purpose of the FOIA, however, is to ensure the disclosure, not the withholding, of 
information. Therefore, agencies are required to separate – whenever possible – the portion 
of a given record that is not covered by any exemptions from the portion, the access to which 
may lawfully be denied to protect one or more of the essential interests that the FOIA 
exemptions imply. Furthermore, agencies are supposed to apply the FOIA exemptions by 
subjecting them to a narrow interpretation. The exemptions embody a compromise Congress 
established between openness and secrecy, but it is for agencies to give substance to such a 
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compromise in practice. Agencies have to follow the instructions contained in the 
memoranda each President and each Attorney General issue on implementation of the FOIA 
by the executive branch as a whole. In accordance with the promise to establish a level of 
openness in the Federal Executive that had never been experienced before, both the 
memorandum issued by President Obama and the one issued by Attorney General Holder on 
the FOIA directed agencies to apply a presumption in favor of disclosure in implementing 
FOIA provisions. Yet, it has not been always like that. The memorandum issued by Attorney 
General Ashcroft in 2001, in particular, instructed agencies to consider thoroughly the 
existence of the need to apply one or more FOIA exemptions before opting for disclosure, 
and laid down a sound legal basis standard for the intervention of the Department of Justice 
in defense of agency withholding determinations. With a stroke of the pen, the Ashcroft 
memorandum degraded the right to know ensured by the FOIA to a weaker need to know. 
As has been noted, the Holder memorandum re-established the level of transparency the 
Federal Executive experienced under the Clinton administration.  
 I have also engaged in a closer examination of two FOIA exemptions, which arouse 
interest within the framework of the present work. Exemption 5 textually refers to the so-
called deliberative process privilege, a privilege that allows agencies to withhold from access 
such memoranda and other documents as are exchanged within an agency and between 
agencies in the formation of policies. This privilege, therefore, is aimed at ensuring that the 
exchange of ideas and opinions among agency personnel be frank. The risk that all such 
ideas be subject to disclosure, and that agencies thus be forced to operate in a fishbowl, 
indeed, could prompt agency personnel to refrain from expressing their views freely, and the 
quality of agency decision-making would be undermined. The need to preserve the candor 
of communications is also concerned with White House conversations, i.e., conversations 
that occur between the President of the United States and his advisors. In such cases, a 
different privilege applies – the presidential communications privilege, which embodies the 
core of executive privilege, meant as an instrument aimed at safeguarding the confidentiality 
of presidential decision-making process. Courts deem it to fall within the scope of 
Exemption 5, even though the scope of the presidential communications privilege is not 
tantamount to that of the deliberative process privilege, as the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia clarified in In re Sealed Case. Another exemption I have focused on is 
Exemption 1, which is peculiar within the system of exemptions because Congress delegates 
to the President the power to fill this exemption with substantial content. It is an executive 
order issued by the President, indeed, that lays down rules, standards, and procedures on the 
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classification of information pertaining to the national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States. Exemption 1, however, makes it clear that agency classification 
determinations are subject to judicial review. By significantly amending the wording of this 
exemption, the FOIA Amendment Act of 1974 explicitly assigned court the authority to 
conduct in camera examination of classified material, and to engage in de novo review of 
the withholding of such material from access. This theoretical regulation of the relation 
between the executive and the judicial branch does not suffice to grasp the dynamics that 
feature such a relation in practice, for it is also necessary to take into account the expertise 
that federal agencies possess in the domains of national security and foreign affairs. Courts 
tend to recognize such expertise, and accordingly deference is the traditional approach of 
courts towards agency determinations on classification of information. Recent data on the 
FOIA show that federal agencies invoke Exemption 5 much more frequently than Exemption 
1, even though the gap in the usage of the two exemptions is not uniform within the executive 
branch. Such a gap, for instance, is higher with respect to the Department of Homeland 
Security than it is as to the number of invocations of exemptions 1 and 5 by the Department 
of Defense1270. The importance of exemptions 1 and 5, however, lies not in the frequency of 
their application but in the fact that their scope embrace most of the issues dealt with in the 
present dissertation.  
 Even though the FOIA is at the heart of the model of transparency concerning the 
executive branch and the whole apparatus of departments and agencies, this model also 
embraces the FACA and the GITSA. These statutes – but especially the latter – establish 
open meeting requirements agencies have to comply with when they hold meetings, and thus 
when they carry out their decision-making process. The people’s ability to attend meetings 
held by agencies (and by advisory committees) contributes to making such decision-making 
process more visible, and thus more transparent. Granting access to agency meetings, indeed, 
is one of the components of a comprehensive FOI legislation Mendel has identified. The 
FOIA does not appear to be a subject of frequent analysis by scholars, and thereby courts – 
as noted above – end up mastering its interpretation. Studies on the FOIA, however, are 
much more numerous than those concerning the FACA and the GITSA. As Bull has pointed 
out, indeed, the FACA and the GITSA “have received relatively scant attention in scholarly 
                                                          
1270 According to data on the FOIA pertaining to the period 2014-2015, the Department of Homeland 
Security applied Exemption 1 59 times and Exemption 5 46293 times, while the Department of 
Defense invoked the two exemptions in the same time frame – respectively – 2626 and 3331 times. 
See https://www.foia.gov/data.html.  
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writings.”1271 A possible reason for this fact is that these statutes are considered to lay down 
purely operational rules, which are left to practice, and thus to their practical application by 
agencies. Analyzing the FACA and the GITSA on a regular basis may be useful to better 
understanding of the overall model of transparency in the United States. Despite the few 
paradoxes mentioned above, the U.S. model of transparency in the public sector turns out to 
be complete.                                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1271 BULL, The Government in the Sunshine Act in the 21st Century, supra note 1224, at 2. 
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